UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform

(Courtesy: el Zorro)

After over a year of electoral propaganda, UNMIN's day of reckoning has came and gone. The question at hand however, isn't whether Ian Martin should be invited to continue in Nepal, but how UNMIN's mindset can be tailored to better fit Nepal's unique requirements. Put simply, UNMIN’s boiler-plate, consultant-minded approach has failed miserably and should no longer be given sustenance.

Setting false expectations

Months before the November 22 date, UNMIN, political pundits, their minions and Nepali civil society all understood that holding elections under continued Maoist duress would be impossible. It was the fear of publicly jetissoning a false reality (fabricated by these very actors), that the “alarm bell” wasn’t rung in time and the Nepali people were betrayed once more.

Where the setting of false election expectations is concerned, UNMIN and every high-ranking UN official who flew in and out of Nepal (while singing praise of the peace process and electoral preparations), is guilty as charged. They were all responsible for exacerbating a lie that intentionally subdued glaring challenges and highlighted peripheral progress. Ian Martin routinely presented hyped versions of UNMIN’s “progress” to his superiors (and fawning Nepalis) in New York, as evidence of UNMIN’s success - a success that had no chance of materializing.

Banking on fine print instead assuming responsibility

Regardless of how Ian Martin chooses his play on words or how he attempts to re-interpret UNMIN’s mandate in Nepal, the fact remains that Martin and his “army” of advisors were incapable of executing even the narrowest interpretation of UNMIN’s current mandate – helping set the stage to ensure constituent assembly elections.

Had Martin’s team executed its limited mandate, assigning unambiguous accountability to the actors that foiled elections would be possible. The collective allocation of responsibility would leave no room for the repetition of similar Maoist shenanigans in the future.

However, because UNMIN failed in this regard, Nepalis are left blaming the Maoists who in turn, conveniently point to the fact that it was the interim government that suspended polls (and not just the Maoists). Such rationale coming from the same weasel who 3 months ago had warned of grave consequences for Nepal (should CA elections not be held on time - i.e., November 22, 2007), is a bitter pill that thanks to UNMIN, all Nepalis must swallow.

UNMIN may have unlimited liability where the dollars spent on supporting Nepal’s peace process is concerned. But, the Nepali government and the Maoists should not be permitted to share in the luxury of such unlimited liability. These actors (at some point) will have to face the Nepali people (and each other) in elections and UNMIN will have to do a better job of ensuring that constituent assembly elections are in fact, held.

Unaccountability is what Nepali Civil Society and UNMIN thrive on

Everyone (UNMIN more than others) understood what the setting of Maoist preconditions meant for CA elections. And even with UNMIN as their vanguard, no one dared practice any of the high minded morality or democratic conviction that accompanies populist rhetoric in Nepal. (For the most part, populism and “democratic” activism in Nepal, have become synonymous).

Instead of advising the Maoists to change course, Nepal’s self-professed democratic stalwarts (those who were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Maoists were yearning to become practitioners of liberal democracy), turned the other way.

For example, Devendra Raj Pandey paid homage to the Maoist demand for a republic through the parliament. Human rights activist Padma Ratna Tuladhar immediately busied himself toeing the Maoist line and Krishna Pahadi’s fluorescent presence was nowhere on the streets of Kathmandu.

Also missing was headline news of Kanak Mani Dixit throwing himself into the Kamal Pokhari jailhouse (to make international SOS calls). In fact, November 22 was a day on which Mr. Dixit’s allegations of a dormant army (as a force waiting to serve it’s King), ran exceptionally hollow.

There is no better term than “pathetic” to describe the state of those who interpret the taming of a power-hungry monarch (in the 21st century) as the crowing jewel on their personal list of accomplishments. Unfortunately for Nepal, this pathetic list is long and varied and runs from Kathmandu to Brussels, from Washington DC to New York, from Sydney to London, and back again.

The connection between UNMIN and Nepal’s disillusioned civil society is this – both find themselves in a symbiotic web of conspiracy driven agendas, diverted development dollars, and foregone conclusions. They profess allegiance to a higher cause, speak of process, of rights, of empowerment and rule of law. All the while, what they practice rarely re-enforces that which they preach – neither UNMIN nor Nepal’s civil society is accountable, transparent, or flexible enough to view Nepal’s political landscape through any paradigm other than their own preconceived notion of what the landscape SHOULD look like.

Operational ineffectiveness – how should this be addressed?

Whether opponents of UNMIN like it or not, the UN is intricately tied to Nepal’s peace process. Getting rid of UNMIN (as some would propose), is not a credible solution to guaranteeing sustained peace or democracy. However, permitting the UN mission in Nepal to carry on in the flimsy manner that it has operated, is no solution either.

Essentially, UNMIN needs to be restructured to carry out its mandate in a responsible and timely manner. Below are a set of recommendations that may help the Nepali state achieve its desired, democratic end-state, at the earliest.

1. UNMIN should focus on its current mandate and stop looking for opportunities to expand. All parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) need to sit and re-establish a set of achievable milestones where constituent assembly elections are concerned. The winter session of the interim parliament declaring yet another election date (only to be missed again), should not be the driving agenda.

Instead, the SPA coalition and the Maoists should produce a set of target objectives (and associated dates) that need to be met, in order for CA elections to be held. These objectives and their associated dates should be shared with UNMIN and UNMIN’s engagement sought in an advisory capacity.

2. UNMIN needs to be more transparent with the Nepali people. Once all parties are in agreement, UNMIN should allocate its resources to ensuring that agreed upon milestones are met and should produce weekly reports (on its website) that outline progress-to-date, challenges/obstacles and upcoming milestones. Should the danger of missing any milestones become obvious, the information should be shared with the Nepali people (and the international community-at-large), in a transparent and public manner.

UNMIN’s practice of inflating progress by subduing “hiccups” should be halted, immediately. All agreements (official and unofficial) between UNMIN, the SPA and the Maoists should be shared in the public domain. For example, Ian Martin’s revelation AFTER the arms verification process had begun, that details on Maoist arms, numbers of verified combatants, etc., should be kept from public disclosure is the kind of practice that UNMIN should be reprimanded for enforcing.

3. UNMIN should negotiate a more practical mandate. In order to avoid the plethora of excuses of the past (and repeated discussion of it’s mandate), Ian Martin should once and for all, tell the SPA and the Maoists the common minimum set of conditions UNMIN REQUIRES, to effectively carry out its responsibilities.

The UN was in a remarkable position at the onset of the peace process to negotiate its own parameters for success but failed to do so. Fortunately for UNMIN, Nepal’s peace process has yet again arrived at a juncture where Ian Martin can better negotiate the terms of UNMIN’s engagement. Martin should take full advantage of the lessons he has learned and negotiate a more effective mandate for his mission. A RESTRUCTURED versus an EXPANDED role is what Ian Martin should focus on.

4. Parallel facilitators should be considered. The perception that the UN (and the UN alone) can help Nepal navigate its peace process is a myth. The nature of conflict has morphed drastically since the UN’s inception. With these transformations have emerged numerous institutions and think tanks that may not be as well funded but are intrinsically better structured to handle discrete components of Nepal’s peace process.

Although it is the usual suspects that infiltrate every one of these institutions (e.g., former ICG “expert” on Nepal, John Norris, now serves as a special advisor to Ian Martin), Nepal’s chances for sustained peace may be benefited by keeping all options open.

All “advice” where peace is concerned is “free.” It wouldn’t hurt Ram Chandra Poudel and his Ministry of Peace to capitalize on handouts.

5. UNMIN’s progress should be monitored. UNMIN should have no problems with the Ministry of Peace and an external fourth party monitoring the progress of Nepal’s peace process.

Oversight is a necessary component to any process. But because independent oversight is desired, it is understood that in Nepal’s case, the existence of the incestuous relationship between UNMIN and known civil society actors, incapacitates civil society as the sole, logical source of unofficial governance. Employment arrangements in particular, hamper the independence of most vocal opinion makers in Nepal’s case.

As an alternative, the inclusion of an Indo-Chinese component as an advisory board to the Ministry of Peace should be an excellent addition to ensuring that UNMIN does its job and that Nepal’s peace process remains on track.

Conclusion

UNMIN's credibility has eroded significantly but has not been irreparably damaged. This, thanks to Nepal's "ordinary" (according to Ian Martin) people who are able comprehend the failure that UNMIN has been but appear incapable of addressing the root causes that “disabled” UNMIN’s election propaganda. This message was the basic thrust of Ian Martin’s most recent press conference.

With all the lies that have been spewed and the double standards that have been practiced, the time to carefully re-evaluate UNMIN’s most effective application is now. It is important to revisit the fact that UNMIN is in Nepal at the behest of the SPA and the Maoists, but is accountable to the Nepali people. UNMIN is in Nepal to do what the Nepali people deem is right for their own country, not what UNMIN (or other external powers) deem, is right for Nepal.

Conscientious Nepalis need to wake up to these facts and stop elevating UNMIN onto a pedestal where it does not belong. For all the progressive politics that Nepal’s elite allegedly represents, its constituents should take a moment to dissociate their wallets from their professed morals and take a good look in the mirror. It is at this point of dissociation (self-reflection) where the chasm that defines (and perpetuates) the failures in Nepal's peace process, lies.

Related Posts:

What UNMIN Should Do to Manage Nepal's Peace Process
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/courtesy-krishna-hari-pushkar-un-is.html

The Problem with Nepali Political Civil Society - The Leftist, the Cowards, and the Compromised
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/10/problem-with-nepali-political-civil.html

What has UNMIN Accomplished in Nepal?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/what-has-unmin-accomplished-in-nepal.html