Monday, July 23, 2007

The Utility of a Professional Nepalese Army

(Courtesy: el Matador)

Introduction

Threats to national security are diverse, complex, intense and lethal. Of these threats, internal conflict – “the war within”- is the most impacting to the integrity and unity of a nation. Internal threats are represented by an explosive combination of political, social, economic and psychological elements combined with violence.

Threats to core national values and interests of a state justify and legitimize the use of military force – an essential component to any geopolitical entity. However, the ability to act (and react) in a timely and effective manner, hinges as much on the credibility of the leadership group in power, as it does on the general state of operational readiness.

Democratic Civilian Control

In the modern era, the responsibility of formulating a national security policy (and the implementation of such a policy) is upheld completely by the civilian authority, guided through its elected representatives.

Strong democratic civilian control must identify itself with two dimensions: institutionalized oversight of all military activities without politicization and promotion of professionalism. The prime reason for civilian control of the military is to retain the de jure authority to maintain control over the de facto power afforded by weaponry and military competence.

Military Power

Military power in its deterrent and employment dimensions is a significant security asset. Military power is a relationship comprising of means (men/women and material), methods and the will to sustains them when faced with adversities.

The new paradigm of war is based upon the concepts of continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and conflict. Today the opponents are mostly non-state actors. We are engaging in conflicts for objectives that do not lead to the resolution of the matter directly by force of arms. Therefore, wars are societal in their make, asymmetrical in nature and permanent in their durability.

Militaries prefer mandates that permit a more decisive use of adequate force and resent ambiguous missions and restrictive conditions. The civilian hierarchy prefer to create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives and political pressures to enforce a desired political outcome.

Nepalese Security Environment

The Nepalese people mandated the SPA to impel the Maoists to strictly extirpate their use of violence, join the political mainstream, and provide good governance to facilitate the conduct of CA elections. Unfortunately, the obduracy of some political leaders and the fractured political unity within (and amongst the political parties) have adversely impacted the overall decision- making process. The achievement of national consensus in any given issue is rendered a distant dream while the court of appeal is located abroad.

Division over ethnicity, community, class, caste, gender, religion and languages are indelible. Inequity in representation and opportunities indicate acute lack of inclusiveness. The aspirations created by a much hyped federal system of governance has opened a Pandora’s box, which if not guided properly, may insinuate sub-nationalism.

The proliferation of small arms and explosives (due to the Maoist insurgency and the open border), the proximity of numerous insurgencies in the adjoining Indian States, the establishment of the precedent that the use of violence delivers recognition (and a short cut to power), as well as the presence of additional vindictive armed splinter groups have debilitated the rule of law. The propensity of HR activists to “regret” rather than to “condemn” Maoist atrocities amounts to indirect support (be it due to fear of Maoist retaliation) or even, accelerated non-judicial, exoneration (of Maoist crimes).

The Nepalese Army

Threat perceptions emanate from internal vulnerabilities that remain neglected and unaddressed.. Neutralization of certain threats may require the application of legitimate coercive force including the military.

The Nepalese Army maintains a history identified with the unification process of Nepal. Despite sporadic HR violations regrettably committed while being blurred by the fog of war, the NA, at times in isolation, did force the Maoist insurgents to abandon their aspirations to achieve military victory. Even the latest ICG report of May 2007 states, “The then RNA proved to be a more stubborn foe than the Maoists predicted.” The NA has been universally recognized as the only dependable bastion that protected the nation from being destabilized. It remains the key obstacle that prevents the Maoists from consolidating power through the application of violence.

The Nepalese state of affairs requires the establishment and maintenance of a viable Nepalese military force structure with a rapid deployment capability. The need for a robust and versatile military force coincides with the national foreign policy stipulating the NA to participate in various UNPKO missions under chapters VI and VII and beyond perhaps, in future version of the “Coalition of the Willing.”.

The NA needs to further build and develop an effective response capability to counter transnational threats and stretch its roles and missions to new heights of professionalism. In terms of serving the people during peacetime, the NA must be capable and equipped to conduct civic actions, civil affairs, rescue and relief operations and national development programs.

Transparency, rule of law, accountability, equal opportunities, empowerment of the junior ranks and a strict military chain of command must be fully maintained in the organization. Inclusiveness must be inculcated but reservation quotas to the extent of compromising quality and merit must be avoided.

Down-sizing the NA and integrating the politically indoctrinated PLA into the NA are theoretical steps but should be considered redundant The Maoists may see victory as theirs and may want to dictate terms of state surrender, but their entry into the parliament is due to the liberal and accommodative stance of the SPA. The illegal YCL activities and the adamancy displayed by the PLA towards the process of UN verification are clear indicators that the resurgence of the old insurgency is still a possibility.

Referring to history, the Indian National Army was never integrated into the Indian Army. The Rakshaya Dal was composed of conventionally trained soldiers, that had been demobilized after the end of World War II. They neither indulged in acts of terrorism and extortion nor believed in anything but democratic rule.

The sanctity of the NA must be maintained. An appropriate security organization must be created and commanded by officers and NCOs seconded from the NA to accommodate eligible PLA combatants. The organization must remain under the jurisdiction of Military Law but the role, mission and capabilities must be secondary to the professional Nepalese Army.

Members of the PLA to be considered for integration, must fulfill physical, educational and medical requisites and must successfully graduate from the intensive basic training (to which all NA personnel are subjected). All political affiliations and beliefs must be surrendered. Human Rights violators and those involved in criminal activities must be banned from enlistment. Lastly, the violators of the existing laws, regulations and rules should be prosecuted without impunity.

Conclusion

The restoration of trust and confidence of the Nepalese people in their Army is a concept that needs to be developed and nurtured with priority. A realization must dawn upon the people that the dedicated participation of the NA in the counter-insurgency operations, prevented Nepal from succumbing to a totalitarian communist rule.

The NA, a professional and experienced fighting force (that has received international acclaim), needs to be maintained as a strong deterrent into the foreseeable future to safeguard both development and democracy. It must be clearly highlighted that simply assigning roles and missions to the NA without furnishing appropriate capabilities and resources will eventually position the SPA with all the “carrots” to entice would-be armed revolutionaries, but without any “sticks” to dissuade the politics of violence.

Related Posts:

Debilitating the State’s Security Forces
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/06/debilitating-states-security-forces.html

Apples, Oranges and the Maoist Victory in Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/06/apples-oranges-and-maoist-victory-in.html

Consolidating Peace in Nepal – General Mehta’s Way
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/06/consolidating-peace-in-nepal-general.html

Dissecting the “feudal” NA
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/08/dissecting-feudal-na.html

A 5 Point Salute to Brig. Gen. Dilip Rana
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/5-point-salute-to-brig-gen-dilip-rana.html

4 comments:

Anonymous said...

There is no doubt that the NA has a major role in the stability and well being of the Nepali state. How the bridge of tust between the Army and the politicians is created and moved forward is the challenge.

But no doubt, without the NA, the Maoists would be firmly seated in power today.

Anonymous said...

This is the topic that should be discussed more. This is what is important because security before the CA elections might be a challenge, but afterward, it will be a nightmare.

Anonymous said...

A lot of theory in the beginning but I agree 100 percent with the conclusion. It is simple, it is fact-based and the approach is one which the Nepali government should seriously consider.

Anonymous said...

Yesterday's headline:

Maoists will be out of govt by Sept 18 if republic is not announced, says Ananta

Wow. And I thought I would never live long enough to see this day. The Maoists are going to leave the government by 18th September. So, they will go back to jungle. Excellent! And then, the PM can send the army after them and finish them off for good or the army can put all the politicians in jail and go after the Maoists and finish them off for good. Either way its all good.

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