Holding the Preachers of Accountability, Accountable for their Actions - The UN's Failure in Nepal

In light of the evidence caught on video, readers are encouraged to review the chronology of events captured in the postings below.

The question that every Nepali must ask themselves is who we should hold accountable for the callous manner in which the UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal) handled the arms (and armies) verification process?

As was the case in East Timor, Ian Martin parachuted in and out of Nepal. But those who will bear the consequences of Martin’s (and the UN’s) willingness to play the role of a (most) “useful idiot,” remain in-country.

If the United Nations as an institution fails to hold its personnel accountable, then Nepalis need to hold Ban Ki Moon and the UN hierarchy accountable for the UN’s complete failure in executing its mandate in Nepal.

February 25, 2007
Summary of Declared (by State) vs. Inventoried (by UNMIN), Weapon Counts
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/symmary-of-declared-by-state-vs.html

February 25, 2007
Discrepancies in Maoist Weapons Inventoried by UNMIN – Do the Math
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/discrepancies-in-maoist-weapons.html

March 01, 2007
The UN and Maoist Arms Controversy: Overkill or Negligence?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/un-and-maoist-arms-controversy-overkill.html

March 01, 2007
UN Fast Losing Credibility in Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/03/un-fast-losing-credibility-in-nepal.html

June 18, 2007
UNMIN Clarifies its Role but Just in Time to be Humiliated by the Maoists
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/06/unmin-clarifies-its-role-but-just-in.html

July 04, 2007
UNMIN's Arms Verification Process in Nepal - More Timely Information and Transparency Needed
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmin-in-over-its-head-in-nepal-arms.html

July 15, 2007
The UN's (UNMIN) Involvement in Nepal's Peace Process: A turning point or another fiasco in the making?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/uns-unmin-involvement-in-nepals-peace.html

July 17, 2007
UNMIN's July 16 Press Release and Subsequent Q&A Disaster
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-july-16-press-release-and.html

July 19, 2007
UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html

September 21, 2007
What has UNMIN Accomplished in Nepal?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/what-has-unmin-accomplished-in-nepal.html

November 01, 2007
What UNMIN Should Do to Manage Nepal's Peace Process
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/courtesy-krishna-hari-pushkar-un-is.html

November 26, 2007
UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/unmin-in-need-of-immediate-reform.html

December, 2007
Constructive Feedback for Ian Martin - Time for a change in UNMIN's Leadership
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/constructive-feedback-for-ian-martin.html

February 04, 2008
Deficient UNMIN
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/deficient-unmin.html

February 07, 2008
UNMIN's (Matthew Kahane's) Observations Completely Legitimate; India's Guilt-Ridden Reaction, Nonsense
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/unmins-matthew-kahanes-observations.html

Asian Centre for Human Rights Report on South Asia - A Cursory Examination of Reporting on Nepal

(Courtesy: Comrade Libre)

The "South Asian Human Rights Index 2008, 1 August 2008" (http://www.achrweb.org/reports/SAARC-2008.pdf) is a publication worthy of reading. From pages 99 to 113, the ACHR (Asian Center for Human Rights) report chronicles in detail, documented human rights violations by all parties in Nepal, over the year 2007 (with reference to specific cases as far back as 2005).

While "naming and shaming" is certainly a powerful tool that is often used in the business of human rights advocacy, a dispassionate review of the ACHR report requires a certain level of detached realism. There are contradictions inherent to the implied recommendations, embedded throughout the text of this report. Some of these contradictions are outlined below.

Security and Human Rights Abuses - A Direct Relationship?

First, the obvious: Human rights violations in Nepal have reduced dramatically since the end of Nepal's Maoist insurgency. The lesson implied here is essentially that war leads to rights violations. The hindsight "epiphany" is that the Maoists should not have provoked Nepal's civil war and successive governments should not have retaliated using the State's military apparatus.

There is no rocket science to this observation. However, there is a stark reality that must be reckoned with - Maoist provocation has been rewarded with their stature as the largest party in Nepal's Constituent Assembly. Additionally, every single politician who advocated military mobilization against the Maoists, are in positions of power today. So where should the accountability of past abuses reside? Individual cases of abuses can certainly be prosecuted to the law's extent. But will legal action be complete without also implicating today's power brokers for their direct involvement in instigating Nepal's civil war?

Further, the following observation adds more confusion: "The biggest concern (in 2007) was not so much state violation but rather the absence of state." Considered in tandem with Nepal's ranking as six out of seven South Asian nations (the higher ranking implying relatively lower rights abuses), a direct correlation is implied between human rights violations and the presence of state forces. The contradiction here is that the ACHR report highlights the absence of state forces as a point of concern while simultaneously suggesting that when the state forces were out of their barracks, human rights abuses were rampant.

Ironically, the great work that human rights defenders within and outside of Nepal have done is partially responsible for the near collapse of the law and order situation in Nepal. When reports are continually headlined with subjective criticisms along the lines of "excessive force," the net result is lawlessness. Security agents are increasingly aware of the repercussions of applying force and hesitate to react even under conditions that warrant the application of force. The ACHR reports correctly states that "the morale of the police was very low (in 2007)." The degradation of morale is directly related to a sense of duty that repeatedly clashes with ambiguous guidelines on the acceptability of action.

This does not mean that the application of "excessive force" should be excused but rather, that the state security forces should be educated on "acceptable" levels of force. For example, is baton charging "acceptable" when public property is being destroyed? Is it "acceptable" to return fire when a VIP convoy comes under fire? Is it "acceptable" to expect the maintenance of law and order with merely the presence of security forces?

There is a fine line that human rights defenders must walk in situations like Nepal where the entire state structure is under indictment and as a result, does not have the capacity to defend its security forces' actions. In other words, the idea of security forces as one of many of the State's organs, with ultimate accountability residing at the political tier, is a notion that needs to be urgently institutionalized. Only then will criticism based on human rights, yield the desired impact.

Politicization or Civil-Military Relations? Which is the Lesser Evil?

This line of thought is a good transition to what is perhaps, the most provocative statement in ACHR's report: "Nepal lives under the shadow of a highly politicized anti-democratic Army… who are not accountable to anyone except themselves." Coming from a organization that itself is unaccountable to anyone (and everyone at the same time), such a statement is hypocritical, callous and counterproductive to the overall human rights agenda.

First, politicization is a two-way street - it's not as though the Army decides to politicize itself and align with say, the Nepali Congress without the Nepali Congress welcoming the move. Second, if in fact different factions in the Army are reaching out to different factions of the political spectrum, is this necessarily bad because the institution is being politicized or good because civil military relations are improving?

Further, is the Army anti-democratic because Girija Prasad Koirala retained COAS Katuwal as its head or was Koirala anti-democratic for recognizing that the sustenance of democracy and stability hinged on retaining a balancing threat of force against a radical communist party, bent on establishing a one-party communist republic in Nepal? Criticizing the Army with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight is immensely more simple than accounting for scenarios that did not materialize by keeping the Army's chain of command intact.

The contradictions, once more, are glaring. In the same report, the ACHR criticizes the Army for being politicized, for civil-military relations being insufficient and for the Army being un-democratic and unaccountable? To whom should the Army be accountable without catering to the political forces and in return, becoming more democratic through enhanced civil-military relations?

If the intent of the ACHR report is to pass judgment on the entire Nepali Army through its COAS, then in the tradition of professional impartiality, perhaps equal judgment should also be passed on the Maoist leader Puspha Kamal Dahal (who is not only the Maoist political head honcho but also the supreme commander of the Maoist "PLA")? The parallels are apparent; yet, the ACHR's reporting is not.

"You Scratch my Back, I'll Scratch Yours" - UNMIN and AHRC

On the subject of accountability, the AHRC's readership may also be drawn to the subtle advocacy performed on behalf of UN agencies in Nepal - namely, the UNMIN and the OHCHR. According to the AHRC report, Nepali actors have "failed to understand or overlook the positive impact of these international agencies in favour of criticising UNMIN for what often appear to be little more than often ill-informed and politically motivated purposes."

In reality, what Nepali actors had failed to understand was the extent to which the UNMIN could have been mobilized to further the cause of sustained and lasting peace in Nepal. But in all fairness, the political motivation behind such failure, goes both ways. Nepal's political class should have provided the UNMIN a mandate to which the UNMIN could have been held accountable; Ian Martin on the other hand, with his first hand experience in Nepal, should have sought a mandate that would have been more impactful.

The misunderstanding that has resulted in overshadowing what little good the UNMIN has done, is actually a latent recognition by the Nepali elite that Nepal's government gave the UNMIN a limited mandate with plenty of room for interpretation and that Ian Martin, happily accepted a multi-million dollar contract with enough loop holes to limit his organization's exposure. For an organization desperate to recreate its diminished relevance, Nepal became to the UN a "gift that just kept on giving." This is what most educated Nepalis resent.

A civilian was kidnapped from Kathmandu and murdered in a cantonment monitored by the UNMIN; the UNMIN's documentation of arms it has inventoried is still unavailable for public consumption; there are so many lingering questions on the Maoist combatant verification process (and the track two dealings between Ian Martin and the Maoists), that the results are still in question; Ian Martin, Kofi Annan, and Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai sharing laughs over beers (at the very onset of Nepal's peace process), became an iconic image of the UNMIN's compromised impartiality .

The AHRC report cites the YCL as a liability to Nepal's peace process. Is the AHRC aware that Ian Martin was fully cognizant of the on-going rotations between the YCL and the Maoists' PLA, at the very founding of the YCL? His admission behind closed doors in New York, amounted to turning a blind eye in favor of helping the Maoists democratize. How democratic is the YCL and how effective was Ian Martin in faciliatating the YCL's birth?

In all fairness, Nepalis have not overlooked the positive impact that UN agencies have had on Nepal. It is rather insulting that the AHRC would insinuate ungraciousness on the part of Nepali people whose criticisms of UNMIN's work, are factually justifiable and on the whole, overwhelmingly legitimate. The UNMIN has received criticism where criticism has been due - namely, in its non-transparent, often partial, and unaccountable mode of operation.

Conclusion

Despite the apparent contradictions in the AHRC's report on Nepal, the report is well worth a thorough read.

The value in the AHRC's report is the detailed documentation of human rights abuses (and allegations) in Nepal. Although much of the material is regurgitation of facts and figures already published through various national and international sources, the benefit to consolidating and (re-highlighting) such egregious acts of abuses, are self-evident.

Overall, the ACHR's report is impartial in its allocation of accountability to actors across Nepal's political spectrum. The report correctly identifies widespread impunity as the root cause behind continued human rights violations. More importantly, this report touches upon a defining facilitator of continued rights abuses - a myopic focus on short-term political horse trading at the cost of long-term stability.

Having correctly identified the weaknesses in Nepal's peace process, what is sorely missing are implementable ideas / recommendations on how best to rectify such deficiencies. Given the contradictions highlighted above, solutions to Nepal's current predicament are anything but apparent.

Related Posts:

UNMIN Finally Speaks Out - A Critical Examination of UNMIN's Letter to News Front
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/unmin-finally-speaks-out-and-pulls-foot.html

The Nepali Army is a Favorite Target for Cheap Provocateurs - An Analysis of a Nepali Adolescent's Professional Obituary
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/being-cheap-provocateur-is-easy.html

UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/unmin-in-need-of-immediate-reform.html

The Problem with Nepali Political Civil Society - The Leftist, the Cowards, and the Compromised http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/10/problem-with-nepali-political-civil.html

UNMIN Finally Speaks Out - A Critical Examination of Kieren Dwyer's Letter to News Front

(Courtesy: Zizimous)

UNMIN’s letter to News Front (located at http://www.newsfront.com.np/) is a reflection of that organization’s performance – incomplete and inadequate. Spokesman Kieren Dwyer’s letter is a carefully crafted but counterproductive rebuttal. By focusing exclusively on tactical (alleged) discrepancies, Dwyer’s letter accentuates the very deficiencies that render his mission a “lame duck.”

Mr. Dwyer’s letter to News Front suggests that UNMIN’s effectiveness should be measured based on the frequency of its statements and reports. Clearly, such a proposal is ludicrous. Results are what the Nepali people, UNMIN’s critics and UNMIN’s benefactors use to measure the mission’s effectiveness; not words.

For if statements and reports alone yielded results, the International Crisis Group and Amnesty International would have solved Nepal’s problems years ago. Further, UNMIN would have been the best peace-keeping mission in the history of the United Nations, based simply on numerous articles (“reports”) published on the NepaliPerspectives web log.

The reality is, the ICG and AI have done a great job at recording facts and UNMIN has done a great job of holding a mandate that effectively contains the potential good the mission could do. Neither of these organizations have had any discernable, positive impact on Nepal aside from checking the hubris of a King who is arguably, on his way back up the value chain.

On the topic of unharnessed potential, Kieran Dwyer’s letter to News Front could have potentially carried much more weight had the letter included examples of positive impact from UNMIN’s activities. Unfortunately, such examples are difficult to come by and even harder to articulate.

Using the very examples that Mr. Dwyer cites, UNMIN’s ineffectiveness becomes clear: Did the “14-page” report on UNMIN’s website curb the YCL’s affinity for violent politics? Have any of Ian Martin’s numerous statements resulted in changed attitudes? Did constituent assembly elections take place after a high level UN delegation visited Nepal and sang the electoral commission’s praise?

Room for further confusion comes from Mr. Dwyer’s comments on armed Madhesi elements. It is very possible that UNMIN officials may not have met with armed Madhesis. But can Mr. Dwyer extend his assertion to the larger organization that he represents? Can Mr. Dwyer unambiguously clarify for this readership that no United Nations employee has ever interacted with armed Madhesi elements, in India or Nepal?

Should Mr. Dwyer care to respond to this “yes / no” question, it is strongly recommended that he carefully evaluate the accuracy and completeness of UNMIN’s intelligence lest Ian Martin end up in the unenviable position of US President George W. Bush.

How are the Nepali people and the international community to reconcile Kieran Dwyer’s statement against Matthew Kahane’s request to Indian authorities, against the armed Mahesi factions’ request for UN mediation (and Girija Koirala’s insistence that there is no role for UNMIN in the Madhes)? Viewed in light of these contradictions, Kieran Dwyer’s letter to News Front raises more questions than it answers.

In spite of the uncertainties that Kieran raises, he is right about one thing – “professional journalists do have a responsibility to report accurately, especially in the politically-charged atmosphere of a peace process.” A corollary of this statement is that professionals in general also have a responsibility to execute their functions by preserving their third-party independence, their professional integrity and by acknowledging (and acting upon) constructive criticisms. Can UNMIN’s leadership, in good conscience, release an unqualified statement that they have fulfilled their own professional obligations?

It is unfortunate that a year and half had to pass for UNMIN to finally acknowledge the intricate workings of the Nepali media. Having unraveled this mystery, Kieran may benefit from revisiting media reports (before and immediately after “Jana Aandolan-II”), upon which UNMIN’s operational assumptions are based. Doing so may help Kieran rescue his organization from the pitfalls of vested interest that UNMIN has regrettably fallen into.

Also regrettable is Kieran Dwyer’s heightened concern that appears motivated more from News Front being an English weekly, than from the substance of News Front’s articles. Could there be some relationship between Kieran’s concerns and the ease of accessibility that News Front’s website provides UNMIN’s benefactors? It is peculiar that the need to publish equally vociferous rebuttals in Nepali publications is not a priority for UNMIN, even though the criticism of UNMIN’s activities are much more scathing in Nepali language publications.

As for Dwyer’s comments regarding UNMIN’s hiring practices, his statement is an outright lie. There are ample examples of highly qualified Nepalis who have not been considered for jobs with UNMIN because of their caste and class affiliations. Off the record, UNMIN employees are able to recite surnames that are ineligible for employment with UNMIN. If this isn’t discrimination, what is?

It is very unfortunate for Nepal that more than a year after its inception, UNMIN’s leadership remains preoccupied justifying the mission’s existence instead of executing its responsibilities. UNMIN’s repeated failure to negotiate a meaningful mandate, its unwillingness to accept accountability, it’s non-transparent handling of the arms management process, and Ian Martin’s lack of independence have been repeatedly documented and brought to UNMIN’s attention. No discernable action has resulted. Naturally, the result is diminished confidence in UNMMIN's capacity to deliver.

A quote from a regular critic of UNMIN is something Kieren Dwyer and his leadership may like to recite two times a day: “It is important to revisit the fact that UNMIN is in Nepal at the behest of the SPA and the Maoists, but is accountable to the Nepali people. UNMIN is in Nepal to do what the Nepali people deem is right for their own country, not what UNMIN (or other external powers) deem, is right for Nepal.”

To further the point above, it is recommended that UNMIN’s leadership not make the mistake of treating Nepal as a playground for “Emergency Sex and Other Desperate Measures.” Relying on “fine print” and the connections that UNMIN has inculcated through its Nepali staff (and their well connected relatives) is not a good option for Kieran or UNMIN.

The only option at this point is for UNMIN to come clean with the Nepali people by disclosing all weaknesses in Nepal’s peace process and explaining why the process continues to falter. Following a public apology, Ian Martin and UNMIN’s current leadership should resign on moral grounds and should be replaced. The Nepali people deserve so much more than what the current UNMIN leadership has shown itslef capable of delivering.

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Although not nearly as fancy as UNMIN’s website, a comprehensive chronicle of UNMIN’s inadequacies complete with recommendations are documented below:

Constructive Feedback for Ian Martin - Time for a change in UNMIN's Leadership
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/constructive-feedback-for-ian-martin.html

This article is a past exchange between NepaliPerspectives and UNMIN Spokesperson, Kieran Dwyer:

UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html

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February 25, 2007
Summary of Declared (by State) vs. Inventoried (by UNMIN), Weapon Counts
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/symmary-of-declared-by-state-vs.html

February 25, 2007
Discrepancies in Maoist Weapons Inventoried by UNMIN – Do the Math
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/discrepancies-in-maoist-weapons.html

March 01, 2007
The UN and Maoist Arms Controversy: Overkill or Negligence?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/un-and-maoist-arms-controversy-overkill.html

March 01, 2007
UN Fast Losing Credibility in Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/03/un-fast-losing-credibility-in-nepal.html

June 18, 2007
UNMIN Clarifies its Role but Just in Time to be Humiliated by the Maoists
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/06/unmin-clarifies-its-role-but-just-in.html

July 04, 2007
UNMIN's Arms Verification Process in Nepal - More Timely Information and Transparency Needed
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmin-in-over-its-head-in-nepal-arms.html

July 15, 2007
The UN's (UNMIN) Involvement in Nepal's Peace Process: A turning point or another fiasco in the making?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/uns-unmin-involvement-in-nepals-peace.html

July 17, 2007
UNMIN's July 16 Press Release and Subsequent Q&A Disaster
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-july-16-press-release-and.html

July 19, 2007
UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html

September 21, 2007
What has UNMIN Accomplished in Nepal?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/what-has-unmin-accomplished-in-nepal.html

November 01, 2007
What UNMIN Should Do to Manage Nepal's Peace Process
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/courtesy-krishna-hari-pushkar-un-is.html

November 26, 2007
UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/unmin-in-need-of-immediate-reform.html

February 04, 2008
Deficient UNMIN
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/deficient-unmin.html

February 07, 2008
UNMIN's (Matthew Kahane's) Observations Completely Legitimate; India's Guilt-Ridden Reaction, Nonsense
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/02/unmins-matthew-kahanes-observations.html

UNMIN's (Matthew Kahane's) Observations Completely Legitimate; India's Guilt-Ridden Reaction, Nonsense

(Courtesy: Ramzes)

A guilty conscience is often identified by a party's reaction to suggestive comments. In the mind of the guilty, the "suggestion" is easily misinterpreted as an "allegation." This invariably leads to a panicked reaction. The unintended consequence of such a reaction is self-implication. The intentional application of this method is one of the oldest tricks in the book of criminal investigations. But sometimes, even unintended applications (of this approach) produce results. A perfect example of this dynamic was the Indian government's response to Matthew Kahane's harmless observations.

The Indian government's reaction to Nepal's resident UNMIN Advisor, Matthew Kahane, is the most obvious display of Indian guilt (on Nepal), to date. The Indian government's formal complaint to the UN Security Council's Chief of Cabinet speaks volumes of the mindset of the Indian establishment and its foreign policy objectives in Nepal.

The thrust of Matthew Kahane's message is captured in two short sentences: "Some of these (violent) groups that are making life difficult in (the) Terai may have some kind of links in North India..." and "It would be enormously helpful if Indian authorities are able to keep these people under control."

Kahane's first sentence is part fact and part suggestion. His statement that certain groups are making life difficult for Nepali people in the Terai is a fact. There is no debate on the misery that armed groups like the JTMM and the Madhesi Tigers have brought upon the Terainans. The second part of Kahane's observation suggests that the groups causing misery to the Terainans may have links to unscrupulous elements across the Nepali border. There is no suggestion whatsoever of the Indian government's links to either the violent elements in Nepal's southern plains or to their interlocutors in India's north.

Kahane's second quote from above is an ask of "Indian authorities" to help "control" trouble-makers in India. This is a request, not an allegation. It is an appeal that factors in the realities of the situation in southern Nepal while respecting India's sovereignty and regional standing.

Although India's disgruntled reaction to Kahane is baseless, Kahane's observations are not.

Kahane's remarks have caused New Delhi unease because of Kahane's affiliation with the UN; not because Kahane's remarks are inaccurate or misleading. To the contrary, Matthew Kahane has innocently restated what countless Nepali Army Officers, bureaucrats and politicians had said, throughout Nepal's Maoist insurgency - that the key to stabilizing Nepal, lies with India.

Some things in Nepal are different today while others are not. The Maoist insurgency that relied heavily on elements within India for its growth and sustenance is (arguably) over. But the Indian tendency to keep fanning the flames of instability in Nepal, persists.

Maoist leader Prachanda's visit to north India after signing Nepal's Comprehensive Peace Agreement deserves mention here. Prachanda stated then, that he wished to thank his Indian "friends" who had sheltered him and his kind, throughout Nepal's brutal insurgency. Given this recollection, is it so outlandish to assume that within the foreseeable future, the world will witness leaders of the JTMM or the Madhesi Tigers doing exactly as Prachanda has already done?

Further, the apprehension and detention of C. P. Gajurel and Mohan Baidya in India are also facts worth recalling. Charges against both were dropped and the duo were returned to Nepal shortly after India engineered the 12 Point Agreement. So without a doubt, India put an end to Nepal's Maoist insurgency. So what's stopping India from preempting another insurgency (in Nepal) by off-shoots of the same Maoists that India "shoved" into Nepal's interim government?

Given the facts presented above, however innocently Matthew Kahane may have made his remarks, was Kahane really that far off the mark? Should UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon have to get down on his knees and apologize to the Indian government? Should Kahane have to "clarify" his remarks upon his return to Nepal? What about apologies to Nepal? Has anyone said sorry to the Nepali people for over a decade of sustained violence that was sponsored by elements who self-admittedly operated from within northern India?

Matthew Kahane's remarks are perfectly within UNMIN's current mandate, a part of which is to help Nepal overcome challenges to holding constituent assembly elections. If one manifestation of such challenges is the cross-border movement of armed elements (that are intent on disrupting elections), then Kahane's observations are within reason. The Indian government's reaction however, is not.

India's reaction is very telling in two ways: First, it's a disclosure of the Indian fear of heightened Nepali nationalism; Second, it's an admission that the Indian government either has no control over its northern frontier or does not wish to exercise the control it has. Either way, the Indian reaction in Kathmandu (through its emissary), in New York (via the Indian mission to the UN) and through Nepal's Home Minister (Krishna Sitoula - the Indian agent in Nepal's interim government) is evidence enough that India would rather take strides to discredit UNMIN and Matthew Kahane than accept its own internal weaknesses.

India has remained an obstacle to the expansion of UNMIN's mandate in Nepal. At the same time, India complained to the UN that Kahane's remarks overstepped the boundaries of UNMIN's mandate. Without a doubt, UNMIN is a thankless job and the organization has its own set of bureaucratic challenges to overcome. But seriously, should pampering a petty minded, red-faced, guilt ridden Indian government be a part of UNMIN's mandate too?

Related Posts:

Smoke and Mirrors - Why Nepal's Constituent Assembly Elections Won't Happen in April 2008
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/smoke-and-mirrors-why-nepals.html

Nationalism as a Political Agenda - Defining Nepali Interests
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/nationalism-as-political-agenda.html

Constructive Feedback for Ian Martin - Time for a change in UNMIN's Leadership
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/constructive-feedback-for-ian-martin.html

Deficient UNMIN

(Courtesy: Zizimous)

Last summer I had the opportunity to visit Kosovo for about two weeks. Like Nepal, Kosovo too has an enormous UN presence, but fortunately for Nepal, the UN's presence is substantially smaller than that in Kosovo. One of the disturbing images I noticed was the graffiti sprayed on UN SUV's by frustrated Albanians labeling the UN as "killers". Of course, the label – "killers" is not justifiable at any cost, especially considering the number of humanitarian missions the UN has in operation in Kosovo. But one thing is for sure, the prolonged presence of UNMIN and its inability to meet its most basic objective in Nepal will inevitably draw more criticism and anger towards UNMIN just like in the case of UNMIK in Kosovo.

Almost two weeks ago, daily news papers carried a story where the British Ambassador had spoken in public about how polls were not possible taking into account the poor law and order situation in the country. Similarly, the following week UN Security Council met in New York and approved UNMIN's tenure extension. Although Britain did propose an extended mandate, China was quick to veto Britain's proposal quite rightly. However, there is a hidden meaning to Britain's proposal to extend the mandate of UNMIN.

In lieu with the British envoy's assessment that polls would not be possible given the present law and order situation; other international powers have also reached similar conclusions and have thus pushed Britain to propose the extension of UNMIN's mandate in Nepal for two reasons. It now becomes obvious that the security situation might be taking a turn for the worse especially considering the casual attitude demonstrated by the government in handling the Terai demands. Similarly, the possibility of election happening depends primarily on the ability of the government to solve the deepening political crisis that seems to be only escalating in the Terai day by day.

Taking into consideration the growing lawlessness in the country and the escalating political crisis in the Terai, many in the international arena are beginning to believe that the elections will be deferred for the third time. However, what really worry the international community about the deferral of the polls are the consequences. Given the track record of the present government – unimaginable corruption and divisive in nature; a section of the international community feels that the UN with its technical expertise is the only international institution that can realistically help Nepal through this fragile transitional process as they know the SPA, if left alone to govern, will make more mess.

For about two years the international community has been toeing India's policy vis-à-vis Nepal. Unfortunately, things haven't worked out as planned for India. The Maoists seem to be far from India's influence and the Terai groups would want India to be sympathetic to their cause. This situation has obviously put India in an awkward position considering the fact that its policy is far too stretched and scattered. This policy of appeasement of all political groups has proved to be counter-productive. But the net result is that; the Nepali peace process is in danger by the very forces perceived to be in the close influence of the Indian government – Maoists and the Terai parties.

As a result of the failure of the Indian policy to successfully democratize and mainstream the Maoists and other warring ethnic groups; the international community now feels the urge to independently pursue their own policy towards Nepal. As the Terai boils, other ethnic groups have also started to raise their demands. The possibility of an ethnic war or a civil war becomes more and more a reality day by day given the lackluster policy of the SPA government. Therefore, the international community wants an extended mandate for UNMIN so that the international community can play a greater role in solving the Nepali problem by leveraging its influence with political parties and other ethnic groups.

However, is an extended UNMIN mandate desirable to Nepal's national interest? The answer of course is, no. Most western countries have their own vested interest in solving Nepal's problems. If the UNMIN is allowed a greater mandate, what we will have in Nepal is a constitution that will probably reflect the desires of other western countries rather than having what we Nepalis want in our constitution.

The other problem is related to the often controversial issue of nationalism and sovereignty. If it was bad enough having the Indian's club together an unholy alliance (SPA-M), think about UNMIN with various international players trying to impose their policy for Nepal all at once. It is a recipe for disaster. More importantly, UNMIN has been very poor in its performance over the last two years; it hasn't even been able to assist the Nepal government in its most basic objective – completion of arms management before elections.

Secondly, the intent of the UN also becomes increasingly questionable. UNMIN and OHCHR have both kept mum over the systematic abuse of political opponents and human rights abuse perpetrated by the state and primarily the Maoists over the last two years.

This whole concept of India card and the China card is just a myth. It is in the interest of both India and China to have a stable democratic Nepal because; Nepal provides both India and China a geographical avenue for economic opportunities to flourish between the two countries. Therefore, it is in the interest for both India and China to work closely on Nepal affairs to thwart any designs to allow western countries to enter the Nepali political platform more visibly and that fundamentally means keeping the UNMIN as far as possible from the politics of Nepal.

Lastly, what is most important is defining and allowing Nepal's national interest to prevail for both India and China. For that matter, it is not in the interest of Nepal to have an extended mandate or mission for UNMIN after its extension expires in June. The need of the hour is for the Nepali political actors to identify the ideology that is the real threat to Nepal's national security and democracy.

Related Posts:

Constructive Feedback for Ian Martin - Time for a change in UNMIN's Leadership
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/constructive-feedback-for-ian-martin.html

Constructive Feedback for UNMIN's Ian Martin - Time for a change in UNMIN's Leadership

(Courtesty: el Zorro & NepaliPerspectives Group)

An authoritative expert on counter insurgency, scholar and author, Dr. Thomas A. Marks ended his response to a question regarding UNMIN on the following note: "It is difficult to speak of accountability when dealing with an institutional culture that invariably recognizes potential mass murderers only after they have committed their crimes. Read any work on UN performance in Rwanda, Darfur, and you see the problem." (http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/10/troglodytes-stalk-nepal-exclusive.html)

On December 14 2007, Ian Martin, Chief of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) displayed precisely the idea expressed in Dr. Marks' response. Essentially, Ian Martin lost his cool: http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=131262

Martin's frustration was visible and his irate message to the Nepali people is best encompassed by following question (statement): "Are chances of maintaining and strengthening peace in Nepal greater with UNMIN's presence? If the answer is no, tell us to go. If the answer is yes, then please don't stop criticizing us, but do constructive criticism."

Here are a few questions that Ian Martin should ask himself:

• Is it customary for the Chief of a mission bearing the UN flag to indirectly "threaten" the very people the mission was created to help?
  
• Is it normal for moderators/facilitators to insinuate that without their participation, the process they are supporting is doomed?
  
• Is it standard operating procedure for the UN to agree to a mandate without negotiating results-oriented terms and conditions (and then complain about not being able to do its job when failure becomes evident)?
  

If the answer to either of the questions above is "yes," then the chances of maintaining and strengthening peace in Nepal is less with Ian Martin's presence. Because a "yes" would be indicative of Martin's mindset - how best to entrench UNMIN in Nepal for the foreseeable future. Such an attitude is conducive neither to regional politics nor to Nepal's immediate needs.

The point that Ian Martin highlights (at this late hour in the peace process), is "mandate." This is the very heart of the issue that Martin should be taken to task on for a number of reasons.

First, the situation in Nepal was not at all "foreign" to Ian Martin. Having served as Louise Arbour's regional representative and the head of OHCHR in Nepal (before the peace process started), Ian should have anticipated better than most, the specific mandate needed for the UN to effectively pave a path to lasting peace in Nepal.

So a year later, how dare Martin make loose allusions to the inadequacy of UNMIN's mandate in Nepal. Having failed to negotiate the precise terms and conditions that UNMIN would need at the onset of Nepal's peace process, how dare Ian Martin now report to the UNSG (who in turn reported to the Security Council) that the "limited focus of the mandate of UNMIN has constrained its ability to adequately assist the overall management of the peace process."

Second, Ian Martin's stark failure is magnified by the overwhelming faith that civil society members (such as journalist Kanak Mani Dixit), placed in Martin's abilities. In "Come back, Ian" (http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue/307/Comment/12177), Dixit made an impassioned appeal to then UNSG, Kofi Annan in the following terms: "Well, what of the peace process in Nepal? It is poised on a razor’s edge and requires full UN engagement. Is not Nepal as important as East Timor (population 1 million)? And is this not one of those places where the UN can be pre-emptive for peace? How does the geo-strategic significance of East Timor compare with that of Nepal?"

Such public displays of confidence in Ian Martin led to the formation of a team of "subject matter experts" on Nepal. Namely, John Norris, formerly of the International Crisis Group (an individual whose coverage of Nepal's Maoist insurgency qualified him as an "expert" on Nepal), Ian Martin (then head of OHCHR in Nepal), and several Nepalis, experienced in INGO circuits.

In hindsight, what do Mr. Martin's advocates have to say about Martin's results? Can the blame for UNMIN's underperformance be squarely attributed to Nepal's political sphere or is Martin also liable for his egregious failure in leadership (guidance)? Was the creation of a team of "experts" preconditioned to a certain political outcome, a smart move or is this turning into a case of 20/20 hindsight? How is East Timor faring these days in Ian Martin's absence? Is Nepal to share a similar fate?

Third, Ian Martin's comment that "our (UNMIN's) mandate is to monitor, not enforce," is just ludicrous. The question that needs to asked is "how well has UNMIN executed on its limited role of "monitoring" Nepal's peace process?" Are stakeholders to Nepal's peace process content with the "value" that UNMIN has added? Based on what UNMIN has accomplished (given its "monitoring" mandate), do the results inspire confidence in Ian Martin's leadership to add three additional roles to UNMIN's existing mandate?

Dr. Bishnu Raj Upreti's comment to Ian Martin's outburst is right on target: "UNMIN can't deny responsibility saying that they were here just to monitor." This sentiment is echoed by former National Human Rights Council member, Sushil Pyakurel who made the following statement: "UNMIN can't say it could not deliver owing to a limited mandate."

Fourth, as for the "constructive" ciriticism that Ian Martin wants, it appears more a case of acting on the criticisms that have already been forwarded rather than receiving any to begin with. What Martin wants to hear is praise for the little his leadership has yielded and sympathy for his self-fabricated dilemma.

Unfortunately for Martin, he will get neither from thinking, feeling, rational Nepalis because it is evident that Ian Martin has clearly failed to deliver the consultative, subject matter expertise that the Nepali people expected of him. UNMIN's progress under Martin's leadership has not reached even a fraction of its true potential.

When Ian Martin spoke on December 14, 2007, it is possible he was having a bad day (week or even month). It is also possible that Mr. Martin's utility to Nepal's peace process had ended. Perhaps it is Ian Martin (not UNMIN), who should consider going home?

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Listed below in chronological order is all the "constructive" criticism that Ian Martin could want. Whether he has acted on the criticisms provided is for the Nepali people to judge.

(Readers should feel free to e-mail the moderators at nepali.perspectives@gmail.com for the full text of any of the pieces listed below)

February 25, 2007
Summary of Declared (by State) vs. Inventoried (by UNMIN), Weapon Counts
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/symmary-of-declared-by-state-vs.html

February 25, 2007
Discrepancies in Maoist Weapons Inventoried by UNMIN – Do the Math
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/discrepancies-in-maoist-weapons.html

March 01, 2007
The UN and Maoist Arms Controversy: Overkill or Negligence?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/un-and-maoist-arms-controversy-overkill.html

March 01, 2007
UN Fast Losing Credibility in Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/03/un-fast-losing-credibility-in-nepal.html

June 18, 2007
UNMIN Clarifies its Role but Just in Time to be Humiliated by the Maoists
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/06/unmin-clarifies-its-role-but-just-in.html

July 04, 2007
UNMIN's Arms Verification Process in Nepal - More Timely Information and Transparency Needed
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmin-in-over-its-head-in-nepal-arms.html

July 15, 2007
The UN's (UNMIN) Involvement in Nepal's Peace Process: A turning point or another fiasco in the making?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/uns-unmin-involvement-in-nepals-peace.html

July 17, 2007
UNMIN's July 16 Press Release and Subsequent Q&A Disaster
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-july-16-press-release-and.html

July 19, 2007
UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html

September 21, 2007
What has UNMIN Accomplished in Nepal?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/what-has-unmin-accomplished-in-nepal.html

November 01, 2007
What UNMIN Should Do to Manage Nepal's Peace Process
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/courtesy-krishna-hari-pushkar-un-is.html

November 26, 2007
UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/unmin-in-need-of-immediate-reform.html

UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform

(Courtesy: el Zorro)

After over a year of electoral propaganda, UNMIN's day of reckoning has came and gone. The question at hand however, isn't whether Ian Martin should be invited to continue in Nepal, but how UNMIN's mindset can be tailored to better fit Nepal's unique requirements. Put simply, UNMIN’s boiler-plate, consultant-minded approach has failed miserably and should no longer be given sustenance.

Setting false expectations

Months before the November 22 date, UNMIN, political pundits, their minions and Nepali civil society all understood that holding elections under continued Maoist duress would be impossible. It was the fear of publicly jetissoning a false reality (fabricated by these very actors), that the “alarm bell” wasn’t rung in time and the Nepali people were betrayed once more.

Where the setting of false election expectations is concerned, UNMIN and every high-ranking UN official who flew in and out of Nepal (while singing praise of the peace process and electoral preparations), is guilty as charged. They were all responsible for exacerbating a lie that intentionally subdued glaring challenges and highlighted peripheral progress. Ian Martin routinely presented hyped versions of UNMIN’s “progress” to his superiors (and fawning Nepalis) in New York, as evidence of UNMIN’s success - a success that had no chance of materializing.

Banking on fine print instead assuming responsibility

Regardless of how Ian Martin chooses his play on words or how he attempts to re-interpret UNMIN’s mandate in Nepal, the fact remains that Martin and his “army” of advisors were incapable of executing even the narrowest interpretation of UNMIN’s current mandate – helping set the stage to ensure constituent assembly elections.

Had Martin’s team executed its limited mandate, assigning unambiguous accountability to the actors that foiled elections would be possible. The collective allocation of responsibility would leave no room for the repetition of similar Maoist shenanigans in the future.

However, because UNMIN failed in this regard, Nepalis are left blaming the Maoists who in turn, conveniently point to the fact that it was the interim government that suspended polls (and not just the Maoists). Such rationale coming from the same weasel who 3 months ago had warned of grave consequences for Nepal (should CA elections not be held on time - i.e., November 22, 2007), is a bitter pill that thanks to UNMIN, all Nepalis must swallow.

UNMIN may have unlimited liability where the dollars spent on supporting Nepal’s peace process is concerned. But, the Nepali government and the Maoists should not be permitted to share in the luxury of such unlimited liability. These actors (at some point) will have to face the Nepali people (and each other) in elections and UNMIN will have to do a better job of ensuring that constituent assembly elections are in fact, held.

Unaccountability is what Nepali Civil Society and UNMIN thrive on

Everyone (UNMIN more than others) understood what the setting of Maoist preconditions meant for CA elections. And even with UNMIN as their vanguard, no one dared practice any of the high minded morality or democratic conviction that accompanies populist rhetoric in Nepal. (For the most part, populism and “democratic” activism in Nepal, have become synonymous).

Instead of advising the Maoists to change course, Nepal’s self-professed democratic stalwarts (those who were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Maoists were yearning to become practitioners of liberal democracy), turned the other way.

For example, Devendra Raj Pandey paid homage to the Maoist demand for a republic through the parliament. Human rights activist Padma Ratna Tuladhar immediately busied himself toeing the Maoist line and Krishna Pahadi’s fluorescent presence was nowhere on the streets of Kathmandu.

Also missing was headline news of Kanak Mani Dixit throwing himself into the Kamal Pokhari jailhouse (to make international SOS calls). In fact, November 22 was a day on which Mr. Dixit’s allegations of a dormant army (as a force waiting to serve it’s King), ran exceptionally hollow.

There is no better term than “pathetic” to describe the state of those who interpret the taming of a power-hungry monarch (in the 21st century) as the crowing jewel on their personal list of accomplishments. Unfortunately for Nepal, this pathetic list is long and varied and runs from Kathmandu to Brussels, from Washington DC to New York, from Sydney to London, and back again.

The connection between UNMIN and Nepal’s disillusioned civil society is this – both find themselves in a symbiotic web of conspiracy driven agendas, diverted development dollars, and foregone conclusions. They profess allegiance to a higher cause, speak of process, of rights, of empowerment and rule of law. All the while, what they practice rarely re-enforces that which they preach – neither UNMIN nor Nepal’s civil society is accountable, transparent, or flexible enough to view Nepal’s political landscape through any paradigm other than their own preconceived notion of what the landscape SHOULD look like.

Operational ineffectiveness – how should this be addressed?

Whether opponents of UNMIN like it or not, the UN is intricately tied to Nepal’s peace process. Getting rid of UNMIN (as some would propose), is not a credible solution to guaranteeing sustained peace or democracy. However, permitting the UN mission in Nepal to carry on in the flimsy manner that it has operated, is no solution either.

Essentially, UNMIN needs to be restructured to carry out its mandate in a responsible and timely manner. Below are a set of recommendations that may help the Nepali state achieve its desired, democratic end-state, at the earliest.

1. UNMIN should focus on its current mandate and stop looking for opportunities to expand. All parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) need to sit and re-establish a set of achievable milestones where constituent assembly elections are concerned. The winter session of the interim parliament declaring yet another election date (only to be missed again), should not be the driving agenda.

Instead, the SPA coalition and the Maoists should produce a set of target objectives (and associated dates) that need to be met, in order for CA elections to be held. These objectives and their associated dates should be shared with UNMIN and UNMIN’s engagement sought in an advisory capacity.

2. UNMIN needs to be more transparent with the Nepali people. Once all parties are in agreement, UNMIN should allocate its resources to ensuring that agreed upon milestones are met and should produce weekly reports (on its website) that outline progress-to-date, challenges/obstacles and upcoming milestones. Should the danger of missing any milestones become obvious, the information should be shared with the Nepali people (and the international community-at-large), in a transparent and public manner.

UNMIN’s practice of inflating progress by subduing “hiccups” should be halted, immediately. All agreements (official and unofficial) between UNMIN, the SPA and the Maoists should be shared in the public domain. For example, Ian Martin’s revelation AFTER the arms verification process had begun, that details on Maoist arms, numbers of verified combatants, etc., should be kept from public disclosure is the kind of practice that UNMIN should be reprimanded for enforcing.

3. UNMIN should negotiate a more practical mandate. In order to avoid the plethora of excuses of the past (and repeated discussion of it’s mandate), Ian Martin should once and for all, tell the SPA and the Maoists the common minimum set of conditions UNMIN REQUIRES, to effectively carry out its responsibilities.

The UN was in a remarkable position at the onset of the peace process to negotiate its own parameters for success but failed to do so. Fortunately for UNMIN, Nepal’s peace process has yet again arrived at a juncture where Ian Martin can better negotiate the terms of UNMIN’s engagement. Martin should take full advantage of the lessons he has learned and negotiate a more effective mandate for his mission. A RESTRUCTURED versus an EXPANDED role is what Ian Martin should focus on.

4. Parallel facilitators should be considered. The perception that the UN (and the UN alone) can help Nepal navigate its peace process is a myth. The nature of conflict has morphed drastically since the UN’s inception. With these transformations have emerged numerous institutions and think tanks that may not be as well funded but are intrinsically better structured to handle discrete components of Nepal’s peace process.

Although it is the usual suspects that infiltrate every one of these institutions (e.g., former ICG “expert” on Nepal, John Norris, now serves as a special advisor to Ian Martin), Nepal’s chances for sustained peace may be benefited by keeping all options open.

All “advice” where peace is concerned is “free.” It wouldn’t hurt Ram Chandra Poudel and his Ministry of Peace to capitalize on handouts.

5. UNMIN’s progress should be monitored. UNMIN should have no problems with the Ministry of Peace and an external fourth party monitoring the progress of Nepal’s peace process.

Oversight is a necessary component to any process. But because independent oversight is desired, it is understood that in Nepal’s case, the existence of the incestuous relationship between UNMIN and known civil society actors, incapacitates civil society as the sole, logical source of unofficial governance. Employment arrangements in particular, hamper the independence of most vocal opinion makers in Nepal’s case.

As an alternative, the inclusion of an Indo-Chinese component as an advisory board to the Ministry of Peace should be an excellent addition to ensuring that UNMIN does its job and that Nepal’s peace process remains on track.

Conclusion

UNMIN's credibility has eroded significantly but has not been irreparably damaged. This, thanks to Nepal's "ordinary" (according to Ian Martin) people who are able comprehend the failure that UNMIN has been but appear incapable of addressing the root causes that “disabled” UNMIN’s election propaganda. This message was the basic thrust of Ian Martin’s most recent press conference.

With all the lies that have been spewed and the double standards that have been practiced, the time to carefully re-evaluate UNMIN’s most effective application is now. It is important to revisit the fact that UNMIN is in Nepal at the behest of the SPA and the Maoists, but is accountable to the Nepali people. UNMIN is in Nepal to do what the Nepali people deem is right for their own country, not what UNMIN (or other external powers) deem, is right for Nepal.

Conscientious Nepalis need to wake up to these facts and stop elevating UNMIN onto a pedestal where it does not belong. For all the progressive politics that Nepal’s elite allegedly represents, its constituents should take a moment to dissociate their wallets from their professed morals and take a good look in the mirror. It is at this point of dissociation (self-reflection) where the chasm that defines (and perpetuates) the failures in Nepal's peace process, lies.

Related Posts:

What UNMIN Should Do to Manage Nepal's Peace Process
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/courtesy-krishna-hari-pushkar-un-is.html

The Problem with Nepali Political Civil Society - The Leftist, the Cowards, and the Compromised
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/10/problem-with-nepali-political-civil.html

What has UNMIN Accomplished in Nepal?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/what-has-unmin-accomplished-in-nepal.html

They Don’t Need No UNMIN Education

Why Does the UNMIN Feel It Needs to Market Its Failure to Nepali Children?

(Courtesy: Mr. Ripley)

Process is an important component of modern society. Software projects, once developed on an ad hoc basis, now follow rigid procedural techniques that go way beyond writing computer code.

Specialists from configuration managers, software architects, testers, and knowledge experts – all working under a sanctioned development protocol have cut out the heroics and borderline alchemy of the past. This has led to better products – despite all the burdens that process imposes.

Politics, and in particular democratic politics, also entails various interests to participate in processes that require a repertoire that includes persuasion, compromise, trust, and on occasion, threats and other forms of “leverage.”

But if process is a necessity of modern institutional practices to achieve an end– then the institution that epitomizes failure of process is reflected by the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations in general. The late United States Senator Patrick Moynihan described the United Nations as a “theater of the absurd, a decomposing corpse, and an insane asylum.”

Even in the areas where the world retains some confidence in the UN, the record is spotty; the most recent scandal being that the United Nations over the years has inflated the number of HIV infections by almost 50 percent to inflate funding needs.

So it’s appalling to see that the UNMIN, an institution that has yet to demonstrate any metric of credible success, inflicting a “mock” session of the UN General Assembly Process for secondary school children in Chitwan.

One can be sure the children participated voluntarily – after all, anyone with a budget to provide a “free” lunch or the capability to menace Nepali schoolchildren can secure their participation. Just ask the political parties and Maoists who have brought in truck-loads of children to support their political agenda.

What honest academic or worldly insights, about the United Nations or the peace process could the UNMIN impart on these kids other than their self-serving interests to prolong their Mission?

What the peace process and autocratic leadership under the Ranas, the Shahs and the Maoists have taught us is that we need our children to think more independently – not herded together to participate in group-think exercises that characterizes the General Assembly or the existing UNMIN-led peace process. Nepali children had enough of that under different masters.

Perhaps, if the UNMIN has a surplus budget, it can educate the children by building them a library where they can explore history and political experiences of other countries on their own.

Maybe there, they might read about how the early Greeks first invented the rudimentary structures of democracy – including early thoughts on republicanism. Or, they might explore how security is a fundamental need for humans as Hobbes postulated and that we readily become “nasty and brutish” without law and order. Perhaps, they can compare and contrast the record of socialism and capitalism and that “Democratic Republic” does not necessarily mean a country is “democratic” or a true “republic.”

They might read of how Churchill refused to negotiate with Hitler, correctly understanding elemental evil and courageously (and shrewdly) overcoming the Nazis. Or maybe, they will also learn on their own how the United Nations, founded with the intention to find a solution to wars and suffering, has become an un-reformable institution.

They may even explore Shakespeare which might help them to understand their political leaders better.

Nepali children will learn more about true intellectual inquiry, rationalism, historical context, and self-criticism on their their OWN if the UNMIN is successful in freeing the country of extortion, of intimidation. Most importantly, they might even respect the UN someday if Ian

Martin and his team can demonstrate independent thinking, integrity, and courage – even if it’s not in their mandate.

Related Posts:

What UNMIN Should Do to Manage Nepal's Peace Process
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/courtesy-krishna-hari-pushkar-un-is.html

What has UNMIN Accomplished in Nepal?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/what-has-unmin-accomplished-in-nepal.html

UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-menta

What UNMIN Should Do to Manage Nepal's Peace Process

(Courtesy: Krishna Hari Pushkar)

The UN is a major player in Nepal's ongoing peace process. Analysts and commentators have focused much on assessing the role of political parties and little has been said about the performance of the world body's mission in Nepal.

In this article I look at the dwindling peace process in Nepal despite the involvement of the UN and other international communities. The Maoists have joined the political mainstream providing some breathing space after years of civil strife. At the same time, there are approximately two dozens small rebel groups who have been rebelling against the state. These new insurgents believe they have been "severely discriminated against and have been excluded from the mainstream since hundreds of years.” The UN could do more, based on relevant past UN resolutions, in bringing these rebels into the peace process.

The UN Mission in Nepal

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was signed on 21 November 2006 and officially ended the decade-long Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Afterward, UNMIN, the United Nations Mission in Nepal, was established by the United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1740, to support the peace process. The objective of the resolution was to assist in creating a free and fair atmosphere for the Constituent Assembly elections and the entire peace process.

The UNMIN was constituted in response to requests by the Seven-Party Alliance Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), in their 9 August 2006 letters to the Secretary-General of the UN. The UNMIN officially began its work on 23 January 2007 as per special agreement made with the Nepal government and Nepal communist party Nepal (Maoist).

The Security Council authorized the establishment of UNMIN under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General with the following mandates:

(a) To monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides, in line with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;
(b) To assist the parties through a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee in implementing their agreement on the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides, as provided for in that agreement;
(c) To assist in the monitoring of the ceasefire arrangements;
(d) To provide technical support for the planning, preparation and conduct of the election of a Constituent Assembly in a free and fair atmosphere, in consultation with the parties, and
(e) To provide a small team of electoral monitors to review all technical aspects of the electoral process, and report on the conduct of the election.

The peace process & paralytic UN role

The principal objectives of the CPA and the efforts of UN and other international communities were to establish sustainable peace and to bring the Maoists into the political mainstream. This was to be achieved through the election of a Constitution Assembly (CA). However, several unfortunate episodes occurred since the beginning of September 2007. These developments have hindered the peace process.

According to CPA and other subordinate understating, the government dissolved the reinstated parliament and brought the Maoists into interim parliament in January 2007 under the terms of an interim constitution 2006. Accordingly, the Maoists joined interim parliament and also interim government on 1 April 2007. They grabbed their quota in almost all state machineries, including embassies, secretariats, corporate leadership, constitutional posts, media wings and others through political nominations. Meanwhile, the Maoists also received substantial facilities enhancing their leaders' and cadres’ luxury, as well as improving cantonment-militia management, and pecuniary concerns.

In the close-up to face the CA election, they started a lot of riotous bargaining by extending various unexpected demands in the last hour. Such demands included declaring Nepal a republic before the CA election and the adoption of a fully proportional electoral system for the CA election. The PM Girija Prasad Koirala termed the demands unrealistic. In an interview with the Kathmandu Post (October 3, 2007), he said the demands were neither possible to fulfil by time factor nor was state technically able to fulfil them before the CA election. The extended, reckless demands were widely criticized with woofing condolences. Despite the huge efforts at dialogue by the seven party alliance and international communities, the Maoists didn’t budge and ultimately resigned on 18 September, 2007. The Maoists termed their resignation "a response of non-starter to reach an adjustment on the 22-point demands."

However, Prime Minster and other leaders were ready to compromise on twenty other demands but not on the above mentioned two demands. The Maoists accused that the seven party alliances, and especially PM Koirala, were acting against the people’s mandate and in favour of the “Palace Theory.” The crisis ensued even though almost all parties principally agreed to fulfil the Maoists’ demands through the legitimate process by using the podium of constitutional assembly.

Thus, the Maoists indicated that they have not abandoned their hard-line approaches. In addition, the Maoists indicated, they would take direct action to obstruct the election if their demands were not met. Therefore, analysts perceive the Maoists are still playing war tactics and have not embraced the democratic political process. As a result of the dispute among the Maoist and other party alliance, the government was forced to suspend the scheduled CA elections slated for 22 November, 2007. The CA election, considered the backbone of peace agreement, is in doubt.

The most astonishing question is this: Why do the Maoists violate the terms of the peace agreements as well as the election bills and regulations they themselves helped to formalize? Why do they continue to dishonour agreements that they themselves agreed to in the past? Also: Why do they frequently alter their commitments and behaviours without legitimate reasoning against the peace agreement and beyond the norms of political ethics, and in presence of UN?”

Another key player in the peace process, the UN, is also not without criticism. The UNMIN have been rolling somehow their routine jobs by issuing pres release, sugar coated reports, moderated political consultation. It also has been criticized for poor cantonment management, futile monitoring of arms and armies, ceded PLA verification, superficial arm storages, disposal of non-storable light weaponry and electoral assistances. Also, it is a serous concern that the UN Secretary General recently appeared heaving appreciations on the UNMIN without analysing much the ground-level factual performances.

Though the role of UNMIN is vital in overall peace process and political mainstreaming of former and existing warrior groups of Nepal, this body has not been effective in managing conflict and maintaining peace and security in the country. On the one side the UNMIN is monitoring, cantoning, storing the army, arms and weapons and on the other side the Moist guerrillas, Young Communist League (YCL) and others groups are also publicly spearheading rebellion and protest as well as demonstrations, attacks, killings, murders, kidnaps, and other violent activities?

The UNMIN has the mandate to broadly support the CA election. In addition, the Secretary General's latest report indicates that UNMIN has also been working in the areas of civil affairs, gender, child protection, social inclusion, political affairs, public information and outreach, safety and security, human rights, etc. Despite such efforts, a few dozens of ethno-regional armed warier groups have been operating against the state in Nepal. These groups assert they are excluded, discriminated against and segregated by states. Very frequently journalists, government employees are killed, deadly communal riots take place from time to time and people are very often loosing life and suffering injury. This is happening despite a huge presence of the UN political mission exits. So, shouldn't this be a concern of the UN Security Council? Sadly, no visible remedial efforts or activities of UNMIN have been seen until now by people except routine jobs and individual celebrity consultation with the political leadership and their followers.

Thus, Nepal's peace process is limping. In special reference to the performance of UNMIN, it looks very paralytic despite receiving the synergetic support from EU, India, US, UK, China and other countries. India is playing huge role by exerting pressure on political parties to continue dialogue; the US and the UK are assigned to supportive roles. They have been sending their high-level authorities to Nepal and paying individual attention on the trend of peace performance. Similarly the EU and other countries are also assisting by sending and mobilization their delegation teams, resources and needed support to the peace process. The UNMIN, despite their huge presence, have not been able to do much. Why is the peace process about to die in presence of UN? Why the weights of international communities becoming ineffective? Why are the Maoists frequently dishonouring the all commitments and agreements concerning the peace process?

As a neutral monitoring agency, the UNMIN has limited role to play. Still, there are several weakness and lapses in UN political mission’s performance. First, except for the routine jobs, UNMIN has totally failed to guard, convince, balance and coordinate effectively the peace accord among the stakeholders as per the mandate provided by UN Security Council. Accordingly, bargaining hazards, troubles, dishonouring and violations are frequently occurring by both the Maoist and government side.

The second major point is to build appropriate atmosphere for the election of constitutional assembly, but it is not possible in the current situation at all, until the dozens of warrior groups and ethnic panels are either convinced about the utility of the CA election or ready to participate in the political mainstream. The UNMIN seems heavy-eyed in this matter, despites the frequent request of warier groups.

Third, sadly UNMIN has also failed to use, coordinate and mobilize properly the collective efforts of international communities and the Nepal's civic societies’ through the missions’ platform.

Fourth, the UNMIN is also suffering with the imbalance and discriminative local team composition. Its recruitment process failed to balance the gender, socio- ethnic and geographical representation in their local teams. Such a balance is crucial during any conflict resolution course of action.

Fifth, the UNMIN has a very light, multi-spheres network that is not enough to fulfil the assigned responsibilities. In such a situation, the UNMIN will not even be able to gain effective understanding of the situation or to build inclusive dealing strategy in accordance with political psychologies of people of Nepal and intention of UN too.

I believe that the UNMIN should review its approaches, if it has to be effective in the peace process. In line with the suggestions by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, I would like to draw UNMIN's attention to the following points:

One, the UNMIN has to develop a special diplomatic-level observer task force of local diplomats and envoys through central UN channels whose countries and authorities have been expressing and providing supports to the ongoing peace process. This task force will be highly effective for collective diplomatic pressure and actions.

Two, the UNMIN has to also draw out tactfully the diplomatic counter treatment through UN centre and other international community networks in case any party dares to violet or dishonour the peace accord.

Three, the mission needs immediately to constitute a broader civic volunteer taskforce in central, regional, district and rural level. These helping hands should be a group of peace-lovers who can report, facilitate, monitor, observe and act locally on behalf of UNMIN, based on assigned mandates.

Four, the mission could use, process or coordinate by adapting the tools of diplomatic and international laws through central UN or local mechanisms to bring the all warier groups into peace process or political mainstream. This is possible through the helping hands or local mechanisms that provide easy means for consultation among leaders and warring groups. In addition, the helping hands could also develop civic pressure on the warier groups. Hence, such mechanism would be very helpful to conduct the CA election in a peaceful environment.

Five, a socio-ethnic and gender balance among the local staffs would be most essential for such mission. This should be corrected immediately and these staff members should be assigned to play leading coordinative role of those helping hands.

Six, the UNMIN should conduct an open peace performances evaluation program through regular multi-party meetings in possible parts of the country by mobilizing and utilizing the local wings. This could help UNMIN for grassroots updates and immediate grip over emerging crisis.

Seven, the mission should conduct a nation-wide peace tutoring campaign in partnership with the peace ministry and other donor agencies with the assistive help of education ministry, local development ministry and women ministry for school and community peace education because many citizens are still ignorant about the electoral process and activities, particularly in rural areas. The role of women and students is crucial to convince members of society about the peace process. Eight, the UNMIN has to publish the weekly evaluation report of peace process performances.

For the above mentioned actions and activities the UNMIN neither require any additional mandate nor does it need a huge additional budget. However, an effective and full-phased utilization and a balanced mobilization of existing resources and channels are essential.

Dynamic role needed

The peace process in Nepal is wearing away. It's facing sever maladies to date due to a number of reasons e.g. the CA election postponement, the Maoist withdrawal from the government, continued revolt by dozens of armed and some ethnic and communal groups.

The peace process is in danger of collapsing any time. This is not a good sign especially in the presence of international support and a huge UN mission. I could only conclude that one of the major causes of the dwindling peace is the paralytic role of UN political mission. One cannot but be critical of the mission's mismanaged tactics, lack of diplomatic and functional synergetic coordination, and poor strategy in dealing with the Nepali political leaders and political developments.

The existing public diplomacy and the functional model of UNMIN have already expired and it's outdated. Similar model that was applied in the case of Angola, East Timor and Indonesia by the UN mission were botched. This might also be the cause of such paralytic situation in Nepal. However, I can not dare to blame only the UNMIN because the Maoists and other political parties are much more responsible than UNMIN for the traumatic situation of the nation today. Therefore, what we need now is a highly precautionary and dynamic role of political parties, the Maoists, the UNMIN and other international communities. Their active participation is critical to resolving glitch in Nepal's peace crisis.

Related Posts:

What has UNMIN Accomplished in Nepal?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/what-has-unmin-accomplished-in-nepal.html

UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html

The UN's (UNMIN) Involvement in Nepal's Peace Process: A turning point or another fiasco in the making?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/uns-unmin-involvement-in-nepals-peace.html

UNMIN's Arms Verification Process in Nepal - More Timely Information and Transparency Needed
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmin-in-over-its-head-in-nepal-arms.html

UNMIN Clarifies its Role but Just in Time to be Humiliated by the Maoistshttp://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/06/unmin-clarifies-its-role-but-just-in.html

The UN and Maoist Arms Controversy: Overkill or Negligence?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/un-and-maoist-arms-controversy-overkill.html

What has UNMIN Accomplished in Nepal?

(Courtesy: el Zorro)

Nepal has remained in an environment of heightened political crisis since long before peace process started. So UNMIN's exasperation at the Maoists' departure from the interim government is completely uncalled for. Through its unwillingness to communicate the result of fact finding missions, its non-transparent procedures in dealing with Maoist combatants, and it's openly partial preference towards the Maoists, UNMIN has been a key catalyst of successive political crises since the initiation of Nepal's peace process.

Aside from OHCHR reports, press releases and a nifty map that records Maoist violations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, UNMIN has absolutely nothing to show for itself. UN Officials fly in and out of Kathmandu and lay praise on the achievements of the Nepali people, the preparations for CA elections, etc. Meanwhile, ordinary Nepalis are busy digging themselves out of the radical rhetoric that brought them to this juncture. They are left wondering whether the sole mandate of the interim government (holding CA elections), will ever be fulfilled? This is just one example of the glaring mismatch between UNMIN's Nepal and the Nepal that is.

As another example of hypocrisy, UMIN personnel take every opportunity to heap layers of praise on politicians, technocrats, on broken processes and violated principles. They do this because they know who to thank for their jobs. UNMIN also knows that painting a picture of progress and success is essential to their longevity and so despite a reality that is increasingly out of hand, UNMIN clings to its practice of grossly skewing reality.

However, reality can only be escaped for so long and UNMIN's day of reckoning is fast approaching. When that day arrives, the whole world will realize what a scam of an arms monitoring process UNMIN ran (is running) in Nepal. Maoist weapons have been documented but details are not available to the public. Very black and white, combatant qualification criteria have been systematically violated and UNMIN's reaction has been to accept verification on the Maoists' terms.

On the human rights front, OHCHR published a lengthy report outlining violations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by the Young Communists League (YCL). They handed a copy of this report to the Maoist leadership whose response was that a biased focus on a "few" misdeeds of the YCL is unfair. The pages of the report could just as well have been used as toilet paper by the Maoists' because right after the OHCHR report was released, the YCL went on a rampage, denying other political parties their right to campaign and in several instances, physically assaulting District Administration Officers.

On the cantonment monitoring front, UNMIN is responsible for ensuring that Maoist combatants remain within their designated cantonments. Instead, one finds clear articulation of the fact that Maoist combatants frequently rotate in and out of cantonment sites (to serve as part of the YCL), within reports that UNMIN itself has authored. The duplicitous nature of UNMIN's activities are for lack of a better term, appalling.

So what exactly motivates young, blue-eyed, idealists to serve within the hypocrisy that UNMIN has become? Well, for one, UNMIN is synonymous with employment for many educated Nepalis and offers secondary benefits to the Civil Society jokers in Nepal.

But more to the point, UNMIN pays well. Exceptionally well. Nowhere in the private or public sectors (anywhere in the world) can a candidate, fresh out of graduate school, expect a whopping salary of $350 a day. This translates to about $10,000 dollars a month and for those familiar with the concept of taxation, UNMIN's salaries are often tax exempt. For a 26 year old graduate in "conflict resolution," life couldn't get any better. This is when idealism goes out the door, morals become temporarily irrelevant and ethics turn into an annoying class, taken while in school.

It is assuring to hear UNMIN voicing its concerns at the Maoists' departure from government. But the question is, what has UNMIN done all along to moderate the Maoists' radical line, to ensure that they abide by their commitments to the Nepali people? Nothing. Not a damn thing. To the contrary, what UNMIN has done is provide the Maoists international legitimacy and additional fuel to set the expectations of Maoists cadres far beyond the achievable.

Mandate is one thing but moral, ethical responsibility is another. UNMIN's sole reliance on the former comes at the negligence of the latter. This has been a consistent theme not only with UNMIN but with UN peace keeping (peace making) missions all over the world. What is being witnessed in Nepal is another UN fiasco in the making.

The Maoists' have continually violated the Comprehensive Peace Agreement without repercussion. They have used Ian Martin and his lackeys to forward their international agenda while continuing with business as usual on the domestic front. With CA elections in plain sight and the prospect of an embarrassing defeat at the polls evident, the Maoists have demanded 35 seats in the constituent assembly. This is what all the present posturing is about.

But the grounds upon which the Maoists' should even contemplate such a large number of seats is baffling. Their claim to ethnic representation has been shattered. Their presence in government has been extremely disruptive for the media, for development projects and for the donor assisted programs in general. Yet, with the assistance of organizations like UNMIN, the Maoists do not even get a slap on the wrist for their continued political manipulation.

It is a fact that Ian Martin is dead scared of Baburam Bhattarai's threat to send UNMIN packing. For better or for worse, the Maoists' are the only ones in Nepal who seem to understand how the UN works and having issued two utterances in the media (clarification for Ian Martin that UNMIN is in Nepal at the Maoists' behest), Ian and his cohorts have been completely incapacitated.

The solution however, is not to force UNMIN to pull out of Nepal. It is to force UNMIN to recognize that it has a firm commitment to the Nepali people and that it is a huge stake holder in Nepal's peace process. Ian Martin and his crew need to man up, stop making excuses on behalf of the Maoists, and they need to spell out clearly that the Maoists' are in complete violation of the CPA and the Arms and Arms Monitoring treaty. They need to do this to galvanize international support to force the Maoists to participate in CA elections.

The excuse of UNMIN inculcating Maoist moderates is growing old. They have been doing this all along and look where it has gotten Nepal? Back to no where. Ian Martin had best stop appeasing the Maoists and focus on carrying out his organization's mandate, strictly, and without exception. Otherwise, UNMIN is doomed to become another notch on the UN's belt of failure and the Nepali people doomed to suffer the consequences of having relied so heavily on the UN.

Related Posts:

UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html

UNMIN's July 16 Press Release and Subsequent Q&A Disaster
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-july-16-press-release-and.html

The UN's (UNMIN) Involvement in Nepal's Peace Process: A turning point or another fiasco in the making?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/uns-unmin-involvement-in-nepals-peace.html

UNMIN's Arms Verification Process in Nepal - More Timely Information and Transparency Needed
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmin-in-over-its-head-in-nepal-arms.html

UNMIN Clarifies its Role but Just in Time to be Humiliated by the Maoists
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/06/unmin-clarifies-its-role-but-just-in.html

UN Fast Losing Credibility in Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/03/un-fast-losing-credibility-in-nepal.html

The UN and Maoist Arms Controversy: Overkill or Negligence?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/un-and-maoist-arms-controversy-overkill.html

Discrepancies in Maoist Weapons Inventoried by UNMIN – Do the Math
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/discrepancies-in-maoist-weapons.html

Summary of Declared (by State) vs. Inventoried (by UNMIN), Weapon Counts
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/symmary-of-declared-by-state-vs.html