(Courtesy: Chiran J. Thapa)
Once again, the Army has become the centre of attention. First, it was the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Rookmangud Katawal's salvo against the integration of the Maoist rebels that caused a stir. Then immediately following his remarks, the Maoists accused the Army of plotting a "democratic coup." And now, the hottest debate underway is about the idea of mobilizing the Army to provide security for the putative Constituent Assembly elections (CA).
It was the COAS' non-accommodative remarks that started the wave. Hinting at the issue of Maoist integration into the Army, General Katawal had strongly opined that no politically indoctrinated individual or group should be inducted into the national army. While the Prime minister and most other political leaders concurred with Katawal's sentiments, the Maoist boss - Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda lambasted Gen. Katawal questioning his authority to make such remarks on integration.
But the fussing did not stop there. The Maoist retorted by making an even more sensational allegation. Dahal and his second-in-command - Baburam Bhattarai accused the Army of plotting a "democratic coup." Dahal has even claimed that the foreign powers were hatching a conspiracy to install a military-backed government like in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Repeatedly, Maoists have proved themselves to have mastered the art of crying wolf. But, some reckon that their allegation could possibly hold some semblance of merit this time around.
The element that has provided some weight to the Maoist allegation is the induction of Sujata Koirala (the daughter of the Prime minister) into the cabinet. Ms Koirala was recently appointed as a minister without portfolio. Given her ailing father's dwindling abilities, many reckon that she is taking charge of his portfolios - which happens to include defence. And it is said that her relationship with the Army top brass has warmed up quite a bit in recent times. Apparently, she was also in Delhi at the same time when Gen. Katawal was there. These turn of events added weight to the Maoists’ claim that her lucid preference for constitutional monarchy has resonated well with the Army top brass and a “democratic coup” is in the offing.
But even before the dust settled, Army was again dragged into the limelight. This time, it was about mobilizing the Army to provide security for the putative elections. Although the Army has remained tight-lipped over the issue, all divisional commanders were recently called into Headquarters to discuss the issue. As for the political leaders, they have been voicing their preference to mobilize the Army almost on a daily basis.
The Army has become the primary choice for the security provision because it is still the largest and the strongest security apparatus in the country. At a time when the security situation has deteriorated critically and that the other security apparatuses have become utterly debilitated, Army remains the only robust hope for the purpose.
Army's power
Perhaps the main reason why the Army has received so much attention is because of its undeniable power. A recent report, released by the Brussels based International Crisis Group (ICG), positions the Army as the most powerful institution in Nepal. There is more than a grain of truth in ICG's assessment. With a total strength of six divisions comprising of 95,000 personnel, the Army is certainly the largest and the most powerful public institution.
The Army derives its power not just from the sheer numbers, but also from the public faith in the institution. According to the most recent nationwide survey titled "Nepal's contemporary situation" conducted by Sudhindra Sharma and Pawan Kumar Sen, the Army enjoys the highest public approval rating amongst the primary government institutions (legislative parliament, Cabinet, Civil service, Nepal Police, and Judiciary). Even the NGOs, Civil society, and Human rights activists’ were unable to override the Army’s approval ratings.
Another opinion poll conducted by Nepalnews/Nepali Times had yielded similar results. In response to the poll question, "In light of the recent developments what is your opinion of the Nepal Army?”, 79% of the respondents indicated that they held the army in positive light.
The public’s faith on the Army stems mainly from its unfaltering discipline and cohesiveness. Unlike the blatantly brazen violations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) committed by its signatories, the Army has strictly abided to all its terms and conditions. And the Nepali people have taken notice to this fact. Also, until date, the Army has remained remarkably subservient to the Transitional Governing Authority’s (TGA) authority and staunchly adhered to the constitution. In stark contrast to the fissiparous political parties that have all endured splits at least once in their political history, the Nepal Army has remained intact and very loyal to its chain of command too.
It is also the financial capability that has provided the Army with an additional oomph. Not only does it receive a budget allotment from the government, but it also earns a substantial amount from UN Peace keeping operations (PKO). As the fifth largest troop contributor, the amount the Nepal Army rakes in from PKOs is almost equal to the amount it receives from the national budget. One estimate even has it that about thirty percent of the capital circulating in Nepal's financial markets comes from the Army's funds.
But the variable that makes the Army so potent and powerful is undoubtedly its fighting prowess. Despite having fought an onerous insurgency for years, the Army still appears indefatigable. Although some have denigrated the Army for its inability to crush the insurgency, others have credited the institution for preventing a complete military takeover by the rebels. Many political pundits also believe that it was primarily the Army’s unyielding resilience that compelled the rebels to shift their strategic gears and opt for the Delhi compromise.
In the transitional period, analysts reckon that the Army has actually increased its potency. Pointedly, the number of personnel in the Army stands at its peak. Training has been made more frequent and more rigorous. It is even believed that it has greatly strengthened the capability of its special forces which comprises of one airborne battalion and one Ranger battalion.
Even more tellingly, the previously throttled supply of military hardware has resumed. The COAS' recent trips to India and China are believed to have revitalized the military ties. Presumably, COAS’ trips have opened more doors for military hardware procurements. Some Nepali news agencies have even reported sightings of two US Air Force C17 Globemasters, delivering a large consignment arms and ammunition to the Army at Tribhuvan International Airport.
In sum, what makes the Army irrefutably powerful is a combination of pubic faith, financial capability and its fighting prowess.
Army's impending role
Today, most eyes rest on the impending role of the Army. Will the Army take the risk of absorbing the rebels? Will it completely severe its conjugal ties with the institution that is attributed for its naissance? Will it be mobilized to provide security for the putative elections? And more importantly, what would happen if it tilted in favour of one political force?
It remains to be seen as to how the Army’s role will play out. But, one thing is unmistakably certain: the Army is greatly perturbed by the rising insecurity and especially alarmed by the eroding state sovereignty. As it considers itself ordained with the task of safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is easily discernable why the downward spiral trend has been unsettling.
But more importantly, it has seemingly sensed its inevitable role. It has detected that the burden of cleaning up the political slag will once again be heaped on its shoulders. Either by being mobilized to provide security for the elections or deployed against the anti-establishment elements, it foresees itself springing into action sooner or later.
The Army, however, faces another formidable task as well. For the Army, more challenging than defusing the stray UXOs (unexploded ordinances) and IEDs (improvised explosive devices), will be the task of striking a balance between its historical institutional values and forces of modernity. Since other political forces have harped about the institution's conjugal relationship with the Monarchy, it has had to repeatedly counter these jaundiced outlooks. But by conforming to the universal norms like human rights, democratization and operating under a civilian authority, it is increasingly dispelling most doubts.
At a time when pervasive threats are undermining the existence of the State, however, many believe that it would be foolhardy for the Army to overlook the significance of its entrenched historical values and ties.
Being one of the two primary institutions that founded the Nepali State, the Army bears a moral, historical, and institutional obligation to salvage the faltering state. Now, the question remains: when and with which partnership will the Army act?
Related Postings:
The Nepali Army is a Favorite Target for Cheap Provocateurs - An Analysis of a Nepali Adolescent's Professional Obituary
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/being-cheap-provocateur-is-easy.html
Nepali Maoists Should bear Moral Responsibility for the Terror Attacks in Kathmandu
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/nepali-maoists-should-bear-moral.html
Nepal's Constituent Assembly Elections - It's not Just a Matter of Security
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/08/nepals-constituent-assembly-elections.html
The Utility of a Professional Nepalese Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/utility-of-professional-nepalese-army.html
The greatest threat to peace in Nepal is misinformed, misguided, agenda-divine journalists like "The Guardian's" Isabel Hilton
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/courtesy-el-punto-isabel-hiltons.html
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Sunday, February 24, 2008
The Final Battle
(Courtesy: Zizimous)
The stage is almost ready; the finale battle for power in Kathmandu is all about to begin. With less than two months left for elections, power players in Kathmandu are all hoping from one party office to the other and from one VIP residence to another in a last minute effort to bridge needy alliances. Unfortunately, what is most lacking among the politicians in Kathmandu is the political will to conduct elections for the convergence of the Constituent Assembly. Former prime minister and NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba who campaigned with a lot of heart in the terai braving repeated bomb blasts during his mass rallies commented after his arrival in the capital "elections are impossible under the present law and order situation". What is clearly evident is that although the SPA keeps reaffirming its confidence in holding timely polls, the parties in reality are well aware of the challenges in conducting credible elections.
Behind the back drop of the political crisis, there is another crisis that poses a major threat to the stability of the transition phase and the peace process – economic crisis. There is an urgent need to address the economic crisis the country is currently facing. Inflation rate is on the rise, fuel shortages have affected not just the industry sector but also the service sector, and worse the government has avoided seeking economic remedies fearing a bad electoral response. The economic problem has clearly evolved into a national one affecting every person and every household through out the country. Instances of casual issuances of bonds by the government are an example to illustrate the government is indeed facing gargantuan challenges in the economic realm.
The Russian Financial Crisis and the Brazilian Financial Crisis in the 1990's both demonstrate how governments sold their debt as government bonds to ease the budgetary pressure on the government. However, the policy to sell government debt as bonds is only a short term measure that invites further problems. Both Vladimir Putin and former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique would agree economic problems are structural and that solutions can be found by addressing the problem at the grassroots rather than issuing bonds to clear government debt. However, what is the most worrying aspect of the Nepali economy is that – will the economy be able to hold it's self for another two months? How long will the people keep quiet?
Similarly, the ethnic divide has widened considerably prompting further social conflict in the country. Dharan, an eastern town has witnessed some of the worst ethnic violence in Nepal. Dharan is a town that is strategically located between the eastern hills and the plains in the east. Reports have it that the ethnic divide there is so strong that some of the radical ethnic fronts have erected landmark pillars banning non-hill people from entering the hilly area. The aim of course is to prohibit madhesis from entering the hill region. But can we Nepali's afford a greater social conflict? The answrer of course is, no. But the social challenges are real and escalating. The Maoists have provided a perfect benchmarking model that espoused sentiments of self determination and violence.
The only real solution is devolution and structural adjustments to the social hierarchy of the country – there are no shortcuts. However, with such a weak government in place, the presence of government has been only limited to certain areas of the country. And due to lack of government authority at all levels through out the country, the radical ethnic groups are fast gaining popularity amongst their people. This is a worrying aspect. The Prime Minister is engaged in talks with the moderate leaders of the Terai, but will these talks lead to fruition? Or will the Maoists exert pressure on the prime minister again to sabotage the talks.
The total damage done to the infrastructure of the country by the Maoists during their 10 years war crossed 15 billion rupees. The human loss was also equally great. But the continued social divide and the looming economic crisis the country will inevitably face in the next two months in the absence of a consensus developed economic and social public policy will be far more violent and difficult to solve than the Maoists rigid dogmatic war.
But, here is the key. Every one knows elections won't probably happen. The chances are very slim. Despite the fact that elections are difficult to hold and unsafe to campaign for, the politicians are reluctantly optimistic about the possibilities of the polls happening; because, no one at this stage wants to be the deliver of the universal truth. However, what is interesting to observe is the changing dynamics of Nepali politics. The King has broken his silence and this time the condemnation has only come from the side of the Maoists. At the same time, the editorials and commentary on the Nepali monarch has clearly softened. The poll conducted by Nepali Times indicates that nearly 60 % of the respondents of the poll want some form of monarchy in the country (47 % for ceremonial monarchy and 13% for absolute monarchy).
The Maoists and all the political actors know the last two months are the most crucial months that will invariably alter the power dynamics of Nepali politics. The King has broken his silence, primarily due to growing frustration because of the incompetence of the democratic forces to counter the bullish left hegemony in the country. Gen Ashok Mehta, known as a vociferous believer of the 12 Point Agreement writes in his article, Clouds over Nepal, for the Pioneer news paper that "In this kay garne (what to do) contingency, the political parties can rise to invent yet another constructive compromise".
We may or may not have to wait until the 10th of April to see what this new "constructive compromise " will reflect in. But given the precarious situation of the country, the communists and the democrats are in their last round of preparation to strike yet another power deal that will shape the future power structure of Nepali politics much before the elections.
Related Posts:
Nepal's Political Paradoxes
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/01/nepals-political-paradoxes.html
Nepal's CA Elections - Assume Nothing
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/nepals-ca-elections-assume-nothing.html
Nationalism as a Political Agenda - Defining Nepali Interests
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/nationalism-as-political-agenda.html
Monday, February 18, 2008
UNMIN Finally Speaks Out - A Critical Examination of Kieren Dwyer's Letter to News Front
(Courtesy: Zizimous)
UNMIN’s letter to News Front (located at http://www.newsfront.com.np/) is a reflection of that organization’s performance – incomplete and inadequate. Spokesman Kieren Dwyer’s letter is a carefully crafted but counterproductive rebuttal. By focusing exclusively on tactical (alleged) discrepancies, Dwyer’s letter accentuates the very deficiencies that render his mission a “lame duck.”
Mr. Dwyer’s letter to News Front suggests that UNMIN’s effectiveness should be measured based on the frequency of its statements and reports. Clearly, such a proposal is ludicrous. Results are what the Nepali people, UNMIN’s critics and UNMIN’s benefactors use to measure the mission’s effectiveness; not words.
For if statements and reports alone yielded results, the International Crisis Group and Amnesty International would have solved Nepal’s problems years ago. Further, UNMIN would have been the best peace-keeping mission in the history of the United Nations, based simply on numerous articles (“reports”) published on the NepaliPerspectives web log.
The reality is, the ICG and AI have done a great job at recording facts and UNMIN has done a great job of holding a mandate that effectively contains the potential good the mission could do. Neither of these organizations have had any discernable, positive impact on Nepal aside from checking the hubris of a King who is arguably, on his way back up the value chain.
On the topic of unharnessed potential, Kieran Dwyer’s letter to News Front could have potentially carried much more weight had the letter included examples of positive impact from UNMIN’s activities. Unfortunately, such examples are difficult to come by and even harder to articulate.
Using the very examples that Mr. Dwyer cites, UNMIN’s ineffectiveness becomes clear: Did the “14-page” report on UNMIN’s website curb the YCL’s affinity for violent politics? Have any of Ian Martin’s numerous statements resulted in changed attitudes? Did constituent assembly elections take place after a high level UN delegation visited Nepal and sang the electoral commission’s praise?
Room for further confusion comes from Mr. Dwyer’s comments on armed Madhesi elements. It is very possible that UNMIN officials may not have met with armed Madhesis. But can Mr. Dwyer extend his assertion to the larger organization that he represents? Can Mr. Dwyer unambiguously clarify for this readership that no United Nations employee has ever interacted with armed Madhesi elements, in India or Nepal?
Should Mr. Dwyer care to respond to this “yes / no” question, it is strongly recommended that he carefully evaluate the accuracy and completeness of UNMIN’s intelligence lest Ian Martin end up in the unenviable position of US President George W. Bush.
How are the Nepali people and the international community to reconcile Kieran Dwyer’s statement against Matthew Kahane’s request to Indian authorities, against the armed Mahesi factions’ request for UN mediation (and Girija Koirala’s insistence that there is no role for UNMIN in the Madhes)? Viewed in light of these contradictions, Kieran Dwyer’s letter to News Front raises more questions than it answers.
In spite of the uncertainties that Kieran raises, he is right about one thing – “professional journalists do have a responsibility to report accurately, especially in the politically-charged atmosphere of a peace process.” A corollary of this statement is that professionals in general also have a responsibility to execute their functions by preserving their third-party independence, their professional integrity and by acknowledging (and acting upon) constructive criticisms. Can UNMIN’s leadership, in good conscience, release an unqualified statement that they have fulfilled their own professional obligations?
It is unfortunate that a year and half had to pass for UNMIN to finally acknowledge the intricate workings of the Nepali media. Having unraveled this mystery, Kieran may benefit from revisiting media reports (before and immediately after “Jana Aandolan-II”), upon which UNMIN’s operational assumptions are based. Doing so may help Kieran rescue his organization from the pitfalls of vested interest that UNMIN has regrettably fallen into.
Also regrettable is Kieran Dwyer’s heightened concern that appears motivated more from News Front being an English weekly, than from the substance of News Front’s articles. Could there be some relationship between Kieran’s concerns and the ease of accessibility that News Front’s website provides UNMIN’s benefactors? It is peculiar that the need to publish equally vociferous rebuttals in Nepali publications is not a priority for UNMIN, even though the criticism of UNMIN’s activities are much more scathing in Nepali language publications.
As for Dwyer’s comments regarding UNMIN’s hiring practices, his statement is an outright lie. There are ample examples of highly qualified Nepalis who have not been considered for jobs with UNMIN because of their caste and class affiliations. Off the record, UNMIN employees are able to recite surnames that are ineligible for employment with UNMIN. If this isn’t discrimination, what is?
It is very unfortunate for Nepal that more than a year after its inception, UNMIN’s leadership remains preoccupied justifying the mission’s existence instead of executing its responsibilities. UNMIN’s repeated failure to negotiate a meaningful mandate, its unwillingness to accept accountability, it’s non-transparent handling of the arms management process, and Ian Martin’s lack of independence have been repeatedly documented and brought to UNMIN’s attention. No discernable action has resulted. Naturally, the result is diminished confidence in UNMMIN's capacity to deliver.
A quote from a regular critic of UNMIN is something Kieren Dwyer and his leadership may like to recite two times a day: “It is important to revisit the fact that UNMIN is in Nepal at the behest of the SPA and the Maoists, but is accountable to the Nepali people. UNMIN is in Nepal to do what the Nepali people deem is right for their own country, not what UNMIN (or other external powers) deem, is right for Nepal.”
To further the point above, it is recommended that UNMIN’s leadership not make the mistake of treating Nepal as a playground for “Emergency Sex and Other Desperate Measures.” Relying on “fine print” and the connections that UNMIN has inculcated through its Nepali staff (and their well connected relatives) is not a good option for Kieran or UNMIN.
The only option at this point is for UNMIN to come clean with the Nepali people by disclosing all weaknesses in Nepal’s peace process and explaining why the process continues to falter. Following a public apology, Ian Martin and UNMIN’s current leadership should resign on moral grounds and should be replaced. The Nepali people deserve so much more than what the current UNMIN leadership has shown itslef capable of delivering.
-----------------
Although not nearly as fancy as UNMIN’s website, a comprehensive chronicle of UNMIN’s inadequacies complete with recommendations are documented below:
Constructive Feedback for Ian Martin - Time for a change in UNMIN's Leadership
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/constructive-feedback-for-ian-martin.html
This article is a past exchange between NepaliPerspectives and UNMIN Spokesperson, Kieran Dwyer:
UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html
-------------
February 25, 2007
Summary of Declared (by State) vs. Inventoried (by UNMIN), Weapon Counts
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/symmary-of-declared-by-state-vs.html
February 25, 2007
Discrepancies in Maoist Weapons Inventoried by UNMIN – Do the Math
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/discrepancies-in-maoist-weapons.html
March 01, 2007
The UN and Maoist Arms Controversy: Overkill or Negligence?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/un-and-maoist-arms-controversy-overkill.html
March 01, 2007
UN Fast Losing Credibility in Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/03/un-fast-losing-credibility-in-nepal.html
June 18, 2007
UNMIN Clarifies its Role but Just in Time to be Humiliated by the Maoists
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/06/unmin-clarifies-its-role-but-just-in.html
July 04, 2007
UNMIN's Arms Verification Process in Nepal - More Timely Information and Transparency Needed
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmin-in-over-its-head-in-nepal-arms.html
July 15, 2007
The UN's (UNMIN) Involvement in Nepal's Peace Process: A turning point or another fiasco in the making?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/uns-unmin-involvement-in-nepals-peace.html
July 17, 2007
UNMIN's July 16 Press Release and Subsequent Q&A Disaster
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-july-16-press-release-and.html
July 19, 2007
UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html
September 21, 2007
What has UNMIN Accomplished in Nepal?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/what-has-unmin-accomplished-in-nepal.html
November 01, 2007
What UNMIN Should Do to Manage Nepal's Peace Process
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/courtesy-krishna-hari-pushkar-un-is.html
November 26, 2007
UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/unmin-in-need-of-immediate-reform.html
February 04, 2008
Deficient UNMIN
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/deficient-unmin.html
February 07, 2008
UNMIN's (Matthew Kahane's) Observations Completely Legitimate; India's Guilt-Ridden Reaction, Nonsense
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/unmins-matthew-kahanes-observations.html
UNMIN’s letter to News Front (located at http://www.newsfront.com.np/) is a reflection of that organization’s performance – incomplete and inadequate. Spokesman Kieren Dwyer’s letter is a carefully crafted but counterproductive rebuttal. By focusing exclusively on tactical (alleged) discrepancies, Dwyer’s letter accentuates the very deficiencies that render his mission a “lame duck.”
Mr. Dwyer’s letter to News Front suggests that UNMIN’s effectiveness should be measured based on the frequency of its statements and reports. Clearly, such a proposal is ludicrous. Results are what the Nepali people, UNMIN’s critics and UNMIN’s benefactors use to measure the mission’s effectiveness; not words.
For if statements and reports alone yielded results, the International Crisis Group and Amnesty International would have solved Nepal’s problems years ago. Further, UNMIN would have been the best peace-keeping mission in the history of the United Nations, based simply on numerous articles (“reports”) published on the NepaliPerspectives web log.
The reality is, the ICG and AI have done a great job at recording facts and UNMIN has done a great job of holding a mandate that effectively contains the potential good the mission could do. Neither of these organizations have had any discernable, positive impact on Nepal aside from checking the hubris of a King who is arguably, on his way back up the value chain.
On the topic of unharnessed potential, Kieran Dwyer’s letter to News Front could have potentially carried much more weight had the letter included examples of positive impact from UNMIN’s activities. Unfortunately, such examples are difficult to come by and even harder to articulate.
Using the very examples that Mr. Dwyer cites, UNMIN’s ineffectiveness becomes clear: Did the “14-page” report on UNMIN’s website curb the YCL’s affinity for violent politics? Have any of Ian Martin’s numerous statements resulted in changed attitudes? Did constituent assembly elections take place after a high level UN delegation visited Nepal and sang the electoral commission’s praise?
Room for further confusion comes from Mr. Dwyer’s comments on armed Madhesi elements. It is very possible that UNMIN officials may not have met with armed Madhesis. But can Mr. Dwyer extend his assertion to the larger organization that he represents? Can Mr. Dwyer unambiguously clarify for this readership that no United Nations employee has ever interacted with armed Madhesi elements, in India or Nepal?
Should Mr. Dwyer care to respond to this “yes / no” question, it is strongly recommended that he carefully evaluate the accuracy and completeness of UNMIN’s intelligence lest Ian Martin end up in the unenviable position of US President George W. Bush.
How are the Nepali people and the international community to reconcile Kieran Dwyer’s statement against Matthew Kahane’s request to Indian authorities, against the armed Mahesi factions’ request for UN mediation (and Girija Koirala’s insistence that there is no role for UNMIN in the Madhes)? Viewed in light of these contradictions, Kieran Dwyer’s letter to News Front raises more questions than it answers.
In spite of the uncertainties that Kieran raises, he is right about one thing – “professional journalists do have a responsibility to report accurately, especially in the politically-charged atmosphere of a peace process.” A corollary of this statement is that professionals in general also have a responsibility to execute their functions by preserving their third-party independence, their professional integrity and by acknowledging (and acting upon) constructive criticisms. Can UNMIN’s leadership, in good conscience, release an unqualified statement that they have fulfilled their own professional obligations?
It is unfortunate that a year and half had to pass for UNMIN to finally acknowledge the intricate workings of the Nepali media. Having unraveled this mystery, Kieran may benefit from revisiting media reports (before and immediately after “Jana Aandolan-II”), upon which UNMIN’s operational assumptions are based. Doing so may help Kieran rescue his organization from the pitfalls of vested interest that UNMIN has regrettably fallen into.
Also regrettable is Kieran Dwyer’s heightened concern that appears motivated more from News Front being an English weekly, than from the substance of News Front’s articles. Could there be some relationship between Kieran’s concerns and the ease of accessibility that News Front’s website provides UNMIN’s benefactors? It is peculiar that the need to publish equally vociferous rebuttals in Nepali publications is not a priority for UNMIN, even though the criticism of UNMIN’s activities are much more scathing in Nepali language publications.
As for Dwyer’s comments regarding UNMIN’s hiring practices, his statement is an outright lie. There are ample examples of highly qualified Nepalis who have not been considered for jobs with UNMIN because of their caste and class affiliations. Off the record, UNMIN employees are able to recite surnames that are ineligible for employment with UNMIN. If this isn’t discrimination, what is?
It is very unfortunate for Nepal that more than a year after its inception, UNMIN’s leadership remains preoccupied justifying the mission’s existence instead of executing its responsibilities. UNMIN’s repeated failure to negotiate a meaningful mandate, its unwillingness to accept accountability, it’s non-transparent handling of the arms management process, and Ian Martin’s lack of independence have been repeatedly documented and brought to UNMIN’s attention. No discernable action has resulted. Naturally, the result is diminished confidence in UNMMIN's capacity to deliver.
A quote from a regular critic of UNMIN is something Kieren Dwyer and his leadership may like to recite two times a day: “It is important to revisit the fact that UNMIN is in Nepal at the behest of the SPA and the Maoists, but is accountable to the Nepali people. UNMIN is in Nepal to do what the Nepali people deem is right for their own country, not what UNMIN (or other external powers) deem, is right for Nepal.”
To further the point above, it is recommended that UNMIN’s leadership not make the mistake of treating Nepal as a playground for “Emergency Sex and Other Desperate Measures.” Relying on “fine print” and the connections that UNMIN has inculcated through its Nepali staff (and their well connected relatives) is not a good option for Kieran or UNMIN.
The only option at this point is for UNMIN to come clean with the Nepali people by disclosing all weaknesses in Nepal’s peace process and explaining why the process continues to falter. Following a public apology, Ian Martin and UNMIN’s current leadership should resign on moral grounds and should be replaced. The Nepali people deserve so much more than what the current UNMIN leadership has shown itslef capable of delivering.
-----------------
Although not nearly as fancy as UNMIN’s website, a comprehensive chronicle of UNMIN’s inadequacies complete with recommendations are documented below:
Constructive Feedback for Ian Martin - Time for a change in UNMIN's Leadership
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/constructive-feedback-for-ian-martin.html
This article is a past exchange between NepaliPerspectives and UNMIN Spokesperson, Kieran Dwyer:
UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html
-------------
February 25, 2007
Summary of Declared (by State) vs. Inventoried (by UNMIN), Weapon Counts
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/symmary-of-declared-by-state-vs.html
February 25, 2007
Discrepancies in Maoist Weapons Inventoried by UNMIN – Do the Math
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/discrepancies-in-maoist-weapons.html
March 01, 2007
The UN and Maoist Arms Controversy: Overkill or Negligence?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/un-and-maoist-arms-controversy-overkill.html
March 01, 2007
UN Fast Losing Credibility in Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/03/un-fast-losing-credibility-in-nepal.html
June 18, 2007
UNMIN Clarifies its Role but Just in Time to be Humiliated by the Maoists
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/06/unmin-clarifies-its-role-but-just-in.html
July 04, 2007
UNMIN's Arms Verification Process in Nepal - More Timely Information and Transparency Needed
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmin-in-over-its-head-in-nepal-arms.html
July 15, 2007
The UN's (UNMIN) Involvement in Nepal's Peace Process: A turning point or another fiasco in the making?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/uns-unmin-involvement-in-nepals-peace.html
July 17, 2007
UNMIN's July 16 Press Release and Subsequent Q&A Disaster
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-july-16-press-release-and.html
July 19, 2007
UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html
September 21, 2007
What has UNMIN Accomplished in Nepal?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/what-has-unmin-accomplished-in-nepal.html
November 01, 2007
What UNMIN Should Do to Manage Nepal's Peace Process
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/courtesy-krishna-hari-pushkar-un-is.html
November 26, 2007
UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/unmin-in-need-of-immediate-reform.html
February 04, 2008
Deficient UNMIN
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/deficient-unmin.html
February 07, 2008
UNMIN's (Matthew Kahane's) Observations Completely Legitimate; India's Guilt-Ridden Reaction, Nonsense
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/unmins-matthew-kahanes-observations.html
Sunday, February 17, 2008
Stop Coddling Despots
(Courtesy: Dr. Hari Bansha Dulal)
Recently, during a training program for party cadres in Chitwan district, in a threat-laden statement, Prachanda assured his brainwashed cadres that the "State" after the Constituent Assembly (CA) election will come to the Maoist fold at any cost. He made it pretty clear to his cadre that if the Maoists failed to capture power through the CA poll, it would be done through a coup.
While the Maoists are tirelessly trumpeting the possibility of a "democratic coup" backed by the army like the one in Bangladesh, they have their own model --"nationalist coup" ready. Two years after the landmark victory against the despotic monarch, the Nepalis are once again nervous about the possibility of another despotic regime.
The revival of the Maoists' parallel administration across the country clearly shows how committed they are towards the forty plus agreement that they have signed with the government. While the mainstream political parties are having a hard time reaching their constituents -- Dilendra Badu's episode says it all -- the Maoists have kept both the option of bullets and ballots open.
Was it expected? Absolutely yes. The Maoists never gave up the idea of capturing the state altogether. It was political parties who thought that the moderation of the Maoists would take place after they come to power. However, what the leaders of the major political parties failed to realize is that providing political power only begets the desires of the radicals to perpetuate and aggrandize power and does not contribute towards "moderation." Bringing the radicals to the helms of affairs has never resulted in moderation. It simply does not work. After coming to power, radicals like Hitler, Mussolini, Khomeini, Castro, Kim Jong Il, Mullah Mohammad Omar, got even more "strong headed" and rhetorical. And, yes, our own Prachanda is not getting any softer.
The only way to soften the radicals is to militarily weaken them first. Negotiation with them should happen only after their dream of capturing the state is completely aborted. Unless you abort their dreams of possible military victory over the state, they will never abide by the rules of the game.
Furthermore, when you join hands with radicals whose views are completely opposite to your's, you are bound to get betrayed. From the never-ending episode of the Maoists' betrayal, if nothing, the politicians of the mainstream political parties must have learnt one lesson -- ideological dilution never pays off. The mainstream political parties could have defeated King Gyanendra without the help of the Maoists. Despots like King Gyanendra cannot remain in power for long. Sooner or later people succeed in unseating them. It might have taken a little longer but it was certainly a doable job.
Musharaff's military regime in Pakistan would have been toppled long ago had Benazir and Nawaz Sharif joined hands with the armed radicals in Pakistan. But Benazir never tried to reach out to the radical Islamofascists. She must have known the cost associated with coddling the radicals.
For an alliance to work, it must have the involvement of like-minded parties. When you forge an alliance with a party that believes power comes from the barrel of guns rather than ballots, you run the risk of getting robbed at a gun point. This is what is precisely happening in Nepal. The Maoists are robbing off the political parties at gun point. The sheer threat of violence brings the major political parties to their knees and forces them to fulfill the Maoists' demands.
When we look back, it becomes quite evident that our politicians have once again failed to live up to the nation's expectation. The last two years were the years of wasted opportunities. We had never been so close to realizing the dreams of being a peaceful and democratic nation. Had the Maoists been committed to the peace process and the government sincere towards fulfilling the genuine demands raised by ethnic minorities, the country would have been pretty peaceful and stable by now. The nation would have taken a giant leap towards peace and democracy.
Nearly two years have passed by, but the people are yet to witness the dividends of democracy. The state has been unable to fulfill its basic duties towards citizens. Safety and security of civilians is still a major concern. Inflation has skyrocketed and smooth delivery of goods and services are far from being normal.
The April revolution of 2006 had provided a perfect platform for securing peace and democracy. Two years down the road and here we are again muddling through. What is it that brought us to this level of chaos, conflict, disunity, intrigue, and erosion of a sense of nationhood?
After the victory against King Gyanendra, what our politicians failed to understand is that, in order to establish a durable peace and stability, the violence and lawlessness that has existed thus far must give way to the security of citizens and the rule of law; social and political exclusion must give way to participatory institutions; animosity between the Maoists and the internally displaced persons (IDPs) must give way to national reconciliation and the economy that has been ravaged by the decade-long violent insurgency must be transformed into a well-functioning market economy. Reconciliation and reconstruction never took off.
While the Maoists always remained glued to their glib idea of capturing the state, the major political parties had no strategies whatsoever. They did not even bother to punish the culprits of King Gyanendra's regime. When the state fails to punish the culprits and reward honest citizens, thugs have no reason to stop thuggery.
The chances of holding CA election on April 10 are very slim. Every politician knows that in the current situation free and fair election cannot be conducted. It is just that they don't dare to cruise against the tide of populist politics and be the bearer of the unpleasant news. Instead of window-dressing, the political parties should be truthful about it.
What next? The prime minister should be tasked with forming a national unity government after consultation with the civil society organizations, religious leaders, and all political parties, even those that are outside the Seven Party Alliance (SPA). The new government should then hold CA election after fulfilling the legitimate demands of the regional parties. It is better to have legitimate election later than have forced election now. Only such practical steps can save Nepal from falling into the hands of power hungry despots like Prachanda and King Gyanendra who want to crush democratic rights of the people.
Related Postings:
Nepal's CA Elections - Assume Nothing
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/nepals-ca-elections-assume-nothing.html
Electoral Façade
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/01/electoral-facade.html
Nationalism as a Political Agenda - Defining Nepali Interests
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/nationalism-as-political-agenda.html
Democracy - Nepali Style
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/democracy-nepali-style.html
Recently, during a training program for party cadres in Chitwan district, in a threat-laden statement, Prachanda assured his brainwashed cadres that the "State" after the Constituent Assembly (CA) election will come to the Maoist fold at any cost. He made it pretty clear to his cadre that if the Maoists failed to capture power through the CA poll, it would be done through a coup.
While the Maoists are tirelessly trumpeting the possibility of a "democratic coup" backed by the army like the one in Bangladesh, they have their own model --"nationalist coup" ready. Two years after the landmark victory against the despotic monarch, the Nepalis are once again nervous about the possibility of another despotic regime.
The revival of the Maoists' parallel administration across the country clearly shows how committed they are towards the forty plus agreement that they have signed with the government. While the mainstream political parties are having a hard time reaching their constituents -- Dilendra Badu's episode says it all -- the Maoists have kept both the option of bullets and ballots open.
Was it expected? Absolutely yes. The Maoists never gave up the idea of capturing the state altogether. It was political parties who thought that the moderation of the Maoists would take place after they come to power. However, what the leaders of the major political parties failed to realize is that providing political power only begets the desires of the radicals to perpetuate and aggrandize power and does not contribute towards "moderation." Bringing the radicals to the helms of affairs has never resulted in moderation. It simply does not work. After coming to power, radicals like Hitler, Mussolini, Khomeini, Castro, Kim Jong Il, Mullah Mohammad Omar, got even more "strong headed" and rhetorical. And, yes, our own Prachanda is not getting any softer.
The only way to soften the radicals is to militarily weaken them first. Negotiation with them should happen only after their dream of capturing the state is completely aborted. Unless you abort their dreams of possible military victory over the state, they will never abide by the rules of the game.
Furthermore, when you join hands with radicals whose views are completely opposite to your's, you are bound to get betrayed. From the never-ending episode of the Maoists' betrayal, if nothing, the politicians of the mainstream political parties must have learnt one lesson -- ideological dilution never pays off. The mainstream political parties could have defeated King Gyanendra without the help of the Maoists. Despots like King Gyanendra cannot remain in power for long. Sooner or later people succeed in unseating them. It might have taken a little longer but it was certainly a doable job.
Musharaff's military regime in Pakistan would have been toppled long ago had Benazir and Nawaz Sharif joined hands with the armed radicals in Pakistan. But Benazir never tried to reach out to the radical Islamofascists. She must have known the cost associated with coddling the radicals.
For an alliance to work, it must have the involvement of like-minded parties. When you forge an alliance with a party that believes power comes from the barrel of guns rather than ballots, you run the risk of getting robbed at a gun point. This is what is precisely happening in Nepal. The Maoists are robbing off the political parties at gun point. The sheer threat of violence brings the major political parties to their knees and forces them to fulfill the Maoists' demands.
When we look back, it becomes quite evident that our politicians have once again failed to live up to the nation's expectation. The last two years were the years of wasted opportunities. We had never been so close to realizing the dreams of being a peaceful and democratic nation. Had the Maoists been committed to the peace process and the government sincere towards fulfilling the genuine demands raised by ethnic minorities, the country would have been pretty peaceful and stable by now. The nation would have taken a giant leap towards peace and democracy.
Nearly two years have passed by, but the people are yet to witness the dividends of democracy. The state has been unable to fulfill its basic duties towards citizens. Safety and security of civilians is still a major concern. Inflation has skyrocketed and smooth delivery of goods and services are far from being normal.
The April revolution of 2006 had provided a perfect platform for securing peace and democracy. Two years down the road and here we are again muddling through. What is it that brought us to this level of chaos, conflict, disunity, intrigue, and erosion of a sense of nationhood?
After the victory against King Gyanendra, what our politicians failed to understand is that, in order to establish a durable peace and stability, the violence and lawlessness that has existed thus far must give way to the security of citizens and the rule of law; social and political exclusion must give way to participatory institutions; animosity between the Maoists and the internally displaced persons (IDPs) must give way to national reconciliation and the economy that has been ravaged by the decade-long violent insurgency must be transformed into a well-functioning market economy. Reconciliation and reconstruction never took off.
While the Maoists always remained glued to their glib idea of capturing the state, the major political parties had no strategies whatsoever. They did not even bother to punish the culprits of King Gyanendra's regime. When the state fails to punish the culprits and reward honest citizens, thugs have no reason to stop thuggery.
The chances of holding CA election on April 10 are very slim. Every politician knows that in the current situation free and fair election cannot be conducted. It is just that they don't dare to cruise against the tide of populist politics and be the bearer of the unpleasant news. Instead of window-dressing, the political parties should be truthful about it.
What next? The prime minister should be tasked with forming a national unity government after consultation with the civil society organizations, religious leaders, and all political parties, even those that are outside the Seven Party Alliance (SPA). The new government should then hold CA election after fulfilling the legitimate demands of the regional parties. It is better to have legitimate election later than have forced election now. Only such practical steps can save Nepal from falling into the hands of power hungry despots like Prachanda and King Gyanendra who want to crush democratic rights of the people.
Related Postings:
Nepal's CA Elections - Assume Nothing
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/nepals-ca-elections-assume-nothing.html
Electoral Façade
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/01/electoral-facade.html
Nationalism as a Political Agenda - Defining Nepali Interests
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/nationalism-as-political-agenda.html
Democracy - Nepali Style
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/democracy-nepali-style.html
Friday, February 08, 2008
UNMIN's (Matthew Kahane's) Observations Completely Legitimate; India's Guilt-Ridden Reaction, Nonsense
(Courtesy: Ramzes)
A guilty conscience is often identified by a party's reaction to suggestive comments. In the mind of the guilty, the "suggestion" is easily misinterpreted as an "allegation." This invariably leads to a panicked reaction. The unintended consequence of such a reaction is self-implication. The intentional application of this method is one of the oldest tricks in the book of criminal investigations. But sometimes, even unintended applications (of this approach) produce results. A perfect example of this dynamic was the Indian government's response to Matthew Kahane's harmless observations.
The Indian government's reaction to Nepal's resident UNMIN Advisor, Matthew Kahane, is the most obvious display of Indian guilt (on Nepal), to date. The Indian government's formal complaint to the UN Security Council's Chief of Cabinet speaks volumes of the mindset of the Indian establishment and its foreign policy objectives in Nepal.
The thrust of Matthew Kahane's message is captured in two short sentences: "Some of these (violent) groups that are making life difficult in (the) Terai may have some kind of links in North India..." and "It would be enormously helpful if Indian authorities are able to keep these people under control."
Kahane's first sentence is part fact and part suggestion. His statement that certain groups are making life difficult for Nepali people in the Terai is a fact. There is no debate on the misery that armed groups like the JTMM and the Madhesi Tigers have brought upon the Terainans. The second part of Kahane's observation suggests that the groups causing misery to the Terainans may have links to unscrupulous elements across the Nepali border. There is no suggestion whatsoever of the Indian government's links to either the violent elements in Nepal's southern plains or to their interlocutors in India's north.
Kahane's second quote from above is an ask of "Indian authorities" to help "control" trouble-makers in India. This is a request, not an allegation. It is an appeal that factors in the realities of the situation in southern Nepal while respecting India's sovereignty and regional standing.
Although India's disgruntled reaction to Kahane is baseless, Kahane's observations are not.
Kahane's remarks have caused New Delhi unease because of Kahane's affiliation with the UN; not because Kahane's remarks are inaccurate or misleading. To the contrary, Matthew Kahane has innocently restated what countless Nepali Army Officers, bureaucrats and politicians had said, throughout Nepal's Maoist insurgency - that the key to stabilizing Nepal, lies with India.
Some things in Nepal are different today while others are not. The Maoist insurgency that relied heavily on elements within India for its growth and sustenance is (arguably) over. But the Indian tendency to keep fanning the flames of instability in Nepal, persists.
Maoist leader Prachanda's visit to north India after signing Nepal's Comprehensive Peace Agreement deserves mention here. Prachanda stated then, that he wished to thank his Indian "friends" who had sheltered him and his kind, throughout Nepal's brutal insurgency. Given this recollection, is it so outlandish to assume that within the foreseeable future, the world will witness leaders of the JTMM or the Madhesi Tigers doing exactly as Prachanda has already done?
Further, the apprehension and detention of C. P. Gajurel and Mohan Baidya in India are also facts worth recalling. Charges against both were dropped and the duo were returned to Nepal shortly after India engineered the 12 Point Agreement. So without a doubt, India put an end to Nepal's Maoist insurgency. So what's stopping India from preempting another insurgency (in Nepal) by off-shoots of the same Maoists that India "shoved" into Nepal's interim government?
Given the facts presented above, however innocently Matthew Kahane may have made his remarks, was Kahane really that far off the mark? Should UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon have to get down on his knees and apologize to the Indian government? Should Kahane have to "clarify" his remarks upon his return to Nepal? What about apologies to Nepal? Has anyone said sorry to the Nepali people for over a decade of sustained violence that was sponsored by elements who self-admittedly operated from within northern India?
Matthew Kahane's remarks are perfectly within UNMIN's current mandate, a part of which is to help Nepal overcome challenges to holding constituent assembly elections. If one manifestation of such challenges is the cross-border movement of armed elements (that are intent on disrupting elections), then Kahane's observations are within reason. The Indian government's reaction however, is not.
India's reaction is very telling in two ways: First, it's a disclosure of the Indian fear of heightened Nepali nationalism; Second, it's an admission that the Indian government either has no control over its northern frontier or does not wish to exercise the control it has. Either way, the Indian reaction in Kathmandu (through its emissary), in New York (via the Indian mission to the UN) and through Nepal's Home Minister (Krishna Sitoula - the Indian agent in Nepal's interim government) is evidence enough that India would rather take strides to discredit UNMIN and Matthew Kahane than accept its own internal weaknesses.
India has remained an obstacle to the expansion of UNMIN's mandate in Nepal. At the same time, India complained to the UN that Kahane's remarks overstepped the boundaries of UNMIN's mandate. Without a doubt, UNMIN is a thankless job and the organization has its own set of bureaucratic challenges to overcome. But seriously, should pampering a petty minded, red-faced, guilt ridden Indian government be a part of UNMIN's mandate too?
Related Posts:
Smoke and Mirrors - Why Nepal's Constituent Assembly Elections Won't Happen in April 2008
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/smoke-and-mirrors-why-nepals.html
Nationalism as a Political Agenda - Defining Nepali Interests
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/nationalism-as-political-agenda.html
Constructive Feedback for Ian Martin - Time for a change in UNMIN's Leadership
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/constructive-feedback-for-ian-martin.html
A guilty conscience is often identified by a party's reaction to suggestive comments. In the mind of the guilty, the "suggestion" is easily misinterpreted as an "allegation." This invariably leads to a panicked reaction. The unintended consequence of such a reaction is self-implication. The intentional application of this method is one of the oldest tricks in the book of criminal investigations. But sometimes, even unintended applications (of this approach) produce results. A perfect example of this dynamic was the Indian government's response to Matthew Kahane's harmless observations.
The Indian government's reaction to Nepal's resident UNMIN Advisor, Matthew Kahane, is the most obvious display of Indian guilt (on Nepal), to date. The Indian government's formal complaint to the UN Security Council's Chief of Cabinet speaks volumes of the mindset of the Indian establishment and its foreign policy objectives in Nepal.
The thrust of Matthew Kahane's message is captured in two short sentences: "Some of these (violent) groups that are making life difficult in (the) Terai may have some kind of links in North India..." and "It would be enormously helpful if Indian authorities are able to keep these people under control."
Kahane's first sentence is part fact and part suggestion. His statement that certain groups are making life difficult for Nepali people in the Terai is a fact. There is no debate on the misery that armed groups like the JTMM and the Madhesi Tigers have brought upon the Terainans. The second part of Kahane's observation suggests that the groups causing misery to the Terainans may have links to unscrupulous elements across the Nepali border. There is no suggestion whatsoever of the Indian government's links to either the violent elements in Nepal's southern plains or to their interlocutors in India's north.
Kahane's second quote from above is an ask of "Indian authorities" to help "control" trouble-makers in India. This is a request, not an allegation. It is an appeal that factors in the realities of the situation in southern Nepal while respecting India's sovereignty and regional standing.
Although India's disgruntled reaction to Kahane is baseless, Kahane's observations are not.
Kahane's remarks have caused New Delhi unease because of Kahane's affiliation with the UN; not because Kahane's remarks are inaccurate or misleading. To the contrary, Matthew Kahane has innocently restated what countless Nepali Army Officers, bureaucrats and politicians had said, throughout Nepal's Maoist insurgency - that the key to stabilizing Nepal, lies with India.
Some things in Nepal are different today while others are not. The Maoist insurgency that relied heavily on elements within India for its growth and sustenance is (arguably) over. But the Indian tendency to keep fanning the flames of instability in Nepal, persists.
Maoist leader Prachanda's visit to north India after signing Nepal's Comprehensive Peace Agreement deserves mention here. Prachanda stated then, that he wished to thank his Indian "friends" who had sheltered him and his kind, throughout Nepal's brutal insurgency. Given this recollection, is it so outlandish to assume that within the foreseeable future, the world will witness leaders of the JTMM or the Madhesi Tigers doing exactly as Prachanda has already done?
Further, the apprehension and detention of C. P. Gajurel and Mohan Baidya in India are also facts worth recalling. Charges against both were dropped and the duo were returned to Nepal shortly after India engineered the 12 Point Agreement. So without a doubt, India put an end to Nepal's Maoist insurgency. So what's stopping India from preempting another insurgency (in Nepal) by off-shoots of the same Maoists that India "shoved" into Nepal's interim government?
Given the facts presented above, however innocently Matthew Kahane may have made his remarks, was Kahane really that far off the mark? Should UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon have to get down on his knees and apologize to the Indian government? Should Kahane have to "clarify" his remarks upon his return to Nepal? What about apologies to Nepal? Has anyone said sorry to the Nepali people for over a decade of sustained violence that was sponsored by elements who self-admittedly operated from within northern India?
Matthew Kahane's remarks are perfectly within UNMIN's current mandate, a part of which is to help Nepal overcome challenges to holding constituent assembly elections. If one manifestation of such challenges is the cross-border movement of armed elements (that are intent on disrupting elections), then Kahane's observations are within reason. The Indian government's reaction however, is not.
India's reaction is very telling in two ways: First, it's a disclosure of the Indian fear of heightened Nepali nationalism; Second, it's an admission that the Indian government either has no control over its northern frontier or does not wish to exercise the control it has. Either way, the Indian reaction in Kathmandu (through its emissary), in New York (via the Indian mission to the UN) and through Nepal's Home Minister (Krishna Sitoula - the Indian agent in Nepal's interim government) is evidence enough that India would rather take strides to discredit UNMIN and Matthew Kahane than accept its own internal weaknesses.
India has remained an obstacle to the expansion of UNMIN's mandate in Nepal. At the same time, India complained to the UN that Kahane's remarks overstepped the boundaries of UNMIN's mandate. Without a doubt, UNMIN is a thankless job and the organization has its own set of bureaucratic challenges to overcome. But seriously, should pampering a petty minded, red-faced, guilt ridden Indian government be a part of UNMIN's mandate too?
Related Posts:
Smoke and Mirrors - Why Nepal's Constituent Assembly Elections Won't Happen in April 2008
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/smoke-and-mirrors-why-nepals.html
Nationalism as a Political Agenda - Defining Nepali Interests
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/nationalism-as-political-agenda.html
Constructive Feedback for Ian Martin - Time for a change in UNMIN's Leadership
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/constructive-feedback-for-ian-martin.html
Monday, February 04, 2008
Deficient UNMIN
(Courtesy: Zizimous)
Last summer I had the opportunity to visit Kosovo for about two weeks. Like Nepal, Kosovo too has an enormous UN presence, but fortunately for Nepal, the UN's presence is substantially smaller than that in Kosovo. One of the disturbing images I noticed was the graffiti sprayed on UN SUV's by frustrated Albanians labeling the UN as "killers". Of course, the label – "killers" is not justifiable at any cost, especially considering the number of humanitarian missions the UN has in operation in Kosovo. But one thing is for sure, the prolonged presence of UNMIN and its inability to meet its most basic objective in Nepal will inevitably draw more criticism and anger towards UNMIN just like in the case of UNMIK in Kosovo.
Almost two weeks ago, daily news papers carried a story where the British Ambassador had spoken in public about how polls were not possible taking into account the poor law and order situation in the country. Similarly, the following week UN Security Council met in New York and approved UNMIN's tenure extension. Although Britain did propose an extended mandate, China was quick to veto Britain's proposal quite rightly. However, there is a hidden meaning to Britain's proposal to extend the mandate of UNMIN.
In lieu with the British envoy's assessment that polls would not be possible given the present law and order situation; other international powers have also reached similar conclusions and have thus pushed Britain to propose the extension of UNMIN's mandate in Nepal for two reasons. It now becomes obvious that the security situation might be taking a turn for the worse especially considering the casual attitude demonstrated by the government in handling the Terai demands. Similarly, the possibility of election happening depends primarily on the ability of the government to solve the deepening political crisis that seems to be only escalating in the Terai day by day.
Taking into consideration the growing lawlessness in the country and the escalating political crisis in the Terai, many in the international arena are beginning to believe that the elections will be deferred for the third time. However, what really worry the international community about the deferral of the polls are the consequences. Given the track record of the present government – unimaginable corruption and divisive in nature; a section of the international community feels that the UN with its technical expertise is the only international institution that can realistically help Nepal through this fragile transitional process as they know the SPA, if left alone to govern, will make more mess.
For about two years the international community has been toeing India's policy vis-Ã -vis Nepal. Unfortunately, things haven't worked out as planned for India. The Maoists seem to be far from India's influence and the Terai groups would want India to be sympathetic to their cause. This situation has obviously put India in an awkward position considering the fact that its policy is far too stretched and scattered. This policy of appeasement of all political groups has proved to be counter-productive. But the net result is that; the Nepali peace process is in danger by the very forces perceived to be in the close influence of the Indian government – Maoists and the Terai parties.
As a result of the failure of the Indian policy to successfully democratize and mainstream the Maoists and other warring ethnic groups; the international community now feels the urge to independently pursue their own policy towards Nepal. As the Terai boils, other ethnic groups have also started to raise their demands. The possibility of an ethnic war or a civil war becomes more and more a reality day by day given the lackluster policy of the SPA government. Therefore, the international community wants an extended mandate for UNMIN so that the international community can play a greater role in solving the Nepali problem by leveraging its influence with political parties and other ethnic groups.
However, is an extended UNMIN mandate desirable to Nepal's national interest? The answer of course is, no. Most western countries have their own vested interest in solving Nepal's problems. If the UNMIN is allowed a greater mandate, what we will have in Nepal is a constitution that will probably reflect the desires of other western countries rather than having what we Nepalis want in our constitution.
The other problem is related to the often controversial issue of nationalism and sovereignty. If it was bad enough having the Indian's club together an unholy alliance (SPA-M), think about UNMIN with various international players trying to impose their policy for Nepal all at once. It is a recipe for disaster. More importantly, UNMIN has been very poor in its performance over the last two years; it hasn't even been able to assist the Nepal government in its most basic objective – completion of arms management before elections.
Secondly, the intent of the UN also becomes increasingly questionable. UNMIN and OHCHR have both kept mum over the systematic abuse of political opponents and human rights abuse perpetrated by the state and primarily the Maoists over the last two years.
This whole concept of India card and the China card is just a myth. It is in the interest of both India and China to have a stable democratic Nepal because; Nepal provides both India and China a geographical avenue for economic opportunities to flourish between the two countries. Therefore, it is in the interest for both India and China to work closely on Nepal affairs to thwart any designs to allow western countries to enter the Nepali political platform more visibly and that fundamentally means keeping the UNMIN as far as possible from the politics of Nepal.
Lastly, what is most important is defining and allowing Nepal's national interest to prevail for both India and China. For that matter, it is not in the interest of Nepal to have an extended mandate or mission for UNMIN after its extension expires in June. The need of the hour is for the Nepali political actors to identify the ideology that is the real threat to Nepal's national security and democracy.
Related Posts:
Constructive Feedback for Ian Martin - Time for a change in UNMIN's Leadership
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/constructive-feedback-for-ian-martin.html
Last summer I had the opportunity to visit Kosovo for about two weeks. Like Nepal, Kosovo too has an enormous UN presence, but fortunately for Nepal, the UN's presence is substantially smaller than that in Kosovo. One of the disturbing images I noticed was the graffiti sprayed on UN SUV's by frustrated Albanians labeling the UN as "killers". Of course, the label – "killers" is not justifiable at any cost, especially considering the number of humanitarian missions the UN has in operation in Kosovo. But one thing is for sure, the prolonged presence of UNMIN and its inability to meet its most basic objective in Nepal will inevitably draw more criticism and anger towards UNMIN just like in the case of UNMIK in Kosovo.
Almost two weeks ago, daily news papers carried a story where the British Ambassador had spoken in public about how polls were not possible taking into account the poor law and order situation in the country. Similarly, the following week UN Security Council met in New York and approved UNMIN's tenure extension. Although Britain did propose an extended mandate, China was quick to veto Britain's proposal quite rightly. However, there is a hidden meaning to Britain's proposal to extend the mandate of UNMIN.
In lieu with the British envoy's assessment that polls would not be possible given the present law and order situation; other international powers have also reached similar conclusions and have thus pushed Britain to propose the extension of UNMIN's mandate in Nepal for two reasons. It now becomes obvious that the security situation might be taking a turn for the worse especially considering the casual attitude demonstrated by the government in handling the Terai demands. Similarly, the possibility of election happening depends primarily on the ability of the government to solve the deepening political crisis that seems to be only escalating in the Terai day by day.
Taking into consideration the growing lawlessness in the country and the escalating political crisis in the Terai, many in the international arena are beginning to believe that the elections will be deferred for the third time. However, what really worry the international community about the deferral of the polls are the consequences. Given the track record of the present government – unimaginable corruption and divisive in nature; a section of the international community feels that the UN with its technical expertise is the only international institution that can realistically help Nepal through this fragile transitional process as they know the SPA, if left alone to govern, will make more mess.
For about two years the international community has been toeing India's policy vis-Ã -vis Nepal. Unfortunately, things haven't worked out as planned for India. The Maoists seem to be far from India's influence and the Terai groups would want India to be sympathetic to their cause. This situation has obviously put India in an awkward position considering the fact that its policy is far too stretched and scattered. This policy of appeasement of all political groups has proved to be counter-productive. But the net result is that; the Nepali peace process is in danger by the very forces perceived to be in the close influence of the Indian government – Maoists and the Terai parties.
As a result of the failure of the Indian policy to successfully democratize and mainstream the Maoists and other warring ethnic groups; the international community now feels the urge to independently pursue their own policy towards Nepal. As the Terai boils, other ethnic groups have also started to raise their demands. The possibility of an ethnic war or a civil war becomes more and more a reality day by day given the lackluster policy of the SPA government. Therefore, the international community wants an extended mandate for UNMIN so that the international community can play a greater role in solving the Nepali problem by leveraging its influence with political parties and other ethnic groups.
However, is an extended UNMIN mandate desirable to Nepal's national interest? The answer of course is, no. Most western countries have their own vested interest in solving Nepal's problems. If the UNMIN is allowed a greater mandate, what we will have in Nepal is a constitution that will probably reflect the desires of other western countries rather than having what we Nepalis want in our constitution.
The other problem is related to the often controversial issue of nationalism and sovereignty. If it was bad enough having the Indian's club together an unholy alliance (SPA-M), think about UNMIN with various international players trying to impose their policy for Nepal all at once. It is a recipe for disaster. More importantly, UNMIN has been very poor in its performance over the last two years; it hasn't even been able to assist the Nepal government in its most basic objective – completion of arms management before elections.
Secondly, the intent of the UN also becomes increasingly questionable. UNMIN and OHCHR have both kept mum over the systematic abuse of political opponents and human rights abuse perpetrated by the state and primarily the Maoists over the last two years.
This whole concept of India card and the China card is just a myth. It is in the interest of both India and China to have a stable democratic Nepal because; Nepal provides both India and China a geographical avenue for economic opportunities to flourish between the two countries. Therefore, it is in the interest for both India and China to work closely on Nepal affairs to thwart any designs to allow western countries to enter the Nepali political platform more visibly and that fundamentally means keeping the UNMIN as far as possible from the politics of Nepal.
Lastly, what is most important is defining and allowing Nepal's national interest to prevail for both India and China. For that matter, it is not in the interest of Nepal to have an extended mandate or mission for UNMIN after its extension expires in June. The need of the hour is for the Nepali political actors to identify the ideology that is the real threat to Nepal's national security and democracy.
Related Posts:
Constructive Feedback for Ian Martin - Time for a change in UNMIN's Leadership
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/constructive-feedback-for-ian-martin.html
Friday, February 01, 2008
Nepal's CA Elections - Assume Nothing
(Courtesy: el Punto)
Contemporary wisdom from Nepal's intellectual elite suggests that constituent assembly elections are a foregone conclusion. Anyone who questions whether the elections can be held on April 10, 2008 is either a radical Madhesi, a sympathizer of the institution of Monarchy, or both. Such thinking is typical of the skewed intellectual fallacies that cloud international media reports on Nepal's anarchy; it is also the type of patronizing propaganda that is certain to cause additional chaos.
For the sake of this argument, let us assume that constituent assembly elections will be held on the 10th of April. Let us assume that the precarious state of lawlessness and insecurity are overly exaggerated and that the issues raised by the Madhesi people are all part of an elaborate Royalist scheme to retain the Monarchy.
Let us forget that most of the Madhesi groups demanding equality and autonomy, and burning Nepali flags were at one point, part of the Maoist organization - the same organization that has gone to great lengths to rationalize its gratuitous violence in the name of eradicating the Nepalese Monarchy.
For the sake of this discussion, let us play along with the ongoing propaganda that all of the Madhesis' demands have been met by this interim government - that Krishna Sitoula was actually held accountable for the deaths of dozens of Madhesis, relieved of his post as Home Minister, prosecuted for his incompetence, and sentenced to the extent of the law for 40+ counts of second degree murder.
Further, let us continue dreaming that no jerry-mandering has occurred in the delineation of Nepal's constituency structure, that the six political parties in power (plus one) and the Maoists have not already settled on the distribution of power in the constituent assembly. Let's assume that the one million Rupees distributed by the government to each interim member of parliament will in no way impact voting patterns during the elections and that it is only a small, radical faction of the Madhesi population that is opposed to polls under the prevailing circumstances.
Now let's return to reality. As the cliché goes, "assumptions are the mother of all major mistakes (actually a much more politically incorrect profanity that is not fit for public consumption)." It is not just the Madhesis and the Royalists who have cause for concern over the unnecessarily aggressive election timetable. Under prevailing conditions, the mere suggestion of overly simplified logic in favor of elections is an insult; it is a back handed slap in the face of every rational Nepali.
Given the precedent that the Maoists set (with silent endorsement from the current seven parties), every individual running for elections could potentially be risking their lives. The assassination of several people who ran for office during the last attempt at municipal polls should be revisited as a serious security concern. None of the criminals then or the dozens of Maoist culprits who perpetrated crimes after signing the peace agreement have been brought to justice. Nepalis have none other than their "dear" Maoists to thank for writing the book on how to undermine elections; and Nepalis owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to their civil society, political class and intellectual elite for silently endorsing the Maoists' method.
The lens under which the intellectual elite has portrayed the Madhesi uprising is hypocrisy at its height. Clearly, the Madhesi people have legitimate demands that should be met before elections are held? For the most part, the Madhesis have pursued their agendas through political means and have refrained from taking up arms against the state (with the exceptions of the JTMM splinters). How does Nepal's intellectual minority justify supporting the Maoists' violent rise to power and at the same time, deny the Madhesis political equivalence? Is this the rewarding of violence arriving at its logical full circle?
It doesn't take an intellect of any capacity to assert that it is in every Nepali's interest to see that constituent assembly elections are held. After all, Nepal hasn't seen elections in over a decade. This isn't where the naiveté comes into play. Rather, it's the "armchair predictions" made by self-professed intellectuals in lieu of the reality around them, that speaks volumes of idiocy.
The priority for these armchair intellectuals is to be proven correct - unfortunately, as outlined above, the gaping chasm between the make-believe (ideal) environment that Nepal's intellectual class projects and the reality of Nepal are two very different worlds. Just put yourself in the shoes of an average Madhesis fighting for his/her rights and the picture becomes crystal clear.
Further, the words and actions of Nepal's political leadership and its intellectual elite dangerously border on inciting full fledged civil war. It is inconceivable as to why people like Sushil Koirala, Ram Chandra Poudel and Baburam Bhattarai suggest the mobilization of the Nepali Army in the Madhes. Such irresponsible comments only add fuel to an already raging fire.
Plus, is the Nepali Army an instrument of the State or was part of the Jana Andolan-II mandate to make the Army a seven party (plus Maoist) tool? Does anyone care to revisit history and ponder the circumstances under Girija Koirala's resignation in 2002? Doesn't the mere suggestion of mobilizing Nepal's Army (in whatever capacity) play right into the hands of every radical Madhesi groups? At a high level, is the situation in the Madhes today any different from what the situation was in Rukkum and Rolpa in 1995/1996?
Then why on earth are ideas being floated to further aggravate the situation? Where Nepal as a nation is concerned, Sushil Koirala as an individual (irrespective of his party affiliation) is insignificant. The fact that bombs were triggered in the vicinity of Sushil's political campaign while unfortunate, pales in comparison to Koirala's politically insensitive suggestion that the Army be mobilized to hold elections. Exactly how should a Madhesi person interpret such a callous remark? Should he/she be delighted at the thought of an (allegedly) unrepresentative Army being deployed to hold elections that the Madhesis claim will not address their core demands?
Should such a mobilization actually happen and cause more violence, it is Sushil Koirala and the political leadership who should be put on trial at the Hauge - not the solider or the policeman deployed to "keep the peace." For anyone who has stared physical harm in the line of duty, the idea of "excessive force" is as ostentatious as the notion of "adequate force." Is this not a concern for the human rights community and the international moralists? No one said institutionalizing democracy would be as easy as removing the King. But what on earth could explain the distinct lack of hue and cry amongst Nepalis abroad or the international media? Is it remotely possible that Nepal's intellectual minority is as skewed in ethnic representation as the rest of Nepal?
At this point, let us return to the elementary Nepal that the so-called intellectual elite continue to pontificate on. Let us continue treating all practical hurdles to constituent assembly elections as Royalist designs. Let us further extend this logic and agree that the King is a spent force and the Madhesi uprising is nothing more than a few trigger-happy radicals. Then by deduction, sheer incompetence is the only explanation if constituent assembly elections - for whatever reason - are not held on the designated date. Without inflating the possibility of this "unlikely" outcome, let's take a moment to consider who to hold accountable at that time and how exactly to expose the propaganda artists who are working overtime to disappoint the Nepali public today.
Related Posts:
Nepal's Constituent Assembly Elections - It's not Just a Matter of Security
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/08/nepals-constituent-assembly-elections.html
No Impunity for Civil Society Leaders: Nepalis are watching....
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/no-impunity-for-civil-society-leaders.html
The greatest threat to peace in Nepal is misinformed, misguided, agenda-divine journalists like "The Guardian's" Isabel Hilton
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/courtesy-el-punto-isabel-hiltons.html
Revisiting Recent Nepali History - A brief Collection of "Inconvenient Truths"
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/revisiting-recent-nepali-history-brief.html
Lack of Law & Order in Nepal, Primarily a Maoist-Originated Problem
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/lack-of-law-order-in-nepal-primarily.html
Nepali Maoists Should bear Moral Responsibility for the Terror Attacks in Kathmandu
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/nepali-maoists-should-bear-moral.html
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)