(Courtesy: el Comandante)
A Brief History of Integration
The Mukti Sena was created in 1951 to wage an armed revolt against the Rana oligarchy and to liberate the Nepalese people. The militant wing was composed of Nepalese citizens and people of Nepalese origin from India and Burma.
The bulk of the military wing consisted of soldiers of the British Indian Army who were initially trained conventionally to fight the Second World War but remained unemployed after demobilization. There were some individuals who had absconded from the British Indian Army and had joined the Indian National Army lead by Subash Chandra Bose too.
The Mukti Sena manpower consisted of neither political activists nor ideologically indoctrinated Communists. During the armed struggle, which lasted for a short span of time, the militant wing had not committed any acts of terrorism, criminal activities or systematic extortion. Kangaroo courts and parallel governments were never operated by the revolutionaries. When the revolution was considered successful and ceasefire established, the Mukti Sena was renamed with dignity as the Rakshaya Dal.
Except those who revolted under the leadership of Dr. K. I. Singh, the rest were formed up to create three para-military battalions of the Nepal Armed Constabulary (NAC) to function as a back-up force to the Police while maintaining general law and order. Later, Officers of the NAC were designated as Civil Police Officers also. In reality, the nucleus of the Nepal Police Officer Corps was subsequently provided by the NAC. Ex- IGPs G. B. Yakthumba, Puran Singh Khawas, P. S. Lama, Rom Bahadur Thapa and Durlav Kumar Thapa are the examples.
The three battalions of the NAC failed to perform satisfactorily in the insurrection in 1961-62 and lost significant weapons to the insurgents. As a consequence, the NAC was rigorously re-trained by the then RNA; army Officers, Warrant Officers (WOs), NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers), and fresh soldiers were integrated into the units and transformed into Home Guards and the new force was brought under the chain of military command by 1963. The three battalions of Home Guards were then declared as regular infantry battalions of the (R)NA by 1966 and equipped accordingly.
Those who had initially enlisted in the British Indian Army as late as 1944 were at least forty years old. There were only a handful of Officers and WOs who were still serving when their units were regularized. A DIG, Dil Man Singh Thapa, was transferred to the (R)NA with the NAC as the brigade commander and eventually retired as a Brigadier General.
The significant aspect to be noted is that though they were conventionally trained and possessed no ideological beliefs, the process of transforming a revolutionary militant to a regular soldier lasted from 1951 till 1966. The result of such a process was an absolutely peaceful integration and the continuation of respect to existing Military Law and dedication to professionalism.
The Indian Government did create a Naga Battalion composed of surrendered Naga insurgents that were strictly trained. However, the plan was simply symbolic because the unit was neither assigned any operational responsibilities nor stationed in Eastern India. Later, the unit failed to attract new recruits and today, remains as a symbolic emblem only. The general belief in India is that insurgents should never be integrated into the National Security Forces as far as regular channels to recruitment remain a viable and effective alternative.
The Current Day Context
The most offensive style adopted by the Maoists after the activation of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement ) has been to physically counter, neutralize and eliminate all affiliated organizations of other political parties. The mobilization of the PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) and the YCL (almost a day time PLA/ night time Young Communist League) to coercively dominate and control Nepal's urban and rural populations has rewarded the Maoist Party with the status as the largest political entity in the Nepal's CA (Constituent Assembly).
The impunity that the Maoist party enjoys through their threat to return to war has to be challenged politically in order for the nation to move forward. Leveraging the peace process as a symbolic icon of Maoist victory has been extremely effective for the Maoists as they continue to enjoy unconditional impunity; the same process has also been a convenient excuse for the incumbent government to remain in power with the pretext of upholding peace.
Now, the prime intention of the Maoists is to capture total national power through a peaceful political process. The steps are as follows:
a. Forcefully manipulate and amalgamate all the leftist parties under its leadership (the presidential elections were a major snag, but one the Maoists are bound to overcome as alliances change based on issues)
b. Maintain an ostracized democratic set-up composed of a marginally reduced liberal opposition whose capability to challenge the Maoist one party rule is virtually absent.
c. Deceive the international community and derive assistance with a commitment to be more transparent, accountable and in conformance with international standards.
d. Maintain a prolonged one-party rule (although the presidential elections did not go in the Maoists' favor, it should be noted that their machinery has been mobilized in support of the general elections already - none of their political competitors have thought this far ahead).
What the Government Should Consider
In order to ensure a smooth constitution making process and also to limit the Maoists' monopoly on force, the integration of Maoist combatants should include the following minimum standards:
a. Maintain reduced cantonments with the weapons and those combatants verified by the UN.
b. Implement a re-verification process with a special questionnaire including whether they prefer to join the NA or NP or APF. Maoists should never be integrated in the NID (National Investigation Department) for the organization has its own vetting process, does not have a rigorous training syllabus and the process of de-doctrination cannot be enforced (in the NID). Maoists in the NID will have serious adverse implications to the collection of information and ultimately, to good governance.
c. Those who volunteer to join the NA must meet the existing physical, medical, educational and vetting standards without compromise. They should also be cleared of human rights violations and extortion activities.
d. Those who are considered eligible must firstly sign a contract declaring that their links and loyalties to the Maoists will be considered unlawful; should their behaviors be in contravention to the signed contract, their employment with the NA should be terminated immediately. Further, should former Maoist combatants be linked to human rights violations, criminal activities or extortion, they should be immediately discharged. (There exists detailed and voluminous amounts of data from the insurgency period, that meticulously documents human rights violations by Maoist militia and combatants. This information should be made public during an independent, third-party re-verification process).
e. The basic training should be executed with utmost strictness and compromises on established standards should be resisted with conviction. Strict oversight must be maintained over the entire vetting process.
f. Those who have managed to complete the training should be posted to less sensitive units and sub-units and dispersed in small numbers. Three to four basic training courses should be conducted consecutively to complete the integration process over two years.
g. Entry into the NA should be either through recruit training or the officer cadet training; NEVER through the technical basic course, clerk basic course or the Para Folding course.
h. Units with only Maoist combatants should never be established.
i. Those who prefer to stay out of the Security Forces should be included in separate cantonments. Allowances, clothing and rations should be provided by the Government. Vocational training, political indoctrination (to align with democratic principles and practice) and adult education should be conducted. (Foreign donors are interested in such projects and should be approached with ideas). The combatants must be encouraged through logic as well as propaganda to opt for vocational training where they will be able to earn more money and also be able to go abroad as skilled manpower.
j. Should the Maoists insist on forming their own intact units, they must be issued the same weapons in the container that have been registered and all other weapons besides those should be declared illegal. Certain elements of the NA, NP and APF must be inducted in such a unit in its chain of command. The role assigned to such a unit should be very much secondary in nature such as security for vital, physical assets in remote areas.
Reforms within the Existing Security Sector
On the NA's part, the organization must immediately establish strict standards concerning the code of conduct, professional training standards, proper and impartial assessments of performance and acceptance of accountability while exercising authority.
The practice of commanders remaining entangled with commissions on contracts and purchases and entertaining with the funds made available from surplus rations should be banned. This practice is prevalent throughout the chain of command and often seeps into the political layer. Such acts must be exposed, unconditionally reprimanded and persons found guilty of involvement, tried to the extent afforded by military law.
Prototype living standards, storage, office and dinning accommodations must be established and constructed urgently. The old theme to save the government funds at the cost of soldier’s comfort and basic needs must stop. Taking these steps will automatically hedge against the possibility of Maoist combatants exploiting such grievances to their political organization's benefit. The APF uprising followed by the uprising in the police force are token examples of what may come, should the necessary action not be taken.
Further, should sweeping changes be implemented, the improvements derived would be appreciated by the rest of the security forces as a "gift" from the Maoists too and may help to bridge the animosity from having been forced into combat.
The Options at Hand
Ultimately, the Maoists have two options at hand:
a. Either to come to power and maintain a very compromising stance with India concerning the issues of national interests and agreements on natural resources. An evolutionary process to democratize without loosing political power may be pursued; OR
b. Maintain a nationalistic stance with more dependence on external resources (other than Indian) and the use of the China Card occasionally. Very similar to the traditional power structure implemented by King Mahendra in the past and perhaps a desired meeting point between Maoists and the more traditional parties in Nepal.
The first option will certainly lead to a drastic down-sizing of the NA, complete dependence on Indian military hardware and assistance, a ban on foreign military training assistance and a gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the UNPKO (UN Peace Keeping Operations) role.
The Indians do openly claim that the APF is their force and that certain allegiance to their orders have surfaced openly. The Indians are intent upon re-establishing border outposts along their northern border and a possibility often voiced is the induction of the Maoist combatants in those posts where contact with the population is minimal. As clarification, it is not India's northern border for which the suggestion is being made; rather, the Indian recommendation is for outposts to be included as part of a Nepal-Tibet Border Security Force. Definitely a suggestion that may be hard for even the Maoists to chew on.
Related Posts:
Endless Possibilities in the Republic of Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/05/endless-possibilities-that-accompany.html
All Attention on the Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/all-attention-on-army.html
The Nepali Army is a Favorite Target for Cheap Provocateurs - An Analysis of a Nepali Adolescent's Professional Obituary
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/being-cheap-provocateur-is-easy.html
The Utility of a Professional Nepalese Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/utility-of-professional-nepalese-army.html
UNMIN's Arms Verification Process in Nepal - More Timely Information and Transparency Needed
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmin-in-over-its-head-in-nepal-arms.html
2 comments:
This is a very informative piece of writing. Blog masters, please post more of this type of information so we can learn from a historical view point how integration has happened in other parts of the world (and south asia specifically).
I hope the powers that be are reading materials like this too.
Himmat, I completely agree. Some of the more salient points this writer has made are well worth taking note of, when the actual policy of integrating Maoist combatants comes into play.
It is not in regional, national or in the interest of the one institution that has survived intact through one political system to another, to be "infected" with indoctrinated, uneduated, and unemployed boys and girls - people who have had their whole lives stolen by a group of power-hungry ideologues.
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