Youth Violence in Post-conflict Scenario

(Courtesy: Suvechha Adhikari & Dipendra Tamang)

Violence or the threat of violence poses fundamental challenge to peace settlements. There is often a prevalence of strategic and tactical deception during peace processes and even those parties which sign the peace agreements may cultivate violence in order to have an upper hand in the peace that follows. After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 2006 to end the 12-year long civil war, the Nepalese people were optimistic. They felt that the social, political, economic and structural problems of the country would be resolved with the proper realisation of the CPA and the interim constitution.

However, due to improper implementation and the negligence by the political parties in addressing these root causes there is now an open space for most of the issues to emerge again and the greatest challenge in the post-CPA period lies in controlling and demobilising alternative sources of violence in the hands of party militias - in the current context, the Young Communist League (YCL).

The Maoist leadership seems to be turning deaf ears to the fact that the YCL in the role of de facto para-military force going beyond the limit and their activities are not directed at reforming the society but at belittling the norms, values, and the laws of the land. The manhandling of CDOs, vandalising of government offices, and attacking civil servants and university students are sheer acts of violence, hostility and disrespect for the rule of law.

In many instances, the YCL members have gone beyond control. Their assertion has been on the rise because they have won the psychological war with the leadership by terrorizing societies. YCL cadres are products of violence, forced dogma, and a brand of preaching that is sufficient to make these individuals dangerous, but insufficient to raise their awareness to the point where they become independent and informed decision makers.

A common feature of most post-conflict societies is the collapse of government authority and institutions and an accompanying growth in criminality and violence. Violence does not happen by itself, nor does it occur in isolated cases. Violence is essentially the consequence of a political culture, which has been shaped by historical and social factors. And the reason for the youth getting into violent activities also has social and political reasons.

The problem in Nepal is that all believe in violence as a tool to reach their aims. Young people are at such an age that they feel the rush of true freedom, begin to grasp who they are and where they belong to, question tradition, resist authority, and yearn for justice – all of which they feel is answered by joining the violent movement.

But besides the psychology, it is also the social and economic context they are in; where there is widespread poverty and unemployment. And talking about social context in Nepal, the discrimination that still exists on the basis of age makes life difficult for the young people and when they are more likely to seek immediate solutions to their survival, including warfare. And furthermore, when faced with the more or less failed national politics and an economic vacuum, joining a local militant force, such as the YCL, seems like a rational choice.

In almost every country’s struggle, the youth have always played an integral role being in the frontline but once the objective of the struggle is achieved, youth are sidelined and their issues and concerns are neglected. In South Africa, youth were central to the anti-apartheid struggle but once negotiations began and the armed struggle suspended, they were instructed to stand down and return if possible to more normal pursuits for their age group while older leaders returned from prison and exile.

This was in part a recognition by leaders that youth have special needs – particularly educational ones – but the youth themselves felt cheated of their right in the decision-making. And in the long run this marginalisation of the youth during transition has posed significant challenges to the post-apartheid governments as it is linked with the development of both criminal gangs and alternative youth policing bodies.

When youth have experienced the power of carrying arms, political promises upon recruitment and an identity in armed conflicts, the transition to peace is difficult and intergenerational conflict is likely to appear in post conflict phases. Even if the youth have been actively involved in political activism and political violence before a settlement , they now become marginalised, as political power flows to adult leadership, elites and elders.

But these elder authorities can and may be disputed. Often, youth grievances from before the war can be linked to repressive or unfair systems of governance and resource distribution which remains unchanged in post conflict situations. The questions, criticisms, and creativity of youth are often not rewarded or fostered in these contexts. Conflicts emerge when adults try to curb both youth violence and peace activism.

With the constant exclusion of youth in Nepal and growing up in an environment where there is no work and education youth see no other way of achieving any 'real changes', or receiving attention from the State than being engaged in the acts of collective violence. By engaging in hostile activities by using the means of confrontational politics in political organisations such as YCL they seek the immediate solutions to their survival—including access to political power, decision making process, education, good jobs, or legitimate ways of achieving greater financial success.

Sixty percent of Nepal’s population comprises of young people. Excluding them from the peace process and the transitional structures in a post-conflict state will not only weaken the peace process but will also have a negative impact on the national economy. No peace or development can be achieved without youth participation in decision making processes and their participation also represents the best way to address this exclusion.

Effective youth participation is about creating opportunities for young people to be involved in influencing, shaping, designing and contributing to policy and the development of services and programmes. But in a context where the attempts are made to stabilise the peace process with the establishment of Peace and Reconstruction Ministry, there is little attempt made in revitalising the Youth Ministry the only governmental institution which can actually provide a space for the engagement of youth in the policy making process.

There might be other ministries which are involving youth in their programme and activities but considering the changing scenarios and increasing youth problems there is a need for strengthened and separate stand-alone Youth Ministry by combining the youth work at both ministries into a new, bigger youth development agency, there are opportunities for even more progress. In a muddled zone of new hope and old grievances, a peace process, transition, or reconstruction period is a powerful symbol as well as a lived experience. Such a period raises expectations. As both symbol and experience, it shapes attitudes and values; young people’s interpretations of its relative costs and benefits from an important test of its legitimacy and sustainability.

Cycles of violence are related to the vulnerability and marginality of youth as well as their roles as social connectors and ideological reproducers, who create and shape social meaning. But, equally important, these social networks of youth offer existing and potential peace roles. Youth have a multidimensional impact in post-conflict situation. They also have multidimensional needs which call for holistic interventions – particularly economic, psychosocial, educational, and political inclusion – that utilise the knowledge of youth and cede some significant political power to them. All of these can be addressed only by the formation of a Ministry of Youth Affairs.

In the current context, efforts are being made only in securing engagement of Maoists leaders in the peace process and facilitating the participation of the Maoists in the election process. Young people joining the YCL and disrupting the peace process and the political alliances with organised networks will not be a major feature as doing that means it provides them with a guarantee of elevated social status, social identity and survival that the government has failed to provide.

Therefore if the peace process has to be secured, there is a need for channeling the youth energy and creativity towards a constructive agenda. Therefore there is a need for coherent national strategies that will speak to Youth collective interest as a group, a strategy that will not only address the needs of youths in general but will also possess the built in sensitivity to the different categories of youth such as young combatants and militias. The strategy should also include the core objective and mechanisms to include youth as central stakeholders in rehabilitation, reconciliation, and rebuilding of war-torn communities, and contributing to sustainable development.

The next generation of leaders, facilitators and stakeholders will emerge from among the current cohort of young people hence their engagement in the peace process/peace building and the shaping their political attitudes and skills in this period will have important long-term implications. This cannot be achieved unless youth – who are often key conflict participants and always potential conflict carriers – are afforded responsibility as well as guardianship during a peace process.

The transition from violence to politics is no straightforward shift, but a continuum of feedback loops, missed opportunities and massive leaps of faith. Now the challenge for Nepal’s peace process and for all the actors with power in post-CPA period is to open the way for youth into the hard politics of peace otherwise they will have missed one of the most critical and crucial opportunities.

Therefore there is a greater need for integrating politically active and pro-peace youth into the peace process and also providing them with ‘ownership’ of the process. Not only bringing the pro-peace youth on board but also bringing young people opposed to the peace process which includes those in dissident political parties such as YCL - the larger and more crucial body, who congregate in destabilising ways on the rejectionist fringes of the pro-peace parties.

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