UN Fast Losing Credibility in Nepal

(Courtesy: el Zorro)

If UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal) doesn’t clean up its act immediately, Nepal is going to become another strike on the UN’s abysmal record of anything remotely associated with the term, “peace.” Considering that the only thing Nepalis have asked the UN to do is facilitate a process that was already in motion, Nepal has immense potential to become the UN’s most humiliating performance, ever.

With the international community’s blessings, UNMIN’s capacity for positive impact (especially in a country like Nepal), has no upward bounds. The hopes and aspirations that the Nepali people have vested in Ian Martin and his team also have no ceiling. Combined, these elements exponentially heighten the UN’s reputational risk – a risk that Ian Martin has done (at best), a mediocre job of managing.

Below is how Ian’s overly diplomatic maneuvering (symptomatic of the UN’s modus operandi) is compromising Nepal’s fragile peace:

UNMIN is Operating like a High-Priced Consultant Instead of a Responsible Stake-Holder

If it’s one thing that consultants excel in, it’s in covering their own asses. In the event that things go as planned, consultants are the first to take credit and cite the experience as a qualification to get work with other clients.

However, when things go wrong, consultants are also the first to wash their hands clean and walk away. They do this by invoking cleverly drafted clauses in their official “Scope of Work”, through fine (contractual) print, and by producing a laundry list of documented interactions (e-mails, press conference briefs, official documents, etc.), through which they will claim impunity.

Ian Martin needs to shift his focus from performing like a high-priced consultant to being a responsible manager of the peace process in Nepal. Ian’s public disclosures are starting to dangerously resemble excuses that may be leveraged at a later date – excuses that will be used to exempt the UN from being held “liable” should the peace process break down.

Ian Martin is the authority where the international community’s stake in Nepal’s peace process is concerned. He needs to start behaving like a stake-holder instead of a spectator or a high-priced consultant that is adding absolutely no value to the overall process.

Perception is that UNMIN’s Mandate in Nepal is Being Executed by ICG

With a former Nepal “expert” from the International Crisis Group (ICG) serving as one of UNMIN’s principal advisors, it is natural for cross-organizational relationships to be leveraged and for the UN to receive moral and technical assistance from the ICG. Areas where synergies exist between the two organizations should be welcomed and encouraged.

However, when Ian Martin is reduced to making weak allusions to deficiencies in Nepal’s peace process while ICG representatives sit next to Martin and bluntly orate risks, the ICG ends up looking like the authority (without a formal mandate) and Ian Martin ends up looking foolish.

Some of the truths that ICG reports and commentators on Nepal have documented are as follows: The CA assembly timeline is way too aggressive, the Maoists are not behaving like responsible actors, Nepal’s PM being on his death bed is hindering the pace of the peace process, etc.

These are all risks that Ian Martin knows just as well as his ICG counterparts. That Mr. Martin has demonstrated neither the courage nor the conviction to speak the full truth, in plain, simple English calls into question UNMIN’s ability to execute even its limited mandate in Nepal.

UNMIN’s Disclosure of Information is Incomplete, Non-Transparent and Meaningless

Ian Martin’s press conference when he disclosed UNMIN’s finding on the first phase of the arms management process was a complete farce.

The Nepali Government had provided UNMIN with a complete and detailed inventory of the types and numbers of weapons that were stolen by the Maoists. Aside from a TOTAL number of stolen weapons, Ian Martin failed to disclose critical information that he had on hand, for the Nepali public’s benefit.

Even though the arms inventoried on the Maoists’ side were disclosed with slightly more detail, UNMIN did not disclose the specific types and numbers of weapons it had documented. Had UNMIN published both the detailed list provided by the government along with the information UNMIN collected from the Maoists, the debate on the 9:1 ratio (between combatants and weapons) would have been a moot point. Such useless debates would have been easily overshadowed by the real debate that hasn’t even taken place yet – a discussion on why the Maoist list is missing the most modern arms stolen from the Army.

Discourse of the RDX (and other explosives) stockpile the Maoists’ possess hasn’t even begun. And with the highly selective (and non-transparent) information that Ian Martin and his team have disclosed to the Nepali public, there is barely enough detail to conduct any meaningfully comparative analysis.

Perhaps Ian Martin’s decision to withhold information from the Nepali public was directed at averting an overwhelming public outcry on the sham of a process arms management has been. Perhaps Ian Martin felt that disclosing full information might somehow compromise the peace process.

Whatever the case, these are not decisions that Ian Martin has the authority to make. It is insulting when Martin on the one hand, takes every opportunity to congratulate the Nepali people for their resolve and conviction, and on the other, insults Nepali peoples’ intelligence by intentionally withholding critical information the public needs to evaluate the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the arms management process.

If the Nepali Government or the Maoists forced Ian Martin to withhold information from the public, he and he alone has the moral imperative to either ask to be replaced or to push back on the Government and champion the peoples’ right to information.

Where this particular stunt is concerned, no amount of “fine print” can negate Martin’s personal (or UNMIN’s) liability. It is appalling that a man representing an institution that champions full transparency, fails to practice what the insitution preaches.

Given the position Ian Martin is in, he is as accountable to the Nepali people as he is to the UN. Martin’s performance needs to change to more accurately reflect complete accountability. Immediately.

UNMIN is Grossly Mis-Managing Public Expectations

Ian Martin’s team has done a horrible job of managing the Nepali peoples’ expectations. At a minimum, the UN’s presence in Nepal was expected to help stake holders in the peace process (the SPA, the Maoists, the people) attain a moderated appreciation of the possible versus the probable.

Unfortunately, all Ian Martin has succeeded in doing is heightening unrealistic expectations. Instead of lending clarity, Ian Martin’s public statements have added confusion; instead guiding the peace process in a logical direction, Mr. Martin has succeeded in injecting ambiguities that are certain to heighten existing tensions.

When Mr. Martin states in public that his team is unable to verify whether the Maoists have purchased arms, and in the same sentence indicates that AK-47 assault rifles were inventoried (weapons not in the government forces’ arsenal), no one is fooled.

When Mr. Martin says that the arms management process has to go through a second phase of verification (before it is complete), and then states that “The consequences if elections are postponed are unpredictable,” it's just silly. Unpredictability is precisely what the UN’s job is supposed to reduce, not augment!!

When Mr. Martin alludes to the Dayton Accords to highlight that Nepal’s peace process is organic (not even close to reality), he misses the point. His mention of Ohio (and the Dayton Accords) elicits a single memory – how UN peace keepers where captured and held hostage by the Serbs, and how NATO (led by the US) had to bomb the Serbs to end ethnic cleansing in the region and bring the Serbs back to negotiations. Nepal would be been lucky to be of any strategic importance to any nation other than India. If it were, the 12 year Maoist insurgency would have ended 6 months after Prachanda opened his mouth.

Although cliché, it is completely appropriate to say that Mr. Martin is leading the Nepali people to believe that they can have their cake and eat it too. They cannot. And neither can Ian Martin.
UNMIN’s front man needs to urgently clarify the UN’s position on two issues: One, are elections possible in June 2007 or not? Second, in the UN’s expert opinion, when will the arms management process (in its entirety) be complete? Before or after June, 2007?

These are questions with “yes,” “no” answers. If Ian Martin as the UN’s subject matter expert on peace process management is unable to provide a straight answer to the Nepali public, then Mr. Martin needs to immediately pave the way for another UNIMIN mission head who can.

Conclusion:

It is easy (and justifiable) to shift part of the blame on the underperforming peace process in Nepal, on the Nepali government. Working with a bed-ridden Prime Minister cannot be easy for Ian Martin or his team. The pressures that accompany Ian Martin’s job cannot be understated either.

However, given the substance and pace of UNMIN’s accomplishments in Nepal, it suffices to say that Ian Martin hasn’t done a particularly good job of making his own life any easier. It is completely unprofessional and inappropriate of Ian Martin (3 full months after the UN committed to assisting Nepal), to claim that “in many ways (high expectations) are based on assumptions that (the) UN’s role is greater and more comprehensive than it is.”

As a professional who has served in various capacities in the past, isn’t this a question Ian Martin should have asked himself 3 months ago – back when he and the UN had all the leverage needed to get the precise mandate Martin claims his team lacks (in order to perform to the Nepali peoples’ expectations), today?

If working with a bed-ridden Prime Minister is a problem, Ian Martin should let it be known. If the arms management process is incomplete, Ian Martin should have the courage to tell the Nepali people. Ian Martin, hiding behind a diplomatic screen of ambiguity is doing a great disservice to the overall peace process and to the Nepali people.

It is certainly not the UN’s mandate to set policy in Nepal, but it is most definitely within the UN’s current mandate to provide expert, non-contradictory opinions that in turn, may be used by various stakeholders to guide policy and make informed decisions. By failing to perform this very basic function, Ian Martin’s extreme diplomatic instinct (to remain non-committal and independent), is impeding on UNMIN’s ability to execute even the limited mandate it currently serves.

Ian Martin’s sheer inability to manage various stake-holders in Nepal’s peace process is dangerously bordering on incompetence. If Ian Martin feels pressured now, he may physically collapse when Nepal’s politicians start shifting blame for mismanaged expectations on UNIMIN.

It appears Mr. Martin may be in over his head in Nepal – he appears to have “diplomatically” maneuvered into a spot where Nepal’s politicians are well-positioned to hang the UN out to dry. Ian Martin and UNMIN need to urgently and systematically address the deficiencies outlined in this writing – that is, if Ian Martin expects to have any credibility left with the Nepali people, 3 months down the road.