Defining a Soft Coup

(Courtesy: Bidushi Dhungel and Siddhartha Thapa)

The peace process in Nepal is approaching a deadlock and the contentious issue is the disagreement between political parties and the former rebels, the Maoist party regarding the tussle over the control of state institutions. The mainstream political parties have endured a constitutional democratic culture where state institutions remain independent of political pressure through checks and balances and the separation of power. However, the Maoists a party have expressed time and again its commitment to establish a people’s republic; a system which contravenes the very structure of a liberal democracy. The state institution that has repeatedly become a topic of debate at a local and political level is the national army- the Nepal Army.

The Nepal army has a long history; it is one of the oldest institutions in South Asia, whereas the PLA has a very infant one. The distinction is as such; the PLA was created by a single radical movement in the span of less than two decades. Their origin can be traced to one single objective which is to fight against and defy the Nepali nation state for the simple purpose of propelling the Maoist ideology. On the other hand, since its inception, the Nepal army has been the lifeline of Nepal’s sovereignty from Prithvi Narayan Shah to Bhimsen Thapa through to Jung Bahadur and into the Shah Dynasty. Until the mid twentieth century, the army played a crucial role in the day to day activities of the state. This was true across continents. What is also true is the fact that the Nepalese army has always been loyal to the political authority of the time. For example, with the political demise of Bhimsen Thapa and Amar Singh Thapa, there was speculation that there would be large scale discontent. However, the army sustained its composure and supported the government of the time. Similarly, as the Rana rule came to an end, the army subsequently took allegiance with the reigning monarch. The Economist, in a publication soon after the April revolution of 2006 described how the army had played a crucial role in convincing the king to hand back power to the political parties. Thus, history has now repeated itself and today we see the army closely aligned with the democratic forces and the government of the day.

There is rife speculation that the Nepal army is staunchly anti- loktantra. If so, such apprehensions need to be justified. Since the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement, the army has not once defied the rules that define the peace process. On the contrary, there have been consistent incidents where one or more PLA members have been solely responsible for the death of political adversaries, journalists and the common people who have simply dared to contest Maoist beliefs. The Maoists today have described the process of integration of the two armies as the core issue on which the future of the peace process hangs. But one must understand the difference between the Nepal army and the former rebels. For example, let’s examine the training received by PLA and the national army. While the national army has multiple functions- maintaining territorial integrity, alongside defending the sovereignty of the country, the PLA has a unilinear function- to revolt against the state and to organise the state within the paradigms of a communist paradise. This immediately begs one to ask how an armed group designed to revolt against the state can be loyal to that very state.

The integration of ideologically indoctrinated guerrilla fighters into the national army is bound to trigger political instability. In the long run, these indoctrinated and dogmatic guerrilla fighters will pollute and influence the thoughts of the common soldier of the Nepali army. The implications of such a move would be profound. The National army would no longer be apolitical and the democratic system of checks and balances will erode as one party will hold power over the vast national army. In essence, the integration of these radicalised fighters would serve the purpose of a soft coup staged by the leaders of these very fighters.

What we often overlook is that victory is still to be seen. The Maoists have gotten thus far through a process of negotiations and power sharing agreements. Had they won a military victory, it would be their right to do as they please. However, as their victory has not been a military one, the 12 Point Agreement and subsequent agreements have bound them within the constraints of a democratic polity. Credit must be given to the Maoists for their decision to engage with other political parties and the common people so far. But the intention of the Maoist party has created a realm of doubt through the utterances of their party leaders who have consistently harped on the idea of eliminating their adversaries in order to achieve their long term goal of establishing a people’s republic. Today, rather than the consolidation of democratic ideals and values, the Maoist party seems to be engrossed in the process of exploiting the weaknesses of other political parties and vital state institutions. This can be manifested by their eventual demand of integrating their fighters into the national army as the political parties began to lose their edge.

The conclusion of the constituent assembly elections and the catapulting of the Maoist party into forefront of national politics as the largest political party have dramatically altered the political equation of the country. In fact, the election victory has bolstered the enthusiasm of the Maoist party to push for complete consolidation of power. However, the Nepalese army (the only other organised armed force that can challenge them) remains the only prominent hurdle to their destination of a people’s republic. The political parties have long been out manoeuvred and as a result, the Maoists have understood that the political parties are no match for them. Therefore, the neutralisation of the Nepal army is a strategic necessity for the Maoists to attain total power.

The episode that triggered the divergence between the Nepal army and the Maoists has been much scrutinised. At the heart of this conflict lies the debate regarding the actions of the army chief, the president and that of the Maoist party. First, the army chief’s bold move to defy the prime minister’s demand for his resignation prevented the collapse of the very structure of the Nepal army. Second, in an abnormal situation as was then the president’s apt intervention saved the country from serious political breakdown and crisis. Third, the army chief resignation row coupled with the release of the Prachanda video has completely exposed the Maoists. The consequences of this were so great that they had to leave government and have had to lie low as a result.

The future discourse of Nepali politics remains extremely fragile. This is because while the present government has enough members to form a government it doesn’t possess the numbers required to draft and implement a new constitution. It is this number game that has become the new mantra of the Maoist party to overwhelm the state. The Maoists now are engaging in talks with the two other major political parties (NC and UML) for the integration of their fighters into the national army. In such informal talks, the Maoists have been reported to be appeasing both the UML and the NC into fanciful power-sharing agreements like that of the past. Concurrently, the Maoists are also making it clear that without them the constitution will not be drafted on time as planned. Their demand: the integration of ideological fighters into the national army. You decide.

To Retain or Retire?

(Courtesy: Chiran Thapa)

Once again, Nepal braces for another nail biting affair. Just when it was time to heave a sigh of relief following the recruitment row, another bout of vicious sparring between the Nepal Army and the Maoists in the government is underway.

Before, the row was over recruitment. This time it is over retirement.

As a customary practice, the Nepal Army had written to the Defence Ministry to extend the tenures of eight of its Brigadier Generals. Such extensions were never stymied in the past. This time, however, the Maoist Defence Minister did not acquiesce. When the Defence ministry did not forward the extension proposal to the cabinet, time elapsed and the Generals' retirement dates passed by.

Initially, when no word came from the Defence Ministry, the Generals were asked to continue with their respective tenures by the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS). But, now that the Defence Ministry has sent a letter to the Army Headquarters to retire the Generals, it remains to be seen how the Nepal Army will respond.

This case bears some resemblance to the retirement of senior officers of the Nepal Police. Just last month, the government did not extend the tenures of the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Hem Bahadur Gurung and three Additional Inspector-Generals (AIGs). Previously too, the government had not extended the tenures of eleven senior police officers who consequently retired in September of last year. That lot included the IGP Om Bikram Rana, five AIGs and five Deputy Inspector Generals (DIGs).

But the Nepal Army's case is markedly different. For one, the Police Force is utterly politicized and the institution has had very little say over postings, promotions and retirements. The Nepal Army, however, had thus far kept such matters strictly under its institutional purview. And the Defence Ministry had never before interjected in such affairs.

Also, under the robust commandership of the current CoAS, the Nepal Army has deftly maintained the chain of command and kept the institution intact. With great dexterity, the CoAS has effectively restrained those that want to come out blazing against the former foes and those that want to sycophantically pay homage to newly ensconced political masters.

Furthermore, under his watch, the Nepal Army has kept its boots off the political landscape. Instead, it has subtly cultivated cordial relations with various political forces, the media, the foreign diplomatic corps and other luminaries.

It is these extensive cordial links cultivated by the Nepal Army that have bolstered its clout and leverage. And the recruitment and retirement tussles manifest those relationships. The retirements of the senior Police officers were hardly an issue for other political forces. But, in the Nepal Army's case, politicians of all persuasions have fervently jumped into the ring to support the Nepal Army.

This time too, various political forces have joined the fray to support the Army. Numerous Nepali Congress (NC) leaders have called on the President Ram Baran Yadav - who is currently the Supreme Commander of the Nepal Army, and requested him to intervene to retain the Generals.

Under the leadership of the NC President – Girija Prasad Koirala, leaders of CPN (UML), CPN (Marxist Leninist), Nepal Sadbhawana Party, Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) and Rastriya Janashakti Party (RJP) have decided to forge an alliance against the decision to retire the Generals.

Besides the politicians, others are throwing in their weight too. A group of four former Lieutenant Generals met the President and requested him to use his “special influence” to end the controversy. They believe that such large scale retirement of the hierarchy would gravely jeopardize the structure and functioning of the institution. On the other hand, one retired Major General and a few other former junior officers have come out in support of the Defence ministry's decision saying that "the retirement is purely an administrative matter and the generals should retire as per the Defence Ministry's decision."

Amid these divergent perspectives, however, there is another distinctly inseparable element about this row. It has to do with the previous recruitment row. Recently, the Nepal Army had mulishly recruited new personnel into its ranks flouting the Defence Minister's objections. The Minister's inability to halt the recruitment process had greatly emasculated and embarrassed him and his party that is leading the government. Hence, given the history, the line between vengeance and righteousness is blurred.

This issue, however, transcends beyond the realms of vengeance or righteousness. For the Maoists, it is a face saving game coupled with their aspiration to reign over the Nepal Army. The only bulwark that stands in the Maoist path of total domination is the Nepal Army. The Maoists understand very well that if it were to get hold of the levers that controlled the Nepal Army, they can suppress and sideline any political opposition with relative ease.

Moreover, at a time when the country is in a hideous mess, this imbroglio provides the Maoist leadership with a much needed respite. This incident is being effectively exploited to divert the attention of the masses away from the inadequacies and insecurities plaguing the Nepali society. Faced with a sharply declining popularity, both nationally and internationally, the Maoists are trying to employ the Nepal Army's resistance to their advantage. By propagating Army's actions as a serious breach of democratic norms and values, the Maoists intend on garnering public support.

But most importantly, it sorely needs to demonstrate its supreme status to the people, and especially to its restive cadres and combatants. By overriding their stiff resistance in the recruitment row, the Nepal Army had given the Maoists a black eye. This incident had unmistakably demonstrated the acumen and strength of the Nepal Army.

It is no wonder why this tussle has become a must win situation for Maoists. The Maoists direly need to redeem themselves after their ignominious retreat from the recruitment row. They need to demonstrate that they are in control and that they have managed to lasso the most powerful institution in the country.

In the meantime, the Army too needs to prove that it still retains the capability to withstand and overcome political interference and that it will not be bossed around whimsically by those who want to infuse a politically indoctrinated bevy into its professional ranks.

If the Maoists are able to withhold the decision and let the Generals retire, it will set a new precedent. From the Maoist viewpoint, it would herald a new beginning in the control of the Nepal Army. This would certainly ease the way for the wholesale integration of their combatants into the National Army.

From the Nepal Army's standpoint, however, it will mark the beginning of political encroachment. And it will certainly instill a visceral sense of vulnerability amongst the troops, especially amongst the higher ranking officers.

But if the Nepal Army digs its heels firmly enough and is able to retain its Generals, then implications could be adverse for the Maoists. If Maoists are compelled to retract their decision, then it would be another humiliating blow to its stature and morale. And it would once again project the Nepal Army as a far superior force.

As this row unfolds, the prognosis is bleak. By retiring Brigadiers and upgrading the Colonels, the Maoists are perhaps hoping to prop up a new hierarchy in the Nepal Army that is more pliable to their interest. But, the new lot could easily turn out to be more radical and recalcitrant than the released ones. In any case, whichever way the tussle goes, it will most certainly poison the sour relationship that already persists between these two formidable forces. Not only that, this could possibly be the beginning of an end of an apolitical National Army.

Political Problems Don’t Have Military Solutions

(Courtesy: Comrade Libre)

There are certain forces, internal and external to Nepal, that are engaged in goading the NA (Nepali Army) into controversy. For the good of the military institution, the well-being of our men and women in uniform, and for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nepal, the NA must continue resisting all forms of political instigation. The Army must continue its journey down a politically independent path, with service to the Nepali nation-state (and her people), as the institution’s ultimate objective.

UNMIN Exposed - Why the controversy now?

First and foremost, blame for the controversy over the NA’s bid to fill vacant spots, lies squarely in the United Nation’s corner. The monitoring of arms and armies is the cornerstone of the UNMIN’s mandate in Nepal - a mandate that apparently, the UNMIN failed to execute on two prior occasions when the NA filled vacation positions, without fanfare or controversy.

Both previous recruitment drives were advertised, were identical in process to the current drive, and were held after the signing of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement). So either the UNMIN learned of all three recruiting events at the same time or it acted at the Maoists’ behest. Irrespective of what the actual rationale may have been, the facts remain that the UNMIN failed to act in a timely manner, failed to carry out its duties and at least in perception, failed the dual tests of impartiality and independence - again.

It is shameful enough that a civilian (Mr. Ram Hari Shrestha) was abducted and subsequently murdered inside a UN supervised, Maoist cantonment. In the face of the public scrutiny that followed, Ian Martin was quick to cite a lack of mandate to report (or even prevent) pre-meditated murder. That was bad enough. But for Ian Martin to throw his weight behind the Maoists’ in the current context is just unhelpful, disingenuous and a shameless display of selective enforcement of the CPA.

Toppling the Maoist Government - What does the average Nepali gain?

Second, the disgruntlement over the NA’s recruitment is only one of several on-going issues. It is neither paramount to the continuity of Nepal’s peace process nor particularly relevant to the constitution-making process. What it is, is an unnecessary distraction of a political variety that should be deferred for resolution at the political level. The last thing the NA should be doing at this juncture is permitting its institutional integrity to be compromised over political power plays.

If Girija Prasad Koirala’s Nepali Congress has political contentions with the Maoists’, it is GPK and the NC who should be addressing such concerns with Prachanda and the Defense Minister. The same goes for the UML, the RPP, the MJF or any other political party. But to use the institutional issue of NA recruitment as a springboard to forward political agendas (specifically, to cripple and embarrass the Maoist government) is dangerous, irresponsible and can escalate into further confrontation.

For issues of a political variety, the Cabinet and the Parliament are where civilized confrontations (also known as debates) should be had. If resolution cannot be achieved at that level, the NC, the UML and others are welcome to pursue street protests. In other words, the “democrats” in these parties ought to rely more on the tools that enable democratic practice - parliamentary politics and civil disobedience - and less on military adventurism to fulfill their respective political objectives.

Betrayal in Historical Perspective - The lessons the NA should never forget

Third and most important, the NA”s leadership should have the common sense and wherewithal to realize that it is the very same politicians who insist upon upholding the NA’s apolitical sanctity, who are also busy exploiting the NA’s predicament. The NC’s ultimate goal is to put GPK back in power and Madhav Kumar Nepal’s pipe dream of replacing Prachanda is distasteful humor. How does either scenario benefit the Nepali nation state?

How is it even possible to take a man like Girija Prasad Koirala seriously? After all, it was under Koirala’s watch that the armed Maoist insurrection took hold; it was GPK’s government under which operations Romeo and Sierra-II-Kilo were launched; it was GPK who resigned his premiership because the Army did not mobilize against the Maoists’; and during the height of the insurgency, it was under GPK’s leadership that the SPA (Seven Party Alliance) forged a political alliance with the Maoists. That very alliance undermined the same Army that today, Girija Koirala is attempting to use to satiate this lust for power.

In a nutshell, it is because Girija Prasad Koirala fell for the Maoists’ “promise” that they would make him Nepal’s first President that the NA answers to the former Chief of the Maoists’ military wing today. And now Girija Koirala is bent on encouraging the NA to defy the Ministry of Defense? How does any of this make sense?

Conclusion

The NA has performed superbly after the restoration of the dissolved parliament in April of 2006. Under its current leadership, the NA has regained must of its lost stature and has exercised restraint, professionalism and an unwavering dedication to the Nepali nation-state and her people. As a deterrent to Maoist adventurism, the NA is the single, standing bastion of hope. And this is precisely where the NA should remain - for now.

The NA should continue encouraging the “useful idiots” (who were instrumental in facilitating the Maoists’ to power) to actively assist in the process of seeking “political solutions” to the political challenges at hand. As for those critics who claim the NA is being too submissive, the NA should assure them that if appearing docile is what it takes to keep soldiers out of harm’s way, then so be it. Better submissive than dead and in all honesty, how seriously should those who have been on the battle field take criticisms from those who are experts at trading words, not bullet?

Under no circumstances should the NA go out on a limb to help any internal political party, individual, or external force, in the pursuit of their self-interests. It is the collective Nepali interest in which the NA should act and if this means allowing Ram Bahadur Thapa a face-saving exit, then so be it. The NA can easily diffuse the debate over recruitment by assuring all concerned parties that future force replenishment will not take place. (This, after the UNMIN takes responsibility for failing to execute its mandate and inform the NA in a timely manner.)

Given the delicate juncture at which Nepal’s peace process has arrived, the NA should remind those who are egging it on that there never was (and never will be) a “military solution” to a “political problem.” The NA should steer clear of becoming a back yard where Parties with no grass roots support or tenable objectives (other than coming into power themselves), air their “dirty laundry.”

Nepal's Military Doctrine

(Courtesy: Chiran Jung Thapa)

Indeed, Nepal is endowed with a distinct martial potential. Known as the land of the fearless and lethal "Gurkha warriors," Nepal's martial prowess has received worldwide acclaim. This is mainly because Nepalis have fended off hostile forces with great resilience and tenacity to preserve the Sovereign and Independent status of the nation. Additionally, the worldwide recognition of Nepal's Military prowess can be attributed to the outstanding martial performance exhibited by Nepalis in numerous global battlefronts.

Nepal's Military Doctrine is an embodiment of Nepal's intention concerning the use of its military power in pursuit of safeguarding its National Interest and accomplishing its National Objectives. By rendering direction to the subordinate concepts like force structure, education and training, operation planning, rules of engagement, and tactics, this doctrine aims to instil a sense of purpose and provide guidance to the men and women in uniform.

This Doctrine delineates the necessity of maintaining a military capability to defend and deter any hostile armed attack against Nepal's National Interest as the primary function of the Military. Essentially, it is a strategic guideline that underscores a firm resolve to guarantee military security to Nepal without any assistance from other states.

The military security of Nepal is guaranteed by denying any aggressor its military objective. If confronted with an unprovoked armed aggression, Nepal's military will adopt self defensive measures in ways that it deems appropriate to dissuade and deter the hostile forces. To serve this purpose, Nepal's military will remain continually prepared for conventional as well as asymmetric confrontations. While maintaining the asymmetric capabilities in its arsenal, the military-training and preparation will be primarily geared towards mobile defence.

In conformity with its strategic objective of institutionalizing peace and promoting prosperity, Nepal's Military Doctrine is peaceful and constructive in nature, and self-defensive in posture.

Any unprovoked armed aggression by any State against the Sovereignty, Independence and Territorial integrity of Nepal will compel Nepal to consider the aggressor as an enemy. Any accomplice abetting the aggressor shall also be regarded as an enemy. And to defend itself from the enemy, Nepal shall employ all available national instruments to put a rapid and decisive end to hostilities and swiftly restore the status quo.

To thwart the threat of military aggression, Nepal shall:
· refrain from branding any state as an enemy
· not employ the instrument of force in its interstate relations
· not pre-emptively deploy its military against any State
· not join any military alliance unless its National Interest is imperilled
· not allow the stationing of foreign troops within its territory
· maintain a military force capable of conducting defensive operations
· consistently train its military to engage in both conventional and asymmetric warfare
· strictly adhere to the charter of the UN and international laws
· continue with its commitment to assist in maintaining international security

Under this doctrine, the following acts shall constitute as threats which will prompt a military response:
· incursion into Nepali territory by any hostile foreign armed force
· armed assault against the Nepali population or the Nepali armed forces by any organized armed group
· armed insurgency aimed at undermining the authority of the state

In addition to its core task of guaranteeing military security, Nepal's military will be prepared to undertake a range of other operations in support of its national interest and strategic objectives. Nepal's Military will be further trained and prepared for 4 additional tasks:

i) Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN):
Nepal has endured a decade long brutal insurgency which pushed the nation to the brink of catastrophe. Notwithstanding the little knowledge and experience in COIN, Nepal's Armed forces were haphazardly deployed to mitigate the threat posed by the insurgents. Devoid of a proper political stratagem, however, the military response failed to yield the intended outcome.

Such recurrence in the foreseeable future cannot be ruled out. Hence, effective and efficient military measures to counter such undesirable recurrences are exigent and imperative. A counter-insurgency manual will be conceived in accordance with the emerging trends in COIN, the capabilities, the needs and the past experiences of the military. Also, a new training facility will be established with the aim of equipping Nepal's armed forces with the skills necessary to engage in COIN.

ii) Peace-Keeping operations (PKO): As a responsible stake holder of the international order, Nepal accords high importance to maintaining international security. Nepal's commitment to fostering international security has been manifested by its robust participation in multilateral peace keeping operations (PKO) under the aegis of the United Nations (UN). Nepal will continue to provide special peacekeeping training to its military and make further efforts to enhance its performance in PKO undertakings. To further reflect Nepal's staunch commitment to upholding international security, Nepal will strive to remain in the hierarchy of top five troop-contributing nations in UN sanctioned PKOs.

iii) Disaster Relief Operations (DRO): With its logistics and mobilization capabilities, Nepal's Military has throughout its history played a pivotal role in DROs. As the likelihood of natural or man-made disaster perpetually persists, Nepal's military will be kept prepared to engage in DROs. In the aftermath of disasters, the military will be mobilized to accomplish three vital tasks: a) search and rescue operations, b) distribution of the temporary relief supplies (water, food & medicine) and c) rebuilding/reconstruction process. A special Rapid Relief Unit (RRU) will be setup within the military to develop better logistics capabilities and more efficient deliverance methods.

iv) Infrastructure Building Operations (IBO): Nepal's Military has played a crucial role in the nation's development. It has been engaged in numerous infrastructure projects. With a competent supply of disciplined labour, the military has delivered on some significant infrastructure projects. During times of peace, one battalion will be specialized and dedicated to the nation's infrastructure building effort.

Taking into account the multitude of tasks assigned to the military, upgrading of military's aviation assets is indispensable. The rugged terrain of the country and the lack of proper infrastructure serve as significant impediments to even the normal mobility of troops. In contingencies, when rapid deployment is warranted, mobilization is further strained and operations are acutely affected due to the proper lack of adequate aviation assets. Thus, upgrading of aviation assets is evidently the most optimal counter-measure against these setbacks.

To enhance it aviation assets, Nepal will aim to increase its fleet of VTOL (vertical-take-off-and-landing) and STOL (short-take-off-and landing) aircrafts. Nepal will conduct a thorough need assessment and feasibility study prior to procuring an optimal mix of VTOL and STOL aircrafts. After procurement, special measures will be taken to minimize the downtime, increase the operability of the each aircraft and ensure an all-weather and all time flying capability. The upgraded aviation capabilities will aim to meet the "RST" (Reconnaissance, Rescue operations, Suppressive firepower and Transport) needs.

The Generalship of Nepal Army - Time for Reflection

(Courtesy: Samarjit Thapa)

The NA (Nepal Army) was forced to take out its ceremonial cloak as the pace of Maoist Insurgency intensified. Presently, the insurgency (at least in theory), has ended. The NA played a vital role in containing the Maoist insurgency. There was a great expectation that the army would crush the insurgency. But this did not happen. Now is the time to analyze why.

Nepal's civil war was provoked by the Maoist insurgents. Only after the NA was attacked did the government of the time (after exhausting other means available), authorize the use of military force. The goal was to swiftly end the violence and bloodshed. But there was nothing swift about the government (or the NA's) reaction.

Why was the NA's operational reaction so retarded? What went wrong in their preparation during pre-mobilization? Was there a serious leadership flaw in that they could not foresee operational requirements of the future? Liddell Hart said "If you want peace prepare for war". Where was the application of this motto? There has been less effort spent on postmortem of the NA leadership's dereliction of duty than the issue deserves.

The involvement of the NA during counter-insurgency operations opened a "Pandora's box." The myth of an infallible Army is no more; the people were able to assess the NA's performance during the insurgency from many different dimensions. The people of Nepal saw Nepal Army through the prism of elite Generals. The army's conduct during the insurgency period created an environment of mistrust between the field commanders and the Generals in Army HQ.

The burden of the war was laden completely upon tactical commanders. This is most likely why the NA experienced tactical victories throughout their counter-insurgency campaign, but a strategic defeat overall. Against this backdrop, it is prudent to ponder the generalship of the army.

In his book "Generalship-Its Diseases and Their Cure," General JFC Fuller draws upon his knowledge of World War-I. He posits that for the first time in British military history, something went terribly wrong with the quality of leadership of senior British officers during World War-I. "Sometime before the outbreak of the World War," Fuller writes, "the art of soldier-ship slipped into a groove and became materialized…the more management or command became methodized, the more dehumanized each grew."

Before World War-I, the ordinary soldier had seen Generals in the thick of the action, but by 1914 soldiers rarely saw their top brass; perhaps, the front line men heard of their leadership, as managing directors sitting in dug-outs and in offices. Frequently, the soldiers did not even know the names of their commanding officers. To the average solider, their top brass were no more than ghosts who could terrify but who seldom materialized; hence battles degenerated into subaltern led conflicts just as manufacturing had degenerated into foreman controlled work…the man was left without a master – the general in flesh and blood.

Emphasizing John Ruskin's words that "if war is bereft of the personal factor in command, it cannot but degenerate into a soulless conflict in which the worst and not the best in man will emerge," Fuller argues that the true General "is not a mere prompter in the wings of the sage of war but a participant in its mighty drama, the value of whose art cannot be tested unless there is a clear possibility of the struggle ending in death." Fuller concludes that that there are 'three pillars of generalship: courage, creative intelligence, and physical fitness; the attributes of youth rather than of middle age." Fuller insists that World War-I generals were not cowards; rather an "…amazing unconscious change…rose out of the Franco-Prussian War and obliterated true generalship, de-humanizing and de-spiritualizing the general until he was turned into an office soldier, a telephone operator, a dug out dweller, a mechanical pressor of buttons …as if armies were a …soulless machine." The way above Fuller hit the disease then he diagnosed it: "In war it is almost impossible to exaggerate the evil effects of age upon generalship, and through generalship, on the spirit of an army … First, war is obviously a young man's occupation; secondly, the older a man grows the more cautious he becomes, and thirdly, the more fixed his ideas …. Youth, in every way, is not only more elastic than old age, but less cautious and far more energetic."

Fuller's writing provides much insight into the NA's performance. Were our Generals incompetent cowards or were they inaccessible ghosts which prevented the creation of a viable counter-insurgency campaign? There definitely was a flaw in the generalship of NA because they were unable to implement the effectiveness of a "Unified Command" as had been done by great Generals like Templar and Briggs during their Malaya campaign.

What could the reason be for such incompetence? The only one that comes to mind is that the NA's Generals were more socially (status) oriented versus task oriented. The reason could be they didn't know what they were doing and were provided with a plethora of facilities beyond the socio-economic standards of the country. The result was a complete failure to evolve 'strategic guidance' and neglected operational coherence. The war was mercifully left on the shoulders of tactical commanders. It is not that the NA lost because the Maoists were superior but that the NA's leadership was so incompetent that the Maoists looked like strategic geniuses.

There is also another school of thought that explains the NA's lackluster performance - the political system was not conducive for the NA to wage war against insurgency. This explanation however, is hollow.

The first responsibility of every officer is to protect his men from illegal and immoral orders issued by politicians known to be lying to the public. The blame would go to the NA for making former King Gyanendra a scapegoat by not challenging (and according to first hand accounts, even encouraging) his immoral actions. The present day NA leadership has little right defending their institution as constitutional stalwarts and protectors of democracy; they all failed to display the quality of Generals when they accepted orders that sent men into harm's way, without a politically acceptable objective. It is the generalship of the NA who should share a piece of the "blame pie" for leading the Nepali State into the chaotic situation today.

The rank and file of the NA is tired of listening to the same rhetoric on the commitment of the NA to Nepal's constitution. The Generals should know that every officer has the responsibility under the constitution to defend Nepal against all enemies, domestic and foreign - executing this function also means refusing to obey illegal and idiotic orders, no matter where they come from. Resignation on moral grounds is the option that NA General's should have taken. It is the moral duty of not only one but all of the Generals to come to the forefront to correct the impending misdeeds of those that command them.

The system that produces Nepalese Generals has done little to reward creativity and moral courage. Only very few Generals had a clear vision of what future conflicts would look like and what capabilities the Army has to develop to prevail in such situations. In light of Maoist insurgency the Generals of the NA failed to exhibit visionary leadership. The state apparatus should create a mechanism to examine the behavior and attitudes of NA Generals. The objective should be to investigate the following question: "Why did many of the NA Generals lack moral courage and competence? And in the post-conflict period, why do many of these same Generals disrespect the souls of the men who died under their command by fraternizing publicly with the Maoists who killed them? Forget values, ethics and standards - is there even an ounce of decency left in these NA Generals?

Related Posts:

Asian Centre for Human Rights Report on South Asia - A Cursory Examination of Reporting on Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/08/asian-centre-for-human-rights-report-on.html

Moving Beyond Pork Barrel Politics - Integrating the Maoists into Nepal's Security Sector
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/07/moving-beyond-pork-barrel-politics.html

Debilitating the State’s Security Forces
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/06/debilitating-states-security-forces.html

Dissecting the “feudal” NA
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/08/dissecting-feudal-na.html

The greatest threat to peace in Nepal is misinformed, misguided, agenda-divine journalists like "The Guardian's" Isabel Hilton
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/courtesy-el-punto-isabel-hiltons.html

The Other Side of SSR (Security Sector Reform) - What Nepal's Mainstream Media Neglects Informing the Public About

(Courtesy: el Commandante)

Recently, Nepal's mainstream media has been rife with opinions on how Security Sector Reform (SSR) should be handled. From so-called international experts on the UNMIN's payroll to child welfare specialists turned expert on security issues, everyone appears to have unsolicited "two cents" to add.

This writing although unsolicited, is factual and grounded in events as they occurred rather than on biased accounts that serve vested interests. In essence, this is not another attempt at re-writing history to get foreign aid dollars for Nepal - it is a targeted account, designed to ensure the dollars that Nepal does receive, reaches destinations where reforms are most urgent.

What most (if not all) of the recent SSR related analyses share is the following theme: "Nepal's security apparatus - especially the Army - needs to be more transparent and more democratic." Having read, re-read and disdainfully digested the words of such internationally esteemed wise-men, below is a slightly more balanced take on the sequence of fixing that really needs to happen.

Nepal's Model Extended to India's Insurgencies - Let's hope the same model doesn't unfold in India!

Before embarking on a point-by-point critique, let us do away with the most ridiculous logic ever to have been aired; that somehow, Nepal's "democratic mainstreaming" of its Maoists will encourage similar insurgent outfits in India to follow suit.

Such logic is retarded for so many reasons but for the sake of this writing, let's focus on the obvious lesson that India's Naxalites have taken from Nepal - that a gratuitous war of attrition using a combination of political, military, ethnic and human rights agendas can ultimately bring a fledgling democracy to its knees.

If Nepal was to really serve as an example for radical Indian leftists to democratize, why hasn't Sitaram Yechuri vocally opposed calls for the Indian Air Force to join the fight against the Naxalites? Perhaps the idea is for the Indian Government to learn from Nepal's mistakes. This would certainly explain why India has continued to train and arm civilian self-defense units to fight their Naxalites while Nepal's attempt at raising "Village Defense Forces" was shut down on humanitarian grounds.

It is not conjecture, but fact, that the idea of "Village Defense Forces" in Nepal would have been a straight up application of "Maoist tactics 101," on the Maoists. They knew it, understood the ramifications, and mobilized known sympathizers like Mr. Padma Ratna Tuladhar to derail the Nepali government's initiative.

Based on historical facts, it is extremely likely that the Nepali government's idea was opposed for the right humanitarian reasons. But the point being highlighted here is not so much the opposition but rather, the double standards that were applied to Nepal versus India - even though the standards were based on the same humanitarian principles.

With this example in mind, let us proceed to take a dispassionate view of the subjects that need to be considered, when speaking of SSR - the Nepalese Army, Political Will/Capacity, and the Integration of Maoist Combatants.

A. The Nepalese Army

A favorite criticism of the Nepalese Army is that it is unprofessional. But by what standards?

By military standards (in the context of Nepal's resources constraints) the Nepalese Army is a professional institution with a hierarchy that consists of officers trained in the best military institutions around the world. They are exposed to and experienced in UN peacekeeping operations and are battle-hardened through participation in a counter-insurgency campaign at home.

The military's chain of command is established through integral institutional mechanisms and procedures that accurately assess character, competence and professional knowledge through annual reviews. Documented feedback on the progression of each officer is subject to appraisals by two senior reviewing officers. Such appraisals are independent reviews of junior officers' assessments and are designed to drive accountability and professional integrity. Promotions are awarded based on competence and institutional judgment with nepotism and favoritism minimized to the extent humanly possible (if not eliminated).

So what's unprofessional about the Nepalese Army that isn't about all the other Armies around the world? What institution in Nepal is more professional than the Nepalese Army? If 100% efficienciency, transparency and immaculate accountability are the standards that the Nepalese Army is being measured against, perhaps those pointing fingers at the Army should get their own houses in order first?

Another criticism of the Nepalese armed forces is that they are undemocratic. Once again, "by whose standards?"

With historical precedent as a yardstick, the Nepalese Army has always remained loyal to the legitimate powerbase as enshrined in the constitution of the day. In fact, the Nepalese Army's training and operational doctrines include detailed accounts of when aid to civilian authorities is deemed appropriate; the same doctrines intentionally (and strictly) exclude any policies or guidance on administrative procedures to be executed under martial law.

So what exactly is undemocratic about the Nepalese Army? Is Nepal's Army undemocratic for having fought the Maoists on the orders of a democratically elected government? Is the Nepali Army undemocratic because it failed to mutiny under the de-throned King's undemocratic (yet constitutionally driven) orders? Then why wasn't the King prosecuted and why does all the blame rest on the Nepalese Army's shoulders? Or truly, is the Nepali Army undemocratic because it refused to go to war with the Maoists on the whims of one man - Girija Prasad Koirala?

The only thing undemocratic about the Nepalese Army appears to be the one-sided abuse that this institution continually bears from individuals like Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Kanak Mani Dixit, Devendra Raj Pandey and the entire lot of international organizations whose budgets depend on the availability of "soft targets" like the Nepalese Army.

Further, the Nepalese Army's financial policies and procedures are transparent and have always been subject to scrutiny by the Auditor General. Yet, the Army is accused of unprecedented levels of corruption and graft. If such practices exist, why hasn't the Auditor General executed independent audits of the Army's spending? The AG is certainly empowered to conduct such audits and yet, no evidence of action exists. Assuming that allegations of the Army's corrupt ways are accurate, the question that begs being asked is at what level the corruption occurs and where the funds end up? The answer to this question may explain the "lame duck" status of the Auditor General which is hardly the Army's fault alone.

The Nepali Army is also alleged to be an exclusive State organ. Yet, no rules, regulations or practices are widely prevalent that thwart inclusiveness. It is true that quality and merit are not compromised during recruitment. And these standards are maintained with professionalism in mind - they are not enforced to decrease inclusiveness.

If the argument of exclusion is based on the disproportion representation of Nepal's southern ethnicities in the Nepalese Army, then the question that need be asked is why the British and especially the Indian Gurkhas recruit exclusively from Nepal's hilly regions? At least the Nepalese Army has recruitment depots in Nepal's southern belt. And it is not the Nepali Army's policy to force recruitment from any part of Nepal - the process is voluntary. So on what basis is the Nepalese Army's recruiting processes, exclusionary?

Further, the Nepalese Army is the only national institution that has always remained satisfactorily functional. It remains steadfastly dedicated to the protection of national integrity and cohesion. It mirrors Nepalese society. And, it was instrumental in safeguarding the nation from being declared a failed state.

The Nepalese Army has consistently dedicated itself to the protection of the Nepali people, and at times, has operated in complete isolation to prohibit the Maoist insurgents from a achieving a military takeover. It still remains a credible, robust and capable force as well as a bastion against illegitimate and undemocratic adventurism. This is precisely why neutralizing or demoralizing the Nepalese Army will always remain a focal point of advocacy for vested interest groups, bent of dismantling an institution they wish to mirror in their own image of "free for all" chaos, lawlessness, and instability.

B. Political Will / (In) Capacity

The erstwhile constitution of 1990 had delegated all authority over the Army to the Legislative and Executive branches of government. It was a democratically elected Prime Minister of the Nepali Congress party, who introduced a legal provision (contradictory to the spirit of the constitution), that mandated Royal approval for military mobilization. Ironically, it was another Nepali Congress Prime Minister (and also the current caretaker PM of Nepal - Girija Prasad Koirala), who also resigned citing the Army's refusal to engage the Maoists - how could the Army go to war in the absence of broad political consensus?

Then, when the Army was finally mobilized to fight Nepal's insurgency, the same political leadership failed to prepare and execute an integrated national campaign plan; they failed to utilize the military as one of many instruments at the State's disposal. The Army was used (and abused) in isolation, devoid of a political aim and continually portrayed with inflated expectations as a "silver bullet" to Nepal's Maoist insurgency.

Such political farce continued well beyond the civil uprising of April 2006. Constituent Assembly Elections were held as a democratic exercise when the country's law and order situation was out of control. As a result, the Maoist party obtained 31 % support by employing widely documented acts of coercion and intimidation.

International observers (including the Carter Center), executed their mandate to observe election procedures at limited cites while in the vast majority of the countryside, intimidation persisted. The observers' essentially put on a stamp of legitimacy that was immediately called into question by almost every major political party candidate, who reported widespread Maoist coercion. The interim Finance Minister, Ram Saran Mahat, even sustained head injuries at the hands of Maoist henchmen, known as the Young Communist League (YCL).

Though the election results must now be fully respected, the ramifications of such futile democratic exercises will unfold and complicate the Nepalese security situation and political process more intensely in the future. A broader and more durable coalition of communist parties can never be fully ruled out because although the leaders of the UML and the fringe leftist parties sound vocally robust, the lower, younger echelons are fully sold on populist rhetoric, extremism and instant gratification derived from resorting to violence (to fulfill political demands).

Currently, the House consists of 69 % of the old political cadres (who remain completely beholden to external powers) and 31% of Maoist cadres (who are exceptionally well versed in modulating between nationalist and extreme leftist designs, as the situation demands).

The 69 % are near-oblivious to issues and procedures that pertain to national security (while technically, they exercise civilian supremacy and oversight over the Security Forces); the remaining 31% believe in establishing “Political Commissars” to command and control the uniformed services.

The Maoist leadership in the interim government are battle hardened and their political chain of command is intricately tied to their military arm. "Prachanda" is still the supreme commander of the Maoist military wing and Maoist commanders like Barsa Man Pun, Ram Bahadur Thapa, are integral components to the Maoists' political strategy. No other political party in Nepal enjoys the company of their own private, military wing even as they participate in open, democratic politics.

There should be absolutely no doubt that the Maoists committed to capturing total political power by any and all means available. While those who remain bent on reinterpreting historical lessons of appeasement wait for the Maoists to sober up, it is advisable for Nepal's political leadership to exercise precautions rather than rely on remedies.

The capacity of the civilian hierarchy – the so-called “Political Masters,” and the civilian bureaucrats of security–related echelons (e.g., the Ministries of Home and Defense), are neither functional nor knowledgeable about security affairs. Their handling of the various mutinies in the Police Force and the Armed Police Force are indicative of their collective incompetence. The Nepalese Army’s “no nonsense resolve” was instrumental in compelling the mutineers to surrender. That in the absence of the Nepalese Army, the government would have succumbed to the pressures of the mutineers is a forgone conclusion.

C. The Process of Re-Verified Maoist Combatant Integration

To fulfill their political aspirations, the Maoists intend to undertake the following measures:

• Neutralize the Nepalese Army which remains the last obstacle in their quest to establish power supremacy.
• Politicize the Judicial Branch and the Bureaucracy.
• Control the media and the Civil Society.
• Subvert the people and demand obedience through the display of public punishments.
• Continue to exploit the international community, the UN and the INGOs' good will.
• Capture and control the national economy through unions.
• Undermine non-Maoist political parties.
• Establish parallel governance mechanisms.
• Manipulate (leverage) previously declared commitments to continue extracting concessions from other parties.
  

The integration process should be conducted according to the following steps:

• Disperse the 12,000 non-verified combatants and reduce the cantonments, immediately.
• Maintain allowances, rations and accommodations for the 19,602 verified combatants.
• Establish vocational training facilities and adult education programs in the cantonments.
• Conduct de-doctrination processes in preparation for integration.
• Conduct re-verification to confirm and identify those Maoist combatants who want to willingly join the security forces. The rest should be provided vocational training to make them skilled laborers and provide them with job guarantees.
• Those who intend to join the Security Forces must fulfill existing pre-requisites, willingly volunteer to abide by the Military Law and de-link themselves from their parent political party and its activities.
• The creation of intact Maoist-only units, a Maoist chain of command and inclusion of politically active members, previous Security Forces deserters, and HR violators should not be permitted.
  

Conclusion

SSR and supreme civilian control of the Nepali State's Security Forces are certainly needed for a fully democratic nation to emerge as the new Nepal. But the process of democratization is as urgently needed for the political side of the equation as it is for the military side. One must learn to effectively exercise control over the other, without repeating the politicization that resulted with the Nepal Police, after the 1990 transition. This is clearly a two-way effort and simply heaping blame on the Nepalese Army and asking for it to democratize and undergo reforms, won't achieve the desired end.

The National Security Council and the Ministry of Defense must be educated to function independently but with knowledgeable and competent civilian manpower. It is absolutely vital to exercise civilian control in an evolutionary manner to avoid unnecessary frictions and animosities. As the apex of Nepal's security forces, the civilian hierarchy must equally inculcate transparency, accountability and inclusiveness into its own mechanisms.

One must clean one's own house first - only then does it make sense to point fingers in others' directions. The political hierarchy must be capable enough to plan, project, provide resources and punctually decide the course of action. Should this level of operational efficiency be achieved, criticisms of corruption and undemocratic practices within Nepal's security forces will automatically become moot points.

Essentially, SSR in Nepal's context cannot be the exclusive domain of any one institution. Rather, it must be planned and executed as a multi-intuitional, joint civilian-military exercise. There is not a single institution in Nepal that is not in need of reform - the Nepalese Army is the most convenient target because it happens to be the one stumbling-block that is preventing the Maoists from achieving political dominance.

No doubt, there are documented instances of grave mistakes that have been committed by security forces in the line of duty. The perpetrators of such abuses should be prosecuted to the law's extent. But the sideshow drama that depicts the Nepalese Army as a bunch of trigger-happy, war-mongering idiots, has to cease. For if the Nepalese Army is guilty of all the allegations heaped on it, then the political establishment that sent the Army to war is equally guilty for committing the Army to combat and then deserting the security forces midstream. The panacea to preventing human rights abuses is clear - DON'T GO TO WAR. Was it the Army that was begging to fight the Maoists or the elected government of the time that ordered to Army into action?

In a country where the largest party in the constituent assembly consists of a group that waged armed rebellion for over a decade, is the State's Security Forces the only organ that needs reform? Or is there a much larger problem that needs to be dealt with, concurrently?

The same apologists who want Nepal's Maoists to serve as role models to India's Naxalites will tell us that "peace is made in such ways." But so are tyrants and this is a thought that should feature prominently on the minds of SSR "subject matter experts," political pundits, and all international agencies that are busy advising Nepal on how to reform its security sector.

Related Posts:

The Utility of a Professional Nepalese Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/utility-of-professional-nepalese-army.html

All Attention on the Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/all-attention-on-army.html

The Nepali Army is a Favorite Target for Cheap Provocateurs - An Analysis of a Nepali Adolescent's Professional Obituary
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/being-cheap-provocateur-is-easy.html

Asian Centre for Human Rights Report on South Asia - A Cursory Examination of Reporting on Nepal

(Courtesy: Comrade Libre)

The "South Asian Human Rights Index 2008, 1 August 2008" (http://www.achrweb.org/reports/SAARC-2008.pdf) is a publication worthy of reading. From pages 99 to 113, the ACHR (Asian Center for Human Rights) report chronicles in detail, documented human rights violations by all parties in Nepal, over the year 2007 (with reference to specific cases as far back as 2005).

While "naming and shaming" is certainly a powerful tool that is often used in the business of human rights advocacy, a dispassionate review of the ACHR report requires a certain level of detached realism. There are contradictions inherent to the implied recommendations, embedded throughout the text of this report. Some of these contradictions are outlined below.

Security and Human Rights Abuses - A Direct Relationship?

First, the obvious: Human rights violations in Nepal have reduced dramatically since the end of Nepal's Maoist insurgency. The lesson implied here is essentially that war leads to rights violations. The hindsight "epiphany" is that the Maoists should not have provoked Nepal's civil war and successive governments should not have retaliated using the State's military apparatus.

There is no rocket science to this observation. However, there is a stark reality that must be reckoned with - Maoist provocation has been rewarded with their stature as the largest party in Nepal's Constituent Assembly. Additionally, every single politician who advocated military mobilization against the Maoists, are in positions of power today. So where should the accountability of past abuses reside? Individual cases of abuses can certainly be prosecuted to the law's extent. But will legal action be complete without also implicating today's power brokers for their direct involvement in instigating Nepal's civil war?

Further, the following observation adds more confusion: "The biggest concern (in 2007) was not so much state violation but rather the absence of state." Considered in tandem with Nepal's ranking as six out of seven South Asian nations (the higher ranking implying relatively lower rights abuses), a direct correlation is implied between human rights violations and the presence of state forces. The contradiction here is that the ACHR report highlights the absence of state forces as a point of concern while simultaneously suggesting that when the state forces were out of their barracks, human rights abuses were rampant.

Ironically, the great work that human rights defenders within and outside of Nepal have done is partially responsible for the near collapse of the law and order situation in Nepal. When reports are continually headlined with subjective criticisms along the lines of "excessive force," the net result is lawlessness. Security agents are increasingly aware of the repercussions of applying force and hesitate to react even under conditions that warrant the application of force. The ACHR reports correctly states that "the morale of the police was very low (in 2007)." The degradation of morale is directly related to a sense of duty that repeatedly clashes with ambiguous guidelines on the acceptability of action.

This does not mean that the application of "excessive force" should be excused but rather, that the state security forces should be educated on "acceptable" levels of force. For example, is baton charging "acceptable" when public property is being destroyed? Is it "acceptable" to return fire when a VIP convoy comes under fire? Is it "acceptable" to expect the maintenance of law and order with merely the presence of security forces?

There is a fine line that human rights defenders must walk in situations like Nepal where the entire state structure is under indictment and as a result, does not have the capacity to defend its security forces' actions. In other words, the idea of security forces as one of many of the State's organs, with ultimate accountability residing at the political tier, is a notion that needs to be urgently institutionalized. Only then will criticism based on human rights, yield the desired impact.

Politicization or Civil-Military Relations? Which is the Lesser Evil?

This line of thought is a good transition to what is perhaps, the most provocative statement in ACHR's report: "Nepal lives under the shadow of a highly politicized anti-democratic Army… who are not accountable to anyone except themselves." Coming from a organization that itself is unaccountable to anyone (and everyone at the same time), such a statement is hypocritical, callous and counterproductive to the overall human rights agenda.

First, politicization is a two-way street - it's not as though the Army decides to politicize itself and align with say, the Nepali Congress without the Nepali Congress welcoming the move. Second, if in fact different factions in the Army are reaching out to different factions of the political spectrum, is this necessarily bad because the institution is being politicized or good because civil military relations are improving?

Further, is the Army anti-democratic because Girija Prasad Koirala retained COAS Katuwal as its head or was Koirala anti-democratic for recognizing that the sustenance of democracy and stability hinged on retaining a balancing threat of force against a radical communist party, bent on establishing a one-party communist republic in Nepal? Criticizing the Army with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight is immensely more simple than accounting for scenarios that did not materialize by keeping the Army's chain of command intact.

The contradictions, once more, are glaring. In the same report, the ACHR criticizes the Army for being politicized, for civil-military relations being insufficient and for the Army being un-democratic and unaccountable? To whom should the Army be accountable without catering to the political forces and in return, becoming more democratic through enhanced civil-military relations?

If the intent of the ACHR report is to pass judgment on the entire Nepali Army through its COAS, then in the tradition of professional impartiality, perhaps equal judgment should also be passed on the Maoist leader Puspha Kamal Dahal (who is not only the Maoist political head honcho but also the supreme commander of the Maoist "PLA")? The parallels are apparent; yet, the ACHR's reporting is not.

"You Scratch my Back, I'll Scratch Yours" - UNMIN and AHRC

On the subject of accountability, the AHRC's readership may also be drawn to the subtle advocacy performed on behalf of UN agencies in Nepal - namely, the UNMIN and the OHCHR. According to the AHRC report, Nepali actors have "failed to understand or overlook the positive impact of these international agencies in favour of criticising UNMIN for what often appear to be little more than often ill-informed and politically motivated purposes."

In reality, what Nepali actors had failed to understand was the extent to which the UNMIN could have been mobilized to further the cause of sustained and lasting peace in Nepal. But in all fairness, the political motivation behind such failure, goes both ways. Nepal's political class should have provided the UNMIN a mandate to which the UNMIN could have been held accountable; Ian Martin on the other hand, with his first hand experience in Nepal, should have sought a mandate that would have been more impactful.

The misunderstanding that has resulted in overshadowing what little good the UNMIN has done, is actually a latent recognition by the Nepali elite that Nepal's government gave the UNMIN a limited mandate with plenty of room for interpretation and that Ian Martin, happily accepted a multi-million dollar contract with enough loop holes to limit his organization's exposure. For an organization desperate to recreate its diminished relevance, Nepal became to the UN a "gift that just kept on giving." This is what most educated Nepalis resent.

A civilian was kidnapped from Kathmandu and murdered in a cantonment monitored by the UNMIN; the UNMIN's documentation of arms it has inventoried is still unavailable for public consumption; there are so many lingering questions on the Maoist combatant verification process (and the track two dealings between Ian Martin and the Maoists), that the results are still in question; Ian Martin, Kofi Annan, and Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai sharing laughs over beers (at the very onset of Nepal's peace process), became an iconic image of the UNMIN's compromised impartiality .

The AHRC report cites the YCL as a liability to Nepal's peace process. Is the AHRC aware that Ian Martin was fully cognizant of the on-going rotations between the YCL and the Maoists' PLA, at the very founding of the YCL? His admission behind closed doors in New York, amounted to turning a blind eye in favor of helping the Maoists democratize. How democratic is the YCL and how effective was Ian Martin in faciliatating the YCL's birth?

In all fairness, Nepalis have not overlooked the positive impact that UN agencies have had on Nepal. It is rather insulting that the AHRC would insinuate ungraciousness on the part of Nepali people whose criticisms of UNMIN's work, are factually justifiable and on the whole, overwhelmingly legitimate. The UNMIN has received criticism where criticism has been due - namely, in its non-transparent, often partial, and unaccountable mode of operation.

Conclusion

Despite the apparent contradictions in the AHRC's report on Nepal, the report is well worth a thorough read.

The value in the AHRC's report is the detailed documentation of human rights abuses (and allegations) in Nepal. Although much of the material is regurgitation of facts and figures already published through various national and international sources, the benefit to consolidating and (re-highlighting) such egregious acts of abuses, are self-evident.

Overall, the ACHR's report is impartial in its allocation of accountability to actors across Nepal's political spectrum. The report correctly identifies widespread impunity as the root cause behind continued human rights violations. More importantly, this report touches upon a defining facilitator of continued rights abuses - a myopic focus on short-term political horse trading at the cost of long-term stability.

Having correctly identified the weaknesses in Nepal's peace process, what is sorely missing are implementable ideas / recommendations on how best to rectify such deficiencies. Given the contradictions highlighted above, solutions to Nepal's current predicament are anything but apparent.

Related Posts:

UNMIN Finally Speaks Out - A Critical Examination of UNMIN's Letter to News Front
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/unmin-finally-speaks-out-and-pulls-foot.html

The Nepali Army is a Favorite Target for Cheap Provocateurs - An Analysis of a Nepali Adolescent's Professional Obituary
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/being-cheap-provocateur-is-easy.html

UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/unmin-in-need-of-immediate-reform.html

The Problem with Nepali Political Civil Society - The Leftist, the Cowards, and the Compromised http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/10/problem-with-nepali-political-civil.html

Moving Beyond Pork Barrel Politics - Integrating the Maoists into Nepal's Security Sector

(Courtesy: el Comandante)

A Brief History of Integration

The Mukti Sena was created in 1951 to wage an armed revolt against the Rana oligarchy and to liberate the Nepalese people. The militant wing was composed of Nepalese citizens and people of Nepalese origin from India and Burma.

The bulk of the military wing consisted of soldiers of the British Indian Army who were initially trained conventionally to fight the Second World War but remained unemployed after demobilization. There were some individuals who had absconded from the British Indian Army and had joined the Indian National Army lead by Subash Chandra Bose too.

The Mukti Sena manpower consisted of neither political activists nor ideologically indoctrinated Communists. During the armed struggle, which lasted for a short span of time, the militant wing had not committed any acts of terrorism, criminal activities or systematic extortion. Kangaroo courts and parallel governments were never operated by the revolutionaries. When the revolution was considered successful and ceasefire established, the Mukti Sena was renamed with dignity as the Rakshaya Dal.

Except those who revolted under the leadership of Dr. K. I. Singh, the rest were formed up to create three para-military battalions of the Nepal Armed Constabulary (NAC) to function as a back-up force to the Police while maintaining general law and order. Later, Officers of the NAC were designated as Civil Police Officers also. In reality, the nucleus of the Nepal Police Officer Corps was subsequently provided by the NAC. Ex- IGPs G. B. Yakthumba, Puran Singh Khawas, P. S. Lama, Rom Bahadur Thapa and Durlav Kumar Thapa are the examples.

The three battalions of the NAC failed to perform satisfactorily in the insurrection in 1961-62 and lost significant weapons to the insurgents. As a consequence, the NAC was rigorously re-trained by the then RNA; army Officers, Warrant Officers (WOs), NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers), and fresh soldiers were integrated into the units and transformed into Home Guards and the new force was brought under the chain of military command by 1963. The three battalions of Home Guards were then declared as regular infantry battalions of the (R)NA by 1966 and equipped accordingly.

Those who had initially enlisted in the British Indian Army as late as 1944 were at least forty years old. There were only a handful of Officers and WOs who were still serving when their units were regularized. A DIG, Dil Man Singh Thapa, was transferred to the (R)NA with the NAC as the brigade commander and eventually retired as a Brigadier General.

The significant aspect to be noted is that though they were conventionally trained and possessed no ideological beliefs, the process of transforming a revolutionary militant to a regular soldier lasted from 1951 till 1966. The result of such a process was an absolutely peaceful integration and the continuation of respect to existing Military Law and dedication to professionalism.

The Indian Government did create a Naga Battalion composed of surrendered Naga insurgents that were strictly trained. However, the plan was simply symbolic because the unit was neither assigned any operational responsibilities nor stationed in Eastern India. Later, the unit failed to attract new recruits and today, remains as a symbolic emblem only. The general belief in India is that insurgents should never be integrated into the National Security Forces as far as regular channels to recruitment remain a viable and effective alternative.

The Current Day Context

The most offensive style adopted by the Maoists after the activation of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement ) has been to physically counter, neutralize and eliminate all affiliated organizations of other political parties. The mobilization of the PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) and the YCL (almost a day time PLA/ night time Young Communist League) to coercively dominate and control Nepal's urban and rural populations has rewarded the Maoist Party with the status as the largest political entity in the Nepal's CA (Constituent Assembly).

The impunity that the Maoist party enjoys through their threat to return to war has to be challenged politically in order for the nation to move forward. Leveraging the peace process as a symbolic icon of Maoist victory has been extremely effective for the Maoists as they continue to enjoy unconditional impunity; the same process has also been a convenient excuse for the incumbent government to remain in power with the pretext of upholding peace.

Now, the prime intention of the Maoists is to capture total national power through a peaceful political process. The steps are as follows:

a. Forcefully manipulate and amalgamate all the leftist parties under its leadership (the presidential elections were a major snag, but one the Maoists are bound to overcome as alliances change based on issues)

b. Maintain an ostracized democratic set-up composed of a marginally reduced liberal opposition whose capability to challenge the Maoist one party rule is virtually absent.

c. Deceive the international community and derive assistance with a commitment to be more transparent, accountable and in conformance with international standards.

d. Maintain a prolonged one-party rule (although the presidential elections did not go in the Maoists' favor, it should be noted that their machinery has been mobilized in support of the general elections already - none of their political competitors have thought this far ahead).

What the Government Should Consider

In order to ensure a smooth constitution making process and also to limit the Maoists' monopoly on force, the integration of Maoist combatants should include the following minimum standards:

a. Maintain reduced cantonments with the weapons and those combatants verified by the UN.

b. Implement a re-verification process with a special questionnaire including whether they prefer to join the NA or NP or APF. Maoists should never be integrated in the NID (National Investigation Department) for the organization has its own vetting process, does not have a rigorous training syllabus and the process of de-doctrination cannot be enforced (in the NID). Maoists in the NID will have serious adverse implications to the collection of information and ultimately, to good governance.

c. Those who volunteer to join the NA must meet the existing physical, medical, educational and vetting standards without compromise. They should also be cleared of human rights violations and extortion activities.

d. Those who are considered eligible must firstly sign a contract declaring that their links and loyalties to the Maoists will be considered unlawful; should their behaviors be in contravention to the signed contract, their employment with the NA should be terminated immediately. Further, should former Maoist combatants be linked to human rights violations, criminal activities or extortion, they should be immediately discharged. (There exists detailed and voluminous amounts of data from the insurgency period, that meticulously documents human rights violations by Maoist militia and combatants. This information should be made public during an independent, third-party re-verification process).

e. The basic training should be executed with utmost strictness and compromises on established standards should be resisted with conviction. Strict oversight must be maintained over the entire vetting process.

f. Those who have managed to complete the training should be posted to less sensitive units and sub-units and dispersed in small numbers. Three to four basic training courses should be conducted consecutively to complete the integration process over two years.

g. Entry into the NA should be either through recruit training or the officer cadet training; NEVER through the technical basic course, clerk basic course or the Para Folding course.

h. Units with only Maoist combatants should never be established.

i. Those who prefer to stay out of the Security Forces should be included in separate cantonments. Allowances, clothing and rations should be provided by the Government. Vocational training, political indoctrination (to align with democratic principles and practice) and adult education should be conducted. (Foreign donors are interested in such projects and should be approached with ideas). The combatants must be encouraged through logic as well as propaganda to opt for vocational training where they will be able to earn more money and also be able to go abroad as skilled manpower.

j. Should the Maoists insist on forming their own intact units, they must be issued the same weapons in the container that have been registered and all other weapons besides those should be declared illegal. Certain elements of the NA, NP and APF must be inducted in such a unit in its chain of command. The role assigned to such a unit should be very much secondary in nature such as security for vital, physical assets in remote areas.

Reforms within the Existing Security Sector

On the NA's part, the organization must immediately establish strict standards concerning the code of conduct, professional training standards, proper and impartial assessments of performance and acceptance of accountability while exercising authority.

The practice of commanders remaining entangled with commissions on contracts and purchases and entertaining with the funds made available from surplus rations should be banned. This practice is prevalent throughout the chain of command and often seeps into the political layer. Such acts must be exposed, unconditionally reprimanded and persons found guilty of involvement, tried to the extent afforded by military law.

Prototype living standards, storage, office and dinning accommodations must be established and constructed urgently. The old theme to save the government funds at the cost of soldier’s comfort and basic needs must stop. Taking these steps will automatically hedge against the possibility of Maoist combatants exploiting such grievances to their political organization's benefit. The APF uprising followed by the uprising in the police force are token examples of what may come, should the necessary action not be taken.

Further, should sweeping changes be implemented, the improvements derived would be appreciated by the rest of the security forces as a "gift" from the Maoists too and may help to bridge the animosity from having been forced into combat.

The Options at Hand

Ultimately, the Maoists have two options at hand:

a. Either to come to power and maintain a very compromising stance with India concerning the issues of national interests and agreements on natural resources. An evolutionary process to democratize without loosing political power may be pursued; OR

b. Maintain a nationalistic stance with more dependence on external resources (other than Indian) and the use of the China Card occasionally. Very similar to the traditional power structure implemented by King Mahendra in the past and perhaps a desired meeting point between Maoists and the more traditional parties in Nepal.

The first option will certainly lead to a drastic down-sizing of the NA, complete dependence on Indian military hardware and assistance, a ban on foreign military training assistance and a gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the UNPKO (UN Peace Keeping Operations) role.

The Indians do openly claim that the APF is their force and that certain allegiance to their orders have surfaced openly. The Indians are intent upon re-establishing border outposts along their northern border and a possibility often voiced is the induction of the Maoist combatants in those posts where contact with the population is minimal. As clarification, it is not India's northern border for which the suggestion is being made; rather, the Indian recommendation is for outposts to be included as part of a Nepal-Tibet Border Security Force. Definitely a suggestion that may be hard for even the Maoists to chew on.

Related Posts:

Endless Possibilities in the Republic of Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/05/endless-possibilities-that-accompany.html

All Attention on the Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/all-attention-on-army.html

The Nepali Army is a Favorite Target for Cheap Provocateurs - An Analysis of a Nepali Adolescent's Professional Obituary
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/being-cheap-provocateur-is-easy.html

The Utility of a Professional Nepalese Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/utility-of-professional-nepalese-army.html

UNMIN's Arms Verification Process in Nepal - More Timely Information and Transparency Needed
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmin-in-over-its-head-in-nepal-arms.html

Nepal’s National Security Agency: Critical Issues Facing The CA

(Courtesy: Mr. Madhukar SJB Rana - Prof. South Asian Institute of Management, Former Finance Minister)

A battle royal is being fought by the political parties in the Constituent Assembly (CA), and outside, as to who should or should not be members of the current National Defence Council (NDC). At a time when security sector reforms is high on the national agenda, and one is quite unsure as to whether the federal democratic republic of Nepal is going to be endowed with a presidential or parliamentary system of governance by the CA, one can appreciate why all 25-33 political parties should clamour to be on board to protect party interests. Given the above uncertainties, the problem is being made more complex by the fact that, as agreed by the government and seven parties, the Head of State (HOS) will now be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The complexity arises from the fragmentation of the unitary state; the polity of proportional representation into parliament leading to in-built instability, and the non-resolution of the issue over the optimal powers for the presidency (ceremonial vs constitutional).

This basic thrust of this article is that only the government should be the member of the NDC. However, all are welcome to be members of the National Security Council (NSC), including civil society and professional experts and academicians.

The other thrust is to underscore the vital need for the CA to define precisely what ‘national security’ is supposed to mean and demarcate the nature, scope and authority of the NSC as a fundamental constitutional agency. In doing so, we, the citizens, would expect that each political party would consider the matter with due intellectual diligence by being analytically grounded in geo-politics, geo-economics and geo-psychology in consideration of 2 factors and its forces: (a) the current status of Nepal’s national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and (b) the future threats to the integrity of Nepal from the probable centripetal and centrifugal forces within a federal body politic, including threats from outside its national territory—be they states, international business, international non-governmental organizations or the international mafia.

Word has it that, when the army lobbied successfully, and rightly, for the NSC to be a constitutional organ in 1990, the proposed NSC was more akin to the NSC of the USA and India: being more of an open, participative think tank on national security where policy and research inputs would be garnered from all political parties, civil society and experts as members and invitees. A National Security Advisor would lead the NSC. This would allow for sufficient national debate, dissent and dialogue before a national security strategy is actually adopted founded on national consensus, if possible . Such an overall national security policy was expected to guide Nepal’s foreign policy, foreign relations and internal security matters in a holistic manner.

Unfortunately, what was originally sought by the army could not take form as intended owing to (a) the Royal Palace military secretariat’s traditional stranglehold over any innovation by the army, (b) the inability of the army to mobilize public opinion with effective public relations and (c) the utter lack of harmonious interface between the various security agencies. Thus what we landed up with was to settle for the NDC, as is, which now is embroiled in deep controversy over who should be members. It must be mentioned that the NDC Secretariat is purely military. It is precisely because of the overwhelming military nature of the secretariat that one recognizes it more as ‘NDC’ than ‘NSC’.

Its major achievements, perhaps, are the development of greater inter-agency communication, cooperation and coordination in response to grappling with civil disobedience, insurgency, terrorism, civil war and natural disasters. It has been highly successful in being able to preserve Nepal as a viable—albeit weak--- state that is nowhere in sight of becoming a ‘failed state’.

Because the current security agency is more an NDC than NSC so, therefore, it should be led by the Head of Government (HOG). Where, however, the HOS is more than just ‘ceremonial’ it is possible, and probably appropriate, that the HOS chair meetings of the new NSC. Both should have their place in the body politic but only the NSC should be imbibed in the Constitution.

To repeat, it is argued here that the NDC should not include any political party as its function is to communicate, coordinated and control defence policy being implemented by the security, security-related and intelligence agencies as approved by the Council of Ministers. The scope of decision-making in the NDC is purely over issues of war, civil war, insurgency, terrorism, curfew, counter intelligence and national emergencies. In short, it is primarily concerned with issues over the break down of law and order and threats to Nepal’s territorial integrity, national sovereignty and independence. The NDC is accountable to parliament through the Ministry of Defence. This should suffice.

It is appropriate to mention hear, which actually is suggestive of just how narrowly conceived the NDC was, that the Foreign Minister in not a member, even when UN peace keeping and peace enforcing operations are or should be legitimate agenda items for decision by NDC.

Nation states and communities within it, just like individuals, feel insecure when their very existence, their material and financial assets, and their fundamental values are threatened by other nations, societies and individuals respectively.

Nations, communities and individuals' families feel internally secure when there exists, within its territory, communal harmony and tolerance so that there is safe from social turmoil and violence. They also feel secure when there is the absence of political disruptions with law and order prevailing with clear prospects of easy recourse to, and dispensation of justice, by a highly trusted judiciary. Freedom of the press and ‘press security’ is equally vital for individual, communal and national security.

Feeling secure in this new age of inter-dependence and instant exposure of daily events throughout the far corners of the globe has got to be a challenging business. Because never before in mankind's history have there been so many nations with so many peoples making daily contacts at the state-to-state and people-to-people levels with attendant vulnerabilities and risks at the global, regional, national and community levels. To respond quickly is the task of intelligence and counter intelligence.

Past experience tells us that a Nepal Central Intelligence Agency (NCIA) is a dire need for the country; and will be even more needed when it moves towards federalism. The lesson from our own insurgency and civil war is that there are limits to military strategy to maintain law and order. With globalization the sanctity of international borders is questionable. Rise of non-state actors in such forms as religious fundamentalists, international anarchists, international mafia, international civil society, and 'sovereign individuals' (individuals with wealth that exceeds those of states in the realm of e-commerce) are cause for great intelligence concern.

If traditionally diplomacy is the alternative to war, in the new era of globalization it may just as well be said that intelligence is the alternative to diplomacy. As a matter of fact, given the huge need for public expenditure to meet the social welfare cost of the world’s graying population intelligence spending is working out to be the first line of cost-effective national defence for most nations. Nepal should not be an exception.

Further, the inter-state struggle for natural resources, like water and minerals, for example, to maintain high economic growth rates will be lost or won on effective intelligence strategy formulation and implementation rather than relying simply on traditional diplomacy and trade and commerce deals. Perhaps the greatest argument for an autonomous central intelligence agency is the dominant mood of the 21st century where global anarchy and wars between civilizations will be a commonplace scenario across continents from the dynamics of global warming, mass migrations coupled with food, energy, water, financial and economic crises.

The other lesson from our political sphere is that, as a weak state, our national administration is near-totally infiltrated by foreign intelligence agencies and their allies, which calls forth a powerful counter-intelligence strategy implemented in earnest to expunge external infiltration and working towards supporting a national anti-corruption drive that seeks legal action combined with social sanctions against traitors and offenders.

In attempting to define ‘national security’ we must learn from Japan, who in the mid-1950’s developed the visionary concept of ‘comprehensive security’ to grapple with the trauma, humiliation and horror of the loss of national sovereignty to the Americans and the psychological sufferings from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki stranded without any natural resources—other than human resources. So they defined ‘national security’ in the broader, more comprehensive concept of ‘human security’.

Fundamentally, the Japanese doctrine of human security rests on the premise that for national security there must not only be ‘military security’ to defend the nation from outside threats but also ‘human security’ to 'defend' nations from inside threats as national stability depends on each individual having sufficient food security, employment security, social security (education, health and old age pension), energy security, information security (access to transport and communications). We might now add ‘water security’, ‘environmental security’ and ‘pandemic health security’ ( HIV AIDS, TB, bird flu ) to the Japanese definition to bring it up to date in its comprehensiveness.

Nepal is now in quest of a new national identity after the removal of monarchy and becoming a secular state. Alienation and confusion is a natural state of in our current social psyche. Political ideologies of the various parties are not going to fill this deep void. Only common values can.

As almost all Nepalese are religious so a new Nepal moral order must be at the core of the national security value system: truth; peace and compassion as preached by Lord Buddha; non-violence and reconciliation as preached by Mahatma Gandhi and, furthermore, duty, devotion; discipline and discrimination to connect the nation’s and each individual’s body, mind and soul, as preached by one of the greatest modern Saints of South Asia-- the Shivapuri Baba of Nepal.

A most valuable organ of state for inter-communal harmony is to have the Council of Relgious Elders (CRE) meet regularly, chaired by the HOS, with rotating co-chairpersonship amongst the various faiths represented, to have constant inter-faith national and local dialogue for communal harmony so as to negate the use of religion, by political parties, to create electoral vote banks, which actually weakens democracy and the rule of law while nurturing communal hatred.

Last, but not least, each ministry and department should review and recommend comprehensive security needs from their sector’s perspective annually henceforth.

Related Posts:

Security Sector Reform: Taking a Regional Approach and Promoting Cooperative Security Arrangement
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/05/security-sector-reform-taking-regional.html

The Utility of a Professional Nepalese Army
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/utility-of-professional-nepalese-army.html

Hyperopic Maoists and Myopic Pundits

(Courtesy: Dr. Hari Bansha Dulal)

Not even 72 hours had passed since the raising of glasses to celebrate victory over the despised monarch, Puspa Kamal Dahal's gibe, "due to the foolishness of Gyanendra, republic has been established. If the NC and UML also continue demonstrating their foolishness, people's republic will be established" forced the left-leaning civil society pundits to drop to their knees and puke till they got sober.

Dahal's words forced our pundits to get into a sober mode even before they fully got kick out of their drinks. This is what happens when the greed to remain in the limelight at the cost of ideological dilution takes a front-seat and the desire to become politically correct all the time overrides objectivity.

In order to become politically correct, the very same pundits that relentlessly advocated endless appeasement of the Maoists, are now sticking their heads out of line and saying the exact same thing that we have been saying (the end goal of the Maoists is to establish a totalitarian regime) for the last two and a half years.

With the Maoists' intention getting clearer, the left-leaning civil society members afflicted by myopia have finally started to see the rust in Maoists' sickle. They have woken up when the Maoists are actually preparing to strike their political opponents and the press in the head with their hammer.

A clarion call by a civil society pundit, who once thought that peace was not possible without the appeasement of the Maoists at this point in time when the Maoists have everything they need: popular mandate, international community's support, and their cadres willingness to fight till the finish -- might be too little and too late. The Maoists are on a march to deliver the exact same thing that the late King Mahendra delivered from the extreme right almost half a century ago. The only difference this time around is that, they will be delivering the exact same thing but from the extreme left. Does it make a difference if they declare Nepal a one-party communist state or not as long as they are successful in replicating King Mahendra's model?

With the Maoists' intention getting clearer and nervousness reigning in, in the ultra-liberal camp, the much talked about consensus politics has vanished into thin air. Politics is slowly but surely getting confrontational. The humiliating defeat in the CA elections and the constant flurry of gibes from the top-rung Maoist leaders have forced both the major political parties of yesteryears and pundits crushed with political baggage to confront an uncomfortable reality.

The NC and the UML happily traveled along "Prachanda path" when they were strong. Now, they want to deviate when they are weak. Will the Maoists let them off the hook without surrendering the power? The Maoists obviously did not fight the decade long bloody insurgency to put old guards of Nepali politics back into the power.

If we look realistically, with the Nepal Army in a silent mode and India on its side, the Maoists do not need an October revolution. The subtle threat is more than enough to bring Koirala's government to its knees. It is just a matter of time.

With the emergence of the Maoists as the largest party in the Constituent Assembly, India's betting reference has changed. It is more interested in geopolitical gain against China rather than help the democratic process in Nepal. In order to preempt China's influence over the Maoists, India is now fully backing the Maoist rule. Surprisingly, it is even ready to review the 1950 agreement.

With Lok Sabha elections round the corner in India, foreign minister of India Pranab Mukherjee will obviously not jeopardize his chances of winning election by displeasing the leftists in West Bengal, who want to see their fellow comrades rule in Nepal. Why would Pranab scuttle his own chances of wining upcoming Lok Sabha election by backing the losers in Nepal? Both politically and personally, it does not make any sense.

It might be an unpleasant thing for some populists in Nepal and abroad to hear that the only institution that has the required strength and the motivation to counter the Maoist threat is the Nepal Army. But like it or not, that's the truth.

However, a million dollar question is, Will the Nepal Army stand against India's will and support the very people that once asked the army to obliterate the Maoists but later on not only joined hands with the Maoists but also set up inquiry commissions to investigate human right abuses committed by them?

For the generals within the army, unless they have a bigger role to play, supporting anyone from the democratic camp doesn't make any sense at this point in time. If the Maoists are somehow able to convince the generals, saluting Puspa Kamal Dahal would not be as painful as expected by many.

The political parties of yesteryears are in a very difficult situation now. And, the worst thing is that, it is them, who invited this trouble. Left-leaning civil society pundits and the so-called intellectuals that gather in coffee houses in Kathmandu are only part of the problem. Why would they want to be in the bad books by asking politicians to stay away from joining hands with people whose views are diagonally opposite, when the game is all about sharing the pie?

The politicians with in the NC and UML are surrounded by sycophants that do not dare to ask their masters to stick to the party's basic ideology and principles. If you are a real democrat, you dare to stand up and say that the party is deviating from its basic principles, when dilution of principles takes place, not justify the riding of populist bandwagon.

By openly threatening the media and expressing his desire to establish a people's republic, Puspa Kamal Dahal has already shown his true color. The democratic forces should immediately form an alliance if they want to survive politically. That alliance should then work relentlessly towards smoothing its relationship with the Army. Before Puspa Kamal Dahal and India convinces the Nepali Army to work with the Maoists, democratic forces should try wining the trust of the army.

Unless the NC, UML, and other parties that believe in multiparty democracy get unequivocal support from the army and convince India that they can overrun the Maoists, India will not change its betting preferences. India loves to ride the winning horse. Than Swe of Myanmar and Maumoon Abdool Gayyom of the Maldives are living examples.

The game is almost over. Act before it is too late to do anything!

Related Posts:

The Problem with Nepali Political Civil Society - The Leftist, the Cowards, and the Compromised
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/10/problem-with-nepali-political-civil.html

The Pitfalls of Relying on Indian Benevolence
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/01/pitfalls-of-relying-on-indian.html

Nepali Congress Lost in Democratic Translation
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/05/nepali-congress-lost-in-democratic.html

Kanak Mani Dixit The Nuanced
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/04/kanak-mani-dixit-nuanced.html

Riding the Republican Bandwagon
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/04/riding-republican-bandwagon.html