Showing posts with label Security Sector / Law and Order. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Security Sector / Law and Order. Show all posts

Monday, June 15, 2009

Will the Real Prachanda Stand Up?

(Courtesy: Dr. Thomas A. Marks)

Just what goes on in the mind of Pushpa Kamal Dahal? His Maoists have lost the reigns of power through their own refusal to foster reconciliation. Yet no sooner has his custom-made (Rs. 110,000) bed been moved out of the Baluwater official residence, than “Fierce One” claims that democratic process is “counterrevolution.”

For good measure, he throws in that the goal of the new leadership is to restore the monarchy, which would seem laughable were it not accompanied by the orders for the YCL storm troopers to take to the streets.

Is this method or madness? Is Robin Just a Hood?

Where to look for answzers? It seems we have but a single book to which we can turn.

In bringing out a biography of “the valiant one” – as per the author, Indian journalist Anirban Roy; “fierce one” as per the most common rendering in Nepal – Mandala Book Point has performed a service. As the only successful communist effort to seize power since the end of the Cold War, the Maoists and their leader require study.

Unfortunately, for anyone interested in something more than various personal details, “the revolutionary” will remain “unknown.” Roy’s book touches upon little of substance and thus leaves us with less than can be gained by reading the often accurate, insightful, and increasingly caustic assessments in the Nepali daily media.

If there is one subject which must be the essence of any book on an insurgent leader, it is the relationship between the leadership and the manpower of the movement. Not only is this critical for understanding the course of the CPN(M)’s people’s war, but also for understanding now the inability of Prachanda’s Maoist-led, pseudo-coalition government to produce little beyond chaos, declining livelihood, and intimidation.

Many have argued – certainly it seems to be the opinion of Roy and a fraction of the Indian foreign policy establishment – that Prachanda is “really” a larger than life version of Robin Hood who has sought only to address the myriad economic, social, and political grievances (as well as hopes and aspirations) of the marginalized Nepali masses. This “moral economy of the peasants” version simply does not consider the obvious: what if Robin is just a Hood?

For the central question of the nasty decade of Maoist insurgency in Nepal has been whether the dog wagged his tail or vice versa. How much that occurred – and it was a bloody decade between 1996 and 2006, with the dead augmented an order of magnitude by mutilations, disappearances, and the like – was planned or simply the result of being astute enough to exploit events as they were carried out autonomously or semi-autonomously by others?

What seems clear is that a fairly typical (in Nepali terms) party structure, the CPN(M), led by marginalized elites (the principal figures among whom, like Prachanda, were Brahmins), achieved traction through linkage with dissatisfied tribal formations, particularly Maggars (who appear historically to have provided a plurality of those recruited to the British Gurkhas). This was not unlike what occurred in the Hmong areas of the north during the unsuccessful effort of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) or in the northern Luzon homelands of the Igorots during the 1980s heyday of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

There, the leadership was Maoist, the manpower grievance guerrillas. Whether the CPT or CPP actually exercised command and control over the tribal formations remains unclear, as it does in the CPN(M) case.

How the Maoists Wages War

In Nepal, the tribal formations appear to have been the heart of the main forces, Maoist battalions, just as the so-called “Secret Army” of the US in Laos was built upon Hmong alienated by North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao abuse. The Maoist battalions were in essence copies of the Indian Gurkha establishment (no surprise given the prominence in Maoist training of ex-figures from that establishment, which presently numbers more than 40 battalions). They were mixed gender, had good discipline, and fought effectively using standard though innovative tactical doctrine.

These forces, however, were a distinct minority amidst the violence that swept across Nepal. They were linked to the numerous local wars that raged in Nepal’s localities – theoretically, in the 3,913 Village Development Committees (VDCs, counties in Western terminology). It was at this local level that the atrocities largely took place.

Efforts to place the onus of human rights abuses on government forces do not hold up well, since they essentially sidestep the massive level of assault and maiming, not to mention destruction of infrastructure, that was carried out by Maoist local forces. Even as this debate has continued, what has not been touched – certainly not in Roy’s volume – is the connection between such local agency and Maoist central structures.

How much was ordered versus simply exploited?

The CPN(M) leadership throughout has claimed absolute control over the organization – except when it comes to owning up to widespread depredation. To the contrary, the Maoists continue to fall back upon denying that which is undeniable. They simply do not acknowledge that their movement wreaked havoc upon the country.

Yet the only defence is to claim that the main forces were the movement, and the rest occurred as commission by loosely affiliated fellow-travellers. This, of course, means they did not actually carry out the insurgency.

This is far from an idle issue, since lawlessness continues under the official umbrella of the Young Communist League (YCL; reflagged but the same organization), storm troopers drawn from the lumpen ranks but officered by the same Maoist chain-of-command that ran the main forces. As a consequence, the demoralized police, unable to act due to continuous political intervention, have been displaced by armed gangs linked to the major political parties.

It matters very much, too, as illustrated by “Prachandagate.” It is not that UNMIN “miscounted.” It is that the inspectors did not know what to count.

The Maoists packed both local and main forces into the camps, plus thousands of brand new recruits. In any Maoist structure, main forces (the battalions) are the tip of the iceberg. Most “combatants” are local forces, largely unarmed with high-powered firearms.

It is similar to the structure of any state security forces. In Nepal, the bulk of the armed representatives of the government are not in the army but in other forces, such as the police.

Hence – as Prachanda himself said in his defence – most of those in the camps were indeed “combatants” of sorts but not the “real guerrillas” that the world was hoodwinked into thinking it was counting. Further, while it could count weapons turned in, it had no way of knowing what was not turned in – and some of the best and most powerful pieces did not appear in the UNMIN inventories.

It has already been noted by one and all what happened next. The camps were used to expand the actual main forces (with the Maoists allowed to retain a proportion of their weapons), while the chain-of-command stood up new local forces – the YCL.

What, then, do the Maoists have in mind for the future of Nepal? Prachanda speaks constantly of the need to displace parliamentary democracy in favor of a people’s republic (though, as with the actual name of the CPN(M), a new formulation has lately been advanced).

Key elements in the Maoist leadership urge an outright power grab. Prachanda and his faction appear to feel that such would provoke, at best, isolation (not least from dominant India), at worst, external intervention (again, India is a prime candidate). Therefore, they urge caution, noting that the same end can be achieved without provocative action.

The Maoists themselves are rent by factionalism, with some truly odious characters not only urging but openly leading violent acts even as Prachanda consuls…what? As noted accurately in Nepali media, “Fierce One” seems all but schizophrenic in his shifts between conciliatory rhetoric and threats of vengeance to be visited upon any who seek to thwart the grandiose schemes of him or his party.

Revolution in the Revolution

Any student of the Nepali insurgency would have asked that such issues as discussed here be placed at the heart of a biography of Prachanda. Regrettably, they are not even raised much less addressed.

From knowledge, though, comes the ability to act. Would be that there had been an understanding of the basics of Maoist military structure. Key issues which remain for exploration by the media and academia:

  • First, a discussion of the strategic thought of the Maoists is needed, especially of the factionalism that led to the fierce debates that occurred within the leadership ranks during the struggle. These offer the Rosetta Stone to Prachanda’s present conduct (and that of his faction).
  • Second, how was operational advance during “the war” related to the individual positions of the Maoist leadership, especially Prachanda (who, judging from Nepali cell phone intercepts, spent much of the decade not in the theatre of operations but India)?
  • Third, what were the actual mechanics whereby this advance was achieved? How, for example, did the urban commandos function in the Kathmandu Valley? Who gave the orders to kill those who were murdered and left hanging on poles throughout the country?
  • Fourth, given the way events have been developing as concerns New Delhi, what was the relationship of Prachanda and his leadership to India? What was the agreement both thought they had reached? After all, it not only did not arrest him (Nepali security forces did provide to the Indians his whereabouts) but ultimately intervened decisively in favor of the insurgents.
  • Fifth, what was the role played by fellow-travellers (both domestic and international) in the Maoist effort? At no time did Prachanda or the Maoists exist as isolated actors. They interacted with numerous Nepali political parties and individuals (e.g., elements of the press and the human rights establishment), as well as numerous foreign actors, official (e.g., certain embassies) and unofficial (e.g., certain INGOs). What was the end-game being pursued by these forces and how did it influence the conflict? Was Prachanda central or marginal to these activities?
  • Sixth, how do the party factions relate to the present chaos and unwillingness of the Maoist movement to engage in good-faith reconciliation? To what extent is Prachanda a prisoner of the local forces that swept him to power or a shrewd politician playing the ends against the middle?

End-Game

Certainly the author pegs him as the latter, though no disinterested observer would accept this position without a great deal of scepticism. Put bluntly, as stated above in slightly different terms: what does “the unknown revolutionary” really believe?

Regrettably, no answers to these and other questions are to be found in the book. What we do know from readily available sources is not encouraging.

Power is the end-game for Prachanda and the Maoists. All they do revolves around that one goal.

Power can be gained “peacefully” – by which the Maoists mean the system surrenders to them and their plans for societal dismemberment. Or it can be achieved violently – what the Maoists are preparing to do with their street thugs (they have announced it).

If Roy’s book provides no answers, there are thousands (literally) which do. Pick up any volume on the rise of Fascism between the great wars. There, a reader will find spelled out chapter and verse what is unfolding in Nepal. Only the name of the storm-troopers has changed to protect the guilty.

Thursday, May 07, 2009

MAOIST INSURGENCY: RETURN OF THE NIGHTMARE

(Courtesy: Dr. Thomas A. Marks)

(Originally published in "India and Global Affairs [New Delhi], Apr-Jun 09," re-posted here with the Author's consent).

Dr. Thomas A. Marks is a political risk consultant based in Honolulu, Hawaii, who has authored a number of benchmark works on Maoist insurgency, to include his recent Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia.

Maoist insurgency is back. People’s war, once thought to have ended with the Cold War, is alive and well in South Asia. Large parts of India are effectively “no-go” areas. Bangladeshi officers cite Maoism as a greater threat than violent radical Islamists. Sri Lanka, having twice decimated the Maoist JVP at considerable human cost, now has them in the ruling coalition, where their often-bizarre positions are a faithful replication of India’s own legal Maoist spectrum. And to the north, what was the world’s only official Hindu kingdom finds itself now ruled by a party which yet begins its meetings before pictures of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao (Nepalis all, cynics note).

Ironically, New Delhi can look to its own intervention for the Maoist victory in Nepal. It was South Bloc which gave heed to the legal left and, in return for the swing votes which allowed Congress to cling to power, effectively ceded control of Nepali policy to the Indian Marxists. The shift brought on by Marxist opposition to the nuclear pact with the US came too late to save Kathmandu, and the country is now a failed state, posing a far greater security threat than ever it did when it was convulsed by war.

Ironically, too, Maoist growth in the Subcontinent continues even as the last real threat elsewhere, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), has been decimated and driven into a survival posture. Marxist but not Maoist, FARC nevertheless used a potent version of people’s war as its revolutionary doctrine. Copied from a combination of FMLN (El Salvador) and Vietnamese manuals, it was only national mobilization under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-present) which reversed the tide.

Why this stunning reality in South Asia? Why now?

Brave New World

The answer to the first query is that South Asia has long had the perfect conditions for Maoist upheaval. To the second, that the age of globalism has exacerbated many of these conditions.

Indeed, it can be argued that the present global situation is “the perfect storm,” combining as it does elements of two past eras of carnage. The first was the profound, irrevocable upheaval of the Industrial Revolution, which gave Europe the so-called “Age of Revolution” and the first age of terrorism. The second was the economic, social, and political despair of the interim between the world wars, which produced the twin nightmares of Stalinism and Fascism and their stupefying cost to humanity.

That terrorism has returned to lash out against the Brave New World of globalism hardly needs mention. It only needs emphasis how sterile is the approach that seeks to gather individual characteristics of those who, say, blow themselves up and then generalizes to the whole. Quite the contrary, it is the context, married to organizational acumen and finesse, that taps individual particulars. Nowhere is this more evident than in the violent radical Islamist organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

It is the violent radical Islamists who are the modern manifestation of fascism (termed by some, Islamofascists), complete with an anti-Semitism that would make the early Hitler of Mein Kampf appear somehow inadequate in his virulence. It is the Maoists who are heirs to Stalinism. Indeed, South Asian communism is distinguished by its continued domination by the thought of one of history’s most loathsome figures, Stalin.

In “globalism,” what was often local is now all but invariably international. Eras of profound change produce winners and losers. Mao emerged from the death of the Chinese imperial system and the clash between two alternative views of its successor, the Republic of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the “People’s Republic” of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By exploiting everything from economic-social-political dislocation to Japanese invasion, he was able to build a challenge capable in the end of seizing the world’s most populous country.

Inspired, self-proclaimed Maoist insurgencies emerged in the likes of Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines, Burma, Cambodia, India, Sri Lanka, Peru, and ultimately Nepal. Even communist but non-Maoist insurgencies recognized the efficacy of people’s war as strategy, and potent versions were seen in Vietnam, Laos, El Salvador, and Colombia. More often than not, linkages were established between the theaters of conflict, with China often directly involved in assisting its ideological partners.

For a time after the end of the Cold War, Maoism seemed a past nightmare. Globalism and the spectacular growth of challenges to the nation-state ensured that the heyday of people’s war was recreated in South Asia. Pronounced economic-social-political imperfections ensured that the 21st Century would see a new age of Maoist bloodshed, with ideologically inspired leaders mobilizing the alienated masses.

Nature of the Challenge

Maoism as a goal seeks to reorder society in a quest for social justice. There is no template as to how this reordering is to take place, except that it is to be Marxist-Leninist (communist). Theoretically a transitional dictatorship guiding socialism to achieve communal ownership of the means of production, in reality it has led only to would-be totalitarianism and attendant human carnage. Even China, where Mao Tse-tung invented the particular politico-military approach that is people’s war, has turned its back on “Maoist” ideology, which produced a tragedy conservatively estimated to have cost 80 million lives.

This is irrelevant to Maoists elsewhere. Arising in terribly flawed states such as Peru or Cambodia, Maoist insurgents seek a way out of the structural abyss by championing a triumph of the will.

Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) saw the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” of 1967-76 as a model for its future Peru. China saw it as a self-inflicted disaster that cost the lives of millions. The Khmer Rouge saw in their own “Year Zero” approach the Cambodian version of Mao’s “Great Leap Forward,” which latest research convincingly demonstrates to have cost between 30 and 50 million lives. In Cambodia, between one-fifth and one-third of the population perished.

Whatever the lack of a realistic goal, the means to achieve the end is manpower, mobilizing the masses in order to overwhelm the foe. The way, linking means to goal, is the strategy of people’s war. The mobilized masses are organized into a new state, a “counter-state,” to challenge the existing state.

In this mobilization, “all politics is local.” Leaders, normally drawn from marginalized elites – divorced either objectively or subjectively (in the mind) – look at the imperfections of the state and advance Maoism as the solution. Specifics need not be spelled out, since utopia is sufficient inspiration for followers, who seek redress of immediate grievances (as well as reinforcement of hopes and aspirations).

Any people’s war, then, is in reality myriad local wars, with “Maoism” serving only as the driver for leadership and committed cadres. Indoctrination of the so-called “grievance guerrillas” gives the effort greater cohesion.

Role of Violence

People’s war is a strategy for armed politics. The mistake is to think it is merely “war,” by which we normally mean action between armed forces. To the contrary, people’s war is very much like any electoral campaign – except violence ensures “the cards favor.”

Significantly, rebels such as the Maoists claim they are merely doing what the state itself has been doing all along. They assert there never has been “non-violent politics.” Rather, echoing Lenin, they label democratic politics practiced by the “old-order” but a façade for oppression. This oppression is carried out using the violence of the state through its armed component, the security forces, as well as the “structural violence” of poverty and injustice.

Thus the Maoists see themselves as engaged in a struggle for liberation, of self-defense even. Such a struggle will proceed along different but orchestrated lines of effort. Use of violence is but one line of effort. Within that line of effort, there are varied forms of violence, from assassinations to main force attacks – the large actions that seek to battle units of the armed forces on even terms.

Each type of violence – terror, guerrilla warfare, main force warfare, war of position (i.e., liberated areas) – may be thought of as a campaign, comprised of numerous discrete acts separate in time and space yet connected in a unity of action designed to achieve a goal. We can speak, for instance, of the campaign of terror that the Maoists use to eliminate all who oppose them in local areas, whether individuals or police. Who can forget those famous photos of the mutilated individuals in Nepal, especially teachers, their limbs hacked, their bodies hanging from poles?

Yet such terror occurs for a reason: to clear the space for political action, to eliminate competitors. This is why legal political activists are normally particular targets. They compete to mobilize the same target audience as the Maoists. Such rivals must be driven out so that the Maoist cadres have uncontested access to the masses. This clears the way for insurgent political mobilization.

Of course, such methods are anathema, even as certain portions of the party platform are attractive. It is for this reason that the Maoists sponsor a multitude of front organizations, the wide variety, for instance, of ethnic and community rights organizations one sees from the Philippines to Nepal to India. On the surface, they are not Maoist, but in reality fronts are controlled by the Maoists. Student, labor, and human rights organizations are normally prominent in this respect.

Such control need not be direct. Fronts can present themselves as independent, even as they are being used to enhance Maoist strength. Lenin called those who unwittingly join such fronts, thinking they are acting on their own, “useful idiots.”

Even as this goes on inside the country, the Maoists work outside. States tend to focus upon the tangible links. Much more important is the information campaign of the insurgents, designed to present their movement as almost benign. As states make mistakes, such as seen in instances of indiscipline when military units are deployed, these are exploited to claim the state itself is the problem, terror as but a natural, defensive component of the solution.

For a Maoist movement, the goal is always power. They must have power, because their goal is to refashion society. They are not seeking reintegration. That would be to accept the structure that exists and to play by that structure’s rules.

Quite vocally, they reject the legitimacy of that structure and its rules. That is why they are adamant that there must be a remaking of society.

Have they worked out the details of what this new society will look like? Of course not. That is the beauty of being the political challenger. Today’s realities can be opposed with tomorrow’s promises.

This is what politicians always do, even those who run “on my record.” The danger of left-wing ideologues, such as the Maoists, is that their worldview dramatically constrains their view of possibilities.

They tend to think of fantasies, such as “self-reliance” and “independence,” as ends that can be achieved if only “will” is harnessed. It was just such fantasies, implemented through violence, that gave us the astonishing crimes of the past century – crimes, it must be noted, the Maoists deny occurred.

India’s Need for Enhanced Approach

India’s approach to the Maoists in South Asia, whether internal or elsewhere, has been consistently misguided, improperly inspired and organized, and wholly tactical.

Internally, there has been a failure to take the threat seriously. The conceptualization of the Maoists as having a military and a political wing quite misses the reality of an armed political party advancing on five lines of effort – political (mass mobilization), allies (creating fronts), violence (of various types, not all present but interlocking when such is the case), political warfare (using nonviolent actions, such as subversion, to make violence more effective), and international (which can be decisive).

The inability or unwillingness of the center to coordinate an inter-state response allows the unified Maoist challenge to play the seams between state forces. Such assistance as New Delhi has provided has been tactical. Calling an individual and small unit tactical center for police “counterinsurgency training” highlights the point. Counterinsurgency is a strategic category. There are no “counterinsurgency tactics,” only tactics applied appropriately in support of correct strategy and operational art.

Externally, India has erred in thinking the Maoists are but a version of the Northeast ethnic insurgents and thus can be “bought.” Nepal offers the best example to the contrary.

There, the Maoists first used the monarchy as their foil, as a surrogate for what they claimed was its role in the old-order. If the “feudal monarchy” is swept away, they endlessly repeated, all would be right with Nepal. In this, they certainly were assisted by the tragic circumstances which placed the then-incumbent, Gyanendra, on the throne. Similarly, they were assisted by his mistakes in maneuvering through the maze of Nepali politics.

A number of elements figured into their calculations. First, as the hegemonic power in an unstable subcontinent, India wanted restoration of order. This was necessary for precisely the reasons stability is desired in Sri Lanka. Disorder produces refugees, unleashes intra-Indian passions, transfers elements of the conflict to Indian soil, and sucks New Delhi into foreign policy nastiness. Second, having opted for order, India played a hand well known to its smaller neighbors: intervention. The only question was how to intervene.

Here, there are several schools of thought. My past work in Sri Lanka has led to my being less than charitable as to Indian motives. In the Sri Lankan case, New Delhi was into everything from supporting terrorism to running covert ops in a friendly, neighboring democracy. Only when the Frankenstein it helped to create, LTTE, turned on its former benefactor did logic and morality reassert themselves in New Delhi’s policy.

In this case, in Nepal, it is perhaps too early to speak in such terms. What we know at the moment is that is that the weak position of the coalition government in New Delhi, combined with its normal “Great Game” psychology and the eagerness of certain Indian personalities, especially on the left, to expand their own role and spheres of involvement, led to a policy shift that supported SPAM (the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists).

It was disappointing and tragic that the SPA and the Palace could not have a meeting of minds. Parliamentary democracy should have been the ultimate bulwark against the Maoist challenge, but the very nature of Nepali parliamentary democracy, with its corruption and ineptitude, led to its marginalization. The increasingly bitter split between SPA and the king became all but inevitable in such circumstances, but personalities also played a central role, as they do in all that occurs in Nepal.

It seems equally clear that India, as it did previously in Sri Lanka, went into the present endeavor quite misinformed by its alleged experts, not to mention its intelligence organs, and that it was ignorant as to the actual nature of the Maoists – no matter the efforts of those same personalities just mentioned to claim how wise, thoughtful, and caring Prachanda and other members of the Maoists leadership were.

In once again misreading the situation in a neighboring state, India now seeks a “soft landing.” To get one, New Delhi’s strategy has been to facilitate in Nepal creation of a “West Bengal” or a “Kerala” – states where the tamed Indian left challenges and even rules (sometimes, in the case of the latter), where it continues with its nasty verbiage and bizarre worldview, but where it must respond to the realities of power and hence stay within the lanes on the national political highway.

What New Delhi has overlooked is that such realities occur in India only because of the capacity of the national state to force compliance. Subtract the Indian military, paramilitary, and police forces from the equation, and India would be anarchy. Not surprisingly, that is the very term being used by many to describe the situation in Nepal.
This has its own implications for India’s security and for its struggle against the growing strength of the Indian Maoists. What Nepal itself is facing is the “state within a state” as seen in Palestine with Hamas and Lebanon with Hezbollah. Whether events play themselves out as we are seeing even now in the Middle East depends quite upon what the Maoists are actually up to.

Hamas and Hezbollah have behaved as the Nepali Maoists seem determined to behave, to participate in “the system” only to use it for their own ends. Those “ends,” obviously, have now made life even worse for the population.

The Way Ahead

What Nepal as a state never understood was that it faced an armed political campaign. This means – a lesson for India -- that democracy, no matter how messy, accompanied by good governance and transparency, should be at the heart of any response to the Maoists, with the security forces providing the shield.

Nepali parliamentary democracy proved incapable of using mobilization of democratic capacity to defend itself. It did not do what the Thai, the Filipinos, the Peruvians, and the Sri Lankans (against the JVP, twice) did to defeat their Maoists. They brought reform to imperfect systems and made them better. They remain imperfect, but so are all systems. And they are not the vicious, man-eating systems as desired by the left-wing, of which the Maoists are the premier representatives.

It should be obvious that the claim that there is “no military solution” to insurgency is simply a canard. Armed capacity enables the campaign of reform, because armed capacity is what enables the challenge to the old-order.

In circumstances such as India (or Nepal earlier), security forces are not committed simply to defend the status quo. They must be committed to defend transformation. That transformation, though, must look rather more like what can be seen in India as it advances toward economic, social, and political modernity – and a lot less like Mao’s China.

Monday, December 22, 2008

Himal Media Reaps the Maoist Whirlwind

(Courtesy: Comrade Libre)

It's hard to decide what's more shocking - Maoists' entering Himal Media's premises and physically assaulting that organization’s employees or the reactions of disbelief from various segments of Nepali polity - many of whom were instrumental in facilitating the Maoists' unchecked rise to power. As “outraged” as these “useful idiots” may be, it is unlikely that Himal Media, the (Western) international community, or any Nepali political Party, has either the resources (manpower, intellect, etc.) or the will, to effectively counter the Maoists.

When it comes to Himal Media in particular, the issue of "perception being reality" is everything. The perception amongst the vast Nepali majority is that Himal Media functions as an Indian mouthpiece and a tax haven for the International NGO (INGO) community. The Nepali Times (the English weekly produced by Himal Media) has an avid readership among the ex-patriot, diplomatic and non-resident Nepali communities. "Himal Khabarpatrika" and Himal Magazine cater to the South Asian intellectual elite. "Wave," another publication from Himal, caters to the elite, urban Nepali youth.

This sort of market segmentation is excellent for business. Good business strategy means more sales but in Nepal’s case, it means higher revenues within vertical demographies as opposed to sales across multiple horizontal segments. To put matters in perspective, the demography that reads Himal Media products is the single largest minority in Nepal – the urbane, sophisticated, metropolitan elite. By extension of this fact, the liberal ideals that Himal Media aspires to represent, are an anathema to most segments of Nepali polity; especially to the Maoists’ who are accustomed to killing scribes that are out of synch with the Prachanda Path’s worldview.

Also, Himal Media’s portrait is incomplete without due mention of its most polarizing and controversial co-owner, Mr. Kanak Mani Dixit. Although it was Kanak’s older brother, Kunda, who bore witness to yesterday’s Maoist aggression, it is Kanak Dixit who is on record for insinuating a Maoist defeat at the CA elections - “the political party that gets the largest number of votes” would have to “carry along all political forces including the Maoists in the running of the government….”

Kanak’s writing (at the time), was widely perceived as regurgitated rhetoric, based on flawed Indian intelligence. His words may have been overlooked by his dinner guests Pushpa Dahal, Baburam Bhattarai and their wives, but many staunch Maoists’ are known to have taken exception to Kanak’s partial stance. Kanak may have been the greatest of Maoist allies for dealing with the King but his partial brand of advocacy during the CA elections is certain to have diminished his standing with the Maoists, compromised his personal independence, and undermined the independence of the organization he leads - Himal Media.

Further, the intelligence upon which Kanak Dixit’s pre-CA position is purported to have been based, is the same intelligence (if one can call it that) which had the Nepali Congress resting on its laurels during the run up to elections. When the expected election outcome did not materialize, the NC’s emissary to the US, Dr. Suresh Raj Chalise, is reported to have spent time, hopping from one think tank to another, explaining what a great job the NC had done in mainstreaming the Maoists.

The rest is history. The Maoists delivered a sweeping victory at the Constituent Assembly elections and Dr. Chalise’s Ambassadorship to the US has been terminated by the Maoist-led government. So much for Kanak’s insinuation that the NC would come out on top and Dr. Chalise’s dreams of a mainstreamed Maoist Party. So much for the excuses that various Himal Media outlets made in support of creating space for the “less radical” Maoists.

As with every opportunity presented before them, the Maoists took what they were given, milked the situation for everything it was worth and have conveniently moved on. It was gross oversight on Himal Media’s part for hoping that Maoist goodwill may still be pending for services rendered (by Himal Media) during the King’s time. The truth is, when it comes to the Maoist worldview, Himal Media is no different that any other organization in Nepal. Himal may have a record for being the most outspoken, but it also has a reputation for being the most elitist and partial to Indian whims. Neither reputation bodes well for Himal Media or its off-shoot businesses (for example, “Rato Bangala”) given the populist tone that Nepal’s Maoist government has successfully set.

The aftermath of the attack on Himal Media will likely expose another less known dimension of Himal Media – its proximity to the INGO and Donor community nexus. For example, in “Come Back, Ian" (published in the Nepali Times), Kanak Dixit made a heart rendering appeal to then UN Secretary General, Kofi Anan, to re-assign Ian Martin to Nepal as the head of UNMIN. Kofi obliged and in doing so, saved Ian Martin from being held accountable to the disgrace of a job that the UN did in East Timor. Ian Martin owes his position in Nepal, to Kanak Dixit.

The Maoists’ are well aware of this relationship and have waited just long enough to test the bonds between Himal Media and the UN in general. Although UNMIN is not MANDATED to comment on episodes like these, the criticism from other UN bodies will undoubtedly be sharp. The intensity of the criticisms forwarded is certain to be matched only by the leniency of the current government’s response. But, the point here is that the louder and more biting the criticism from Nepal's international well-wishers, the easier the attack on Himal Media will be for the Maoists and ultra-nationalists to stomach.

As unpleasant and distasteful as the attack on Himal Media was, this is the type of “lesson” that Nepalis need to learn over and over again. Day by day, the Maoists’ are growing bolder and more calculated as the opposition becomes weaker and more disorganized. The lines between progressive and regressive elements are being redrawn and where the middle ground once stood, is an empty, barren wasteland.

No one wants renewed conflict. No one wants more Nepalis to be butchered for any political party to come to power. But the inevitable (and unspoken) reality is that there will come a time when dealing with the Maoists will necessarily imply the application of the only terms that the Maoists understand – force. Till that day rolls around, the only certainty is that there will be many more episodes like the one at Himal Media.

The Maoists’ will always find an excuse to rationalize what happened. Even if the Maoist leadership apologizes for the actions of its labor union, there is no guarantee that any Nepali journalist will ever again dare to publicly criticize the Maoists. With so many skeletons to hide, there is no certainty that deals which compromise freedom of speech, won’t be made in return for “protection.”

Avoiding this domino-style catastrophe is why it is absolutely imperative that the Himal Media experience be taken seriously and be opened up for public discourse. Such debate should include not just the documented hooliganism of the Maoist labor union but also any real grievances the Maoists may have against Himal Media. Nepal’s government should take a democratic approach to dealing with this issue, should feel the pulse of the Nepali majority and for a change, should rely less on internationally driven sensation and more on addressing the root causes behind incidents like the one at Himal Media.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008

Nepali Polity: A Waning Pseudo-Democracy with No Real Alternatives

(Courtesy: el Zorro)

Whether the Maoists’ have the capacity to last through Nepal’s constitution-making process is turning into a big question. With every passing day and every emerging episode of Maoist mischief, this government’s days in office appear limited. The only saving grace for the Maoists’ (unfortunately), is that their opposition is held in such contempt that even with all the high handedness in the world, the Maoists’ still remain the best of the worst.

The base argument to topple Nepal’s Maoist-led government is simple: Cutting off heads, assassinating surrendered combatants, murdering political opponents, then threatening and intimidating the opposition vote-bank into submission is not synonymous with a democratic rise to power.

For anyone who may still be confused, it was a sustained campaign of violence (for ten years running) that earned the Maoists’ the political currency they possess today – NOT the CA elections. Further, the maintenance of the Maoists’ current power-base requires that the perceived threat of violence be maintained at all times. So, “Prime Minister” Dahal’s rant about a reversion to arms (which he later claimed was grossly misinterpreted journalism) was much less a slip of his tongue than a reminder to the depleted Nepali psyche that violence is imminent - unless the Maoists’ have their way.

The constant fear of a return to violence is what the Maoists’ have always leveraged to keep their critics at bay. The idea that the Nepali people are being held hostage to peace on the Maoists’ terms may have been too conservative a view for Nepal’s liberals to stomach a year ago but thankfully, times have changed.

Given what the Maoists’ have demonstrated while in power, it would be criminal for anyone to continue insisting on their democratic intent (or to keep alluding to the Maoists’ internal struggle) as an excuse for why the Maoists’ deserve a chance. The initial insistence on goodwill towards the Maoists’ may have originated from curiosity of the unknown but any insistence that persists today, most certainly originates from a fear of the known. To put matters plainly, what Nepali people know, is that the Maoists’ will not hesitate to kill to make their point.

Owing to these painstakingly slow realizations, the days when Nepal’s self declared “civil society” apologists and human rights defenders would shield the Maoists’ against criticism, are coming to an end. The days when rubbing shoulders with the Maoists’ was considered a fashion statement for the ultra-liberal (and the wide-eyed Nepalis abroad), is also nearing its end. Pretty soon, the Maoists’ are not going to be a “cool association” and youngsters and grown-ups alike are going to have to make some tough choices.

The reality is that making excuses for the Maoists’ is turning into a full time job – a profession that is not without ethical consequences or moral hazards. For example, the Maoists’ kidnapped and murdered a civilian (Kishor Shrestha) from Kathmandu, held the individual in a UN monitored cantonment and then murdered the man. No action has yet been taken although the guilty party has been identified as a Maoist Commander. Any takers to defend the continuation of Maoist impunity? There used to be plenty when Gyanendra was still around.

As another example, under this Maoist government, a total of 349 criminal court cases from across Nepal were recently declared null and void. These cases the Maoists’ claim, were politically motivated and thus, have to be nullified because they implicate almost the entire Maoist leadership in some way, shape or form. Any signs of “brave,” democracy-loving Supreme Court advocates who would dare to check the Maoists’ infringement upon the Nepali Judiciary’s independence? No. Not a single advocate in the same spot where an "army" of advocates once stood to shine in the international media's spotlight and "defy" an autocratic Gyanendra!!

Well, Nepal has a bigger problem now - the Maoists plus all the middle ranks of the Royalists are in the same corner. But this situation apparently, is not as grave a threat to democracy as Gyanendra so there's no point in risking one's life for few seconds of air time on Nepal TV!! Also, there's an unspoken factor that every Maoist opponent must constantly consider: Gyanendra's henchmen may have gone around and censored news papers, limited freedom of speech and curbed freedom of assembly, but the Maoists' will hold nothing back. They will simply eliminate that which they perceive as a threat and no Supreme Court Advocate wants to make the Maiosts' black list. The net result is, it's the Maoists' way, all the way.

With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, there is a never-ending litany of examples of not-so-smart ideas that the academically bright (and the practically devoid) were manipulated into adopting. But the problem moving forward is far less that mistakes were made and much more that people who made them, are unwilling to publicly rectify their wrongs. (There are terms that describe persons of this temperament – unprincipled, immoral, shameless, cowards, etc.).

It is precisely because of a select few who prefer to reinterpret the past to fit their worldviews (rather than admitting their mistakes and changing course), that Nepalis are without the moral impetus necessary to facilitate lasting change and the emergence of real alternatives. The Nepali Congress under Girija Prasad Koirala, supported by his network of cronies at home and abroad, is not a real alternative to the current set up. The Maoist off-shoot Upendra Yadav, is after all, a Maoist at heart. He has likely killed with the “best” of them – not a real alternative either. The same goes for most if not all of the faces that have “graced” Nepali politics over the past two decades.

So the issue at hand is less that the Maoists’ murdered their way to power and more that those with the moral authority to stand up to the Maoists are either too afraid, or too proud (or both), to admit that they were duped. Until the truth behind how badly Nepal’s political and academic elites were used and abused by the Maoists’ enters the domain of public discourse, there will be no platform for real, lasting change.

To put matters plainly, until this process of introspection and self-realization (and hopefully remorse) has taken its course, Nepalis are better off living under the Maoists’ than reverting to life under Girija Koirala’s Nepali Congress. And this simple calculus, despite everything the Maoists’ are doing to subvert democracy in Nepal, is why the Maoists’ will outlast a “broader democratic alliance,” and any other shenanigan that a desperate, power-hungry and disorganized opposition, can dream up.

Monday, September 22, 2008

Nepal's Military Doctrine

(Courtesy: Chiran Jung Thapa)

Indeed, Nepal is endowed with a distinct martial potential. Known as the land of the fearless and lethal "Gurkha warriors," Nepal's martial prowess has received worldwide acclaim. This is mainly because Nepalis have fended off hostile forces with great resilience and tenacity to preserve the Sovereign and Independent status of the nation. Additionally, the worldwide recognition of Nepal's Military prowess can be attributed to the outstanding martial performance exhibited by Nepalis in numerous global battlefronts.

Nepal's Military Doctrine is an embodiment of Nepal's intention concerning the use of its military power in pursuit of safeguarding its National Interest and accomplishing its National Objectives. By rendering direction to the subordinate concepts like force structure, education and training, operation planning, rules of engagement, and tactics, this doctrine aims to instil a sense of purpose and provide guidance to the men and women in uniform.

This Doctrine delineates the necessity of maintaining a military capability to defend and deter any hostile armed attack against Nepal's National Interest as the primary function of the Military. Essentially, it is a strategic guideline that underscores a firm resolve to guarantee military security to Nepal without any assistance from other states.

The military security of Nepal is guaranteed by denying any aggressor its military objective. If confronted with an unprovoked armed aggression, Nepal's military will adopt self defensive measures in ways that it deems appropriate to dissuade and deter the hostile forces. To serve this purpose, Nepal's military will remain continually prepared for conventional as well as asymmetric confrontations. While maintaining the asymmetric capabilities in its arsenal, the military-training and preparation will be primarily geared towards mobile defence.

In conformity with its strategic objective of institutionalizing peace and promoting prosperity, Nepal's Military Doctrine is peaceful and constructive in nature, and self-defensive in posture.

Any unprovoked armed aggression by any State against the Sovereignty, Independence and Territorial integrity of Nepal will compel Nepal to consider the aggressor as an enemy. Any accomplice abetting the aggressor shall also be regarded as an enemy. And to defend itself from the enemy, Nepal shall employ all available national instruments to put a rapid and decisive end to hostilities and swiftly restore the status quo.

To thwart the threat of military aggression, Nepal shall:
· refrain from branding any state as an enemy
· not employ the instrument of force in its interstate relations
· not pre-emptively deploy its military against any State
· not join any military alliance unless its National Interest is imperilled
· not allow the stationing of foreign troops within its territory
· maintain a military force capable of conducting defensive operations
· consistently train its military to engage in both conventional and asymmetric warfare
· strictly adhere to the charter of the UN and international laws
· continue with its commitment to assist in maintaining international security

Under this doctrine, the following acts shall constitute as threats which will prompt a military response:
· incursion into Nepali territory by any hostile foreign armed force
· armed assault against the Nepali population or the Nepali armed forces by any organized armed group
· armed insurgency aimed at undermining the authority of the state

In addition to its core task of guaranteeing military security, Nepal's military will be prepared to undertake a range of other operations in support of its national interest and strategic objectives. Nepal's Military will be further trained and prepared for 4 additional tasks:

i) Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN):
Nepal has endured a decade long brutal insurgency which pushed the nation to the brink of catastrophe. Notwithstanding the little knowledge and experience in COIN, Nepal's Armed forces were haphazardly deployed to mitigate the threat posed by the insurgents. Devoid of a proper political stratagem, however, the military response failed to yield the intended outcome.

Such recurrence in the foreseeable future cannot be ruled out. Hence, effective and efficient military measures to counter such undesirable recurrences are exigent and imperative. A counter-insurgency manual will be conceived in accordance with the emerging trends in COIN, the capabilities, the needs and the past experiences of the military. Also, a new training facility will be established with the aim of equipping Nepal's armed forces with the skills necessary to engage in COIN.

ii) Peace-Keeping operations (PKO): As a responsible stake holder of the international order, Nepal accords high importance to maintaining international security. Nepal's commitment to fostering international security has been manifested by its robust participation in multilateral peace keeping operations (PKO) under the aegis of the United Nations (UN). Nepal will continue to provide special peacekeeping training to its military and make further efforts to enhance its performance in PKO undertakings. To further reflect Nepal's staunch commitment to upholding international security, Nepal will strive to remain in the hierarchy of top five troop-contributing nations in UN sanctioned PKOs.

iii) Disaster Relief Operations (DRO): With its logistics and mobilization capabilities, Nepal's Military has throughout its history played a pivotal role in DROs. As the likelihood of natural or man-made disaster perpetually persists, Nepal's military will be kept prepared to engage in DROs. In the aftermath of disasters, the military will be mobilized to accomplish three vital tasks: a) search and rescue operations, b) distribution of the temporary relief supplies (water, food & medicine) and c) rebuilding/reconstruction process. A special Rapid Relief Unit (RRU) will be setup within the military to develop better logistics capabilities and more efficient deliverance methods.

iv) Infrastructure Building Operations (IBO): Nepal's Military has played a crucial role in the nation's development. It has been engaged in numerous infrastructure projects. With a competent supply of disciplined labour, the military has delivered on some significant infrastructure projects. During times of peace, one battalion will be specialized and dedicated to the nation's infrastructure building effort.

Taking into account the multitude of tasks assigned to the military, upgrading of military's aviation assets is indispensable. The rugged terrain of the country and the lack of proper infrastructure serve as significant impediments to even the normal mobility of troops. In contingencies, when rapid deployment is warranted, mobilization is further strained and operations are acutely affected due to the proper lack of adequate aviation assets. Thus, upgrading of aviation assets is evidently the most optimal counter-measure against these setbacks.

To enhance it aviation assets, Nepal will aim to increase its fleet of VTOL (vertical-take-off-and-landing) and STOL (short-take-off-and landing) aircrafts. Nepal will conduct a thorough need assessment and feasibility study prior to procuring an optimal mix of VTOL and STOL aircrafts. After procurement, special measures will be taken to minimize the downtime, increase the operability of the each aircraft and ensure an all-weather and all time flying capability. The upgraded aviation capabilities will aim to meet the "RST" (Reconnaissance, Rescue operations, Suppressive firepower and Transport) needs.

Tuesday, August 19, 2008

The Generalship of Nepal Army - Time for Reflection

(Courtesy: Samarjit Thapa)

The NA (Nepal Army) was forced to take out its ceremonial cloak as the pace of Maoist Insurgency intensified. Presently, the insurgency (at least in theory), has ended. The NA played a vital role in containing the Maoist insurgency. There was a great expectation that the army would crush the insurgency. But this did not happen. Now is the time to analyze why.

Nepal's civil war was provoked by the Maoist insurgents. Only after the NA was attacked did the government of the time (after exhausting other means available), authorize the use of military force. The goal was to swiftly end the violence and bloodshed. But there was nothing swift about the government (or the NA's) reaction.

Why was the NA's operational reaction so retarded? What went wrong in their preparation during pre-mobilization? Was there a serious leadership flaw in that they could not foresee operational requirements of the future? Liddell Hart said "If you want peace prepare for war". Where was the application of this motto? There has been less effort spent on postmortem of the NA leadership's dereliction of duty than the issue deserves.

The involvement of the NA during counter-insurgency operations opened a "Pandora's box." The myth of an infallible Army is no more; the people were able to assess the NA's performance during the insurgency from many different dimensions. The people of Nepal saw Nepal Army through the prism of elite Generals. The army's conduct during the insurgency period created an environment of mistrust between the field commanders and the Generals in Army HQ.

The burden of the war was laden completely upon tactical commanders. This is most likely why the NA experienced tactical victories throughout their counter-insurgency campaign, but a strategic defeat overall. Against this backdrop, it is prudent to ponder the generalship of the army.

In his book "Generalship-Its Diseases and Their Cure," General JFC Fuller draws upon his knowledge of World War-I. He posits that for the first time in British military history, something went terribly wrong with the quality of leadership of senior British officers during World War-I. "Sometime before the outbreak of the World War," Fuller writes, "the art of soldier-ship slipped into a groove and became materialized…the more management or command became methodized, the more dehumanized each grew."

Before World War-I, the ordinary soldier had seen Generals in the thick of the action, but by 1914 soldiers rarely saw their top brass; perhaps, the front line men heard of their leadership, as managing directors sitting in dug-outs and in offices. Frequently, the soldiers did not even know the names of their commanding officers. To the average solider, their top brass were no more than ghosts who could terrify but who seldom materialized; hence battles degenerated into subaltern led conflicts just as manufacturing had degenerated into foreman controlled work…the man was left without a master – the general in flesh and blood.

Emphasizing John Ruskin's words that "if war is bereft of the personal factor in command, it cannot but degenerate into a soulless conflict in which the worst and not the best in man will emerge," Fuller argues that the true General "is not a mere prompter in the wings of the sage of war but a participant in its mighty drama, the value of whose art cannot be tested unless there is a clear possibility of the struggle ending in death." Fuller concludes that that there are 'three pillars of generalship: courage, creative intelligence, and physical fitness; the attributes of youth rather than of middle age." Fuller insists that World War-I generals were not cowards; rather an "…amazing unconscious change…rose out of the Franco-Prussian War and obliterated true generalship, de-humanizing and de-spiritualizing the general until he was turned into an office soldier, a telephone operator, a dug out dweller, a mechanical pressor of buttons …as if armies were a …soulless machine." The way above Fuller hit the disease then he diagnosed it: "In war it is almost impossible to exaggerate the evil effects of age upon generalship, and through generalship, on the spirit of an army … First, war is obviously a young man's occupation; secondly, the older a man grows the more cautious he becomes, and thirdly, the more fixed his ideas …. Youth, in every way, is not only more elastic than old age, but less cautious and far more energetic."

Fuller's writing provides much insight into the NA's performance. Were our Generals incompetent cowards or were they inaccessible ghosts which prevented the creation of a viable counter-insurgency campaign? There definitely was a flaw in the generalship of NA because they were unable to implement the effectiveness of a "Unified Command" as had been done by great Generals like Templar and Briggs during their Malaya campaign.

What could the reason be for such incompetence? The only one that comes to mind is that the NA's Generals were more socially (status) oriented versus task oriented. The reason could be they didn't know what they were doing and were provided with a plethora of facilities beyond the socio-economic standards of the country. The result was a complete failure to evolve 'strategic guidance' and neglected operational coherence. The war was mercifully left on the shoulders of tactical commanders. It is not that the NA lost because the Maoists were superior but that the NA's leadership was so incompetent that the Maoists looked like strategic geniuses.

There is also another school of thought that explains the NA's lackluster performance - the political system was not conducive for the NA to wage war against insurgency. This explanation however, is hollow.

The first responsibility of every officer is to protect his men from illegal and immoral orders issued by politicians known to be lying to the public. The blame would go to the NA for making former King Gyanendra a scapegoat by not challenging (and according to first hand accounts, even encouraging) his immoral actions. The present day NA leadership has little right defending their institution as constitutional stalwarts and protectors of democracy; they all failed to display the quality of Generals when they accepted orders that sent men into harm's way, without a politically acceptable objective. It is the generalship of the NA who should share a piece of the "blame pie" for leading the Nepali State into the chaotic situation today.

The rank and file of the NA is tired of listening to the same rhetoric on the commitment of the NA to Nepal's constitution. The Generals should know that every officer has the responsibility under the constitution to defend Nepal against all enemies, domestic and foreign - executing this function also means refusing to obey illegal and idiotic orders, no matter where they come from. Resignation on moral grounds is the option that NA General's should have taken. It is the moral duty of not only one but all of the Generals to come to the forefront to correct the impending misdeeds of those that command them.

The system that produces Nepalese Generals has done little to reward creativity and moral courage. Only very few Generals had a clear vision of what future conflicts would look like and what capabilities the Army has to develop to prevail in such situations. In light of Maoist insurgency the Generals of the NA failed to exhibit visionary leadership. The state apparatus should create a mechanism to examine the behavior and attitudes of NA Generals. The objective should be to investigate the following question: "Why did many of the NA Generals lack moral courage and competence? And in the post-conflict period, why do many of these same Generals disrespect the souls of the men who died under their command by fraternizing publicly with the Maoists who killed them? Forget values, ethics and standards - is there even an ounce of decency left in these NA Generals?

Related Posts:

Asian Centre for Human Rights Report on South Asia - A Cursory Examination of Reporting on Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/08/asian-centre-for-human-rights-report-on.html

Moving Beyond Pork Barrel Politics - Integrating the Maoists into Nepal's Security Sector
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/07/moving-beyond-pork-barrel-politics.html

Debilitating the State’s Security Forces
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/06/debilitating-states-security-forces.html

Dissecting the “feudal” NA
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/08/dissecting-feudal-na.html

The greatest threat to peace in Nepal is misinformed, misguided, agenda-divine journalists like "The Guardian's" Isabel Hilton
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/courtesy-el-punto-isabel-hiltons.html

Monday, August 11, 2008

From Freefall to Basket Case?

(Courtesy: Dr. Hari Bansha Dulal)


It's been four months since the Constituent Assembly (CA) election was held and we still don't have a legitimate government. Is it because the proportional representation system has started producing disproportionate results or because the self-portrayed progressives have resorted to the same old tricks played during the coalition era of the past decades?


If the government formation takes four months, how long will it take to undo the failures of the past governments and deliver the dividends of democracy? With this pace, when will the wholesale transformation of Nepal's political and social foundation and the apparent consensus be achieved between various ethnic groups in Nepal?


As usual, no political party is ready to take the responsibility for the current political impasse. Accountability has evaporated in countless networks, bargaining and search for compromises. Shouldn't someone somewhere be responsible for the current state of affairs?


A daughter of noted neurosurgeon was abducted in broad day light from the heart of the capital. Unable to rely on the professional ability of the security apparatus, the hapless father pays multi-million rupees in ransom for the safe release of his sibling. Dr Devkota's willingness to pay ransom to the abductors is an example of erosion of people's faith in government's ability to solve their problems. This is one among hundreds if not thousands of cases happening every month.


Our so-called intellectuals get baffled when high profile abduction cases like the one involving the daughter of Dr Upendra Devkota occur. Like an ignorant little child who suddenly wakes up after a bad dream, they start questioning the existence of the nation's security apparatus and the responsibility of the Home Ministry. Anyone keeping a close tab on Nepal can easily tell that the law and order situation in the country is in a shambles and it has been so for a long time now. It certainly did not happen overnight for anyone to miss it, did it? What appears as if the abduction of Dr Devkota's daughter was the first ripple in a perfectly calm lake? The lake has been muddied and unsettled for a long time now. It is just that in order to appear politically correct some of us chose not to question the abilities of the guards responsible to keep the lake clean and healthy.


We live in a country where the vice-president of the country flouts court order, home minister overlooks crimes (killers of Jitendra Sah and Ram Hari Shrestha are still at large) and the prime minister, instead of firing the incompetent home minister, uses him as his emissary. Lawlessness starts from the top and trickles down to the common man. Criminals at the bottom of this food chain of lawlessness are taking every opportunity to take the law into their hands because that is the example leaders are leading with.


The major political parties are intoxicated by foul poison of power and this is evidenced by their disgraceful attitude towards formation of the new government and writing a constitution. From old guards of Nepali politics to the new entrants like the Maoists, MPRF, and TMLP, political honesty is something that is seriously lacking. Moral nudity on part of the Maoists has become so apparent that it is hard to trust their words.


Needless to say, they were not trustworthy to begin with. When the chances of getting into the power brightens, they suggest the return of all seized properties and curbing illegal acts of their brigade of brigands (YCL), but as soon as their chances of clinching to the power fades, their threat-laden statements start flying in all directions. They get verbal diarrhea.


It is not only the Maoists that have mastered the art of deal making. Upendra Yadav has picked it in a relatively shorter period of time. He is ready to join hands with anyone and everyone so long as he gets his share. The Maoists' call for having a Madhesi president and a Pahadi vice-president was a logical one, but for Upendra Yadav, having his man as a vice-president was more important than ensuring ethnic balance in the top most posts of the land. For him, inclusion of other ethnic groups is irrelevant. So long as the process ensures the inclusion of the members of his vote bank, ethnic empowerment is on the roll!


In order to minimize the dissent that arises from the incompetence on the part of politicians, the political parties have divided the nation along political ideology and ethnicity. And with each passing day, the people are getting sucked into this game plan devised by our politicians to cover up their incompetence and enhance their own political agendas. If a Madhesi intellectual raises a red flag against functioning of Madhesi leaders, he is immediately branded as a traitor. He becomes an instant enemy of his community. Many Madhesis dislike the president simply because, in their eyes, he is not Madhesi enough. His clarion call for national unity is in collision course with agendas pursued by those that do not see anything wrong with vice-president taking oath in Hindi even though it is unconstitutional. If something is unconstitutional, it is unlawful. And, that is how it ought to be.


How we got here and where are we headed? Many of us decided not to raise our voice against the failures of our politicians because our beloved politicians have created an environment whereby anyone, who questions their ability to handle the situation well automatically falls into a least wanted category-status quoists. Is it finally time to realize that Bollywood-type happy ending is not something that happens in African-style drama?


Unless the people rise and make their voice heard, politicians are not going to mend their ways. If we continue to remain divided, we may lose any chances that we might have from this point onwards to emerge as a functional democracy and may end up as a basket case of Asia.


Nepal, in every sense, is a nation under construction. The depth and scale of the transformation taking place in every dimension of Nepal's social, economic, and political lives is very rapid and difficult for even experts to comprehend. The ongoing experiment of building a "New Nepal" if handled properly could be one of the most successful developments in the history of the nation. But if it fails, the consequences for Nepal could be tragic, and possibly catastrophic.

Saturday, August 02, 2008

Asian Centre for Human Rights Report on South Asia - A Cursory Examination of Reporting on Nepal

(Courtesy: Comrade Libre)

The "South Asian Human Rights Index 2008, 1 August 2008" (http://www.achrweb.org/reports/SAARC-2008.pdf) is a publication worthy of reading. From pages 99 to 113, the ACHR (Asian Center for Human Rights) report chronicles in detail, documented human rights violations by all parties in Nepal, over the year 2007 (with reference to specific cases as far back as 2005).

While "naming and shaming" is certainly a powerful tool that is often used in the business of human rights advocacy, a dispassionate review of the ACHR report requires a certain level of detached realism. There are contradictions inherent to the implied recommendations, embedded throughout the text of this report. Some of these contradictions are outlined below.

Security and Human Rights Abuses - A Direct Relationship?

First, the obvious: Human rights violations in Nepal have reduced dramatically since the end of Nepal's Maoist insurgency. The lesson implied here is essentially that war leads to rights violations. The hindsight "epiphany" is that the Maoists should not have provoked Nepal's civil war and successive governments should not have retaliated using the State's military apparatus.

There is no rocket science to this observation. However, there is a stark reality that must be reckoned with - Maoist provocation has been rewarded with their stature as the largest party in Nepal's Constituent Assembly. Additionally, every single politician who advocated military mobilization against the Maoists, are in positions of power today. So where should the accountability of past abuses reside? Individual cases of abuses can certainly be prosecuted to the law's extent. But will legal action be complete without also implicating today's power brokers for their direct involvement in instigating Nepal's civil war?

Further, the following observation adds more confusion: "The biggest concern (in 2007) was not so much state violation but rather the absence of state." Considered in tandem with Nepal's ranking as six out of seven South Asian nations (the higher ranking implying relatively lower rights abuses), a direct correlation is implied between human rights violations and the presence of state forces. The contradiction here is that the ACHR report highlights the absence of state forces as a point of concern while simultaneously suggesting that when the state forces were out of their barracks, human rights abuses were rampant.

Ironically, the great work that human rights defenders within and outside of Nepal have done is partially responsible for the near collapse of the law and order situation in Nepal. When reports are continually headlined with subjective criticisms along the lines of "excessive force," the net result is lawlessness. Security agents are increasingly aware of the repercussions of applying force and hesitate to react even under conditions that warrant the application of force. The ACHR reports correctly states that "the morale of the police was very low (in 2007)." The degradation of morale is directly related to a sense of duty that repeatedly clashes with ambiguous guidelines on the acceptability of action.

This does not mean that the application of "excessive force" should be excused but rather, that the state security forces should be educated on "acceptable" levels of force. For example, is baton charging "acceptable" when public property is being destroyed? Is it "acceptable" to return fire when a VIP convoy comes under fire? Is it "acceptable" to expect the maintenance of law and order with merely the presence of security forces?

There is a fine line that human rights defenders must walk in situations like Nepal where the entire state structure is under indictment and as a result, does not have the capacity to defend its security forces' actions. In other words, the idea of security forces as one of many of the State's organs, with ultimate accountability residing at the political tier, is a notion that needs to be urgently institutionalized. Only then will criticism based on human rights, yield the desired impact.

Politicization or Civil-Military Relations? Which is the Lesser Evil?

This line of thought is a good transition to what is perhaps, the most provocative statement in ACHR's report: "Nepal lives under the shadow of a highly politicized anti-democratic Army… who are not accountable to anyone except themselves." Coming from a organization that itself is unaccountable to anyone (and everyone at the same time), such a statement is hypocritical, callous and counterproductive to the overall human rights agenda.

First, politicization is a two-way street - it's not as though the Army decides to politicize itself and align with say, the Nepali Congress without the Nepali Congress welcoming the move. Second, if in fact different factions in the Army are reaching out to different factions of the political spectrum, is this necessarily bad because the institution is being politicized or good because civil military relations are improving?

Further, is the Army anti-democratic because Girija Prasad Koirala retained COAS Katuwal as its head or was Koirala anti-democratic for recognizing that the sustenance of democracy and stability hinged on retaining a balancing threat of force against a radical communist party, bent on establishing a one-party communist republic in Nepal? Criticizing the Army with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight is immensely more simple than accounting for scenarios that did not materialize by keeping the Army's chain of command intact.

The contradictions, once more, are glaring. In the same report, the ACHR criticizes the Army for being politicized, for civil-military relations being insufficient and for the Army being un-democratic and unaccountable? To whom should the Army be accountable without catering to the political forces and in return, becoming more democratic through enhanced civil-military relations?

If the intent of the ACHR report is to pass judgment on the entire Nepali Army through its COAS, then in the tradition of professional impartiality, perhaps equal judgment should also be passed on the Maoist leader Puspha Kamal Dahal (who is not only the Maoist political head honcho but also the supreme commander of the Maoist "PLA")? The parallels are apparent; yet, the ACHR's reporting is not.

"You Scratch my Back, I'll Scratch Yours" - UNMIN and AHRC

On the subject of accountability, the AHRC's readership may also be drawn to the subtle advocacy performed on behalf of UN agencies in Nepal - namely, the UNMIN and the OHCHR. According to the AHRC report, Nepali actors have "failed to understand or overlook the positive impact of these international agencies in favour of criticising UNMIN for what often appear to be little more than often ill-informed and politically motivated purposes."

In reality, what Nepali actors had failed to understand was the extent to which the UNMIN could have been mobilized to further the cause of sustained and lasting peace in Nepal. But in all fairness, the political motivation behind such failure, goes both ways. Nepal's political class should have provided the UNMIN a mandate to which the UNMIN could have been held accountable; Ian Martin on the other hand, with his first hand experience in Nepal, should have sought a mandate that would have been more impactful.

The misunderstanding that has resulted in overshadowing what little good the UNMIN has done, is actually a latent recognition by the Nepali elite that Nepal's government gave the UNMIN a limited mandate with plenty of room for interpretation and that Ian Martin, happily accepted a multi-million dollar contract with enough loop holes to limit his organization's exposure. For an organization desperate to recreate its diminished relevance, Nepal became to the UN a "gift that just kept on giving." This is what most educated Nepalis resent.

A civilian was kidnapped from Kathmandu and murdered in a cantonment monitored by the UNMIN; the UNMIN's documentation of arms it has inventoried is still unavailable for public consumption; there are so many lingering questions on the Maoist combatant verification process (and the track two dealings between Ian Martin and the Maoists), that the results are still in question; Ian Martin, Kofi Annan, and Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai sharing laughs over beers (at the very onset of Nepal's peace process), became an iconic image of the UNMIN's compromised impartiality .

The AHRC report cites the YCL as a liability to Nepal's peace process. Is the AHRC aware that Ian Martin was fully cognizant of the on-going rotations between the YCL and the Maoists' PLA, at the very founding of the YCL? His admission behind closed doors in New York, amounted to turning a blind eye in favor of helping the Maoists democratize. How democratic is the YCL and how effective was Ian Martin in faciliatating the YCL's birth?

In all fairness, Nepalis have not overlooked the positive impact that UN agencies have had on Nepal. It is rather insulting that the AHRC would insinuate ungraciousness on the part of Nepali people whose criticisms of UNMIN's work, are factually justifiable and on the whole, overwhelmingly legitimate. The UNMIN has received criticism where criticism has been due - namely, in its non-transparent, often partial, and unaccountable mode of operation.

Conclusion

Despite the apparent contradictions in the AHRC's report on Nepal, the report is well worth a thorough read.

The value in the AHRC's report is the detailed documentation of human rights abuses (and allegations) in Nepal. Although much of the material is regurgitation of facts and figures already published through various national and international sources, the benefit to consolidating and (re-highlighting) such egregious acts of abuses, are self-evident.

Overall, the ACHR's report is impartial in its allocation of accountability to actors across Nepal's political spectrum. The report correctly identifies widespread impunity as the root cause behind continued human rights violations. More importantly, this report touches upon a defining facilitator of continued rights abuses - a myopic focus on short-term political horse trading at the cost of long-term stability.

Having correctly identified the weaknesses in Nepal's peace process, what is sorely missing are implementable ideas / recommendations on how best to rectify such deficiencies. Given the contradictions highlighted above, solutions to Nepal's current predicament are anything but apparent.

Related Posts:

UNMIN Finally Speaks Out - A Critical Examination of UNMIN's Letter to News Front
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/unmin-finally-speaks-out-and-pulls-foot.html

The Nepali Army is a Favorite Target for Cheap Provocateurs - An Analysis of a Nepali Adolescent's Professional Obituary
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/being-cheap-provocateur-is-easy.html

UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/unmin-in-need-of-immediate-reform.html

The Problem with Nepali Political Civil Society - The Leftist, the Cowards, and the Compromised http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/10/problem-with-nepali-political-civil.html

Monday, July 21, 2008

Moving Beyond Pork Barrel Politics - Integrating the Maoists into Nepal's Security Sector

(Courtesy: el Comandante)

A Brief History of Integration

The Mukti Sena was created in 1951 to wage an armed revolt against the Rana oligarchy and to liberate the Nepalese people. The militant wing was composed of Nepalese citizens and people of Nepalese origin from India and Burma.

The bulk of the military wing consisted of soldiers of the British Indian Army who were initially trained conventionally to fight the Second World War but remained unemployed after demobilization. There were some individuals who had absconded from the British Indian Army and had joined the Indian National Army lead by Subash Chandra Bose too.

The Mukti Sena manpower consisted of neither political activists nor ideologically indoctrinated Communists. During the armed struggle, which lasted for a short span of time, the militant wing had not committed any acts of terrorism, criminal activities or systematic extortion. Kangaroo courts and parallel governments were never operated by the revolutionaries. When the revolution was considered successful and ceasefire established, the Mukti Sena was renamed with dignity as the Rakshaya Dal.

Except those who revolted under the leadership of Dr. K. I. Singh, the rest were formed up to create three para-military battalions of the Nepal Armed Constabulary (NAC) to function as a back-up force to the Police while maintaining general law and order. Later, Officers of the NAC were designated as Civil Police Officers also. In reality, the nucleus of the Nepal Police Officer Corps was subsequently provided by the NAC. Ex- IGPs G. B. Yakthumba, Puran Singh Khawas, P. S. Lama, Rom Bahadur Thapa and Durlav Kumar Thapa are the examples.

The three battalions of the NAC failed to perform satisfactorily in the insurrection in 1961-62 and lost significant weapons to the insurgents. As a consequence, the NAC was rigorously re-trained by the then RNA; army Officers, Warrant Officers (WOs), NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers), and fresh soldiers were integrated into the units and transformed into Home Guards and the new force was brought under the chain of military command by 1963. The three battalions of Home Guards were then declared as regular infantry battalions of the (R)NA by 1966 and equipped accordingly.

Those who had initially enlisted in the British Indian Army as late as 1944 were at least forty years old. There were only a handful of Officers and WOs who were still serving when their units were regularized. A DIG, Dil Man Singh Thapa, was transferred to the (R)NA with the NAC as the brigade commander and eventually retired as a Brigadier General.

The significant aspect to be noted is that though they were conventionally trained and possessed no ideological beliefs, the process of transforming a revolutionary militant to a regular soldier lasted from 1951 till 1966. The result of such a process was an absolutely peaceful integration and the continuation of respect to existing Military Law and dedication to professionalism.

The Indian Government did create a Naga Battalion composed of surrendered Naga insurgents that were strictly trained. However, the plan was simply symbolic because the unit was neither assigned any operational responsibilities nor stationed in Eastern India. Later, the unit failed to attract new recruits and today, remains as a symbolic emblem only. The general belief in India is that insurgents should never be integrated into the National Security Forces as far as regular channels to recruitment remain a viable and effective alternative.

The Current Day Context

The most offensive style adopted by the Maoists after the activation of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement ) has been to physically counter, neutralize and eliminate all affiliated organizations of other political parties. The mobilization of the PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) and the YCL (almost a day time PLA/ night time Young Communist League) to coercively dominate and control Nepal's urban and rural populations has rewarded the Maoist Party with the status as the largest political entity in the Nepal's CA (Constituent Assembly).

The impunity that the Maoist party enjoys through their threat to return to war has to be challenged politically in order for the nation to move forward. Leveraging the peace process as a symbolic icon of Maoist victory has been extremely effective for the Maoists as they continue to enjoy unconditional impunity; the same process has also been a convenient excuse for the incumbent government to remain in power with the pretext of upholding peace.

Now, the prime intention of the Maoists is to capture total national power through a peaceful political process. The steps are as follows:

a. Forcefully manipulate and amalgamate all the leftist parties under its leadership (the presidential elections were a major snag, but one the Maoists are bound to overcome as alliances change based on issues)

b. Maintain an ostracized democratic set-up composed of a marginally reduced liberal opposition whose capability to challenge the Maoist one party rule is virtually absent.

c. Deceive the international community and derive assistance with a commitment to be more transparent, accountable and in conformance with international standards.

d. Maintain a prolonged one-party rule (although the presidential elections did not go in the Maoists' favor, it should be noted that their machinery has been mobilized in support of the general elections already - none of their political competitors have thought this far ahead).

What the Government Should Consider

In order to ensure a smooth constitution making process and also to limit the Maoists' monopoly on force, the integration of Maoist combatants should include the following minimum standards:

a. Maintain reduced cantonments with the weapons and those combatants verified by the UN.

b. Implement a re-verification process with a special questionnaire including whether they prefer to join the NA or NP or APF. Maoists should never be integrated in the NID (National Investigation Department) for the organization has its own vetting process, does not have a rigorous training syllabus and the process of de-doctrination cannot be enforced (in the NID). Maoists in the NID will have serious adverse implications to the collection of information and ultimately, to good governance.

c. Those who volunteer to join the NA must meet the existing physical, medical, educational and vetting standards without compromise. They should also be cleared of human rights violations and extortion activities.

d. Those who are considered eligible must firstly sign a contract declaring that their links and loyalties to the Maoists will be considered unlawful; should their behaviors be in contravention to the signed contract, their employment with the NA should be terminated immediately. Further, should former Maoist combatants be linked to human rights violations, criminal activities or extortion, they should be immediately discharged. (There exists detailed and voluminous amounts of data from the insurgency period, that meticulously documents human rights violations by Maoist militia and combatants. This information should be made public during an independent, third-party re-verification process).

e. The basic training should be executed with utmost strictness and compromises on established standards should be resisted with conviction. Strict oversight must be maintained over the entire vetting process.

f. Those who have managed to complete the training should be posted to less sensitive units and sub-units and dispersed in small numbers. Three to four basic training courses should be conducted consecutively to complete the integration process over two years.

g. Entry into the NA should be either through recruit training or the officer cadet training; NEVER through the technical basic course, clerk basic course or the Para Folding course.

h. Units with only Maoist combatants should never be established.

i. Those who prefer to stay out of the Security Forces should be included in separate cantonments. Allowances, clothing and rations should be provided by the Government. Vocational training, political indoctrination (to align with democratic principles and practice) and adult education should be conducted. (Foreign donors are interested in such projects and should be approached with ideas). The combatants must be encouraged through logic as well as propaganda to opt for vocational training where they will be able to earn more money and also be able to go abroad as skilled manpower.

j. Should the Maoists insist on forming their own intact units, they must be issued the same weapons in the container that have been registered and all other weapons besides those should be declared illegal. Certain elements of the NA, NP and APF must be inducted in such a unit in its chain of command. The role assigned to such a unit should be very much secondary in nature such as security for vital, physical assets in remote areas.

Reforms within the Existing Security Sector

On the NA's part, the organization must immediately establish strict standards concerning the code of conduct, professional training standards, proper and impartial assessments of performance and acceptance of accountability while exercising authority.

The practice of commanders remaining entangled with commissions on contracts and purchases and entertaining with the funds made available from surplus rations should be banned. This practice is prevalent throughout the chain of command and often seeps into the political layer. Such acts must be exposed, unconditionally reprimanded and persons found guilty of involvement, tried to the extent afforded by military law.

Prototype living standards, storage, office and dinning accommodations must be established and constructed urgently. The old theme to save the government funds at the cost of soldier’s comfort and basic needs must stop. Taking these steps will automatically hedge against the possibility of Maoist combatants exploiting such grievances to their political organization's benefit. The APF uprising followed by the uprising in the police force are token examples of what may come, should the necessary action not be taken.

Further, should sweeping changes be implemented, the improvements derived would be appreciated by the rest of the security forces as a "gift" from the Maoists too and may help to bridge the animosity from having been forced into combat.

The Options at Hand

Ultimately, the Maoists have two options at hand:

a. Either to come to power and maintain a very compromising stance with India concerning the issues of national interests and agreements on natural resources. An evolutionary process to democratize without loosing political power may be pursued; OR

b. Maintain a nationalistic stance with more dependence on external resources (other than Indian) and the use of the China Card occasionally. Very similar to the traditional power structure implemented by King Mahendra in the past and perhaps a desired meeting point between Maoists and the more traditional parties in Nepal.

The first option will certainly lead to a drastic down-sizing of the NA, complete dependence on Indian military hardware and assistance, a ban on foreign military training assistance and a gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the UNPKO (UN Peace Keeping Operations) role.

The Indians do openly claim that the APF is their force and that certain allegiance to their orders have surfaced openly. The Indians are intent upon re-establishing border outposts along their northern border and a possibility often voiced is the induction of the Maoist combatants in those posts where contact with the population is minimal. As clarification, it is not India's northern border for which the suggestion is being made; rather, the Indian recommendation is for outposts to be included as part of a Nepal-Tibet Border Security Force. Definitely a suggestion that may be hard for even the Maoists to chew on.

Related Posts:

Endless Possibilities in the Republic of Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/05/endless-possibilities-that-accompany.html

All Attention on the Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/all-attention-on-army.html

The Nepali Army is a Favorite Target for Cheap Provocateurs - An Analysis of a Nepali Adolescent's Professional Obituary
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/being-cheap-provocateur-is-easy.html

The Utility of a Professional Nepalese Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/utility-of-professional-nepalese-army.html

UNMIN's Arms Verification Process in Nepal - More Timely Information and Transparency Needed
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmin-in-over-its-head-in-nepal-arms.html

Sunday, July 13, 2008

Nepal’s National Security Agency: Critical Issues Facing The CA

(Courtesy: Mr. Madhukar SJB Rana - Prof. South Asian Institute of Management, Former Finance Minister)

A battle royal is being fought by the political parties in the Constituent Assembly (CA), and outside, as to who should or should not be members of the current National Defence Council (NDC). At a time when security sector reforms is high on the national agenda, and one is quite unsure as to whether the federal democratic republic of Nepal is going to be endowed with a presidential or parliamentary system of governance by the CA, one can appreciate why all 25-33 political parties should clamour to be on board to protect party interests. Given the above uncertainties, the problem is being made more complex by the fact that, as agreed by the government and seven parties, the Head of State (HOS) will now be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The complexity arises from the fragmentation of the unitary state; the polity of proportional representation into parliament leading to in-built instability, and the non-resolution of the issue over the optimal powers for the presidency (ceremonial vs constitutional).

This basic thrust of this article is that only the government should be the member of the NDC. However, all are welcome to be members of the National Security Council (NSC), including civil society and professional experts and academicians.

The other thrust is to underscore the vital need for the CA to define precisely what ‘national security’ is supposed to mean and demarcate the nature, scope and authority of the NSC as a fundamental constitutional agency. In doing so, we, the citizens, would expect that each political party would consider the matter with due intellectual diligence by being analytically grounded in geo-politics, geo-economics and geo-psychology in consideration of 2 factors and its forces: (a) the current status of Nepal’s national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and (b) the future threats to the integrity of Nepal from the probable centripetal and centrifugal forces within a federal body politic, including threats from outside its national territory—be they states, international business, international non-governmental organizations or the international mafia.

Word has it that, when the army lobbied successfully, and rightly, for the NSC to be a constitutional organ in 1990, the proposed NSC was more akin to the NSC of the USA and India: being more of an open, participative think tank on national security where policy and research inputs would be garnered from all political parties, civil society and experts as members and invitees. A National Security Advisor would lead the NSC. This would allow for sufficient national debate, dissent and dialogue before a national security strategy is actually adopted founded on national consensus, if possible . Such an overall national security policy was expected to guide Nepal’s foreign policy, foreign relations and internal security matters in a holistic manner.

Unfortunately, what was originally sought by the army could not take form as intended owing to (a) the Royal Palace military secretariat’s traditional stranglehold over any innovation by the army, (b) the inability of the army to mobilize public opinion with effective public relations and (c) the utter lack of harmonious interface between the various security agencies. Thus what we landed up with was to settle for the NDC, as is, which now is embroiled in deep controversy over who should be members. It must be mentioned that the NDC Secretariat is purely military. It is precisely because of the overwhelming military nature of the secretariat that one recognizes it more as ‘NDC’ than ‘NSC’.

Its major achievements, perhaps, are the development of greater inter-agency communication, cooperation and coordination in response to grappling with civil disobedience, insurgency, terrorism, civil war and natural disasters. It has been highly successful in being able to preserve Nepal as a viable—albeit weak--- state that is nowhere in sight of becoming a ‘failed state’.

Because the current security agency is more an NDC than NSC so, therefore, it should be led by the Head of Government (HOG). Where, however, the HOS is more than just ‘ceremonial’ it is possible, and probably appropriate, that the HOS chair meetings of the new NSC. Both should have their place in the body politic but only the NSC should be imbibed in the Constitution.

To repeat, it is argued here that the NDC should not include any political party as its function is to communicate, coordinated and control defence policy being implemented by the security, security-related and intelligence agencies as approved by the Council of Ministers. The scope of decision-making in the NDC is purely over issues of war, civil war, insurgency, terrorism, curfew, counter intelligence and national emergencies. In short, it is primarily concerned with issues over the break down of law and order and threats to Nepal’s territorial integrity, national sovereignty and independence. The NDC is accountable to parliament through the Ministry of Defence. This should suffice.

It is appropriate to mention hear, which actually is suggestive of just how narrowly conceived the NDC was, that the Foreign Minister in not a member, even when UN peace keeping and peace enforcing operations are or should be legitimate agenda items for decision by NDC.

Nation states and communities within it, just like individuals, feel insecure when their very existence, their material and financial assets, and their fundamental values are threatened by other nations, societies and individuals respectively.

Nations, communities and individuals' families feel internally secure when there exists, within its territory, communal harmony and tolerance so that there is safe from social turmoil and violence. They also feel secure when there is the absence of political disruptions with law and order prevailing with clear prospects of easy recourse to, and dispensation of justice, by a highly trusted judiciary. Freedom of the press and ‘press security’ is equally vital for individual, communal and national security.

Feeling secure in this new age of inter-dependence and instant exposure of daily events throughout the far corners of the globe has got to be a challenging business. Because never before in mankind's history have there been so many nations with so many peoples making daily contacts at the state-to-state and people-to-people levels with attendant vulnerabilities and risks at the global, regional, national and community levels. To respond quickly is the task of intelligence and counter intelligence.

Past experience tells us that a Nepal Central Intelligence Agency (NCIA) is a dire need for the country; and will be even more needed when it moves towards federalism. The lesson from our own insurgency and civil war is that there are limits to military strategy to maintain law and order. With globalization the sanctity of international borders is questionable. Rise of non-state actors in such forms as religious fundamentalists, international anarchists, international mafia, international civil society, and 'sovereign individuals' (individuals with wealth that exceeds those of states in the realm of e-commerce) are cause for great intelligence concern.

If traditionally diplomacy is the alternative to war, in the new era of globalization it may just as well be said that intelligence is the alternative to diplomacy. As a matter of fact, given the huge need for public expenditure to meet the social welfare cost of the world’s graying population intelligence spending is working out to be the first line of cost-effective national defence for most nations. Nepal should not be an exception.

Further, the inter-state struggle for natural resources, like water and minerals, for example, to maintain high economic growth rates will be lost or won on effective intelligence strategy formulation and implementation rather than relying simply on traditional diplomacy and trade and commerce deals. Perhaps the greatest argument for an autonomous central intelligence agency is the dominant mood of the 21st century where global anarchy and wars between civilizations will be a commonplace scenario across continents from the dynamics of global warming, mass migrations coupled with food, energy, water, financial and economic crises.

The other lesson from our political sphere is that, as a weak state, our national administration is near-totally infiltrated by foreign intelligence agencies and their allies, which calls forth a powerful counter-intelligence strategy implemented in earnest to expunge external infiltration and working towards supporting a national anti-corruption drive that seeks legal action combined with social sanctions against traitors and offenders.

In attempting to define ‘national security’ we must learn from Japan, who in the mid-1950’s developed the visionary concept of ‘comprehensive security’ to grapple with the trauma, humiliation and horror of the loss of national sovereignty to the Americans and the psychological sufferings from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki stranded without any natural resources—other than human resources. So they defined ‘national security’ in the broader, more comprehensive concept of ‘human security’.

Fundamentally, the Japanese doctrine of human security rests on the premise that for national security there must not only be ‘military security’ to defend the nation from outside threats but also ‘human security’ to 'defend' nations from inside threats as national stability depends on each individual having sufficient food security, employment security, social security (education, health and old age pension), energy security, information security (access to transport and communications). We might now add ‘water security’, ‘environmental security’ and ‘pandemic health security’ ( HIV AIDS, TB, bird flu ) to the Japanese definition to bring it up to date in its comprehensiveness.

Nepal is now in quest of a new national identity after the removal of monarchy and becoming a secular state. Alienation and confusion is a natural state of in our current social psyche. Political ideologies of the various parties are not going to fill this deep void. Only common values can.

As almost all Nepalese are religious so a new Nepal moral order must be at the core of the national security value system: truth; peace and compassion as preached by Lord Buddha; non-violence and reconciliation as preached by Mahatma Gandhi and, furthermore, duty, devotion; discipline and discrimination to connect the nation’s and each individual’s body, mind and soul, as preached by one of the greatest modern Saints of South Asia-- the Shivapuri Baba of Nepal.

A most valuable organ of state for inter-communal harmony is to have the Council of Relgious Elders (CRE) meet regularly, chaired by the HOS, with rotating co-chairpersonship amongst the various faiths represented, to have constant inter-faith national and local dialogue for communal harmony so as to negate the use of religion, by political parties, to create electoral vote banks, which actually weakens democracy and the rule of law while nurturing communal hatred.

Last, but not least, each ministry and department should review and recommend comprehensive security needs from their sector’s perspective annually henceforth.

Related Posts:

Security Sector Reform: Taking a Regional Approach and Promoting Cooperative Security Arrangement
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/05/security-sector-reform-taking-regional.html

The Utility of a Professional Nepalese Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/utility-of-professional-nepalese-army.html

Looking Past the Moment of Truth

Dear Nepali Perspectives, I had written what is below in response to an article that came out on Republica.  I may have written someth...