Political Problems Don’t Have Military Solutions

(Courtesy: Comrade Libre)

There are certain forces, internal and external to Nepal, that are engaged in goading the NA (Nepali Army) into controversy. For the good of the military institution, the well-being of our men and women in uniform, and for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nepal, the NA must continue resisting all forms of political instigation. The Army must continue its journey down a politically independent path, with service to the Nepali nation-state (and her people), as the institution’s ultimate objective.

UNMIN Exposed - Why the controversy now?

First and foremost, blame for the controversy over the NA’s bid to fill vacant spots, lies squarely in the United Nation’s corner. The monitoring of arms and armies is the cornerstone of the UNMIN’s mandate in Nepal - a mandate that apparently, the UNMIN failed to execute on two prior occasions when the NA filled vacation positions, without fanfare or controversy.

Both previous recruitment drives were advertised, were identical in process to the current drive, and were held after the signing of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement). So either the UNMIN learned of all three recruiting events at the same time or it acted at the Maoists’ behest. Irrespective of what the actual rationale may have been, the facts remain that the UNMIN failed to act in a timely manner, failed to carry out its duties and at least in perception, failed the dual tests of impartiality and independence - again.

It is shameful enough that a civilian (Mr. Ram Hari Shrestha) was abducted and subsequently murdered inside a UN supervised, Maoist cantonment. In the face of the public scrutiny that followed, Ian Martin was quick to cite a lack of mandate to report (or even prevent) pre-meditated murder. That was bad enough. But for Ian Martin to throw his weight behind the Maoists’ in the current context is just unhelpful, disingenuous and a shameless display of selective enforcement of the CPA.

Toppling the Maoist Government - What does the average Nepali gain?

Second, the disgruntlement over the NA’s recruitment is only one of several on-going issues. It is neither paramount to the continuity of Nepal’s peace process nor particularly relevant to the constitution-making process. What it is, is an unnecessary distraction of a political variety that should be deferred for resolution at the political level. The last thing the NA should be doing at this juncture is permitting its institutional integrity to be compromised over political power plays.

If Girija Prasad Koirala’s Nepali Congress has political contentions with the Maoists’, it is GPK and the NC who should be addressing such concerns with Prachanda and the Defense Minister. The same goes for the UML, the RPP, the MJF or any other political party. But to use the institutional issue of NA recruitment as a springboard to forward political agendas (specifically, to cripple and embarrass the Maoist government) is dangerous, irresponsible and can escalate into further confrontation.

For issues of a political variety, the Cabinet and the Parliament are where civilized confrontations (also known as debates) should be had. If resolution cannot be achieved at that level, the NC, the UML and others are welcome to pursue street protests. In other words, the “democrats” in these parties ought to rely more on the tools that enable democratic practice - parliamentary politics and civil disobedience - and less on military adventurism to fulfill their respective political objectives.

Betrayal in Historical Perspective - The lessons the NA should never forget

Third and most important, the NA”s leadership should have the common sense and wherewithal to realize that it is the very same politicians who insist upon upholding the NA’s apolitical sanctity, who are also busy exploiting the NA’s predicament. The NC’s ultimate goal is to put GPK back in power and Madhav Kumar Nepal’s pipe dream of replacing Prachanda is distasteful humor. How does either scenario benefit the Nepali nation state?

How is it even possible to take a man like Girija Prasad Koirala seriously? After all, it was under Koirala’s watch that the armed Maoist insurrection took hold; it was GPK’s government under which operations Romeo and Sierra-II-Kilo were launched; it was GPK who resigned his premiership because the Army did not mobilize against the Maoists’; and during the height of the insurgency, it was under GPK’s leadership that the SPA (Seven Party Alliance) forged a political alliance with the Maoists. That very alliance undermined the same Army that today, Girija Koirala is attempting to use to satiate this lust for power.

In a nutshell, it is because Girija Prasad Koirala fell for the Maoists’ “promise” that they would make him Nepal’s first President that the NA answers to the former Chief of the Maoists’ military wing today. And now Girija Koirala is bent on encouraging the NA to defy the Ministry of Defense? How does any of this make sense?

Conclusion

The NA has performed superbly after the restoration of the dissolved parliament in April of 2006. Under its current leadership, the NA has regained must of its lost stature and has exercised restraint, professionalism and an unwavering dedication to the Nepali nation-state and her people. As a deterrent to Maoist adventurism, the NA is the single, standing bastion of hope. And this is precisely where the NA should remain - for now.

The NA should continue encouraging the “useful idiots” (who were instrumental in facilitating the Maoists’ to power) to actively assist in the process of seeking “political solutions” to the political challenges at hand. As for those critics who claim the NA is being too submissive, the NA should assure them that if appearing docile is what it takes to keep soldiers out of harm’s way, then so be it. Better submissive than dead and in all honesty, how seriously should those who have been on the battle field take criticisms from those who are experts at trading words, not bullet?

Under no circumstances should the NA go out on a limb to help any internal political party, individual, or external force, in the pursuit of their self-interests. It is the collective Nepali interest in which the NA should act and if this means allowing Ram Bahadur Thapa a face-saving exit, then so be it. The NA can easily diffuse the debate over recruitment by assuring all concerned parties that future force replenishment will not take place. (This, after the UNMIN takes responsibility for failing to execute its mandate and inform the NA in a timely manner.)

Given the delicate juncture at which Nepal’s peace process has arrived, the NA should remind those who are egging it on that there never was (and never will be) a “military solution” to a “political problem.” The NA should steer clear of becoming a back yard where Parties with no grass roots support or tenable objectives (other than coming into power themselves), air their “dirty laundry.”