(Courtesy: Samarjit Thapa)
The NA (Nepal Army) was forced to take out its ceremonial cloak as the pace of Maoist Insurgency intensified. Presently, the insurgency (at least in theory), has ended. The NA played a vital role in containing the Maoist insurgency. There was a great expectation that the army would crush the insurgency. But this did not happen. Now is the time to analyze why.
Nepal's civil war was provoked by the Maoist insurgents. Only after the NA was attacked did the government of the time (after exhausting other means available), authorize the use of military force. The goal was to swiftly end the violence and bloodshed. But there was nothing swift about the government (or the NA's) reaction.
Why was the NA's operational reaction so retarded? What went wrong in their preparation during pre-mobilization? Was there a serious leadership flaw in that they could not foresee operational requirements of the future? Liddell Hart said "If you want peace prepare for war". Where was the application of this motto? There has been less effort spent on postmortem of the NA leadership's dereliction of duty than the issue deserves.
The involvement of the NA during counter-insurgency operations opened a "Pandora's box." The myth of an infallible Army is no more; the people were able to assess the NA's performance during the insurgency from many different dimensions. The people of Nepal saw Nepal Army through the prism of elite Generals. The army's conduct during the insurgency period created an environment of mistrust between the field commanders and the Generals in Army HQ.
The burden of the war was laden completely upon tactical commanders. This is most likely why the NA experienced tactical victories throughout their counter-insurgency campaign, but a strategic defeat overall. Against this backdrop, it is prudent to ponder the generalship of the army.
In his book "Generalship-Its Diseases and Their Cure," General JFC Fuller draws upon his knowledge of World War-I. He posits that for the first time in British military history, something went terribly wrong with the quality of leadership of senior British officers during World War-I. "Sometime before the outbreak of the World War," Fuller writes, "the art of soldier-ship slipped into a groove and became materialized…the more management or command became methodized, the more dehumanized each grew."
Before World War-I, the ordinary soldier had seen Generals in the thick of the action, but by 1914 soldiers rarely saw their top brass; perhaps, the front line men heard of their leadership, as managing directors sitting in dug-outs and in offices. Frequently, the soldiers did not even know the names of their commanding officers. To the average solider, their top brass were no more than ghosts who could terrify but who seldom materialized; hence battles degenerated into subaltern led conflicts just as manufacturing had degenerated into foreman controlled work…the man was left without a master – the general in flesh and blood.
Emphasizing John Ruskin's words that "if war is bereft of the personal factor in command, it cannot but degenerate into a soulless conflict in which the worst and not the best in man will emerge," Fuller argues that the true General "is not a mere prompter in the wings of the sage of war but a participant in its mighty drama, the value of whose art cannot be tested unless there is a clear possibility of the struggle ending in death." Fuller concludes that that there are 'three pillars of generalship: courage, creative intelligence, and physical fitness; the attributes of youth rather than of middle age." Fuller insists that World War-I generals were not cowards; rather an "…amazing unconscious change…rose out of the Franco-Prussian War and obliterated true generalship, de-humanizing and de-spiritualizing the general until he was turned into an office soldier, a telephone operator, a dug out dweller, a mechanical pressor of buttons …as if armies were a …soulless machine." The way above Fuller hit the disease then he diagnosed it: "In war it is almost impossible to exaggerate the evil effects of age upon generalship, and through generalship, on the spirit of an army … First, war is obviously a young man's occupation; secondly, the older a man grows the more cautious he becomes, and thirdly, the more fixed his ideas …. Youth, in every way, is not only more elastic than old age, but less cautious and far more energetic."
Fuller's writing provides much insight into the NA's performance. Were our Generals incompetent cowards or were they inaccessible ghosts which prevented the creation of a viable counter-insurgency campaign? There definitely was a flaw in the generalship of NA because they were unable to implement the effectiveness of a "Unified Command" as had been done by great Generals like Templar and Briggs during their Malaya campaign.
What could the reason be for such incompetence? The only one that comes to mind is that the NA's Generals were more socially (status) oriented versus task oriented. The reason could be they didn't know what they were doing and were provided with a plethora of facilities beyond the socio-economic standards of the country. The result was a complete failure to evolve 'strategic guidance' and neglected operational coherence. The war was mercifully left on the shoulders of tactical commanders. It is not that the NA lost because the Maoists were superior but that the NA's leadership was so incompetent that the Maoists looked like strategic geniuses.
There is also another school of thought that explains the NA's lackluster performance - the political system was not conducive for the NA to wage war against insurgency. This explanation however, is hollow.
The first responsibility of every officer is to protect his men from illegal and immoral orders issued by politicians known to be lying to the public. The blame would go to the NA for making former King Gyanendra a scapegoat by not challenging (and according to first hand accounts, even encouraging) his immoral actions. The present day NA leadership has little right defending their institution as constitutional stalwarts and protectors of democracy; they all failed to display the quality of Generals when they accepted orders that sent men into harm's way, without a politically acceptable objective. It is the generalship of the NA who should share a piece of the "blame pie" for leading the Nepali State into the chaotic situation today.
The rank and file of the NA is tired of listening to the same rhetoric on the commitment of the NA to Nepal's constitution. The Generals should know that every officer has the responsibility under the constitution to defend Nepal against all enemies, domestic and foreign - executing this function also means refusing to obey illegal and idiotic orders, no matter where they come from. Resignation on moral grounds is the option that NA General's should have taken. It is the moral duty of not only one but all of the Generals to come to the forefront to correct the impending misdeeds of those that command them.
The system that produces Nepalese Generals has done little to reward creativity and moral courage. Only very few Generals had a clear vision of what future conflicts would look like and what capabilities the Army has to develop to prevail in such situations. In light of Maoist insurgency the Generals of the NA failed to exhibit visionary leadership. The state apparatus should create a mechanism to examine the behavior and attitudes of NA Generals. The objective should be to investigate the following question: "Why did many of the NA Generals lack moral courage and competence? And in the post-conflict period, why do many of these same Generals disrespect the souls of the men who died under their command by fraternizing publicly with the Maoists who killed them? Forget values, ethics and standards - is there even an ounce of decency left in these NA Generals?
Related Posts:
Asian Centre for Human Rights Report on South Asia - A Cursory Examination of Reporting on Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/08/asian-centre-for-human-rights-report-on.html
Moving Beyond Pork Barrel Politics - Integrating the Maoists into Nepal's Security Sector
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/07/moving-beyond-pork-barrel-politics.html
Debilitating the State’s Security Forces
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/06/debilitating-states-security-forces.html
Dissecting the “feudal” NA
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/08/dissecting-feudal-na.html
The greatest threat to peace in Nepal is misinformed, misguided, agenda-divine journalists like "The Guardian's" Isabel Hilton
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/courtesy-el-punto-isabel-hiltons.html
5 comments:
"is there even an ounce of decency left in these NA Generals?" Good question Thapa kazi. But did they have any decency to begin with so that some of it may be left? When boot-licking, and nothing else, makes you a general, you do some more boot-licking to remain there. Period.
Insurgency of Nepali maoist was based on Mao Zedong's fundamental precept that superior political will with dedicated groups. Which even got good support from Indian collegues both shelter and even physical arms with strtegic suggestions. Whereas NA, got neither physical or political support from inside politics and outside. Most of the upper levels of NA were not interested to take any risk as well due to some international pressures and addicted to facilities.
In Nepal case, insurgents had organized themselves to ensure political rather than military success. The insurgency in Nepal was unified, hierarchical organizations that the Chinese, and later the Vietnamese, developed from the 1920s to the 1960s.
NA were forced to stay in defending rather than providing security and governance to the people due to lack of political and international support.Any study of modern insurgency has to start with Mao. The communist leader who defeated China's nationalist forces, is not read to tackle the similar case in Nepal by NA and political wings.
The maoist won by not defeating NA but by breaking their political will. They won by assuring the different ethnic groups about their past rights of 240 years back to receive massive support all over Nepal. It is well know fact that if government cannot give security and hope for better future, it will be overthrown. That is what exactly happend yesterday and may continue tomorrow as well looking at the present context. Maoist are now Learning to eat soup with knife which they can never do it.
Furthermore, it is very difficult to win warriors hiding inside and if local people supports them (either intentionally or with fear).That is also the case winning over the Taliban by USA in Afghanistan seems less.
Yes, absolutely NA Generals had decency to begin with. Painting a wide stroke is what cowards who watch the action do. There were good, bad and horrible Generals just like there are good, bad and horrible politicians.
Look at Girija Koirala. Can you call the whole Nepali Congress corrupt and power-hungry because of Koirala and his family in the NC? Look at the the Nepal Police. Achyut Kharel fed Girija's pocket the whole time he was IGP. But is the whole Nepal Police indecent because the IGP was bad?
The fact is, there are bad Generals because there are bad political leaders to control the Army.
The struggle between the Palace and Army HQ is also known to all who fought the war with the Maoists. It is because of that tension with the Palace like Bivek Shah protecting the Maoists that the NA was operationally handicapped.
Much easier to label widely than to dig into the facts and understand what really happened.
We all knows that those officers are all ill fated with millions of ruppee in thier pockets. and they are more funkier than comanders so how they can make right decision in right time? here i read all the coments and all of you idiot still don't have power to spell your names? that clearly shows that you all still have jelousy inside you that your could not make as much as other Generals made.
now time has changed and nepal army is just an institution to show for public not for any action.
hope maoist whould try to reduce them coz we do not require any army in nepal coz everything depends in India. they will take care of us. why not they are doing it invisible.
should i have to write my name?
Great views, I do not quite agree with what you guys have said about the generals of the NA. There certainly were one or two, but not all were as selfish and useless as you guys are trying to protray. Mr Thapa has put a great effort to gather such comprehensive information on only the dark side of NA's counter Maoist operation and the role played by the generals. Let me tell you folks, the NA soldiers are still proud of their leaders and to answer to Mr Anonymous you do not stand at the right time and place to discuss downsizing of NA. Do not fall into the trap of Maoist's ploy that the war is over and now we do not need such large army.
You must try to understand that the days to come could become more bloodier than the days we saw in the past.
Do not forget Prachanda's speech that was published few months ago. Dont you feel that he was fooling the whole country and taking money out of the national budget to strengthen his party and army?
Now the last message is, Do not get carried away... do not think NA is wrong or democratic system is wrong and Maobadi who went around killing people brutually and terrorised us and pushed our economy back 25 years is RIGHT.
You do not have to like the NA, but it would become unfair on your mother Nepal to say NA is wrong. Many of you do not even realise how the great soldiers gave up their lives serving for people like you and mother Nepal....
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