Contributants to Nepal's Peace Agreement

There were very few who believed in what the king did when he usurped power. Love him or hate him, he was still the last line of defense against a Maoist victory, which is precisely what has transpired in Nepal, supplemented by a conciliatory sense of peace for the nation at large. This supplemental benefit is huge and will continue to be leveraged as the rationale behind the 11 year insurgency and the need to de-throne the King, etc., etc.

Nepali intellectuals' estimation that a conflict on both extremist fronts could be fought simultaneously was heavily premised on the idea that external support would be unconditionally available to counter either extreme. This assumption has proved true in taming one extreme, now the democrats can pray that it will also hold true when the time comes to tame the other extreme.

The Chinese are bound to extend their support to any nationalist force in Nepal and the Indians have coddled the Maoists for so long, they would rather back a winning horse over a pack of spent mules. So again, “se la vie” to the would-be democrats and “hear! Hear!” to our comrades in arms.

The American position on Nepal remains the most logical but is prey to each and every tactical pillar the Maoists have advanced to power on. It's not easy doing business the liberal democratic way when informed decision making is virtually absent. Complicating matters further is a group of useful idiots who are wasting more time rationalizing the negative consequences of their doomed assumptions than planning to play the role of much needed opposition.

Again, even less hope in this area because the Nepali Congress (NC) is too proud to ever consider itself an opposition party, the United Marxist Leninist (UML) still believes the attrition of its cadre to the Maoists is nonsense and the rest of the smaller political entities are yet to recuperate from the royal onslaught.

Given the pace at which events are moving on the ground, the emergence of credible political opposition to the inevitable leftist onslaught seems virtually impossible. The icing on the cake will be when the Nepalese military is commissioned to "train" Maoist fighters and integrate them into the national military's rank and file - any guess on where loyalties are going to lie when it's time for the last round?

The NC appears to have taken some precautionary measures in this regard by placing key security assets in strategic postings. However, even with these assets in place, there remains serious doubt over the priority of loyalties individuals may exercise (which could easily run contrary to what popular expectations predict).

The outpouring of euphoria to mark the end of Nepal’s brutal insurgency is exceptionally high, as it should be. However, less heartening is the ease with which democracy as an idea is being systematically abused to engender the realization of a form of polity that could easily be so much further from the democracy that Nepal’s educated think they fought for.

Prachanda has already thanked American Senator Patrick Leahy in one of his monologues. He should really be thanking a wider audience whose sense of sustainable democratic polity continues to extend no further than 12-14 months down the road. We are already on month 6. Another 8 down the road Nepal is traveling and the world will see a form of democracy never before witnessed. And there's a whole slew of individuals and organizations we can credit with Nepal's democratic experiment over the coming months.

India, in particular, deserves mention for the role it has palyed in halting the Maoist assault on the Nepali state. The point being made here is not that Nepal's ailments all lie with its southern neighbor. Rather, the slew of deals and agreements that have all taken place in New Delhi should appraise even the casual observer where the key to Nepal's Maoist insurgency has always been.

It is no coincidence that Indian embarassment over Gyanendra's invitation to China (as an external observer within SAARC) sparked the 12 Point agreement. This agreement in turn, led to successive understandings and agreements (most of which were advised upon by the Indian Ambassador in Kathmandu) and resulted in the halting of cessations between the Maoists and the State.

It was never the case that the Nepali people did not want democracy or peace or stability for the 11 year duration of the brutal insurgency Nepal suffered. It was simply a matter of convenience that demanded Indian involvement in the insurgency be presented in a positive limelight for the truth to come out. To the occasional observer, Indian involvement in Nepal's peace deal is seen as paramount and magnanimous; to those who have studied Nepal's Maoist insurgency (particularly aspects of the rebels' military strategies), the evidence is simply overwhelming to write off Indian instigation, support and participation as a mere conincidence.

Even in the hey day of the insurgency, Nepalese Generals who were well versed on Maoist tacits, operations and support, commented that the Maoist insurgency could be ended overnight, were Indian involvement to become overt. Unfortunately, it took a solid 11 years before Indian involvement surfaced but on the bright side, it is fortuitious that it did, for Indian policy makers aptly demonstrated how a decade of violence could be turned into peace in a little over 7 months. It is painful wondering why 13,000 people had to lose their lives when a 7 month process and 2 signatures could just as easily have snipped the misery, right in its bud.

As has been discussed throughout, the Maoists see themselves as accepting the surrender of the old-order, not as having reached a compromise agreement. There will be no "demobilization" upon their part. There will be an effort to neutralize the remaining power of the old-order from within, in particular to destroy the army.

The Maoists attempt to cashier the entire Nepalese military officer corps and to replace the individuals with their own people. They are not sure what to do with all the NA enlisted ranks, but they do know they must integrate their own manpower into the existing forces in such manner as to be able to checkmate anything the government does.

What is absolutely necessary for the government is that there be a framework into which actions feed. Unfortunately, since the politicos are incapable of coming up with such, the security forces (especially the army itself) must have a framework -- and then simply must refuse to do that which is destructive.

"Civilian supremacy" is accepted by the security forces, but the way it is playing itself out is very dangerous. For the government is not even talking at all to the security forces while it is making concession after concession -- concessions which, in the final analysis, ask the security forces to go as lambs to the slaughter.

What Nepal has stumbled into, of course, is precisely the situation driven by cultural particulars long noted by any tourist -- an unwillingness of Nepalis to grapple with specifics. Always, they desire that generalities be accepted, with specifics left until later. This is precisely the opposite of how the Western notion of contracts works.

The Maoist position is the perfect illustration: "you fools of the old-order have demonstrated an inability to develop the country -- now it is our turn. Give us the power, and we will see what comes out of it." That's a pretty lousy basis for anything lasting, but it's very "Nepali."

The Indians are beside themselves at having stumbled, at last, into absorption of Nepal. They don't want formal absorption, with all its problems, but they want a Bhutanese-like lapdog with no irritating displays of independence, a "union territory" in all but name.

Neither can anything be expected from the international "mediators," any number of whom (in their role as "the foreigners who would be gods") are longtime haters of the "old regime" and the NA, in particular. "Process" is the name of the game with them. "Process" is simply another way of using "hope as method."

There are no “t's” being crossed, or “i's” being dotted. That is very bad -- unless one wants to be a Maoist and relive the dreary and nasty fantasies of the Cold War.