(Courtesy: el Zorro)
A war of words has erupted within Nepal’s political circle. The source of this round of jockeying (as deciphered by obsunabervers of Nepali politics), appears to have its roots in the following issues: General discontent with the SPA’s handling of the peace process and serious concern over the Maoist rejection of arms management. The apparent disparities between paper positions and ground realities are the focus of this writing.
Unabated appeasement and nothing to show for it
The bitter truth is upon us. The current administration’s tactics of appeasing the Maoists into the mainstream is working – that is, it’s working marvelously for the Maoists. Aside from verbal commitments (each of which have been systematically disregarded), there is no tangible evidence of reciprocity from the Maoist camp.
Sufficient excuses are made on behalf of the Maoists (by sections of Nepal’s civil society and intellectual class), but there appears little tolerance for completely logical positions adopted by the government. Such positions are immediately stigmatized as detrimental to the peace process (or pro-royalist) and allowed to fade into irrelevance.
For example, whatever became of former PM (and member of the current parliament), Sher Bahadur Deuba’s insistence that the Maoist People’s Court be dismantled? Maoist leader, Pushpa Dahal is on record, acquiescencing to this demand but reports from Nepal indicate anything but compliance.
Similarly, what about Foreign Minister K.P. Oli’s resolve that the inclusion of Maoists in any interim government be preconditioned on the management of Maoist arms (by the UN)? The Maoists appear content forwarding their insistence on the formation of an interim government but remain mute on the underlying reasons for why they are unable to have their arms managed – a condition explicitly echoed by the international community including the EU, Japan and the US.
Media reports from Nepal suggest that Maoist extortion is proceeding at an unprecedented rate, that Maoist cadres continue to carry out verdicts passed by their self-styled courts and that Maoist atrocities progress, unabated.
The most biting indictment of such excesses was publicized by the Industrial Security Group (ISG), on the 7th of September, 2006. The following excerpt from the ISG statement, says it all: “These (the Maoist) actions contravene international human rights standards. They are also incompatible with the Maoists' stated aspirations to join the democratic process.” The ISG statement is a wholesale request to the SPA government to ensure the maintenance of law and order – a benefit that every tax paying Nepali citizen has the right to demand.
Unfortunately, with Krishna Sitaula donning the responsibility of two “hats” (as the Home Minister and the Chief Government negotiator), the probability of simultaneously fulfilling both roles is not only unlikely, it is completely counterintuitive.
What provisioning of security can be expected from a government that can’t even prevent students from burning down their educational Department because of unfavorable exam results? (A police Inspector’s retort to allegations of intransigence upon witnessing a mob burn newspaper deliveries speaks volumes – his rationale for not having baton charged the mob was fear of persecution by human rights lobbyists).
Such is the law and order condition in Nepal. The peace process takes precedence over the protection of life and property and the fear of persecution for “excessive force” or “manhandling” prevents the maintenance of order.
Which faction controls the Maoist agenda?
At a time when documented reports of “20 Point” (12+8 point codes of conduct) violations are shamelessly dismissed by Maoist leaders as “sporadic,” it is worth revisiting some of the major concessions that the SPA has made to avert similar violations (on its part).
For example, portraying it as a symbolic dismantling of the former government’s support structure, the SPA leadership dissolved the Unified Command. Emblematically, the dissolution of the command and control structure procured significant, short-term political gains for its inceptors.
Realistically however, disbanding the Unified Command has resulted in the closure of joint security facilities located in the most remote and vulnerable parts of Nepal. In these far-flung districts, what little semblance of government presence (and law and order) that remained, was gleefully terminated by an over-zealous bunch of “useful idiots,” eager to bask in the fleeting glory of their public stunt. Naturally, the only reaction from the Maoists regarding this move, has been silence. Probably of the incredulous, gleeful variety.
No wonder the peace process is faltering. When one’s enemies take up the task of dismantling the very fiber that serves as one’s deterrent (to an armed victory), why pretend to be in negotiations? When one retains the luxury of pre-conditioning the cantonment of troops till after constituent assembly elections, why bother hiding behind the façade of “summit talks?”
The irony is that not only are the state’s armed forces demoralized and in disarray, they are actually confined to their barracks – exactly what the Maoist leader, Pushpa Dahal has refused to do with his own private army. Apparently, the Maoists have no intentions of restraining their armed faction prior to constituent assembly elections (synonymous with restructuring of the sate).
Allegations of the SPA government not abiding by the spirit of the 8 and 12 point agreements are lobbed by Maoists leaders almost daily. Yet, the unconcealed contempt Pushpa Dahal displayed by backpedaling on a previously agreed upon position (the cantonment of Maoist fighters), draws absolutely no criticism.
The verbiage authored by the Maoists and sent to the UN has no mention of pre-conditioned cantonment. Neither does the letter submitted to the UN, by the Nepalese Government. The difference of course, is that the state’s military, on the orders of the government, has been (and remains) confined to its barracks.
On the other hand, the Maoist army appears to have given its political leadership orders contrary to the spirit of the peace process. During a press conference on the 26th of August, Maoist military commander, Ram Bahadur Thapa made the following statement: “This (referring to arms management) is a political issue, we would not accept the UN dictating on the issue.” Such an unambiguously worded statement begs the question as to what exactly the much hyped UN monitoring team is meant to observe during the run up to the constituent assembly elections? Dashain and Tihar? Perhaps Christmas and New Years in Thamel?
One cannot help but wonder if the SPA government has been talking to the wrong people? If the military writ is what prevails in the Maoist rank and file, why is the SPA wasting time talking to Pushpa Dahal and his entourage? Perhaps Krishna Sitaula should have left Baburam Bhattarai at the airport and instead, driven Ram Bahadur Thapa (in the Home Minister’s car with the state flag fluttering), to the Prime Minister’s residence? Maybe then we’d be having serious, meaningful negotiations?
The intellectual interpretation of risks to the peace process
The discussion above, leads to another quirky aspect of on-going negotiations. Somehow, Nepal’s intellectuals have got it in their minds that if the Maoists aren’t handled with extra love and care, that the peace talks will fail, that the Maoists will break up and that it will all be the government’s fault. This position is re-enforced by talk of endless conspiracies against the peace process which conveniently coincide with rational demands levied by the government (on the Maoists).
The genius who concocted this logic no doubt, deserves mention in the Guiness Book of World Records for the most partial and outlandish logic in support of unsustainable peace. He/she should also recognize that the burden of making peace is an equally shared responsibility between the Maoists’ and the Nepali peoples’ representatives in the government.
Successful negotiations are never the result of one-sided concessions and one-sided concessions are precisely what the Maoists are gaining. They are doing this by inflating the Maoists’ self-propelled impression of victory and subsequently acquired “rights” over the Nepali state. It’s important to mention that these illusions are premised on a private army (and militia), indoctrinated (by political theory) and bent on garnering power through the threat of arms.
A related point to consider is that given the publicly divulged characteristics of the peace process to date, a split in the Maoist party may actually be a be a logical (and beneficial) outcome to the Maoists, not a consequence of any hardball agenda forwarded by the government.
This wouldn’t be the first time Nepal’s Maoists have manipulated events to forward their political ambitions. For example, the killing of Maoist cadres in Doramba was cited by Maoist leaders as the root cause behind the failure of a past round of negotiations. Naturally, this line was championed by various rights groups and members of civil society. However, the fact of the matter is that the Maoist leadership had already made a conscious decision to withdraw from the peace process, well in advance of the Doramba incident. This is a verifiable fact that any member of the former government’s negotiating team can speak to.
Given this sort of demonstrated behavior, Nepal’s political pundits would do well to consider how to deal with a Maoist faction that “rejects” violence (and subsequently joins an interim government), while a splintered military faction continues to roam the countryside, unleashing terror.
If such a situation was to materialize, it is almost certain that Maoist supporters in the current government and civil society would bend over backward to accommodate any moderate line emanating from those Maoists who reject violence. They would also most certainly blame the breakup of the Maoist organization on the SPA government’s lack of flexibility during negotiations.
Naturally, such allegations would be levied on the SPA in complete oblivion of the strategic gains a splintered Maoist faction (in government) would enjoy. The Maoists in government would undoubtedly continue to leverage their “unofficial” linkages with their former military wing.
This may be a bleak scenario to consider, but one that most definitely satisfies the constraints that prevent Maoist participation in any future, interim government. The point here is that very careful consideration need be paid to a growing divergence between the political and military lines the Maoists forward.
To ensure that the Nepalese people don’t end up with a raw deal, it would be advisable to inform the Maoists at the negotiating table that this is in fact, an all or nothing deal – either there will be wholesale peace with the entire Maoist group renouncing violence (and entering the mainstream) or nothing at all. This is a point that should truly be non-negotiable.
The limitations of due process and the burden of maintaining a moral high-ground
So, which side’s deficiency is it that the political arm of the Maoists are extremely capable of wielding their armed faction in war, but completely inept at doing the same, in peace? The State seems to have had minimal difficulties enforcing its will on a national army that appears completely content with orders to confine itself to its barracks.
What’s shameless about this affair is that a government that stands for democratic values (and thereby, debate and due process) is constantly harangued by Nepal’s civil society for “endangering” the peace process. The Maoists, on the other hand, are chastised disproportionately, if at all.
The underlying disparity seems to accrue from the sub-conscious recognition by civil society that it can exert pressure on a democratic government, shame it, and get results. If similar tactics are employed on the Maoists, the best civil society can expect is acknowledgement and at worst, a cold shoulder.
Plus, there are ample examples of consequences to either shaming the Maoists in public (the murder of the President and Vice-President of the Maoist Victim’s association) or to disobeying their decree (the targeted assassinations of a number of candidates in the municipal polls conducted by the former government). Such examples most certainly weigh in on the decision making process, as do the confessions of Maoist threats and brutality documented in support of political asylum applicants, some of whom were former NGO and human rights activists in Nepal.
Irrespective of the Maoist’s claim to the democratic values they represent, they are clueless on the definition of what democracy truly implies. If the Maoists were as dedicated to the principle of liberal democracy and as accountable an organization (as they profess to be), where’s the “full report” from the “serious investigation” on the landmine explosion in Madi, Chitwan? More importantly, where’s the follow up from Amnesty International on this "horrific violation" of human rights?
There is a laundry list of disproportional pressures levied against the Maoists versus incumbent Nepali governments. Firm opposition to the erection of a civil defense force (to counter the Maoist recruitment drive) was vociferously forwarded by advocacy groups – even as the Nepali Maoists employed exactly this strategy to counter the state’s security forces.
In another example, the Indian government’s recent decision to erect a civil militia to counter its growing Maoist insurgency has met with much less resistance. Such discrepancies exhibit an unintended, dualistic nature that favors the decisions of larger and wealthier nations and at the same time, undermines decisions made by smaller, poorer nations. This, despite the application of identical rationale to justify such actions.
Based on Nepal’s experience, it would seem that those who pressure the government do so mostly with good intent but without a firm appreciation of the subtle ramifications of their advocacy. Also, most advocacy organizations are funded based on the results they are able to generate and results are much easier had from the government than from the Maoists (and from smaller aid-dependent governments than from larger more independent ones). There simply aren’t sufficient levers that can be exercised on the Maoists whereas levers are in abundance to extract compliance from the government.
This is an issue most try to avoid in their quest for political correctness. An unfortunate consequence is that political correctness walks a fine line between right and wrong; between condoning behavior unbecoming responsible political agents and what is in reality, the right thing to do.
Despite the international support the current government enjoys, it’s rising level of frustration with actors unable to differentiate long-term national interest from short-term personal (organizational) goals is understandable. PM Koirala’s recent statement that he does not care about “who said what” and that he will pursue “only what has been discussed with the Maoists” evidences the growing aggravation within the current government.
This is not to say that the government should become less democratic. Rather, it’s to say that those who flout independence and impartiality should revisit the long-term consequences of their actions. Advocacy that is premised on social or judicial justice is necessary. Advocacy that is driven by short term wins (that levy disproportional pressure on the government), is risky to the sustainability and outcome of the overall peace process. Ironically, this is also the very premise that advocates use to forward their agendas – the attainment of peace.
Moving Forward
A term that is often used in negotiations parlance is BATNA which stands for, “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement.” The idea holds some relevance to game theory and is posited on the premise that a negotiated agreement can only be achieved when the disputing parties’ respective BATNA’s are sufficiently degraded. In other words, peace becomes possible only when the cost of returning to war is too high.
Nepal’s case is a variation of the general context in which BATNA is applied – there are two warring parties but one is earnestly seeking a negotiated agreement while the other is happy to feed off the perception of unilateral victory. That is, as masters at manipulating the political atmosphere, the Maoists are portraying that they retain credible alternatives to a negotiated agreement.
Nothing could be further from the truth. The Maoist leadership would do well to quickly re-educate their cadre on the potential repercussions of a failure in current peace talks. They are quick to threaten with the prospect of a “peaceful” urban uprising (Pushpa Dahal’s reference to an “October Revolution”) when in fact, what the Maoists should be considering are the risks to their political platform that will accrue from further alienating Nepal’s increasingly discontent populous.
No one is under the illusion that the retention of arms is necessary for “peaceful” street protests. Arms however, are an essential ingredient of the Maoists’ power-base: There is nothing to substantiate that a disarmed Maoist organization will command even a fraction of their purported support-base.
Further, the Maoist leadership’s claim that a return to the jungles is no longer an option is often contradicted by their veiled threats of a return to hostilities. This implies only one certainty – that the capture of state power is still a primary driver of the Maoist agenda. Taking this implication into consideration, the Maoist drive to neutralize the security forces, their insistence on retaining arms, their vitriol with the international position on arms management and rumors of their back channel discussions with the Palace, all fall into perspective.
A competing theory posits that the current peace process is a product of the Maoists’ realization that they could not usurp state power through the application of force. The merits of this argument however, are nebulous at best and are not substantiated by rhetoric that the Maoists themselves espouse in public. Also, any excuse that justifies the necessity of making inflammatory public statements (to maintain cohesion within the Maoists) completely misses the point – there is nothing healthy about rhetoric that sets unachievable goals or insinuates a return to violence
In aligning with the SPA, the Maoists did what any group facing a common enemy would do – they merged assets to undermine a perceived threat and pursue a mutual interest. The SPA’s pursuit in bringing down the king’s government may have temporarily coincided with the Maoist interest of eliminating the monarchy. But with the neutralization of the Palace, this mutual interest has been served, a common enemy defeated and the Maoists have moved ahead in pursuit their own agenda.
It is fallacious to equate the means adopted to serve a mutual interest, with the Maoist acceptance of multi-party politics. First, a temporary alliance fomented by India to “tame” Nepal’s monarch is exactly that – temporary. Second, the pursuit of multi-party politics may be part of the overall Maoist strategy, but it is certainly not the type of liberal democratic set-up that believers of a reformed Maoist group tend to portray. Just ask SPA party cadre who they have to seek permission from, to go speak in their home districts? The answer is, the local Maoist strongmen. Not very healthy signs coming from a purported participant in multi-party politics.
One again, the truth is apparent for anyone willing to grasp it – The Maoists have achieved their current stature not through polls, not through electoral processes, not by persuasion, but through the application of violent force. And, despite the on-going peace process, the Maoists continue to do what has worked best for them – they continue to extract concessions from the State by holding the entire country psychologically hostage, to the threat of renewed violence.
If the Nepalese government fails to address the stark contradictions that inhibit the provision of law and order and if they fail to negotiate with the Maoists on the nation’s terms, a desirable conclusion to the peace talks is unlikely to materialize.
Similarly, if the Maoist leadership fails to concede to the government’s (and the international community’s) demands for arms management, and if they insist on waging a campaign of psychological intimidation, the gains from the uprising in April will never achieve a logical state of consolidation.
If the Maoists continue to display their politically immature and irresponsible attitude towards negotiations, they will ultimately contribute to the resurrection of an extreme right-wing reaction. And this time around, the Maoists will not enjoy the luxury of hiding behind the façade of a democratic alliance.
Allegedly, mid-Level Maoist cadre are convinced that elections to a constituent assembly are not possible and that the on-going peace process will amount to absolutely nothing. Their logic is premised on the assumption that as India conditions its support for the Maoists on the issue of disarmament, the result will be a widening rift between the SPA government and the Maoists (so much for entry into mainstream politics).
This trend, allegedly, will amount to a stalemate whereby the Maoists, the SPA and the King will ultimately have to sit down and collectively figure out their differences. The alternative to this is a set of unthinkable alliances, a possible return to hostilities and a peace-keeping force, not of the blue-helmet variety (refer to "Consolidating Peace in Nepal – General Mehta’s Way" in the June Archives of NepaliPerspectives).
There are however, steps that the government and the Maoists can take today, to avert the scenario portrayed above. They must urgently learn to trust each other, to trust the process, stop issuing inflammatory rhetoric and engage in measurable, reciprocal concessions.
This implies a lot of trust that needs to be quickly built and a lot of innate tendencies that need to be immediately purged. It also implies a lot of hope in a process that has yielded little in the way of concrete gains. In summary, such hopes equate to a whole lot of uncertainty and risk.
The government should continue to take as non-confrontational an approach to negotiations, as possible. But when it comes to issues such as the management of arms or the threat of the Maoist organization splintering, the SPA needs to put forth a common minimum stand – “no way.”
The Maoists on the other hand, need to acknowledge that their BATNA has been sufficiently degraded to the point where threats of a return to war or a peaceful (but armed) urban uprising will be completely counterproductive to their end goal – transformation into a legitimate political entity.
Ultimately, there is only one certainty in all of this: No one is going to solve Nepal’s problems for her – not the Americans, not the Indians, not the EU, not Japan and especially not the United Nations. Where figuring out Nepal’s internal issues is concerned, Nepal is on her own.
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