Deliver or Quit

(Courtesy: Dr. Hari Bansha Dulal)

It’s been more than a year since the election of Constitution Assembly (CA). On April 10, 2010, the stipulated term of the CA, which is mandated to draft a new constitution and decide the issue of federalism expires. In the last fourteen months, CA members, who draw a salary of fifty thousand Rupees, have been seen engaged in everything from infamous land grabbing and brawl within CA secretariat campus to availing services of masseuse but draft constitution and decide on the federal structure. If we a do a back-of-the-envelope calculations, six hundred one CA members have so far drawn forty two crores in salary alone. The political parties seem to appear interested in everything else but drafting a constitution and agreeing on a functionally viable federal structure. A federal structure that is fiscally sufficient to govern itself, safeguard the rights and interests within its jurisdiction, and most importantly, maintain unity in diversity.

Having a constitution also means complying with the stipulated rules. After all who wants to play by the rules in “New Nepal” except for the poor, who are bound to? At least not the major political parties. If media is to be believed, in the past six months, only 12 days were free of any kind of strikes or bandhs. The strikes or bandhs that accounted for the 166 days of lost productivity in the past six months were not called by the disgruntled silence majority, which in reality should have been the case. The largest party in the CA leads the pack in enforcing strikes. Organizations affiliated with UCPN-M, whose mother party claims to be the only force capable of bringing sociopolitical and economic transformation in the country was responsible for enforcing 39 bandhs and strikes in the month of may and June alone. It enforced 69 bandhs and strikes in the past six months. Others, who claim to be the alternative to the Maoist bullying are not very far behind. The UML and the NC organized 17 and 15 bandhs during the past six months. So if we combine the strikes and bandhs called by the major three parties, they are responsible for 101 days of lost productivity in the last six months. What does that say, if anything, about the seriousness on the part of the political parties that are responsible for solving common men’s problem and moving the nation forward?

There is a rapid decay in the sense of public service among the politicians. Sadly, the political parties are using democratic process and institutions to legitimize their undemocratic and antisocial activities aimed at achieving their ultimate goal, the maximization of rents. Lack of viable alternatives has left Nepal people used to the moral bankruptcy of the political class. You can contest elections on ethnic agendas, become a foreign minister for nine months and get away without uttering a word on the need for ethnic empowerment for nine months. The globe-trotting foreign minister is again back in action posing himself as ethnic messiah. Political insincerity of few politicians is diluting the purity of the demand for ethnic rights.

Nobody, at least not the politicians, want to have a serious constructive debate on the form of federal structure that is viable and just. The major political parties, whose leadership comprises of mostly pahadi Brahmins and Chettris do not want to raise the issue, because they clearly see their clout diminishing if ethnic federalism is realized. But they do not want to say that, at least not in public. So what they do is- give it a nationalist color. They phrase it quite nicely. Ethnic mindset is antithetical to the notion of national integrity and nationalist pride. Sounds great. Doesn’t it? But the ethnic minorities that are pushing for ethnic federalism do know where these politicians’ Mecca is located at.

Progress should be the ultimate criteria for designing a federal structure. The federal structure should be founded in administrative prudence and developmental prospects rather than petty issues of politics like ethnicity, caste, and language. It is important ensure that the poor, who are not only ethnic minorities benefit from the new structure or else the demand for the separate state is not going to go away like in India. It is important ensure that the poor, who are not only ethnic minorities benefit from the new structure or else the demand for the separate state is not going to go away like in India. The demand for separate states did not die down with the creation of Uttaranchal, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh, which were carved out from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh. Currently, the demand for creation of 10 new states is lying before the Indian government. India, which was governed and governed quite effectively by British under 4 Administrative Blocks-Bombay, Madras, Calcutta and Delhi-now has 30 states. If the demand for 10 more states is met, it will have 40 states. The country which was divided along the linguistic lines has encouraged fight for language, water, and border. It did not stop there. Politicians further divided the nation along minorities, hindus, scheduled caste (SC), scheduled tribe (ST), and other backward castes (OBCs). The demand for separate state based on ethnicity to promote vote-bank politics has vitiated sociopolitical environment. In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the demand for Harit Pradesh and Mithilanchal is being raised. The mental portioning of India engineered by V.P. Singh is getting deeper.

Nepal should learn from Indian experience. A sincere effort towards drafting constitution and debate on federal structure should start immediately. Running away from the problem is not the solution. It will require a sincere dialogue and consensus building. Political elites of yesteryears do not want to cave in to the demands of regional parties as it will shrink their political base and bargaining potential. The regional parties do not want to compromise on anything less than “one madhesh, one pradhesh” because the very minute a regional party will agree to anything less than “one madhesh, one pradhesh” demand, other regional players will cry foul and call it a "sellout." But this game of waiting the other party to drop the ball cannot go for ever, can it?

Constitution drafting and design of the federal structure is put in back burner because of political insincerity. Remaining insincere towards people’s need and the nation’s progress while drawing a pay check at best can be called as a morally repugnant act. Either CA members should stop draining the state’s coffer or get back to the business.

(This piece was originally published on My Republica and is re-produced here with the Author's consent).

To Retain or Retire?

(Courtesy: Chiran Thapa)

Once again, Nepal braces for another nail biting affair. Just when it was time to heave a sigh of relief following the recruitment row, another bout of vicious sparring between the Nepal Army and the Maoists in the government is underway.

Before, the row was over recruitment. This time it is over retirement.

As a customary practice, the Nepal Army had written to the Defence Ministry to extend the tenures of eight of its Brigadier Generals. Such extensions were never stymied in the past. This time, however, the Maoist Defence Minister did not acquiesce. When the Defence ministry did not forward the extension proposal to the cabinet, time elapsed and the Generals' retirement dates passed by.

Initially, when no word came from the Defence Ministry, the Generals were asked to continue with their respective tenures by the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS). But, now that the Defence Ministry has sent a letter to the Army Headquarters to retire the Generals, it remains to be seen how the Nepal Army will respond.

This case bears some resemblance to the retirement of senior officers of the Nepal Police. Just last month, the government did not extend the tenures of the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Hem Bahadur Gurung and three Additional Inspector-Generals (AIGs). Previously too, the government had not extended the tenures of eleven senior police officers who consequently retired in September of last year. That lot included the IGP Om Bikram Rana, five AIGs and five Deputy Inspector Generals (DIGs).

But the Nepal Army's case is markedly different. For one, the Police Force is utterly politicized and the institution has had very little say over postings, promotions and retirements. The Nepal Army, however, had thus far kept such matters strictly under its institutional purview. And the Defence Ministry had never before interjected in such affairs.

Also, under the robust commandership of the current CoAS, the Nepal Army has deftly maintained the chain of command and kept the institution intact. With great dexterity, the CoAS has effectively restrained those that want to come out blazing against the former foes and those that want to sycophantically pay homage to newly ensconced political masters.

Furthermore, under his watch, the Nepal Army has kept its boots off the political landscape. Instead, it has subtly cultivated cordial relations with various political forces, the media, the foreign diplomatic corps and other luminaries.

It is these extensive cordial links cultivated by the Nepal Army that have bolstered its clout and leverage. And the recruitment and retirement tussles manifest those relationships. The retirements of the senior Police officers were hardly an issue for other political forces. But, in the Nepal Army's case, politicians of all persuasions have fervently jumped into the ring to support the Nepal Army.

This time too, various political forces have joined the fray to support the Army. Numerous Nepali Congress (NC) leaders have called on the President Ram Baran Yadav - who is currently the Supreme Commander of the Nepal Army, and requested him to intervene to retain the Generals.

Under the leadership of the NC President – Girija Prasad Koirala, leaders of CPN (UML), CPN (Marxist Leninist), Nepal Sadbhawana Party, Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) and Rastriya Janashakti Party (RJP) have decided to forge an alliance against the decision to retire the Generals.

Besides the politicians, others are throwing in their weight too. A group of four former Lieutenant Generals met the President and requested him to use his “special influence” to end the controversy. They believe that such large scale retirement of the hierarchy would gravely jeopardize the structure and functioning of the institution. On the other hand, one retired Major General and a few other former junior officers have come out in support of the Defence ministry's decision saying that "the retirement is purely an administrative matter and the generals should retire as per the Defence Ministry's decision."

Amid these divergent perspectives, however, there is another distinctly inseparable element about this row. It has to do with the previous recruitment row. Recently, the Nepal Army had mulishly recruited new personnel into its ranks flouting the Defence Minister's objections. The Minister's inability to halt the recruitment process had greatly emasculated and embarrassed him and his party that is leading the government. Hence, given the history, the line between vengeance and righteousness is blurred.

This issue, however, transcends beyond the realms of vengeance or righteousness. For the Maoists, it is a face saving game coupled with their aspiration to reign over the Nepal Army. The only bulwark that stands in the Maoist path of total domination is the Nepal Army. The Maoists understand very well that if it were to get hold of the levers that controlled the Nepal Army, they can suppress and sideline any political opposition with relative ease.

Moreover, at a time when the country is in a hideous mess, this imbroglio provides the Maoist leadership with a much needed respite. This incident is being effectively exploited to divert the attention of the masses away from the inadequacies and insecurities plaguing the Nepali society. Faced with a sharply declining popularity, both nationally and internationally, the Maoists are trying to employ the Nepal Army's resistance to their advantage. By propagating Army's actions as a serious breach of democratic norms and values, the Maoists intend on garnering public support.

But most importantly, it sorely needs to demonstrate its supreme status to the people, and especially to its restive cadres and combatants. By overriding their stiff resistance in the recruitment row, the Nepal Army had given the Maoists a black eye. This incident had unmistakably demonstrated the acumen and strength of the Nepal Army.

It is no wonder why this tussle has become a must win situation for Maoists. The Maoists direly need to redeem themselves after their ignominious retreat from the recruitment row. They need to demonstrate that they are in control and that they have managed to lasso the most powerful institution in the country.

In the meantime, the Army too needs to prove that it still retains the capability to withstand and overcome political interference and that it will not be bossed around whimsically by those who want to infuse a politically indoctrinated bevy into its professional ranks.

If the Maoists are able to withhold the decision and let the Generals retire, it will set a new precedent. From the Maoist viewpoint, it would herald a new beginning in the control of the Nepal Army. This would certainly ease the way for the wholesale integration of their combatants into the National Army.

From the Nepal Army's standpoint, however, it will mark the beginning of political encroachment. And it will certainly instill a visceral sense of vulnerability amongst the troops, especially amongst the higher ranking officers.

But if the Nepal Army digs its heels firmly enough and is able to retain its Generals, then implications could be adverse for the Maoists. If Maoists are compelled to retract their decision, then it would be another humiliating blow to its stature and morale. And it would once again project the Nepal Army as a far superior force.

As this row unfolds, the prognosis is bleak. By retiring Brigadiers and upgrading the Colonels, the Maoists are perhaps hoping to prop up a new hierarchy in the Nepal Army that is more pliable to their interest. But, the new lot could easily turn out to be more radical and recalcitrant than the released ones. In any case, whichever way the tussle goes, it will most certainly poison the sour relationship that already persists between these two formidable forces. Not only that, this could possibly be the beginning of an end of an apolitical National Army.

Political Problems Don’t Have Military Solutions

(Courtesy: Comrade Libre)

There are certain forces, internal and external to Nepal, that are engaged in goading the NA (Nepali Army) into controversy. For the good of the military institution, the well-being of our men and women in uniform, and for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nepal, the NA must continue resisting all forms of political instigation. The Army must continue its journey down a politically independent path, with service to the Nepali nation-state (and her people), as the institution’s ultimate objective.

UNMIN Exposed - Why the controversy now?

First and foremost, blame for the controversy over the NA’s bid to fill vacant spots, lies squarely in the United Nation’s corner. The monitoring of arms and armies is the cornerstone of the UNMIN’s mandate in Nepal - a mandate that apparently, the UNMIN failed to execute on two prior occasions when the NA filled vacation positions, without fanfare or controversy.

Both previous recruitment drives were advertised, were identical in process to the current drive, and were held after the signing of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement). So either the UNMIN learned of all three recruiting events at the same time or it acted at the Maoists’ behest. Irrespective of what the actual rationale may have been, the facts remain that the UNMIN failed to act in a timely manner, failed to carry out its duties and at least in perception, failed the dual tests of impartiality and independence - again.

It is shameful enough that a civilian (Mr. Ram Hari Shrestha) was abducted and subsequently murdered inside a UN supervised, Maoist cantonment. In the face of the public scrutiny that followed, Ian Martin was quick to cite a lack of mandate to report (or even prevent) pre-meditated murder. That was bad enough. But for Ian Martin to throw his weight behind the Maoists’ in the current context is just unhelpful, disingenuous and a shameless display of selective enforcement of the CPA.

Toppling the Maoist Government - What does the average Nepali gain?

Second, the disgruntlement over the NA’s recruitment is only one of several on-going issues. It is neither paramount to the continuity of Nepal’s peace process nor particularly relevant to the constitution-making process. What it is, is an unnecessary distraction of a political variety that should be deferred for resolution at the political level. The last thing the NA should be doing at this juncture is permitting its institutional integrity to be compromised over political power plays.

If Girija Prasad Koirala’s Nepali Congress has political contentions with the Maoists’, it is GPK and the NC who should be addressing such concerns with Prachanda and the Defense Minister. The same goes for the UML, the RPP, the MJF or any other political party. But to use the institutional issue of NA recruitment as a springboard to forward political agendas (specifically, to cripple and embarrass the Maoist government) is dangerous, irresponsible and can escalate into further confrontation.

For issues of a political variety, the Cabinet and the Parliament are where civilized confrontations (also known as debates) should be had. If resolution cannot be achieved at that level, the NC, the UML and others are welcome to pursue street protests. In other words, the “democrats” in these parties ought to rely more on the tools that enable democratic practice - parliamentary politics and civil disobedience - and less on military adventurism to fulfill their respective political objectives.

Betrayal in Historical Perspective - The lessons the NA should never forget

Third and most important, the NA”s leadership should have the common sense and wherewithal to realize that it is the very same politicians who insist upon upholding the NA’s apolitical sanctity, who are also busy exploiting the NA’s predicament. The NC’s ultimate goal is to put GPK back in power and Madhav Kumar Nepal’s pipe dream of replacing Prachanda is distasteful humor. How does either scenario benefit the Nepali nation state?

How is it even possible to take a man like Girija Prasad Koirala seriously? After all, it was under Koirala’s watch that the armed Maoist insurrection took hold; it was GPK’s government under which operations Romeo and Sierra-II-Kilo were launched; it was GPK who resigned his premiership because the Army did not mobilize against the Maoists’; and during the height of the insurgency, it was under GPK’s leadership that the SPA (Seven Party Alliance) forged a political alliance with the Maoists. That very alliance undermined the same Army that today, Girija Koirala is attempting to use to satiate this lust for power.

In a nutshell, it is because Girija Prasad Koirala fell for the Maoists’ “promise” that they would make him Nepal’s first President that the NA answers to the former Chief of the Maoists’ military wing today. And now Girija Koirala is bent on encouraging the NA to defy the Ministry of Defense? How does any of this make sense?

Conclusion

The NA has performed superbly after the restoration of the dissolved parliament in April of 2006. Under its current leadership, the NA has regained must of its lost stature and has exercised restraint, professionalism and an unwavering dedication to the Nepali nation-state and her people. As a deterrent to Maoist adventurism, the NA is the single, standing bastion of hope. And this is precisely where the NA should remain - for now.

The NA should continue encouraging the “useful idiots” (who were instrumental in facilitating the Maoists’ to power) to actively assist in the process of seeking “political solutions” to the political challenges at hand. As for those critics who claim the NA is being too submissive, the NA should assure them that if appearing docile is what it takes to keep soldiers out of harm’s way, then so be it. Better submissive than dead and in all honesty, how seriously should those who have been on the battle field take criticisms from those who are experts at trading words, not bullet?

Under no circumstances should the NA go out on a limb to help any internal political party, individual, or external force, in the pursuit of their self-interests. It is the collective Nepali interest in which the NA should act and if this means allowing Ram Bahadur Thapa a face-saving exit, then so be it. The NA can easily diffuse the debate over recruitment by assuring all concerned parties that future force replenishment will not take place. (This, after the UNMIN takes responsibility for failing to execute its mandate and inform the NA in a timely manner.)

Given the delicate juncture at which Nepal’s peace process has arrived, the NA should remind those who are egging it on that there never was (and never will be) a “military solution” to a “political problem.” The NA should steer clear of becoming a back yard where Parties with no grass roots support or tenable objectives (other than coming into power themselves), air their “dirty laundry.”

Deconstructing Myths related to Hydropower II – Suggestions

(Courtesy: Ratna Sansar Shrestha)

A friend has said to me (verbally) that “only raising issues does not resolve the problem,” howsoever pertinent the issues are. That is absolutely correct. My excuse for not touching upon this facet in my previous write ups was simply the time the average readers are able to afford or inclined to devote. Besides, I launched this writing spree to ensure that a few errors in the presentations of some eminent personalities do not mislead the intellectuals, bureaucracy and policy makers. Since, his comment has provided me with an opportunity I will write a few paragraph in this respect but I will limit myself to the specific issues I have touched upon in my last write up, in the interest, again, of the time of the readers.

It’s Fresh Water, Not Energy

South Africa pays a lump sum of US $25 million (in 1991 prices) each year to Lesotho (surrounded by South Africa on all sides) for 18 cum/sec of water it receives from Lesotho Highlands Water Project. There is similar arrangement under Columbia Treaty between Canada and USA. For the sake of simplicity using the rate agreed between Lesotho and South Africa, Nepal is entitled to US $ 125 million per annum (equivalent to Rs 8.125 billion pa) from India for the augmented flow of 90 cum/sec from west seti project. To my mind it is as simple as what follows: if India doesn’t want to pay for the augmented flow then Nepal should not sacrifice 2,750 hectare of land to be submerged by the reservoir and 1,630 hectare permanently and 645 hectares partially of her land in Banke district to be inundated by the augmented flow, due to Lakshmanpur “barrage.” Columbia Treaty, too, clearly has provision to recompense Canada for her losing alternative uses of the submerged land, besides the recompense for flood control benefit. It is important to note that the project is going to rehabilitate people to be displaced by the reservoir which will amount to recompense of cultivated land that will be submerged by the reservoir but such land amounts to only 10%. There is no arrangement to recompense for non-cultivated land including forest.

What also needs to be remembered that building a reservoir not only provides augmented flow to the downstream area but also results in flood control for which too the beneficiary needs to recompense Nepal. Columbia treaty, further, recognizes power benefit due to building of the reservoir and she is entitled to one-half of the additional power generated due the reservoir. To draw a parallel here, the specific site of west seti project would have generated 100 MW without the reservoir. Therefore, Nepal is entitled to 325 MW (not meagerly 75 MW).

In this backdrop, therefore, agreements related to west seti needs to be revised accordingly.

India has never acknowledged downstream benefit and she equates free flowing water with stored water which is not one and the same. No one will pay a paisa for the water flowing in any river but the water will have economic (financial, as well) value after adding spatial or temporal utility for which purpose Nepal will be sacrificing, as mentioned above, 2,750 hectare submerged by the reservoir and 1,630 hectare permanently and 645 hectares partially in Banke district, inundated due to Lakshmanpur “barrage.”.

Let’s look at Mahakali treaty in the above light. Nepal is entitled to 50% water from Mahakali River, deemed to be a border river. But, under current treaty India has been given additional 46.5% over and above 50% it is entitled to. Therefore, this treaty too needs to be revised incorporating provision under which India will be obligated to pay Nepal for any additional water over and above her share of 50% that India receives/uses from this river.

Export to and Import from India

People might have jumped to the conclusion that I am complaining about India short changing us in this respect. I just hope that people will not be shocked, if I am to say that what is happening is natural phenomenon in this kind of market. From the perspective of export of power from Nepal to India we have a monopsony market condition and it is but natural that the importer enjoys “market power” and is able to dictate the price. Besides, in the power market it is also a fact of life that longer PPAs fetch lower prices while the shorter ones higher. West seti has a longer PPA term, and has been given lower price while, when Nepal imports power from India we do it for short term, and pay high price.

Having looked at the ground reality, Nepal should aim to maximize use of power generated by harnessing its water resource domestically and also benefit by forward linkaged benefits. Use it to lift water to irrigate, to run cold storage, to set up agro-processing industries, use for industrialization of Nepal, also to set up energy intensive industries. Nepal can escape from current petroleum product crisis significantly by electrifying transportation system (ranging from electric train, trolley bus, etc. to even hybrid car). As I said in my first write up Nepal’s objective should be to harness full economic potential of 43,000 MW for use by the population expected to reach 42 million in 2030 which will result in electricity consumption of 3,594 kWh per capita compared to more than 10,000 kWh of prosperous countries.

However, it does not mean that Nepal should, absolutely, be against export of electricity. What we should do is instead of dedicated power from Nepal’s water resource, Nepal should plan to export energy during wet seasons and off peak hours when it needs to spill her electricity generation capacity while during the same window of time the electricity demand in south is at its peak, thus commanding premium tariff for Nepal’s electricity. In this manner we could easily get out of the trap of long term PPAs.

In order to achieve above I recommend a mechanism under which Nepal should implement as many hydropower projects as possible with domestic investment so that investment linkaged benefit will stay in the country. This does not mean that we should close our doors to FDI. As long as the electricity is used for the benefit of the country who is investing in the project does not matter. My second recommendation is that Nepal should allow projects to be implemented by the investor/s (domestic or foreign) that will generate the electricity at the lowest cost. We should purchase all such power (at low cost) and electrify the nation massively (not just lighting a few bulbs in houses, though) and export the electricity that Nepal is not able to consume at premium price (I wonder if people are aware that India asked INR Rs 7 from a power plant in Tripura from Bangladesh). It should be obvious to all that Nepal may, for example, not be able to use full generation of west seti project for first few years, after that Nepal will be in a position to use close to half of it. In about a dozen years, Nepal will definitely be able to use all electricity generative by this project. I could go on with my recommendations but I think this much will suffice for now.

Decommissioning

In order to avoid having to make the tax payers of Nepal pay for decommissioning of west seti project, the better and prudent course is not to build it at all under present arrangement. However, if India is willing to recompense Nepal for (1) flood control, (2) augmented flow in the dry season and also (3) pay reasonable price for peak-in power, then we should allow it to be built on the condition that the developer company will set aside a certain portion of the cost of decommissioning and deposit it with GoN each year such that by the time the project is handed over GoN will have necessary fund to decommission it.

Related Posts:

Nepal's Hydropower - Deconstructing a Few Mythshttp://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/08/nepals-hydropower-deconstructing-few.html

Nepal's Hydropower - Deconstructing a Few Myths II

(Courtesy: Ratna Sansar Shrestha)

(Responses provided by author to comments on original post located at the following URL: http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/08/nepals-hydropower-deconstructing-few.html#comments)

It is clear from a number of comments to my first write up on the subject that it will not be possible for the politicos to continue to take Nepali people for ride. Every time Nepal passes through the transition (politically unstable) period Nepali politicos give away Nepal’s vital interests. 1950 treaty set the ball rolling on this path during the 20th century, merely to have Koshi, Gandaki and Mahakali Treaties (starting from Tanakpur “Understating” to Mahakali package) to follow in its wake. With the demise of “Panchayati democracy,” a new trend got underway entailing Nepal to surrender rivers to private sector in the name of export oriented projects. Examples of this new trend manifests in West Seti, Upper Karnali and Arun III projects.

It’s Fresh Water, Not Energy

One thing is common in all these treaties and agreements – ensuring fresh water for India. Without spelling it out explicitly, Nepal’s right to water in these rivers have been ceded. The issue in terms of downstream benefit in the case of reservoir projects is relatively easy to understand (some politicos refuse to understand the value of stored water while going about lamenting that water flowing in rivers, for which no one will be willing to pay a price without adding spatial or temporal value to it, is going awaste). West Seti project, for example, augments the dry season flow in the downstream areas in India by 90 m3/s, equivalent to 7.77 billion liters per day. In order to understand the value of such water one needs to know that Nepal is planning to invest in the order of Rs 30 billion to bring 170 million liters per day into Kathmandu. Had West Seti project been conceptualized as a multipurpose project, there would not have been an issue of downstream benefit to India. However, as there are no plans for Nepal to benefit from the augmented flow, India will receive such stored water free of cost, besides benefiting from flood control benefits. The issue here is why Nepal should inundate over 4,000 hectares of its land (to build the reservoir and due to inundation in Banke district as a result of Laxmanpur barrage and augmented flow) and displace over 30,000 people just to provide additional water to India during dry season, free of cost. Politicos and bureaucrats sermonize that Nepal is free to use such water while it flows within Nepal. But without a multipurpose project being conceptualized for Nepal to use such water, India, after using the augmented flow during one season, will start asserting the principle of “existing prior consumptive use” and Nepal will lose the right over such bodies of water permanently. This principle has already been used in structuring Mahakali Treaty to the disadvantage of Nepal. This is one way of gifting precious fresh water produced by storing it in Nepal to India.

One will need to study Columbia Treaty under which Canada is compensated for losing alternative use of the land inundated and also for augmented flow in the dry season from USA, besides the power benefit shared between the two countries for constructing the reservoir project. Nepal should have insisted on using this treaty as a precedent in getting recompense for land mass lost due to submergence (including forest resources, wild life, existing infrastructure, etc.) in the case of West Seti project. But …

Another way Nepal is ceding its right to water becomes apparent with some difficulty. Run of the river projects like Upper Karnali and Arun III do not generate augmented flow and, hence, apparently, no water related issues are involved. But an in depth study will make it clear that water issue is involved even in these projects. Section 20 of Electricity Regulation, 1993 guarantees “Right on Water Resources” which says that “The licensee, who has obtained license for production of electricity, shall have the right to use the water resources for the works as mentioned in the license to the extent of such place and quantity as specified in the license.” As stipulated by this section someone possessing a license to a specific site is guaranteed that no consumptive use of water will be undertaken in the upstream areas of the project, which might entail reduction of flow to the project site. By getting various “investors” to secure licenses to sites in Nepal, India has succeeded in ensuring that Nepal is forced to refrain from using the water for consumptive uses in these areas. In this manner too downstream flow to the Ganges is successfully secured with the issuance of each license and Nepal misses an opportunity to use such water, for example, to irrigate its arable land. In order to put things in proper perspective, one needs to remember that the Ganges receives 41% of its flow from Nepal in the wet season and 75% in the dry season.

On the other hand, although quite a few of Nepal’s hydrocracy (bureaucrats, intellectuals and politicos related to hydropower) believe that India badly needs electricity from Nepal, time has already proven that it’s not so. Take the example of West Seti. If India was badly in need of electricity from this project, Indians would have made sure that this project was built more than a decade ago. In other words, they would not have allowed this project to hibernate for one and a half decade. Same conclusion could be drawn from Mahakali Treaty as well. The detailed project report (DPR) for Pancheswar project was supposed to be ready within six months of execution of this treaty. It’s been over a decade now but the DPR is nowhere near sight. From this it could be easily seen that India is not that desperate for electricity from rivers in Nepal, as is being perceived (and also propagated) by Nepal’s hydrocracy. If indeed India was starving for electricity she could have easily ensured that Pancheswar project (6,480 MW from storage project and 240 MW from reregulating dam) is built and, probably, commissioned by now. By getting Nepal to sign on the dotted lines in the treaty document, India succeeded in legitimizing the use of water in excess of what she is entitled to (50% of the water in Mahakali – deemed to be a border River), which she had been illegitimately using prior to execution of the treaty. And it’s also not that difficult to see that she is in no hurry to get this project commissioned.

Export to and Import from India

Prayasjee has put his finger on the raw nerve. Thanks. The peak demand in last fiscal year, according to NEA’s latest report, was 720 MW. The industrial corridors in Butwal-Bhairahawa, Parwanipur-Birgunj, and Duhabi-Biratnagar are starving for energy for the existing industries. These corridors could use 200 MW each while establishment of new industries and expansion of the existing industries is constrained due to lack of electricity. Dr Amrit Nakarmi has figured out that merely to displace cooking gas (LPG, which is causing NOC to hemorrhage, besides other petroleum products) in Kathmandu valley we need additional 680 MW. By the time West Seti project gets commissioned in about 5 years, in this manner, Nepal’s own demand will exceed 2,000 MW. If Nepal is to try to be self reliant in the matter of energy for transportation and, therefore, electrify its transportation system (ranging from electric train, trolley bus, cable car to hybrid cars) the demand will be much higher. Therefore, I have no choice but to agree with you that it makes no sense for Nepal to endeavor to export electricity when she herself “doesn't have enough electricity” as you have very aptly put it.

Prayasjee, there is also fiscal tragedy inherent in this export-import “business.” It costs about Rs 21/kWh for NEA to generate peak-in power (from thermal plants) but peak-in power from West Seti project is slated to be exported at around Rs 3/kWh (US $ 0.0495/kWh). Further, Nepal is importing electricity from (the same) PTC at prices ranging from Rs 5.58 to Rs 6.50, for any time during the day and during all seasons, in 2006 (I don’t have the applicable rate for 2008 which is bound to be higher). After knowing this, I have to agree with you that it not only “sounds really stupid,” but it’s really stupid on the part of us (people in Nepal – for tolerating such a hydrocracy and the leadership all these years).

Decommissioning

Prayasjee, you are also right with respect to the hype created by the hydrocracy about Nepal becoming rich after getting the project handed over after 30 years “free of cost”. As the old saying goes, it will be tantamount to us going about bragging that we have put on some weight while it was merely a case of swelling of the body. Besides the point you have rightly raised, there is the issue of decommissioning which both the hydrocracy and the project people don’t like to talk. Although the main source of Kulekhani reservoir, for example, is not river based, the dead storage of this reservoir is already 25%. In other words, the capacity of Kulekhani reservoir has diminished to 75% of original capacity in about 25 years. Seti River carries high silt load and West Seti project will transform into a run-of-the-river project from the reservoir project in about 30-40 years. At that time, after getting it handed over to Nepal, this project’s dam will have to be decommissioned. As the private sector has not provided any budget for this purpose, the government of Nepal will be forced to spend money for this purpose. Meaning, when Nepal is supposed to be “enjoying” electricity from this project handed over free of cost, she will be forced to shell out money for decommissioning which will be costlier than the origial project cost.

Monopsony

Hiding behind the shield of anonymity one commentator has alleged that I was trying to fool “innocent Nepali readers.” It seems s/he her/himself is trying to fool the readers while forgetting that the readers are much more informed than s/he deigns to think. I earnestly hope that s/he will desist from doing so soon. S/he attempted to prove the point by explaining that PTC is not the only buyer and went on to “try” to enlighten me by listing some other “could be” buyers. Existence of other buyers in India and PTC being authorized to be sole buyer of electricity from Nepal (thereby leading to monopsony market situation) is very different. Once other potential buyers also become authorized to play in this market the monopsony market with regard to export of electricity from Nepal will cease to exist. I am sure that s/he is aware of this. I am obliged to other commentators who also have pointed this fact out.

Export Tarrif

S/he also says that “The going rate for a PPA with PTC is Rs। 5।30...that is why West Seti project is not taking off...they signed a terribly bad and unfeasible deal।” If that is the case then the proponents of West Seti people are better off by canceling current PPA with PTC and asking for new one with the rate s/he (the particular commentator) has quoted। In any case, the point I was making in my original write up was that expecting PTC to pay Rs 5।13/kWh from even run-of the river project is an over estimation when PTC has agreed to pay merely around Rs 3/kWh for peak-in energy (I am sure that the commentator is not “innocent” to the extent of not understanding the difference between the energy generated by the two types of projects)।


I request Damanjee to note that PTC hasn’t offered West Seti Rs 5.13 per kWh, rather around Rs 3/kWh only (US $ 0.0495/kWh). The website for Department of Electricity Development is http://www.doed.gov.np/

Nepal’s Economically Feasible Potential

The anonymous commentator has even called me a “theoretical man” based on the fact that I have used 43,000 MW to compute per capita electricity that will be available to the people of Nepal। S/he needs to remember that I was merely using a number that is being used by government authorities including Water and Energy Commission of GoN। S/he needs to remember that I was not endeavoring to establish a correct number for Nepal’s economically feasible potential contrasted with what is currently official accepted number। I, however, agree with her/him that “this number will continue to go up with more infrastrucute (sic) being built and PPA rates going up” and potential virgin sites being identified.

Royalty

S/he goes on to allege that I don’t “have a clue as to how energy royalties are calculated” and goes on to talk about gross and net energy। It is common knowledge that there is no monopoly or monopsony whatsoever in the matter of understanding the difference between gross and net (and Damanjee also says that I “may not know the difference between NET and GROSS (based on royalties))।” Being a Fellow of Institute of Chartered Accountant and also a student of both management and economics (also having taught in Tribhuvan and Kathmandu Universities for over 3 decades), it’s not possible for me to deny knowing the difference between NET and GROSS. However, my whole and sole point in the write up was: it’s practically impossible for Nepal to earn the royalty at the rate of US 1.5 ¢ per kWh at currently prevalent tariff rates for electricity, under current Nepal law. In order for Nepal to earn royalty at the rate of US 1.5 ¢ per kWh under existing law, as I have mentioned in my write up, the tariff will have to be US $ 0.60/kWh – which is well neigh impossible even in the near future, unless applicable royalty rate is revised upwards to 25% by amending the relevant law and Nepal starts exporting electricity at the rate of US 6 ¢ per kWh.

Related Post:

Nepal's Hydropower - Deconstructing a Few Myths
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/08/nepals-hydropower-deconstructing-few.html

The End of the Line? - Nepal's Experience with Terrorism as an Expedited Path to Power

(Courtesy: el Mariachi)

Less than five years ago, no one would have guessed that the leader of Nepal's Maoist party, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (also known as "Prachanda") would become the first elected Prime Minister of the Republic of Nepal. After a decade of unrelenting, terror, murder and degrading the Nepali psyche, Nepal's Maoists are close to achieving their political objective - "capturing" state power.

The Maoists do deserve some credit. Even their harshest critics will admit that the Maoist leadership has more than its fair share of strategic masterminds. This is not to discount the impacts of acute incompetence and self-centered politics that continues to plague Nepal's non-Maoist leadership. But it is fair to also say that the Maoists have distinguished themselves with political machination and foresight of a level that far exceeds the collective intellect of their political contemporaries.

The Maoists' have masterfully accomplished their end-goal by leveraging every available opportunity to their political advantage. Twice, State forces had beat down the Maoists' insurgent capabilities and at both times, the Maoist leadership came to the negotiating table while their fighting forces re-grouped and re-armed. The Maoists' even recognized opportunity when King Birendra's family was murdered. They wasted no time in blaming the multiple murders on the new King, Gyanendra, and essentially, fed off of the public's standing discontent with the Gyanendra and his son.

When former King Gyanendra took over, the Maoists turned a life-threatening situation to their advantage by forming an alliance with seven political parties (including those who commissioned the war against the Maoists). Having eliminated the Royalist and military threat, the Maoists have now discarded the Nepali Congress - a party the Maoists were able to manipulate to the maximum extent through the NC's "Achilles' Heel" - Girija Prasad Koirala's never-ending lust for power.

The Maoists' have leveraged every agenda from republicanism, to nationalism, to ethnic determination, to gender-based politics, to federalism, to human rights - each, depending on time and situation. When examined over a continuum, the contradictions inherent to various Maoist positions is apparent. But, the Maoists' have managed to sell their changed positions as "adaptations" (or flexibility) as opposed to the tactical maneuvers they really are; the Maoists' have managed to keep the Nepali public focused peripheral issues and their political opponents, guessing and in disarray.

Nepal's Maoists' have also used civil society and the INGO community as stepping stones on their path to power. Politically speaking, there is nothing wrong with the manner in which the Maoists have campaigned - they have operated under the same constraints as their political rivals. However, there is one differentiator between the Maoists' political campaign and the campaigns of others. This differentiator is the subtle (but ever-present) threat of violence.

Whether through the PLA, the YCL, or through their unions, the Maoists have always retained a credible (and demonstrated) penchant for the application of force. Meanwhile, Nepal's liberal elite (domestically and abroad), have continued to focus on the more progressive aspects of the Maoist agenda while turning a blind eye to the not-so-progressive, power plays that actually enable the Maoists as a force to reckon with.

The height of hypocrisy has been so-called civil society leaders expressing fear for their lives in private and then praising the Maoists' in public. The Maoists using the human rights lobby to neutralize the NA's most effective counter-insurgency unit - "Brigade #10" - while burying documented human rights abuses of their own (during the war and during the on-going peace process), is also an "exemplary" feat. For the Maoists, the entire peace process has been a one-way street of "take, take and take some more." This, according to the international community and the gainfully employed UNMIN, has been indicative of the "success" of Nepal's peace process.

Consider for example, the number of concessions that the Maoists have gained from a single demand they continue to agree to meet and then flout - the return of seized properties. Or, consider the Maoist leadership's promise to curb violent YCL activities and more recently, to disband the YCL. The first promise will never materialize; the second one has more potential since the Maoists' have figured out how to disband the YCL only to recreate it under the illusion of a "Youth Ministry." The net result of both examples is the same - the Maoists retain the initiative while their rivals remain helpless. Ironically, it is what the Maoists do (and how they do it) that makes their opponents "reactionary."

When any other party challenges the Maoists', the peace process comes under threat; but as long as the Maoists get what they want, the peace process remains on track. This however, is about to change. As the head of the interim government, the Maoists' no longer enjoy the luxury of opposition. With Pushpa Dahal as Nepal's newly elected Prime Minister, over night, the Maoists have become front and center of the peace process, of the nation's governance, its foreign policy and the constitution-writing process, all at the same time.

Using the Nepali Congress as a diversion to focus public angst is not going to be as easy as it was when Nepal had a Monarchy to blame everything on. Hydropower is not the panacea the Maoists have painted as the solution to Nepal's economic woes. Taxing aphrodisiac sales my have helped the Maoists with their insurgency but it is hardly something that can be relied upon as a GDP enhancer. The Swiss model of federalism works best for Switzerland because Switzerland isn't where in Nepal. These are all realities the Maoists will have to face.

According to work cited by best selling author Malcom Gladwell, 150 persons (or less) is the optimal number when it comes to operational efficiency (decision making). While there are certainly levels of acceptable efficiencies, 601 (the number of individual in the constituent assembly chartered to write Nepal's new constitution) appears "slightly" suboptimal. The "logical end" to the Nepal's peace process is not as forthcoming as Mr. Dahal would have us believe - unless of course, the "logical end" by Dahal's definition differs from the "logical end" as envisioned by others.

Whatever the case may be, the time has finally arrived for the Maoists' to put their money where their mouths are and deliver on their populist rhetoric. The "people" want a "Switzerland" in Nepal and they want it yesterday. The educated Nepali elite want a liberal democracy. China wants the Tibetan issue to disappear. India wants whoever is in power to continue reporting to New Delhi on a periodic basis.

The international community (especially the UN) has done an excellent job of crediting the Maoists for being pragmatic in their political approach. The Maoists for their part would do well to continue being as pragmatic in leadership, as they were in opposition. A few useful tips to Nepal's new Prime Minister may come from News Week Editor, Fareed Zakaria; both from Zakaria's seminal writing ("The Future of Freedom") and from Zakaria's very bold and pragmatic recommendation (in News Week - http://www.newsweek.com/id/151731) that the Bush Administration's second term policies are balanced and should be continued irrespective of which presidential hopeful reaches the White House, this Fall. There are lessons for Nepal's Maoists in all of Zakaria's work.

Unfortunately, for brilliant minds like Fareed Zakaria, Nepal is at best, a data point. And since it is unlikely that Nepal has Zakaria-equivalents on stand-by to advise the country's new Prime Minister, Mr. Dahal may wish to spend a little less time attending Olympic fanfare and more time thinking about drafting Nepal's new constitution. He may also want to take a few notes from Zakaria's writings on "illiberal democracy." Then again, a "liberal autocracy" may be of more interest to Dahal.

Related Posts:

State of the Nepali State - Equilibrium nowhere in Sight
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/08/state-of-nepali-state-equilibrium-not.html

End the Immoral Politics
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/07/end-immoral-politics.html

Endless Possibilities in the Republic of Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/05/endless-possibilities-that-accompany.html

All the Right Agendas
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/04/all-right-agendas-nepali-national.html

The Other Side of SSR (Security Sector Reform) - What Nepal's Mainstream Media Neglects Informing the Public About

(Courtesy: el Commandante)

Recently, Nepal's mainstream media has been rife with opinions on how Security Sector Reform (SSR) should be handled. From so-called international experts on the UNMIN's payroll to child welfare specialists turned expert on security issues, everyone appears to have unsolicited "two cents" to add.

This writing although unsolicited, is factual and grounded in events as they occurred rather than on biased accounts that serve vested interests. In essence, this is not another attempt at re-writing history to get foreign aid dollars for Nepal - it is a targeted account, designed to ensure the dollars that Nepal does receive, reaches destinations where reforms are most urgent.

What most (if not all) of the recent SSR related analyses share is the following theme: "Nepal's security apparatus - especially the Army - needs to be more transparent and more democratic." Having read, re-read and disdainfully digested the words of such internationally esteemed wise-men, below is a slightly more balanced take on the sequence of fixing that really needs to happen.

Nepal's Model Extended to India's Insurgencies - Let's hope the same model doesn't unfold in India!

Before embarking on a point-by-point critique, let us do away with the most ridiculous logic ever to have been aired; that somehow, Nepal's "democratic mainstreaming" of its Maoists will encourage similar insurgent outfits in India to follow suit.

Such logic is retarded for so many reasons but for the sake of this writing, let's focus on the obvious lesson that India's Naxalites have taken from Nepal - that a gratuitous war of attrition using a combination of political, military, ethnic and human rights agendas can ultimately bring a fledgling democracy to its knees.

If Nepal was to really serve as an example for radical Indian leftists to democratize, why hasn't Sitaram Yechuri vocally opposed calls for the Indian Air Force to join the fight against the Naxalites? Perhaps the idea is for the Indian Government to learn from Nepal's mistakes. This would certainly explain why India has continued to train and arm civilian self-defense units to fight their Naxalites while Nepal's attempt at raising "Village Defense Forces" was shut down on humanitarian grounds.

It is not conjecture, but fact, that the idea of "Village Defense Forces" in Nepal would have been a straight up application of "Maoist tactics 101," on the Maoists. They knew it, understood the ramifications, and mobilized known sympathizers like Mr. Padma Ratna Tuladhar to derail the Nepali government's initiative.

Based on historical facts, it is extremely likely that the Nepali government's idea was opposed for the right humanitarian reasons. But the point being highlighted here is not so much the opposition but rather, the double standards that were applied to Nepal versus India - even though the standards were based on the same humanitarian principles.

With this example in mind, let us proceed to take a dispassionate view of the subjects that need to be considered, when speaking of SSR - the Nepalese Army, Political Will/Capacity, and the Integration of Maoist Combatants.

A. The Nepalese Army

A favorite criticism of the Nepalese Army is that it is unprofessional. But by what standards?

By military standards (in the context of Nepal's resources constraints) the Nepalese Army is a professional institution with a hierarchy that consists of officers trained in the best military institutions around the world. They are exposed to and experienced in UN peacekeeping operations and are battle-hardened through participation in a counter-insurgency campaign at home.

The military's chain of command is established through integral institutional mechanisms and procedures that accurately assess character, competence and professional knowledge through annual reviews. Documented feedback on the progression of each officer is subject to appraisals by two senior reviewing officers. Such appraisals are independent reviews of junior officers' assessments and are designed to drive accountability and professional integrity. Promotions are awarded based on competence and institutional judgment with nepotism and favoritism minimized to the extent humanly possible (if not eliminated).

So what's unprofessional about the Nepalese Army that isn't about all the other Armies around the world? What institution in Nepal is more professional than the Nepalese Army? If 100% efficienciency, transparency and immaculate accountability are the standards that the Nepalese Army is being measured against, perhaps those pointing fingers at the Army should get their own houses in order first?

Another criticism of the Nepalese armed forces is that they are undemocratic. Once again, "by whose standards?"

With historical precedent as a yardstick, the Nepalese Army has always remained loyal to the legitimate powerbase as enshrined in the constitution of the day. In fact, the Nepalese Army's training and operational doctrines include detailed accounts of when aid to civilian authorities is deemed appropriate; the same doctrines intentionally (and strictly) exclude any policies or guidance on administrative procedures to be executed under martial law.

So what exactly is undemocratic about the Nepalese Army? Is Nepal's Army undemocratic for having fought the Maoists on the orders of a democratically elected government? Is the Nepali Army undemocratic because it failed to mutiny under the de-throned King's undemocratic (yet constitutionally driven) orders? Then why wasn't the King prosecuted and why does all the blame rest on the Nepalese Army's shoulders? Or truly, is the Nepali Army undemocratic because it refused to go to war with the Maoists on the whims of one man - Girija Prasad Koirala?

The only thing undemocratic about the Nepalese Army appears to be the one-sided abuse that this institution continually bears from individuals like Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Kanak Mani Dixit, Devendra Raj Pandey and the entire lot of international organizations whose budgets depend on the availability of "soft targets" like the Nepalese Army.

Further, the Nepalese Army's financial policies and procedures are transparent and have always been subject to scrutiny by the Auditor General. Yet, the Army is accused of unprecedented levels of corruption and graft. If such practices exist, why hasn't the Auditor General executed independent audits of the Army's spending? The AG is certainly empowered to conduct such audits and yet, no evidence of action exists. Assuming that allegations of the Army's corrupt ways are accurate, the question that begs being asked is at what level the corruption occurs and where the funds end up? The answer to this question may explain the "lame duck" status of the Auditor General which is hardly the Army's fault alone.

The Nepali Army is also alleged to be an exclusive State organ. Yet, no rules, regulations or practices are widely prevalent that thwart inclusiveness. It is true that quality and merit are not compromised during recruitment. And these standards are maintained with professionalism in mind - they are not enforced to decrease inclusiveness.

If the argument of exclusion is based on the disproportion representation of Nepal's southern ethnicities in the Nepalese Army, then the question that need be asked is why the British and especially the Indian Gurkhas recruit exclusively from Nepal's hilly regions? At least the Nepalese Army has recruitment depots in Nepal's southern belt. And it is not the Nepali Army's policy to force recruitment from any part of Nepal - the process is voluntary. So on what basis is the Nepalese Army's recruiting processes, exclusionary?

Further, the Nepalese Army is the only national institution that has always remained satisfactorily functional. It remains steadfastly dedicated to the protection of national integrity and cohesion. It mirrors Nepalese society. And, it was instrumental in safeguarding the nation from being declared a failed state.

The Nepalese Army has consistently dedicated itself to the protection of the Nepali people, and at times, has operated in complete isolation to prohibit the Maoist insurgents from a achieving a military takeover. It still remains a credible, robust and capable force as well as a bastion against illegitimate and undemocratic adventurism. This is precisely why neutralizing or demoralizing the Nepalese Army will always remain a focal point of advocacy for vested interest groups, bent of dismantling an institution they wish to mirror in their own image of "free for all" chaos, lawlessness, and instability.

B. Political Will / (In) Capacity

The erstwhile constitution of 1990 had delegated all authority over the Army to the Legislative and Executive branches of government. It was a democratically elected Prime Minister of the Nepali Congress party, who introduced a legal provision (contradictory to the spirit of the constitution), that mandated Royal approval for military mobilization. Ironically, it was another Nepali Congress Prime Minister (and also the current caretaker PM of Nepal - Girija Prasad Koirala), who also resigned citing the Army's refusal to engage the Maoists - how could the Army go to war in the absence of broad political consensus?

Then, when the Army was finally mobilized to fight Nepal's insurgency, the same political leadership failed to prepare and execute an integrated national campaign plan; they failed to utilize the military as one of many instruments at the State's disposal. The Army was used (and abused) in isolation, devoid of a political aim and continually portrayed with inflated expectations as a "silver bullet" to Nepal's Maoist insurgency.

Such political farce continued well beyond the civil uprising of April 2006. Constituent Assembly Elections were held as a democratic exercise when the country's law and order situation was out of control. As a result, the Maoist party obtained 31 % support by employing widely documented acts of coercion and intimidation.

International observers (including the Carter Center), executed their mandate to observe election procedures at limited cites while in the vast majority of the countryside, intimidation persisted. The observers' essentially put on a stamp of legitimacy that was immediately called into question by almost every major political party candidate, who reported widespread Maoist coercion. The interim Finance Minister, Ram Saran Mahat, even sustained head injuries at the hands of Maoist henchmen, known as the Young Communist League (YCL).

Though the election results must now be fully respected, the ramifications of such futile democratic exercises will unfold and complicate the Nepalese security situation and political process more intensely in the future. A broader and more durable coalition of communist parties can never be fully ruled out because although the leaders of the UML and the fringe leftist parties sound vocally robust, the lower, younger echelons are fully sold on populist rhetoric, extremism and instant gratification derived from resorting to violence (to fulfill political demands).

Currently, the House consists of 69 % of the old political cadres (who remain completely beholden to external powers) and 31% of Maoist cadres (who are exceptionally well versed in modulating between nationalist and extreme leftist designs, as the situation demands).

The 69 % are near-oblivious to issues and procedures that pertain to national security (while technically, they exercise civilian supremacy and oversight over the Security Forces); the remaining 31% believe in establishing “Political Commissars” to command and control the uniformed services.

The Maoist leadership in the interim government are battle hardened and their political chain of command is intricately tied to their military arm. "Prachanda" is still the supreme commander of the Maoist military wing and Maoist commanders like Barsa Man Pun, Ram Bahadur Thapa, are integral components to the Maoists' political strategy. No other political party in Nepal enjoys the company of their own private, military wing even as they participate in open, democratic politics.

There should be absolutely no doubt that the Maoists committed to capturing total political power by any and all means available. While those who remain bent on reinterpreting historical lessons of appeasement wait for the Maoists to sober up, it is advisable for Nepal's political leadership to exercise precautions rather than rely on remedies.

The capacity of the civilian hierarchy – the so-called “Political Masters,” and the civilian bureaucrats of security–related echelons (e.g., the Ministries of Home and Defense), are neither functional nor knowledgeable about security affairs. Their handling of the various mutinies in the Police Force and the Armed Police Force are indicative of their collective incompetence. The Nepalese Army’s “no nonsense resolve” was instrumental in compelling the mutineers to surrender. That in the absence of the Nepalese Army, the government would have succumbed to the pressures of the mutineers is a forgone conclusion.

C. The Process of Re-Verified Maoist Combatant Integration

To fulfill their political aspirations, the Maoists intend to undertake the following measures:

• Neutralize the Nepalese Army which remains the last obstacle in their quest to establish power supremacy.
• Politicize the Judicial Branch and the Bureaucracy.
• Control the media and the Civil Society.
• Subvert the people and demand obedience through the display of public punishments.
• Continue to exploit the international community, the UN and the INGOs' good will.
• Capture and control the national economy through unions.
• Undermine non-Maoist political parties.
• Establish parallel governance mechanisms.
• Manipulate (leverage) previously declared commitments to continue extracting concessions from other parties.
  

The integration process should be conducted according to the following steps:

• Disperse the 12,000 non-verified combatants and reduce the cantonments, immediately.
• Maintain allowances, rations and accommodations for the 19,602 verified combatants.
• Establish vocational training facilities and adult education programs in the cantonments.
• Conduct de-doctrination processes in preparation for integration.
• Conduct re-verification to confirm and identify those Maoist combatants who want to willingly join the security forces. The rest should be provided vocational training to make them skilled laborers and provide them with job guarantees.
• Those who intend to join the Security Forces must fulfill existing pre-requisites, willingly volunteer to abide by the Military Law and de-link themselves from their parent political party and its activities.
• The creation of intact Maoist-only units, a Maoist chain of command and inclusion of politically active members, previous Security Forces deserters, and HR violators should not be permitted.
  

Conclusion

SSR and supreme civilian control of the Nepali State's Security Forces are certainly needed for a fully democratic nation to emerge as the new Nepal. But the process of democratization is as urgently needed for the political side of the equation as it is for the military side. One must learn to effectively exercise control over the other, without repeating the politicization that resulted with the Nepal Police, after the 1990 transition. This is clearly a two-way effort and simply heaping blame on the Nepalese Army and asking for it to democratize and undergo reforms, won't achieve the desired end.

The National Security Council and the Ministry of Defense must be educated to function independently but with knowledgeable and competent civilian manpower. It is absolutely vital to exercise civilian control in an evolutionary manner to avoid unnecessary frictions and animosities. As the apex of Nepal's security forces, the civilian hierarchy must equally inculcate transparency, accountability and inclusiveness into its own mechanisms.

One must clean one's own house first - only then does it make sense to point fingers in others' directions. The political hierarchy must be capable enough to plan, project, provide resources and punctually decide the course of action. Should this level of operational efficiency be achieved, criticisms of corruption and undemocratic practices within Nepal's security forces will automatically become moot points.

Essentially, SSR in Nepal's context cannot be the exclusive domain of any one institution. Rather, it must be planned and executed as a multi-intuitional, joint civilian-military exercise. There is not a single institution in Nepal that is not in need of reform - the Nepalese Army is the most convenient target because it happens to be the one stumbling-block that is preventing the Maoists from achieving political dominance.

No doubt, there are documented instances of grave mistakes that have been committed by security forces in the line of duty. The perpetrators of such abuses should be prosecuted to the law's extent. But the sideshow drama that depicts the Nepalese Army as a bunch of trigger-happy, war-mongering idiots, has to cease. For if the Nepalese Army is guilty of all the allegations heaped on it, then the political establishment that sent the Army to war is equally guilty for committing the Army to combat and then deserting the security forces midstream. The panacea to preventing human rights abuses is clear - DON'T GO TO WAR. Was it the Army that was begging to fight the Maoists or the elected government of the time that ordered to Army into action?

In a country where the largest party in the constituent assembly consists of a group that waged armed rebellion for over a decade, is the State's Security Forces the only organ that needs reform? Or is there a much larger problem that needs to be dealt with, concurrently?

The same apologists who want Nepal's Maoists to serve as role models to India's Naxalites will tell us that "peace is made in such ways." But so are tyrants and this is a thought that should feature prominently on the minds of SSR "subject matter experts," political pundits, and all international agencies that are busy advising Nepal on how to reform its security sector.

Related Posts:

The Utility of a Professional Nepalese Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/utility-of-professional-nepalese-army.html

All Attention on the Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/all-attention-on-army.html

The Nepali Army is a Favorite Target for Cheap Provocateurs - An Analysis of a Nepali Adolescent's Professional Obituary
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/being-cheap-provocateur-is-easy.html

Nepal’s National Security Agency: Critical Issues Facing The CA

(Courtesy: Mr. Madhukar SJB Rana - Prof. South Asian Institute of Management, Former Finance Minister)

A battle royal is being fought by the political parties in the Constituent Assembly (CA), and outside, as to who should or should not be members of the current National Defence Council (NDC). At a time when security sector reforms is high on the national agenda, and one is quite unsure as to whether the federal democratic republic of Nepal is going to be endowed with a presidential or parliamentary system of governance by the CA, one can appreciate why all 25-33 political parties should clamour to be on board to protect party interests. Given the above uncertainties, the problem is being made more complex by the fact that, as agreed by the government and seven parties, the Head of State (HOS) will now be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The complexity arises from the fragmentation of the unitary state; the polity of proportional representation into parliament leading to in-built instability, and the non-resolution of the issue over the optimal powers for the presidency (ceremonial vs constitutional).

This basic thrust of this article is that only the government should be the member of the NDC. However, all are welcome to be members of the National Security Council (NSC), including civil society and professional experts and academicians.

The other thrust is to underscore the vital need for the CA to define precisely what ‘national security’ is supposed to mean and demarcate the nature, scope and authority of the NSC as a fundamental constitutional agency. In doing so, we, the citizens, would expect that each political party would consider the matter with due intellectual diligence by being analytically grounded in geo-politics, geo-economics and geo-psychology in consideration of 2 factors and its forces: (a) the current status of Nepal’s national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and (b) the future threats to the integrity of Nepal from the probable centripetal and centrifugal forces within a federal body politic, including threats from outside its national territory—be they states, international business, international non-governmental organizations or the international mafia.

Word has it that, when the army lobbied successfully, and rightly, for the NSC to be a constitutional organ in 1990, the proposed NSC was more akin to the NSC of the USA and India: being more of an open, participative think tank on national security where policy and research inputs would be garnered from all political parties, civil society and experts as members and invitees. A National Security Advisor would lead the NSC. This would allow for sufficient national debate, dissent and dialogue before a national security strategy is actually adopted founded on national consensus, if possible . Such an overall national security policy was expected to guide Nepal’s foreign policy, foreign relations and internal security matters in a holistic manner.

Unfortunately, what was originally sought by the army could not take form as intended owing to (a) the Royal Palace military secretariat’s traditional stranglehold over any innovation by the army, (b) the inability of the army to mobilize public opinion with effective public relations and (c) the utter lack of harmonious interface between the various security agencies. Thus what we landed up with was to settle for the NDC, as is, which now is embroiled in deep controversy over who should be members. It must be mentioned that the NDC Secretariat is purely military. It is precisely because of the overwhelming military nature of the secretariat that one recognizes it more as ‘NDC’ than ‘NSC’.

Its major achievements, perhaps, are the development of greater inter-agency communication, cooperation and coordination in response to grappling with civil disobedience, insurgency, terrorism, civil war and natural disasters. It has been highly successful in being able to preserve Nepal as a viable—albeit weak--- state that is nowhere in sight of becoming a ‘failed state’.

Because the current security agency is more an NDC than NSC so, therefore, it should be led by the Head of Government (HOG). Where, however, the HOS is more than just ‘ceremonial’ it is possible, and probably appropriate, that the HOS chair meetings of the new NSC. Both should have their place in the body politic but only the NSC should be imbibed in the Constitution.

To repeat, it is argued here that the NDC should not include any political party as its function is to communicate, coordinated and control defence policy being implemented by the security, security-related and intelligence agencies as approved by the Council of Ministers. The scope of decision-making in the NDC is purely over issues of war, civil war, insurgency, terrorism, curfew, counter intelligence and national emergencies. In short, it is primarily concerned with issues over the break down of law and order and threats to Nepal’s territorial integrity, national sovereignty and independence. The NDC is accountable to parliament through the Ministry of Defence. This should suffice.

It is appropriate to mention hear, which actually is suggestive of just how narrowly conceived the NDC was, that the Foreign Minister in not a member, even when UN peace keeping and peace enforcing operations are or should be legitimate agenda items for decision by NDC.

Nation states and communities within it, just like individuals, feel insecure when their very existence, their material and financial assets, and their fundamental values are threatened by other nations, societies and individuals respectively.

Nations, communities and individuals' families feel internally secure when there exists, within its territory, communal harmony and tolerance so that there is safe from social turmoil and violence. They also feel secure when there is the absence of political disruptions with law and order prevailing with clear prospects of easy recourse to, and dispensation of justice, by a highly trusted judiciary. Freedom of the press and ‘press security’ is equally vital for individual, communal and national security.

Feeling secure in this new age of inter-dependence and instant exposure of daily events throughout the far corners of the globe has got to be a challenging business. Because never before in mankind's history have there been so many nations with so many peoples making daily contacts at the state-to-state and people-to-people levels with attendant vulnerabilities and risks at the global, regional, national and community levels. To respond quickly is the task of intelligence and counter intelligence.

Past experience tells us that a Nepal Central Intelligence Agency (NCIA) is a dire need for the country; and will be even more needed when it moves towards federalism. The lesson from our own insurgency and civil war is that there are limits to military strategy to maintain law and order. With globalization the sanctity of international borders is questionable. Rise of non-state actors in such forms as religious fundamentalists, international anarchists, international mafia, international civil society, and 'sovereign individuals' (individuals with wealth that exceeds those of states in the realm of e-commerce) are cause for great intelligence concern.

If traditionally diplomacy is the alternative to war, in the new era of globalization it may just as well be said that intelligence is the alternative to diplomacy. As a matter of fact, given the huge need for public expenditure to meet the social welfare cost of the world’s graying population intelligence spending is working out to be the first line of cost-effective national defence for most nations. Nepal should not be an exception.

Further, the inter-state struggle for natural resources, like water and minerals, for example, to maintain high economic growth rates will be lost or won on effective intelligence strategy formulation and implementation rather than relying simply on traditional diplomacy and trade and commerce deals. Perhaps the greatest argument for an autonomous central intelligence agency is the dominant mood of the 21st century where global anarchy and wars between civilizations will be a commonplace scenario across continents from the dynamics of global warming, mass migrations coupled with food, energy, water, financial and economic crises.

The other lesson from our political sphere is that, as a weak state, our national administration is near-totally infiltrated by foreign intelligence agencies and their allies, which calls forth a powerful counter-intelligence strategy implemented in earnest to expunge external infiltration and working towards supporting a national anti-corruption drive that seeks legal action combined with social sanctions against traitors and offenders.

In attempting to define ‘national security’ we must learn from Japan, who in the mid-1950’s developed the visionary concept of ‘comprehensive security’ to grapple with the trauma, humiliation and horror of the loss of national sovereignty to the Americans and the psychological sufferings from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki stranded without any natural resources—other than human resources. So they defined ‘national security’ in the broader, more comprehensive concept of ‘human security’.

Fundamentally, the Japanese doctrine of human security rests on the premise that for national security there must not only be ‘military security’ to defend the nation from outside threats but also ‘human security’ to 'defend' nations from inside threats as national stability depends on each individual having sufficient food security, employment security, social security (education, health and old age pension), energy security, information security (access to transport and communications). We might now add ‘water security’, ‘environmental security’ and ‘pandemic health security’ ( HIV AIDS, TB, bird flu ) to the Japanese definition to bring it up to date in its comprehensiveness.

Nepal is now in quest of a new national identity after the removal of monarchy and becoming a secular state. Alienation and confusion is a natural state of in our current social psyche. Political ideologies of the various parties are not going to fill this deep void. Only common values can.

As almost all Nepalese are religious so a new Nepal moral order must be at the core of the national security value system: truth; peace and compassion as preached by Lord Buddha; non-violence and reconciliation as preached by Mahatma Gandhi and, furthermore, duty, devotion; discipline and discrimination to connect the nation’s and each individual’s body, mind and soul, as preached by one of the greatest modern Saints of South Asia-- the Shivapuri Baba of Nepal.

A most valuable organ of state for inter-communal harmony is to have the Council of Relgious Elders (CRE) meet regularly, chaired by the HOS, with rotating co-chairpersonship amongst the various faiths represented, to have constant inter-faith national and local dialogue for communal harmony so as to negate the use of religion, by political parties, to create electoral vote banks, which actually weakens democracy and the rule of law while nurturing communal hatred.

Last, but not least, each ministry and department should review and recommend comprehensive security needs from their sector’s perspective annually henceforth.

Related Posts:

Security Sector Reform: Taking a Regional Approach and Promoting Cooperative Security Arrangement
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/05/security-sector-reform-taking-regional.html

The Utility of a Professional Nepalese Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/utility-of-professional-nepalese-army.html

Immoral Depletion of Scarce Resources

(Re-published with permission from Dr. Khagendra N. Sharma - originally published in the Kathmandu Post)

The Finance Ministry has done an unpardonable disbursement of the scarce national resource. It has decided to give Rs one million each to 330 ex-Members of the Legislative Parliament. Some of the ex-MLPs have been re-elected in the present Legislative Constituent Assembly and will continue till the life of the LCA. But most of the ex-MLPs have been defeated in the LCA election. In the political connotation they do not represent any people any more. Not all of them represented the people in the first place because they were nominated by their parties. Even those, who were elected in the earlier election, had lost the people's trust in the recent election. In both the cases, the disbursement is unjustified.

First of all, the very policy of distributing Rs one million to an MLP to be spent at his discretion is not justified. A democratic country runs through the wishes of the people. In matters of development, the people's wish is the prime factor. The discretion of the leader is not compatible with the concept of democratic governance. In the second place, Nepal followed a policy of decentralized governance, where the local bodies make all the development decisions. The concept of distributing money through the MLP creates a chasm or a polarization between the local bodies and the national level MLP. It is not proper to superimpose the MLP over the local body like the village development committee, the urban municipality and the district development committee.

In the third place, the earlier decision to disburse the money was stopped at the behest of the Supreme Court, wherein it was stated that the money at the hands of the MLPs would be a factor of influencing the voters in their favor vis-à-vis other elector competitors. At that time, at least some of the MLPs (by no means all MLPs) could be considered people's representatives because of their past electoral victory. The court had made a moral link to the money factor. At this new instance, most of the MLPs have lost their popular touch. The Finance Ministry has gone ahead without consulting the court. The tenure of the LP was terminal with the official institutionalization of the LCA. Granting money after the termination of their official status of people's representatives is constitutionally illegitimate and morally repugnant.

In the fourth place, the timing of the disbursement is untenable with all the financial procedures. The annual budget comes to a close on the twentyfifth of Ashar. The money is being disbursed with the condition that it should be spent in just five days after disbursement, with all the financial procedures met and the development work done. (If development were so easy and the leaders so efficient, Nepal would have turned into a paradise in the last two years of the interim rule!)

In the fifth place, the intention behind the disbursal is immoral. It is intended to appease the leaders who could not get the popular support. That is the overt attempt. The covert intention is even more sinister. The Finance Minister belongs to the party that lost the most seats. This appeasement would, therefore, benefit the candidates of that party in the utmost.

The present political situation is the most sensitive in the history of Nepal. The two and a half century old monarchy is just gone, but the future set-up is yet to take up a shape. The parties that were responsible for the removal of the monarchy are in the war path among themselves. The Nepali Congress is finding it hard to digest that the people have not trusted it in the hustings. The CPN-Maoists have been the largest party but the not so large parties in the hung legislative CA are trying to invent one alibi or the other to prevent the largest party from taking over power. The CPN-Maoists are not finding it easy to compromise their principle of hegemony with the other parties without whose co-operation the coalition is not going to succeed. Newly emerged groups and parties are claiming more than their share of popular trust. The CA has not been allowed to function because of this inflated boast.

In the above circumstances, all the efforts should have been directed towards making the present set up work. But the Finance Ministry is depleting the scarce resource on an unnecessary and immoral practice of bribing the untrusted leaders. What was the need? It was done in a desperation at the very end of the fiscal year. Not even seven days are saved for spending the money when the normal time would have required at least seven months to fulfill the demands of honest work to spend the money in accordance with the financial regulations. There is no money for many more urgent needs of the country. The government has raised credits from various sources to fill this need off and on. The government is going to need much more in the two years ahead because the strength of the inflated legislature even for their regular salary and perks.

The present disbursement is 330 million rupees, not a small amount for our financial strength. In the case of the LCA it is going to be a whopping Rs 601 million. Apart from the size of the money, the priority is wrong. The present disbursement is wholly deplorable for obvious reasons, some of them explained above. It is immoral. It is illegal. It is totally unwarranted. No tax payer will tolerate it. No sensible citizen will tolerate it. The outgoing finance Minister is not authorized to disburse it. The PM is not authorized. The outgoing cabinet is not authorized. The country is supposed to be run on moral principles. One of the moral principles is that the executive is accountable towards the legislature. When the legislature is gone, to whom will the executive remain accountable? The whole thing is a sham. It is shameful.This is out right robbery. It is naked corruption. It must not be allowed.

The priority before the LCA is the drafting of the new constitution and it should remain the top and the only agenda. The members of the LCA will have no time to indulge in any other work during their to year term. So, the practice of disbursing the development aid to them should be put to a moratorium for this period. The present case should be an eye opener. Let us not let the leaders loot the country. IF the present disbursement is effected at this hour, it should be recovered from the finance minister, the prime minister and the cabinet members remaining in the saddle today. This should be the first lesson of collective accountability.

The author can be reached at: knsad1@gmail.com

Related Posts:

Act Responsibly!
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/04/act-responsibly.html

CA Election: Compromised Beginning, Flawed Process and Ominous
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/03/ca-election-compromised-beginning.html

More on Hope, Less on Commitment

(Courtesy: Mr. Hemant Arjyal)

This piece, in a way, can be taken as the logical continuation of “Forty-ninth Bhoto jatra” published 16 July last year. This year’s bhoto jatra is yet to be held as Lord Macchendranath is still stuck at Iti tole since about two months, there is nothing wrong with the chariot though. It is said that the Lord finds it very difficult to leave the place, as the saying goes, because of his mistress there!

As for RA one of its 757 has had, perhaps, the longest ever C check in any one’s memory. On the surface the reason for the delay is blamed on non delivery of the engine, which might as well be true. But what had stopped the then RA management from making timely and appropriate decision regarding awarding of repair contract earlier? The board and the government knew quite well that with one operational engine the aircraft will remain grounded for long. It is a ‘democratic’ country and naturally both the government and the RA board were within their rights in sitting put - twiddling their thumbs! We had hoped that by doing away with the ‘R’ the airline would turn a new leaf. Wonder whether bringing back the ‘R’ (for Republic this time) would do the magic! But, again, we can not be too hopeful seeing the way the elected assembly is functioning.

The 50th RA anniversary function was held at even lower scale this time amidst opposition from the unions. The chief guest was the Chief Secretary, not the Minister as was customary. There was no minister to chair the function as he had resigned under party’s order. The Chief Secretary, as the highest ranking guest, seized the god send opportunity to vent out his disgust by declaring RA was in the death bed. Many inferred it as the verdict of a ghatey baidya given the fast sinking trend of the airline.

Anniversary functions provide a forum to commemorate achievements, acknowledge faults, specify challenges and, last but not least, present broad improvement plans / promises for the future. There is no point in recalling that RA once flew to London and Frankfurt and had four jetliners. The stark reality is that RA has been doing the regional route with just one aircraft since the last seven months in one stretch. With its reach severely curtailed, it is no surprise that, skilled pilots and passengers have no option but to look for alternatives.

We see a fundamental similarity in the manner the RA and the country is run. The ‘elected’ politicians are seen to be least concerned with the general public and their welfare as they wrangle endlessly. And in the RA, the management is more concerned with its vested interest than start worrying about the sundries like passengers.

This time around the published write ups on the anniversary day were on the minimum. A person who had four different pieces last year had just one this time. As usual both the articles, written by RA insiders, spoke highly of the contributions made and lamented about the way the corporation was neglected by the government. Without substantiating one of the writers makes a tall claim that NAC was still able to “retain its popularity among the customers”. If it is to be believed then it looks like its RA clients were too happy to bear with it even when the services were abruptly cut.

‘Serious aircraft shortage’ was the title of the other piece published in the Nepal Samachar Patra. It points out at the duplicity on the part of the government which makes loudest noise about losses made while it fails to appreciate, by being helpful; the services provided to the remote areas despite heavy losses. The article boasts about RA ground handling services to many international airlines and the revenue this has generated. But in reality, RA landed the ground handling jobs more due to compulsion on the part of other airlines than on its merit.
The primary job of an airline is to fly passengers - profitably and as per the published schedule. We do not have to be an expert to say how RA fares on those aspects.

Coinciding with the Golden anniversary the RA has made its commitment public through the media. It takes a defensive stand, right at the beginning, by acknowledging that criticisms are valued highly and treated as guide lines for making improvements. Next it accepts that RA has not been providing services to the desired extent due to the shortage of aircraft. And that it can not solve all the problems on its own and needs help and understanding of all including the government and its employees. It concludes by hoping to get the love and understanding of all concerned as it strives to achieve the goals set up to create a ‘New’ Nepal.

There is no doubt that the document is extremely over laden with the ‘hope’ aspect. The ‘commitment’, as spelt towards the end, is too weak to be of any significance. One wonders whether it was brought out just as a ritualistic exercise. Surely, RA must have foreseen that it was not likely to create any waves whatsoever. It is an irony that the present excitement is more due to the impending return of old B-757 as if RA was about to get a ‘new aircraft’. But if the news in Kantipur (08 June) is to be believed then there is a serious doubt about return date again.

The government, which holds the controlling interest in the RA, has to seriously think about its future course of action. It will be just enough if the government runs the country properly by providing a rule of law, security to its citizens and make appropriate and sound policy decisions to encourage all round development. It is not the work of a government to engage itself with the nitty-gritties of running an airline. It may have been right to have taken the rein in the early years. But to drag a fifty year adult like a child and tell it constantly what it can do and what it cannot does not fall under good governance by any count.

We do not know what the future holds until we see the policies and priorities set up by the coming government. Hopefully, there will be some concrete steps to ameliorate the mismanagement all around including that in the RA as well. This will be a small step in the making of, not a ‘new’, but a better Nepal. Last year we had hoped that RA will arrest the uncontrolled dive and maintain a level flight before its 50th bhoto jatra. That is out of the question now. But we can not rule out a bleaker possibility should the future government exercise even stringer control over the airline. It may, like all others before, be tempted to learn flying RA first before it does any thing appreciable!