Maoist Electoral Strategy - What is the CPN-M up to?

(Courtesy: Dr. Thomas A. Marks)

CPN(M) demands cannot be met within the context of parliamentary democracy. The Maoists themselves are quite explicit in this regard. They remain committed to sweeping away of the old-order and replacing it with a new-order that is “Maoist.” The specifics involved are common to Maoist movements throughout South Asia and feature a dreary litany of state intervention in all economic, social, and political facets of existence, accompanied by an “anti-imperialist” foreign policy that supports the likes of North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela.

Power as Goal

All actions being taken are designed to bring the Maoists to power. When called to account by their CCOMPOSA compatriots for their having abandoned the revolutionary struggle, the Nepali Maoists succeeded in placating their critics by outlining just what is set forth here. Put in so many words: our way will deliver power by emphasizing the “non-violent” aspects of people’s war – and using violence to give them salience.

This implementation of people’s war strategy, however, has not gone unchallenged. The 5th Plenum of the CPN(M), which was held in early August using as an “expanded meeting (EM)” format that brought together 2,174 delegates, saw fierce opposition to staying the course with campaigns just short of overt confrontation. Though a Central Committee meeting was held at the end of July (2007) to ensure that the required report (to the party) by Prachanda was a consensus document, the “EM” did not go smoothly. Having continued to exclude the state from the rural areas, yet gained unfettered access to the urban centers, a faction of the Maoist leadership demanded open confrontation to finish the job. In particular, it saw no point in Maoist ministers continuing in the government. In the event, the Maoists did bolt in September 2007.

Thus the Maoists left the government, strenuously demanded acceptance of their 22 demands – many of them precisely the issues that were to be settled by a constitutional convention – and issued instructions to CPN(M) front organizations to be prepared to initiate street actions. What happened was fully in accord with their plans: SPA agreed to establish a “republic,” thus disestablishing the centuries old monarchy, and the Maoists, in December, returned to government. Their only goal left unaccomplished, which will be used to precipitate the next crisis, is integration of their combatants into the army – thus neutralizing it.

The CPN(M), therefore, is simply pursuing its ends by time and again changing its tactics. Its lines of operation have remained consistent. Only the emphasis placed upon any one line has changed with time and circumstances. The present means of choice are front organizations (there are numerous allegedly independent bodies that are in reality Maoist creatures) and the YCL, which dominates the streets and conducts the strong-arm activities against businesses (e.g., forcing through Maoist unionization). Concurrently, the CPN(M) seeks to function as an open political party (the mass line), mobilizing those who will respond to any force that seems to offer them better life-chances.

What Motivates the Maoists?

Coercion, persuasion, and inducement are but facets of Maoist strategy, campaign elements inherent to the Maoist lines of operation. Faced with the refusal of the old-order to go quietly, the Maoists have responded through greater use of coercion, a form of violence. They have increased their level of menace, particularly through use of the YCL. This coercion is linked to upping the ante in numerous other ways, from verbal abuse to throwing sand in the machinery of governance. What is significant is that all coercion is linked to inducements and persuasion. Businessmen, for instance, are assured that the market will be allowed to function – but in a more equitable manner. Interest groups are assured that their concerns will finally be addressed once the Maoists are in power.

The trump card, as the Maoists see it, is threatening to bolt, to take to the streets, to launch a new people’s war. Though they quickly clarify that they do not mean “returning to the jungles,” the threat is clear enough: pitched street battles. That plans have been made for such an eventuality is known to the government, but the SPAM coalition is so tenuous that there is no one to take cognizance of the information.

What is occurring is a battle of mobilization capabilities. Throughout the counterinsurgency, the Maoists had the advantage for the simplest of reasons: the government did not recognize the game being played. To the contrary, all efforts by knowledgeable members of the state, especially within the security forces, to mobilize citizen capacity, whether in local defense forces or even watcher groups, were thwarted by incomprehension, outright opposition, or alliances made with the donor community.

In contrast, the entire thrust of the Maoist effort was to engage in mass mobilization, to form a counter-state that could challenge the state. The Maoists explained their situation in these terms – they continue to do so. By 2003, they claimed they were a state (i.e., a counter-state) that existed on equal terms with the existing state and therefore had all the rights and privileges of the state. Just as interesting theoretically was their advancing the claim that sub-state actors had all the rights and privileges afforded in international law only to states. There could be no middle ground: one order had to give way to the other.

In this effort, Maoist organization remained hierarchical, with an effort to overcome centripetal forces and indiscipline. “The revolution” was overwhelmingly an internal phenomenon, with the Nepali expatriate community largely onlookers, except as victimized by Maoist efforts at extortion or seeking to participate in the form of fellow-travelers. Eventually, after April 2006, serious divisions did emerge within the expatriate community, with the debate played out principally through blogs but noteworthy for the increasing consideration in the debate of “Mein Kampf considerations.” That is, what does it mean for the possible future of a country to have potential (and certainly would-be) leadership figures who engage in Cambodian Holocaust denial; who deify (at least several) mass murderers; and who advance ideas that in the 20th Century produced the greatest crimes in the history of humanity?

The decentralized nature of the electronic debate faithfully reflects what has been occurring within Nepal itself as hierarchy, both organizational and societal, has broken down. In one sense, it could be argued that the security forces have maintained a degree of hierarchy even as the Maoists have increasingly become networked. Indeed, one of the problems for the transitional state in dealing with the Maoists is the factor of assessing just what the Maoist leadership really controls. How much that is happening is in response to commands, and how much is simply local initiative that the Maoist leadership seeks to exploit?

The most frightening prospect, of course, remains a possible breakdown of law and order beyond anything yet seen. This at times appears to be the way the tarai is headed. Determined not to deploy NA, the weak government would have to be faced with a catastrophic situation before it would act, and by that time, the forces unleashed would probably be uncontrollable. The beneficiaries certainly would be the Maoists.

(Thomas A. Marks is a political risk consultant based in Hawaii. His most recent book is Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2007).

Related Posts:

Nepali Maoists Prepare for their Final Assault
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/08/nepali-maoists-prepare-for-their-final.html

Lack of Law & Order in Nepal, Primarily a Maoist-Originated Problem
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/lack-of-law-order-in-nepal-primarily.html

Young, Confused and Lost (YCL) – The Hammer of the Maoist “Party” of Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/05/young-confused-and-lost-ycl-hammer-of.html