Tuesday, September 05, 2006

Hedging Against Nepal's Leadership Crisis

(Courtesy: Dipta Shah)

Playing a card game for the first time can be a confusing and costly experience – you don’t really know what you’re doing, but the instant gratification of winning a single hand tends to overshadow the accumulated losses from having folded in the last six rounds.

It’s only near the point of no return that the realization sets in: The rules you thought you were playing by weren’t exactly the rules of the game and as the ante increases, your opponent(s) call your bluff, “rob” you blind and walk away leaving you broke.

What does gambling have to do with Nepal’s current political climate? A lot more than what one may care to admit. Even a novice of political theory is able to draw analogies from the portrayal above, to actors in Nepal’s unfolding saga: The governing seven party coalition (also known as the Seven Party Alliance or simply SPA) plays the role of the novice gambler and the Maoists, the experienced, ruthless opponents who to a degree, are also writing the rules as the game is being played.

Metaphorically speaking, the SPA is not “broke” just yet, but this is not a potential outcome that is easily dismissed. Currently, the chief retarding factor to an otherwise guaranteed “Chapter-11” situation is an Indian position that has astutely re-aligned itself with the American stand. The changed Indian position is widely perceived to be a calculated move that re-enforces the notion of India as a staunch advocate of Nepalese democracy. The altered position also establishes India as an opponent of any electoral outcome (which if had under current circumstances) would skew Nepalese polity toward a virulent brand of leftist, extremist, nationalism.

For obvious reasons, the direction of political outcomes in Nepal are predicated to a significant degree on the positions held by India and the United States (more so India, as demonstrated by the massive injection of moral and material resources during the April 2006 demonstrations). Given the enormous influence that these two donors are able to exercise, their continued guidance in assisting Nepal unravel its political conundrum will be critical to any sustainable long-term solution.

Despite timely suggestions from the United States and India (and other well-wishers of Nepal), the ultimate outcomes of such guidance can only be as good as the individuals who execute on them. This is where even the best advice possible, is constrained by the tools at Nepal’s well-wishers’ disposal – namely, the presiding leadership structure. The universally acknowledged but unspoken perception is as follows: The SPA leadership, having literally been picked up out of near obscurity, re-imaged and re-inserted into the halls of power, is struggling to keep afloat.

Apologists quickly fall back on the “it’s not easy…” excuse, but no one ever expected it to be simple. The only expectation is for the current leadership to demonstrate qualities becoming their designation; that they clearly (and transparently) articulate possibilities and continually gauge public opinion while driving their collective vision forward.

This is not to insinuate that the current leadership has failed to deliver what is expected of them. In fact, over the past 5 months, the SPA leadership has done more than any leadership since 1990. They are a group that began their term under exceptionally difficult circumstances. A group that on one hand, remains hounded by a civil society (that insists on leveraging the leadership’s past performance as a causal indicator of future failure) and on the other, by an unrelenting public relations onslaught from the Maoists (who leverage every opportunity to threaten a degradation in the already abysmal law and order situation, to bring the state to its knees).

Granted, the reality is that most of what has been accomplished by this government is merely on paper, is not legally sanctioned and is as arbitrary as proclamations that originated in the immediate, post-February-1 era – i.e., all spectacular reading and excellent material for commentary, but nothing in the way of substance to contextualize in a legally enforceable framework.

There is much talk about former government officials being “grilled” for “suppressing” the uprising in April and speculation on the modalities of how the king should be “grilled.” These issues certainly keep the tabloids full and the population amused; they also detract public attention from more pertinent issues such as how to permanently neutralize the threat of a return to civil war and how to ensure that the gains of the post-April 2006 period are permanently institutionalized.

Unfortunately, the UN is not going to miraculously solve any of the critical challenges that presently confront the SPA leadership. Irrespective of what the leadership portrays to the public, the UN’s performance will only be as effective as the mandate under which the international agency is permitted to operate. This mandate will come from a consensus between the SPA and the Maoist leadership; an agreement that hinges on the issue of how arms should be managed.

No one wants to say it, but negotiations between the SPA and the Maoists are in near deadlock. The only way out is for the government to concede more to the Maoist position by agreeing to a compromise, somewhere between disarmament and Maoist participation in an all-party government. Such concessions if had, will speak volumes on the role that Home Minister and Chief Government Negotiator, Krishna Sitaula, has played. Obviously, the first chapter in this “story” begins with the lack of wisdom in appointing the Home Minister as the Government’s Chief Negotiator – a blatant conflict of interest.

In complete fairness, the examples of weaknesses in state leadership (alluded to above) are confined neither to the country’s political class, nor to any specific organ within the state’s governing bodies. Rather, such shortcomings are manifested in every aspect of failure that continues to dog the state and by extension, to every leadership structure across the entire state spectrum. In fact, one could easily argue that Nepal’s leadership crisis is the key contributant to the explosive growth in support for Nepal’s recently legitimized terrorists – the Maoists.

Deciding on the nature and values of national leadership is a task for Nepalis and Nepalis alone. This is one element of what elections to a constituent assembly are meant to accomplish. However, if the same names and faces (and the associated norms and values) are to exclusively reemerge as options in a post-constituent assembly world, the parliamentary elections to follow, will be somewhat hollow.

Granted, the process of leadership evolution could easily span another decade to allow for the currently entrenched, upper echelon to retire (or alternatively, for nature to take its course). However, there should be nothing that prevents this transformation from being planned for and executed in the present. The education of upcoming leaders in the security forces, within the political parties and all other organs that contribute to the functioning of the sate should start now, with a weighted focus on lessons learned from mistakes made in the past.

For peace to be sustained and democracy to flourish, Nepal’s future has to be one that is created by responsible players who understand how the game is played and participate with a commitment to the well-being of their collective constituents. It must be an environment where each player is dedicated to upholding the rules of the game and where the power of decisions are derived not from threats of anarchy (or “peaceful protests” by armed elements), but from the collective wisdom of astute, dedicated individuals.

Nepal’s present may resemble a series of risky bets wagered on the basis of unsubstantiated assumptions. The future however, need not be a gamble if today’s leaders take the time to gracefully transition their responsibilities to the upcoming generation. The game of politics will never be risk-free. However, it need not be a high-risk enterprise either; not if emerging participants go into the game, well trained, immaculately groomed and prepared to confront a range of eventualities that no doubt, a nascent democracy will continue to face.


1 comment:

Anonymous said...

Very well put, Dipta.

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