Consolidating Peace in Nepal – General Mehta’s Way

Retired Indian Army General Ashok Mehta has been a consistent commentator on Nepal. As a former Indian Army officer, he is widely published on matters that pertain to Indian security interests. The relevance of his writings on Nepal however, derive more from having commanded the Indian Army’s Gurkha brigades than from substantive exposure to Nepal’s own military assets (and national interests).

While General Mehta’s book, “The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenge” is a mediocre work of tailored facts and figures (many of them inaccurate and out of context), it’s his recent views on Nepal’s road to peace, that are significantly more thought-provoking.

The eight-point agreement between Nepal’s government and its Maoist outfit includes a stated desire to solicit assistance from the UN to help Nepal’s peace process. Although the particulars are ambiguous at this time, the desired role for the UN extends to managing arms and thus factors directly into enforcing peace, in general.

Although UN participation is being enthusiastically sought by many in Nepal (and elements in the UN organization itself), the modal requisites of such involvement will not offer immediate results. Needless to say, the UN’s own record of performance in peace making (and consolidation) is shabby at best. The UN’s DPKO has demonstrated capabilities in peace keeping, which entails the maintenance of peace. But as a general trend, successful UN operations have tended to come mostly on the heels of successful, external military operations by third parties that first “make” the peace.

This is a critical point of distinction for Nepal, because the nature of assistance sought from the UN will be an indication of where the Maoists, SPA and Civil Society believe the country stands – at a point where peace has been achieved and only requires continuity or at a point where peace has been initiated, but requires further consolidation and vigilant enforcement. It appears the former may be the case, but there is a very fine line of perception, that distinguishes the two scenarios.

This point of distinction may provide one layer of rationale for General Metha’s insinuation that if agreeable to Nepal’s government and the Maoists, India could operate under the auspices of the UN, to assist in arms management in Nepal. This proposition acknowledges the threat of force as a necessary precondition to consolidate peace. It offers a realist view that inventorying arms and combatants is an insufficient deterrent to the likelihood of the resumption of violence, which at least for now, seems increasingly unlikely.

General Mehta’s “offer” may also be reflective of the heightened concerns felt by the Indian security establishment, at the rate of unreciprocated concessions made to Nepal’s Maoists. This sets a rather alarming precedent for dealing with India’s growing Naxalite movement that has obvious fraternal ties through CCOMPOSA and RIM, to Nepal’s Maoists.

Having actively enforced the assumption that the power void resulting from a decimation of the Palace could easily be filled by the SPA (who could then offer peace to the Nepali Maoists on their own terms), the features of an emerging, but unexpected outcome seem to have caught India’s foreign policy hawks off guard.

Thus, General Mehta’s proposal could offer room for Indian Gurkha peace keeping operations in Nepal, under the broader UN umbrella. The 60,000 strong force could serve as a reasonable complement to any UN mission because by and large, the Indian Gurkhas consists almost entirely of Nepali citizens for whom the attainment of peace in Nepal, is a logical priority.

The Gurkha troops have no linguistic barriers (which reduces communication challenges) and they have allegiance neither to the Maoists, nor Nepal’s government. And, if mandated under the UN, the Gurkhas’ operational capabilities would be constrained by UN rules and regulations, which would directly reflect mutually agreed upon parameters between the Nepali government, the Maoists and the UN. Further, the designation of a member of the Janajati community as the UN’s force commander for Nepal, should be a fitting complement to what the emerging Nepal should look like.

Form the UN’s perspective, a “donor” force of 60,000 Indian Gurkhas would be a budgetary blessing. India has already received praise from the Maoists’ for cementing the 12-point agreement, has received thanks from the SPA for Sitaram Yechuri’s advocacy and has gained the trust of Nepal’s civil society for having morally (and financially) buttressed the nation-wide uprisings that ended the February-1 affair. In the eyes of the world, such adulation speaks highly for India’s coveted role as a regional power and its goal to eventually become a permanent member of the UN’s Security Council.

Supplementing India’s Mashall plan for Nepal with additional funds to guarantee the enforcement of peace (through a large and capable peace-making, keeping and consolidating force), should not be cause for alarm for any peace-loving party in Nepal – not the Maoists, not civil society, not the military and certainly not the SPA.

To keep fooling ourselves that a “solution to the political problem will be found from within the country” is an insult to collective Nepali intellect – who are our leaders kidding by pretending that were it not for external Indian assistance, the SPA alliance would still be talking about “regression” and the Maoists would be busy playing the parties against the Palace? If Nepal’s leaders can accept development and budgetary aid from India with open arms, they should have no reservations accepting aid aimed at consolidating peace, either.

Although official statements from major powers on the eight-point agreement (between the Nepali government and the Maoists) have not yet emerged, it may be safe to assume that where Nepal is concerned, India is likely to continue its policy of employing unofficial channels like Sitaram Yechuri and now, Ashok Mehta. This is an approach that acknowledges limited liability for the South Block and also pays heed to the complex role that India plays in the Nepali psyche.

For General Mehta’s suggestion to materialize, there are practical considerations to be had on both sides of the fence – the Indian public has to remain convinced that involvement in Nepal will not be a repetition of India’s experience in Sri Lanka. Nepalis on the other hand, will have to become resigned to the idea that moving forward, by virtue of India’s economic and power projection capabilities, Nepal will remain a de-facto extension of the Republic of India.

Now, coming to terms with this realization, would really qualify as an historic event for all Nepalis, at home and abroad!