Defining the Mainstream

(Courtesy: el Zorro)

Amongst all the various changes that are taking shape in Nepal, mainstreaming the Maoists occupies the level most priority. The successful implementation of this initiative requires flexibility in modes of operation, in attitudes and most important of all, in the level-setting of expectations across the political spectrum.

Counterintuitive as it may sound, changes to Nepal’s political landscape require ownership by the Maoists, the SPA (and other political parties), civil society and the Nepali people-at-large, as victory in their own terms. For changes to be consolidated, they even require recognition from Nepal’s right-of-center that the attainment of lasting peace, is a “win” for their constituents as well.

Cementing victory in terms that are generally acceptable is where matters become tricky. Concessions to the Maoists have to be tailored to meet their leadership’s challenge of assuaging the Maoist cadre-base. Similarly, what the Maoists’ offer in return, must also qualify as substantive reciprocity for their dispensations to allay the concerns of political and apolitical actors in Nepal and abroad.

This is why rhetoric requires responsible moderation. Writing off inflammatory language as necessary to alleviate the concerns of one element is akin to condoning the escalation of counter-rhetoric for the sake of equilibrium.

It would be most unfortunate to equate the process of mainstreaming the Maoists with the act of defining the mainstream itself. The process will consist of steps required to achieve the goal; the goal’s definition, will be derived from public discourse – precisely why what leaders utter today, counts more than ever before.

During the run up to the constituent assembly, it is very important for the Maoists to publicly renounce violence and educate their cadre on the generally accepted version of liberal democracy. This is just as paramount as it is for advocates of a liberal democratic set-up in Nepal, to extend flexibility to the Maoist leadership’s plight.

It is also significant for the Maoist leadership to recognize that the onus of rectifying the over-inflated expectations they set for their cadre-base, is primarily theirs. The idea here is to mainstream not just the Maoist leaders and a segment of sympathetic elements, but the entire Maoist mass. The failure to achieve this tidal shift will have catastrophic consequences on the primary agenda at hand – sustainable peace.

Just as the state will gradually need to accept the notion of invoking the Maoists into the halls of power, the Maoists also have to accept the idea that their integration requires behavior befitting responsible statesmanship. Negotiating with the government on the one hand while feeding their cadre unrealistic aspirations on the other, is not helpful to anyone. Neither is issuing provocative statements against the state’s security forces that detract debate form substantive issues and drive divisive wedges amongst the SPA’s leadership.

While Nepal’s political elite have much to learn from their Maoist counterparts, the Maoist leadership also has much to learn from others. The first lesson for the Maoists should be the consequences of making empty promises, in favor of short-term political gain.

It is as crucial for the Maoist organization to remain intact as it is for the seven party alliance to hold; at least until an interim constitution is drafted and preparations are made for constituent assembly elections. This is in the best interest of all Nepalese, political and apolitical alike. The need for such continuity is what draws unwavering support from civil society leaders who advocate the Maoist position and tolerate inflammatory rhetoric as a necessary evil.

But the guarantee of an equitable and sustainable political solution depends as much on ferrying the Maoist agenda as it does on ensuring that every voice in Nepal has adequate political representation. This includes the right-of-center (without royal liability), the center, the left-of-center, the Maoist army (or militia) and members of the state’s security forces.

An agenda for peace that is premised on meeting unconditional demands from one party runs the risk of undermining the entire agenda, by de-facto exclusion. While the exhibition of willingness on the part of the Maoists (to enter the mainstream) is a realistic pre-condition to peace, it is also a concession that serves their legitimization just as much as it serves the national interest.

Ultimately, the measure of real concessions from all political actors will come in the form of moderate rhetoric, which by way of public record, will define the mainstream going into constituent assembly elections.