Private sector management consulting is a business that thrives on three demand attributes: First, the requirement for specialized skill-sets; second, the requirement for credible facilitation (implementation); and third, the requirement for a “whipping boy.”
From an economic perspective, consulting business models works well because consultants and their employers are guided by similar incentive structures – consultants by lucrative fees and the prospect of add-on business and executives by perceived success and associated increases in compensation.
This implies that each task undertaken by consultants involves a careful analysis that weighs the perceived costs of failure against the benefits of success. In conducting such pre-contractual due diligence, consultants perform internal analyses that weigh the probability of success against the consulting firm’s exposure to failure – this exposure is often referred to as reputational risk.
If a desired reduction in reputational risk cannot be attained, even lucrative contracts may be rejected – at least by consulting firms that have market brands worth more than the size of the fees in question. The logic is that the long-term cost of failure to the service provider’s brand name (and associated losses in future fees) often out-weigh the benefits of accruing non-contingent, short-term revenues.
What does all this have to do with Nepal’s peace process? A lot. In many ways, the functions performed by the United Nations (UN) in conflict situations are very similar to services provided by private sector management consultants. The only significant difference is that the cost of employing the UN in Nepal will not be borne by the Nepalese government, but by the international community.
With recent statements made by Maoist leaders, the very rationale for UN involvement in “arms management” has come under serious speculation. Even before the Maoists reversed their commitment to having their arms managed, the absence of a high-level roadmap to constituent assembly elections already presented a significant risk to UN operations.
Many would argue that the UN system needs success in Nepal just as much as Nepalis needs success in their endeavors for peace. Given this particular view-point, there is a very strong correlation in incentive structures for both the Nepali Government and for the UN to make Nepal’s peace process a success.
Unfortunately, there is less of an overlap in incentive structures for ALL internal parties to Nepal’s conflict to engineer a situation that allows effective UN involvement. Although publicly, every group claims that it wants to see peace in Nepal, the Maoists in particular, demonstrate a documented pattern of behavior that implies they want peace under one condition – Maoist victory. Naturally, such a condition is unacceptable to the Maoists’ partners in the April movement.
So far, the UN has carefully managed perceptions by assuring the government and the rebels of its willingness to help solve Nepal’s conflict. Official (and unofficial) UN emissaries have also repeatedly highlighted that the UN’s involvement in Nepal will be a process – one that is subject to bureaucratic “red-tape” within the UN system, similar to pre-contractual due diligence in management consulting.
More to the point, viable UN involvement will be a process that can only be initiated once the government and rebels have acceded to peace on mutually acceptable terms. Similar to a strategic roadmap that management consultants are empowered to work toward, the UN needs a clearly outlined set of rules, regulations, standard operating procedures and metrics for success before it can do anything meaningful in Nepal. The UN needs a detailed mandate and the 12, 8, 25, 10, 15 however many points, aren’t it.
The UN may recommend different models of peace making to the concerned parties in Nepal, but it will never advocate a single model. Doing so would be a cardinal violation of the UN’s own operating procedure. Plus, this is a decision to be made by the SPA and the Maoists – not any external third party. The UN will be happy to provide its organizational expertise backed by its unique charter. But for obvious reasons, the UN will not want to position itself as a “whipping boy” for a peace process that by any meaningful account, is yet to kick off.
The next round of “summit talks” needs to focus on producing a detailed roadmap that convinces the UN that its role is desired and a necessary complement to peace in Nepal. Anything less will almost certainly result in the resumption of violence – either as “peaceful” street protests or all out urban combat.
Which way the situation steers is completely up to the SPA and the Maoists. This time, there’s no “whipping boy” in sight.
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