Asian Centre for Human Rights Report on South Asia - A Cursory Examination of Reporting on Nepal

(Courtesy: Comrade Libre)

The "South Asian Human Rights Index 2008, 1 August 2008" (http://www.achrweb.org/reports/SAARC-2008.pdf) is a publication worthy of reading. From pages 99 to 113, the ACHR (Asian Center for Human Rights) report chronicles in detail, documented human rights violations by all parties in Nepal, over the year 2007 (with reference to specific cases as far back as 2005).

While "naming and shaming" is certainly a powerful tool that is often used in the business of human rights advocacy, a dispassionate review of the ACHR report requires a certain level of detached realism. There are contradictions inherent to the implied recommendations, embedded throughout the text of this report. Some of these contradictions are outlined below.

Security and Human Rights Abuses - A Direct Relationship?

First, the obvious: Human rights violations in Nepal have reduced dramatically since the end of Nepal's Maoist insurgency. The lesson implied here is essentially that war leads to rights violations. The hindsight "epiphany" is that the Maoists should not have provoked Nepal's civil war and successive governments should not have retaliated using the State's military apparatus.

There is no rocket science to this observation. However, there is a stark reality that must be reckoned with - Maoist provocation has been rewarded with their stature as the largest party in Nepal's Constituent Assembly. Additionally, every single politician who advocated military mobilization against the Maoists, are in positions of power today. So where should the accountability of past abuses reside? Individual cases of abuses can certainly be prosecuted to the law's extent. But will legal action be complete without also implicating today's power brokers for their direct involvement in instigating Nepal's civil war?

Further, the following observation adds more confusion: "The biggest concern (in 2007) was not so much state violation but rather the absence of state." Considered in tandem with Nepal's ranking as six out of seven South Asian nations (the higher ranking implying relatively lower rights abuses), a direct correlation is implied between human rights violations and the presence of state forces. The contradiction here is that the ACHR report highlights the absence of state forces as a point of concern while simultaneously suggesting that when the state forces were out of their barracks, human rights abuses were rampant.

Ironically, the great work that human rights defenders within and outside of Nepal have done is partially responsible for the near collapse of the law and order situation in Nepal. When reports are continually headlined with subjective criticisms along the lines of "excessive force," the net result is lawlessness. Security agents are increasingly aware of the repercussions of applying force and hesitate to react even under conditions that warrant the application of force. The ACHR reports correctly states that "the morale of the police was very low (in 2007)." The degradation of morale is directly related to a sense of duty that repeatedly clashes with ambiguous guidelines on the acceptability of action.

This does not mean that the application of "excessive force" should be excused but rather, that the state security forces should be educated on "acceptable" levels of force. For example, is baton charging "acceptable" when public property is being destroyed? Is it "acceptable" to return fire when a VIP convoy comes under fire? Is it "acceptable" to expect the maintenance of law and order with merely the presence of security forces?

There is a fine line that human rights defenders must walk in situations like Nepal where the entire state structure is under indictment and as a result, does not have the capacity to defend its security forces' actions. In other words, the idea of security forces as one of many of the State's organs, with ultimate accountability residing at the political tier, is a notion that needs to be urgently institutionalized. Only then will criticism based on human rights, yield the desired impact.

Politicization or Civil-Military Relations? Which is the Lesser Evil?

This line of thought is a good transition to what is perhaps, the most provocative statement in ACHR's report: "Nepal lives under the shadow of a highly politicized anti-democratic Army… who are not accountable to anyone except themselves." Coming from a organization that itself is unaccountable to anyone (and everyone at the same time), such a statement is hypocritical, callous and counterproductive to the overall human rights agenda.

First, politicization is a two-way street - it's not as though the Army decides to politicize itself and align with say, the Nepali Congress without the Nepali Congress welcoming the move. Second, if in fact different factions in the Army are reaching out to different factions of the political spectrum, is this necessarily bad because the institution is being politicized or good because civil military relations are improving?

Further, is the Army anti-democratic because Girija Prasad Koirala retained COAS Katuwal as its head or was Koirala anti-democratic for recognizing that the sustenance of democracy and stability hinged on retaining a balancing threat of force against a radical communist party, bent on establishing a one-party communist republic in Nepal? Criticizing the Army with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight is immensely more simple than accounting for scenarios that did not materialize by keeping the Army's chain of command intact.

The contradictions, once more, are glaring. In the same report, the ACHR criticizes the Army for being politicized, for civil-military relations being insufficient and for the Army being un-democratic and unaccountable? To whom should the Army be accountable without catering to the political forces and in return, becoming more democratic through enhanced civil-military relations?

If the intent of the ACHR report is to pass judgment on the entire Nepali Army through its COAS, then in the tradition of professional impartiality, perhaps equal judgment should also be passed on the Maoist leader Puspha Kamal Dahal (who is not only the Maoist political head honcho but also the supreme commander of the Maoist "PLA")? The parallels are apparent; yet, the ACHR's reporting is not.

"You Scratch my Back, I'll Scratch Yours" - UNMIN and AHRC

On the subject of accountability, the AHRC's readership may also be drawn to the subtle advocacy performed on behalf of UN agencies in Nepal - namely, the UNMIN and the OHCHR. According to the AHRC report, Nepali actors have "failed to understand or overlook the positive impact of these international agencies in favour of criticising UNMIN for what often appear to be little more than often ill-informed and politically motivated purposes."

In reality, what Nepali actors had failed to understand was the extent to which the UNMIN could have been mobilized to further the cause of sustained and lasting peace in Nepal. But in all fairness, the political motivation behind such failure, goes both ways. Nepal's political class should have provided the UNMIN a mandate to which the UNMIN could have been held accountable; Ian Martin on the other hand, with his first hand experience in Nepal, should have sought a mandate that would have been more impactful.

The misunderstanding that has resulted in overshadowing what little good the UNMIN has done, is actually a latent recognition by the Nepali elite that Nepal's government gave the UNMIN a limited mandate with plenty of room for interpretation and that Ian Martin, happily accepted a multi-million dollar contract with enough loop holes to limit his organization's exposure. For an organization desperate to recreate its diminished relevance, Nepal became to the UN a "gift that just kept on giving." This is what most educated Nepalis resent.

A civilian was kidnapped from Kathmandu and murdered in a cantonment monitored by the UNMIN; the UNMIN's documentation of arms it has inventoried is still unavailable for public consumption; there are so many lingering questions on the Maoist combatant verification process (and the track two dealings between Ian Martin and the Maoists), that the results are still in question; Ian Martin, Kofi Annan, and Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai sharing laughs over beers (at the very onset of Nepal's peace process), became an iconic image of the UNMIN's compromised impartiality .

The AHRC report cites the YCL as a liability to Nepal's peace process. Is the AHRC aware that Ian Martin was fully cognizant of the on-going rotations between the YCL and the Maoists' PLA, at the very founding of the YCL? His admission behind closed doors in New York, amounted to turning a blind eye in favor of helping the Maoists democratize. How democratic is the YCL and how effective was Ian Martin in faciliatating the YCL's birth?

In all fairness, Nepalis have not overlooked the positive impact that UN agencies have had on Nepal. It is rather insulting that the AHRC would insinuate ungraciousness on the part of Nepali people whose criticisms of UNMIN's work, are factually justifiable and on the whole, overwhelmingly legitimate. The UNMIN has received criticism where criticism has been due - namely, in its non-transparent, often partial, and unaccountable mode of operation.

Conclusion

Despite the apparent contradictions in the AHRC's report on Nepal, the report is well worth a thorough read.

The value in the AHRC's report is the detailed documentation of human rights abuses (and allegations) in Nepal. Although much of the material is regurgitation of facts and figures already published through various national and international sources, the benefit to consolidating and (re-highlighting) such egregious acts of abuses, are self-evident.

Overall, the ACHR's report is impartial in its allocation of accountability to actors across Nepal's political spectrum. The report correctly identifies widespread impunity as the root cause behind continued human rights violations. More importantly, this report touches upon a defining facilitator of continued rights abuses - a myopic focus on short-term political horse trading at the cost of long-term stability.

Having correctly identified the weaknesses in Nepal's peace process, what is sorely missing are implementable ideas / recommendations on how best to rectify such deficiencies. Given the contradictions highlighted above, solutions to Nepal's current predicament are anything but apparent.

Related Posts:

UNMIN Finally Speaks Out - A Critical Examination of UNMIN's Letter to News Front
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/unmin-finally-speaks-out-and-pulls-foot.html

The Nepali Army is a Favorite Target for Cheap Provocateurs - An Analysis of a Nepali Adolescent's Professional Obituary
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/being-cheap-provocateur-is-easy.html

UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/unmin-in-need-of-immediate-reform.html

The Problem with Nepali Political Civil Society - The Leftist, the Cowards, and the Compromised http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/10/problem-with-nepali-political-civil.html