Thursday, September 28, 2006

Governance and Arms and Armies Management until Constituent Assembly Elections

(Courtesy: Dr. Shiva Gautam)

The current chorus of "Management of arms and armies, and mainstreaming Maoists" falls silent each time someone asks 'how'. Amidst the confusion of charges and counter charges of delaying the peace process, Maoists seem to be inching towards checkmating the government endangering all the accomplishments achieved so far.

It is naïve to think that Maoists will just surrender their arms to SPA government and join the democratic political process and will not ask anything in return. Similarly, SPA will not dismantle Nepal army and let the Maoists army take over the country.

An idea suggesting keeping both armies in cantonments with UN's involvement until constituent assembly elections is being resuscitated by members of civil society through a petition addressed to members of political parties including CPN (Maoists).

This certainly is a step forward. But the current problem of armies and arms management will resurface with same intensity once the constituent assembly elections are concluded. One of the most important factors is that security situation is likely to deteriorate the management of two armies is not addressed on time. After the formation of the constituent assembly, the sticky question concerning two armies and their arms is likely to remain same.

Few important things need to be factored in while looking for ways to move ahead. These are deteriorating security situation, inability of the government and Maoists in providing basic services to the people, firm Maoists' grip on and government's absence from the rural areas, and Maoists demands and eagerness to govern

There are virtually two parallel governments in the country; one is mostly confined in urban areas and another in the rural areas. Even cabinet ministers seem have accepted it. Deputy Prime Minister Oli, referring to Rukmangad Katuwal's appointment as Nepal Army chief, asked Maoists not to interfere with the government's decision because the government does not interfere with Maoists' decision to appoint their regional commanders.

In the light of above situation, I would like to propose the following which not only incorporates the idea of confinement of both armies in cantonments but also institutes a temporary functioning government throughout the country until a new government through constituent assembly comes into existence.

Promulgate an interim constitution to:

1. Divide the country into few administrative and political regions (not according Maoists plan) with a separate region for Kathmandu valley (Capital region)
2. Form governments both at central and regional levels including members of SPA and CPN (Maoist). But the central government will also be in charge of capital region.

3. Keep Nepal Army under defense Ministry (central level) to be headed by the defense minister from SPA

4. Keep Maoists army under a special ministry (central level) to be headed by a minister from CPN (Maoist).

5. Put the day to day security of the capital (Kathmandu) region under the central home ministry headed by SPA

6. Put the day to day security in all the regions except for the capital region under regional home ministries to be headed by home minister from CPN (Maoists).

7. Confine both armies in barracks. The central government will pay for both armies (this is already being discussed)

8. Form a new police force at regional levels. Though the regional/local governments will consist of both SPA and Maoists, security will be headed by home minister from Maoists.

9. Conduct constituent assembly election once regional governments formed by Maoists and SPA recommend for it after becoming confident that an appropriate environment has been created.

The purpose of the above suggestions is to start integrating of two sides while maintaining their separate identity until a trust between the two begins develops.

These arrangements will initiate the integration process at least at the psychological level. It will allow the Maoists to be the part of the central government. It will also allow SPA to be a part of the local governments and reconnect with people at grassroots levels.

Also, it will test if the SPA is sincere in mainstreaming Maoists, and if the Maoist are sincere and committed to democracy. The length of this arrangement could be easily extended if needed for various reasons.

Most of all, it will allow to immediately jump start the development work and delivery of services to the people.

However, it requires rigorous analysis and bold political decisions. No decision is risk free, but the risk can be minimized with careful analyses, weighing pros and cons, refinements and fine-tuning.

3 comments:

Anonymous said...

A question for Dr. Gautam - Sir, are you paying taxes in Nepal? Do you pay to this government, money out of our hard earned salary? If you do, then you must understand that Nepal is not in need of a 200,000 army. It is hard enough support the security we have now, with so much taxes. You should ask the Maoists to support their own army by taxing the people they govern.

Thank you very much for your proposal, but I am not for paying double taxes and getting nothing in return. Security in Nepal is bad enough with 100,000 and 200,000 isn't going to make it any better when the Maoists are the ones creating the security crisis.

Your idea is nice to imagine but you need to find funding from somewhere besides our taxes.

Anonymous said...

What does this writer think about the idea to conduct CA with 100,000 maoist milita and 44,000 Nepal police? Will the results be fair?

Anonymous said...

Botton Line is, These Maoist and SPA are Terrorist outfits and do not have any moral responsibilities of Democracy. They only know how to mislead Innocent Nepalese People and stupid enough Western Countries for the Terrorist Movement under the shadow of Democratic Movement.

India and US has destroyed our Beautiful Kingdom of Nepal.

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