Nepal's Constituent Assembly Elections - It's not Just a Matter of Security

(Courtesy: el Guapo)

While the United Nations and the international community are correct in their assessment that the lack of security is a challenge to Nepal's CA elections, they would be wise to refrain from characterizing the restoration of law & order as the obstacle to timely, free and fair elections. A much deeper appreciation of the underlying causes of instability are needed before a definitive set of recommendations can be made.

In lieu of such recommendations, the current trend of disproportionate emphasis on security is likely to continue, unchallenged. This continuity heightens the likelihood that order will be pursued through the application of force. In turn, this heightened likelihood is almost certain to derail Nepal's peace process, split the country along ethnic lines, and result in a segregationist civil war that will make the Maoist insurrection pale in comparison.

The established precedent of force

Placed in the context of Nepal's trigger-happy governing elite, force as an option is already a risky enterprise. Add to this the fact that the chief architects of Nepal's 12 year civil war are all represented in the interim parliament and one finds readily available ingredients for a "perfect storm." Not surprisingly, it's the executors of operations Romeo and Sierra-II Kilo, the engineers of human wave attacks, and the harbingers of political assassinations who in present day Nepal, are spearheading efforts to apply force in Nepal's southern plains.

Based on the Nepali Congress's past record in office, one would expect its leaders to exhibit more caution when considering the application of force, but they don't. One would expect equally cautionary advice coming from the ranks of Maoist ministers (against the use of force to address politically rooted problems) but instead, these charlatans stand shoulder-to-shoulder with their counterparts in the Nepali Congress, advocating armed action in the Nepali Madhes.

Another established precedent to be weary of stems from experiences during the February-1 period. The attempted municipal elections during King Gyanendra's time was a farce for two reasons. First, because those elections did not have legitimacy from either national or international perspectives and second, because a large number of individuals who elected to participate, were murdered by the Maoists. Targeted political assassinations in full view of and with encouragement, the Maoists have claimed, from Nepal's mainstream political parties.

These precedents together should suffice to ward off any conjecture on the disutility of using force in the Terai. Armed elements are sure to follow the precedent established by their Maoist predecessors to foil elections and if the option to use force is pursued, the death of innocent Madhesis is bound to engulf Nepal is another round of violent, armed, civil unrest.

The "Civil Unrest / Security" Equation

To the casual observer of Nepal's convoluted politics, the reflections above may appear counterintuitive - Why on earth would a logical call to negotiations not be the optimal path to pursue? The answer to this question may be found by evaluating the "equation" below:

Trouble in the Terai = Civil Unrest
+ Threat to Elite "Bahunist" Domination
+ Restructured Voter-banks
+ Heightened Uncertainty
+ Risk of Legitimacy of CA elections
= Security Operations to "Restore Law & Order"

In the crudest terms, the reason Nepal's interim government is aggressively pursuing security operations against a tiny armed minority in the Terai is because doing so serves the limited, narrowly defined interests of the elite, Bahunist clan. The apparent convergence of interests for Bahunists across the political spectrum (Nepali Congress, UML, Maoists, etc.) presents a dangerous situation where the objective of holding constituent assembly elections is confused with attempts at maintaining political dominance.

In other words, the ruling political elite have arrived at a point where their desire to maintain political hegemony, intersects (the Maoist-SPA merger of necessity). In such a situation, the rationale for security action becomes much more pronounced (and some may argue, legitimate); especially when it comes from all the governing political parties who feel collectively threatened by the unrest in the Terai.

From a political perspective, the emergence of a strong, unified, Terai-based political entity (namely, the Madhesi Peoples' Rights Form - MPRF) is guaranteed to diminish voter banks for the existing political parties. A quick count of the number of Nepali Congress and UML leaders whose Terai constituencies are sure to swing in favour of the MPRF reveals the extent to which the emergence of a political entity (dedicated to the Terai) will reconfigure the current political dominance.

The equation above also explains why Nepal's civil society is quiet these days and it also explains why there is a mad rush to integrate Maoist combatants into the NA and speed up the verification process. It also explains why the Maoist military ranks are gradually warming up to the NA - the Maoists will need the NA on their side because ultimately, the Maoists have nothing to fall back on but their ultra-nationalist card. The more things go "wrong" in the Terai, the more likely the Maoists are to channel unrest in other parts of the country, along nationalist lines.

More Inclusion means more than just lip service

The often referred to dimension of "bahun-chhetri" domination and the inequitable distribution of power within the Nepali state is something the United Nations, the Carter Centre, the International Crisis Group and every other "expert" continually alludes to; such allusions are made when recommending how best to enhance the feasibility Constituent Assembly elections.

"Guaranteeing inclusiveness" has become the seasonal mantra for the NGO/INGO community and select non-Bahunist civil society elements (backed by a plethora of international organizations). This arrangement works well because it keeps the funds flowing, a newly emerged (INGO/NGO dependent) middle-class employed, and it keeps the peace bubble afloat. What it also does is introduce considerable uncertainty into the political equation for a dinosaur class of politicians who have grown comfortable with the idea of their respective parties' dominant positions.

The flip-side to this agenda of "inclusiveness" (in politically "correct" terms) is precisely what Nepal's Madhesi population is revolting against in their own (for some, politically "incorrect") terms - the dominant Bahunist attitudes that have percolated into the post-April 2006 environment. The set of collective attitudes, institutions and mindset is what the Madhesis, the Dalits, the Janajatis (and every other ethnic minority in Nepal) is rebelling against. The rebellion is often misconstrued as a revolt against just the monarchy when in fact, the attack being waged has repercussions for ALL "fedual" institutions and entrenched positions across the entire range of Nepal's socio-political spectrum.

Conclusion

Rather than advocating the use of force, Nepal's interim government and the international community should be lobbying for negotiations between the ruling elite and Nepal's marginalized ethnic minorities. Diffusing political tensions between the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF, also known as Madhesi Peoples' Rights Forum - MPRF) is a logical and peaceful means to "stealing" the initiative from armed factions in the Terai. If the MJF can be provided amenable terms upon which to enter into national political processes, the rationale for armed militancy ceases to exist.

The international community has the right set of "carrots" and "sticks" to render negotiations successful and also to re-engineer the established precedent of applying force to deal with political problems. India in particular, with its firm grip on Nepal's political class and its traditional support for the Maoists, has a key role to play.

In conclusion, there should be no mention of security operations in the Terai until and unless the MJF's demands are met. It's really that simple. If the MJF gets what it wants (which by the way, is completely on par with what they deserve), the JTMM issue is diffused by default. Of course, this implies a shift in power from the current elite to a "new kid on the block" which is why we're having all this drama.

What any logical person/group should push for is the integration of the Madhesis into the national political arena before integrating the Maoists into the NA. This is literally a pre-condition to the consolidation of peace and the renunciation of force as a means to settle political disputes. Nepal's policy makers need to consider security but only within the larger context of political settlement. Nothing is non-negotiable provided Nepal's archaic politicians demonstrate the capacity to compromise their hegemony on state power.

Related Posts:

Lack of Law & Order in Nepal, Primarily a Maoist-Originated Problem
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/lack-of-law-order-in-nepal-primarily.html

Nepali Politics: Brahmin and Chhetri Everywhere
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/nepali-politics-brahmin-and-chhetri.html

The Mysterious "Environment" and the Bogey of Elections
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/06/mysterious-environment-and-bogey-of.html

Bahunists and Bahunism - A mini-Dissertation on the Caretakers of Nepal's Feudal Tradition
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/03/bahunists-and-bahunism-mini.html

The Idiot’s Guide to the Maoist Playbook
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/01/idiots-guide-to-maoist-playbook.html