The Pitfalls of Relying on Indian Benevolence

(Courtesy: el Guapo)

Slightly over 12 months ago, a select group of Nepal's civil society agents were busy lauding India for her role in "restoring" democracy in Nepal. Their logic ran as follows: As the world's largest democracy and Nepal's closest neighbor, India’s 21st century benevolence and her quest to expand liberal democracy, has no limits.

A year later, such laudatory accolades are absent. Activists who once marketed Indian interests as Nepal's own, are completely shut out. Stunned by the swiftness with which Indian security interests have (once again) eclipsed India's alleged democratic compassion, Indian sympathizers in Nepal are at loss for words.

After all the donations of cars and medicine, the lip service about democracy and peace, there is a single term that overwhelmingly describes what the Indian Federal Government desires of Nepal. It desires “security” which from a traditional viewpoint implies a benign Nepal as a geographical buffer state and from a contemporary perspective, implies an environmentally friendly carbon credit worthy source of hydro-power and unregulated fresh water.

The argument that all of India’s security interests are automatically achieved through a stable and democratic Nepal has merit. But when push comes to shove, the idea that India prefers a relatively stable Nepal now over a perfectly democratic Nepal later, has even more merit. Especially when the transition period in question is impossible to determine.

To rationalize the expression of Indian interests differently, compare American foreign policy vis-à-vis the world to Indian foreign policy vis-à-vis South Asia. In the truest form of the neo-conservative tradition, American foreign policy plays out as “benevolent hegemon” in every context EXCEPT when American national interests are at stake.

Where India is concerned, the exception is the rule - everything in South Asia happens to be in India’s national interest. So although policy makers like to project a range of options at their disposal, in reality, the execution of Indian foreign policy is severely constrained. The opportunity to demonstrate the “benevolence” that elite Nepalis like to dream of, is rare if ever, and is certainly not sustainable.

In practice, Indian foreign policy closely reflects the realities of Indian’s geo-political existence. For example, the Indian establishment sees fit to maintain Bhutan as an Indian protectorate so long as Jigme Singhe Wangchuk and his coterie remain subservient to the Indian dictate. Ties with the Burmese military junta are kept strong as long as the Chinese continue rubbing shoulders with the leadership in that country. The Bhutanese government-orchestrated refugee crisis was a bi-lateral issue in India's eyes, even though the process of expulsion involved transportation of refugees through India territory. The Indian government saw fit to declare Nepal’s Maoists as “terrorists,” declare their own Naxalite movement as “India’s greatest security threat,” and still, somehow calculated that “terrorists” could be mainstreamed in Nepal but not in India.

It is clear that where South Asia is concerned, the Indian nation state operates very much in the Realist paradigm. It forwards Indian national interests through proxy wars in smaller countries and where Pakistan is concerned, India maintains a "balance of power" through policies like “détente,” “containment” and “mutually assured destruction." Although the overall Indian economy has exploded onto the twenty-first century stage, Indian politics remains firmly grounded in the Cold War era.

So despite all the lip service that the Indian government pays its neighbors (and the world), the Indian nation state is but a collection of fragmented and often contradictory policies that are simultaneously executed by different Indian agencies. The cohesive, single state image that India projects is applicable only to the world outside of South Asia. In the region where India is situated, she is both a deal maker and a deal breaker, a situational democrat, and a power center that is loathed for maintaining a foreign policy that keeps neighboring states perpetually unstable.

Given these realities, no thinking, feeling or rational human being should be surprised at India’s quest to forward her national security interests in whatever form she sees fit. Where teaching King Gyanendra a lesson in humility was concerned, funding Nepal’s political has-beens (and forging an alliance between them and the Maoists) was in India’s interest. With the growth in nationalist venom from Nepal’s Maoists, energizing the Madhesi issue has become India’s national interest.

Put succinctly, for Indian paranoia to be assuaged, there has to be an Indian lapdog in each of her neighbors' political arenas and Nepal is not an exception to this requirement. Extending this logic further, one may argue that the inability of South Asian nations to fully embrace and institutionalize liberal democratic norms is a direct consequence of the projection of Indian national interests. It becomes impossible to exercise democracy when the installation of "made in India" leadership is a requisite condition to every South Asian stage.

For example, in Nepal's case, it would be counterintuitive to expect any government that is truly accountable to the Nepali people and fully democratic, to continue toeing the Indian line. Although written off as Panchayati era propaganda, the equation of anti-Indian sentiment to radical Nepali nationalism merits much deeper consideration than the current generation of Nepali politicians (who are busy shuttling to New Delhi), are willing to admit.

The only actors in Nepal who are positioned to capitalize on the political currency gained from standing up to India, is a segment of the Nepali Maoist leadership. With guidance from China - a country that has always forwarded its own interests in Nepal by extending support to the most nationalist Nepali group - Nepal's Maoists appear to have enacted a campaign to envelop all would-be forces that see through the charade of Indian duplicity.

The formation of such a coalition is greatly feared and unacceptable to the Indian establishment. The rise of the Madhesi movement and talk about a an autonomous Federal structure where the entire Madhes would be a single state, is a direct result of Indian jitters. Such propositions however, are not be acceptable to the Nepali people. In fact, any resource distribution mechanism (under a Federal structure) that does not demarcate states vertically from north to south, is unrealistic given Nepal's topography. (This is the same reason the Maoist proposal for an ethnicity-based Federal structure was rejected across the board, as elementary populism and nothing more).

Much time has elapsed since April 2006 and many events have come to pass. For one, India’s insistence that the Maoists could be “tamed” through the democratic process has proved to be unrealistic. Second, the Indian assumption that Nepal could be politically stabilized by eliminating the monarch and disarming the Maoists has also proved false. Third, India’s ever image-conscious desire that her actions be interpreted as those of a compassionate regional power have also been overtaken by events that have forced India to realign her threat perception with the reality of nationalist fervor in Nepal.

What all this means for Nepal is that banking on Indian benevolence is not a practical solution to sustained peace, democracy or stability. Similarly, blaming India for taking advantage of the internal fissures in Nepal (while forwarding Indian interests) is just as unproductive. Instead, Nepalis should fully anticipate the Indian government to execute on its fiduciary responsibilities toward the Indian people. And, Nepalis should also understand that situations where Indian and Nepali interests align are the exception, not the norm. And even when such alignments arise, dimensions such as time and the extent of alignment must be dynamically factored into the overall political equation.

This is not to suggest that options proposed by those close to the Indian establishment be discarded. However, this is to suggest that the option that is ultimately adopted, should weigh Nepali national interests as the guiding principle in decision making. A good start to a transition in this direction is to critically analyze any and all suggestions that emanate from the beneficiaries of Indian sponsored funds.

An example of such a endowment is the B.P. Koirala fund which has two primary beneficiaries in Nepal - a well known journalist and a radical academic. Both claim in public that constituent assembly elections must happen at any cost and that those who insist that elections cannot happen "do not understand." What individuals like these do not understand themselves is that the walls of the Indian embassy in Nepal are porous. And when such Indian agents try to re-invent their democratic qualifications by regurgitating half of what they hear, the unspoken half is what Nepalis should focus on.

Constituent Assembly elections along with a host of political agendas can materialize in Nepal the minute such events overlap with Indian interests. India has already demonstrated how easily it was able to end Nepal's civil war - all it took was King Gyanendra rubbing the Indian establishment the wrong way. Given that the movement in the Madhes is completely under Indian influence, the holding of Constituent Assembly elections also rides on Indian whims.

The challenge for Nepalis is to choose the lesser of two evils - to either submit to Indian hegemony by engineering a political scenario that aligns with Indian expectations or to reject Indian hegemony and continue as an independent nation state. The latter option is clearly the more painful but it is also the choice that ensures Nepal's sovereignty and guarantees freedom for the Nepali people.

Essentially, the latter option would be a complete rejection of the idea that India be allowed to exercise political influence over Nepal - either through a modified form of monarchy or through some other political entity. This is also why the latter option is less realistic - to assume that India would roll over and allow Nepal to evolve on its own, directly contravenes India's national interests.

Indian benevolence only goes so far before the kindness impinges on Indian national interests. Unfortunately, Indian benevolence falls far short of what Indian agents in Nepal would like Nepalis to believe. Relying exclusively on the extension of Indian benevolence is a horrible policy option for Nepal.

Related Posts:

No Impunity for Civil Society Leaders: Nepalis are watching....
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/no-impunity-for-civil-society-leaders.html

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http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/10/earth-to-john-norris-and-kanak-dixit.html

The Problem with Nepali Political Civil Society - The Leftist, the Cowards, and the Compromised
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/10/problem-with-nepali-political-civil.html

Debunking the Democratic Dogma
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/debunking-democratic-dogma.html