Perpetual Denial – The State of Nepal’s Intellectual Class

(Coutesy: el Guapo)

Even the most avid supporters of liberal democracy in Nepal express a grudging sense of adulation toward the Maoists. Despite having employed violence as their primary vehicle of power projection, the Maoists today, are victorious in Nepal. Their conniving political maneuvers backed by a ruthless campaign of attrition (and low intensity conflict) has elevated the Maoists to the top of Nepal’s political pecking order.

In no small measure has the Maoist ascendancy to power been facilitated by Nepal’s intellectual and pseudo-intellectual class. Knowingly or unknowingly, intellectuals in Nepal (at one point or another) have all fallen prey to some component of Maoist strategy.

In self-denial, many of Nepal’s pseudo-intellectuals are congratulating themselves and celebrating along with the Maoists. In doing so, they are attempting desperately to rationalize the Maoist triumph in every term other than what it truly is – a masterful, Maoist victory (or in George W. Bush’s words, a “thumping” for Nepal’s democratic forces).

Judging by the negotiated number of seats that the Maoists are to occupy in Nepal’s interim parliament (which surpasses the UML’s allocation and is second to none but the Nepali Congress), the Maoists’ successful ascendancy to power through a sustained campaign of violence has yielded dividends.

Maoist celebrations across Nepal in the aftermath of the recent agreement holds testament to the Maoists’ notion of victory. In the words of the Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the political changes in Nepal account for 40% of the Maoists’ ultimate goals; the remaining 60% will be pursued in the days to come.

Dahal’s admission of Maoist victory contrasts sharply with Girja Prasad Koirala’s assertion that the recent agreement was a victory for no single party but a victory for all Nepalese. Although anecdotal, the political composition of the celebratory parades (held in different parts of the country) appears to challenge Girija’s logic – the composition of such parades have been 100% Maoist. No other political party (including Girija’s own), has shown much in the way of celebration.

This is just one (of many) indications of how far out of touch political party leaders in Nepal are, with grass roots workers. Those who operate at the district levels and below, understand fully well that the November 8 agreement has pitted them against a ruthless political rival that has demonstrated time and again, a cohesive willingness to do anything necessary to attain power. Hardly cause for celebration, especially for UML cadre who have been consistently engaged in low level (but violent) skirmishes with Maoist cadre over the past 3-4 months.

Taking this logic (presented above) a step further, if indeed the SPA-M deal is a victory for Nepalese of all political denominations (and that members of the SPA purportedly represent the people), then something is terribly amiss in Girija’s political calculation. If the majority of Nepali people are happy, the political parties must be completely out of touch with their constituents to not be celebrating along side the population and the Maoists. However, no evidence of such euphoria has surfaced-to-date.

Self-admittedly, Maoist leaders on various occasions have publicly discussed their desire to limit armed insurrection as their flagship political tool in favor of “alternative means.” In other words, having bled the Nepali nation for 10 years, the Maoists feel they have earned sufficient political capital by terrorizing the populous – capital that they can rely on, moving into constituent assembly elections. The Maoists have learned from history, have educated themselves in the art of global activism and now perceive themselves as well-positioned to rely on continued psychological intimidation as a guarantor of success during future political parleys.

Such shrewd, power-based calculations in turn, have been erroneously translated by various groups within and outside of Nepal as evidence of a Maoist change of heart. Despite repeated admissions by the Maoist leadership that they had no choice but to pursue their stipulated ideological goals through alternative means (most of which are convenient by-products of armed Maoist politics), Nepal’s intellectual class remains convinced that the Maoists’ decision to enter mainstream politics was guided by some element other than sheer necessity.

In other words, Nepal’s intellectual class had remained so emasculated by a fixation on delegitimizing royal politics, they ended up legitimizing Maoist politics. It is only over the past week that intellectuals have begun challenging the Maoist leadership’s hold over their militia. It is also during the very recent past that questions on whether the Maoists are being folded into the mainstream or whether the Maoists are actually defining the mainstream have crept into intellectual discourse. All points that were previously raised, but discarded as being out of synch with reality.

Ironically, the very predictions predicated upon which many anti-Maoist (but vehemently democratic forces) were attracted to the king’s roadmap, are materializing one after another. While these predictions were allegedly falsehoods upon which fear-based politics was being exercised (in the February-1 world), they certainly do not appear unfounded or misguided judging by the degree to which Maoist violence has been legitimized today.

Further, it is only natural that major media houses in Nepal would refuse (in private) or refrain (in public) from publishing “controversial” literature on the Maoists at this point in time.

First, these media businesses remain captive to the idea of dispensing self-styled retribution against a king they detest (particularly Kantipur publications for reasons that are all too transparent). Second, they (as active participants in Nepal’s civil and political discourse) do not wish to add any semblance of negativity to the peace process. Third, as politically savvy businesses elsewhere, these media houses would probably not want to upset the Maoists – not when they are at the very top of their game. Fourth and last, Maoist actions of the past against journalists who opposed the Maoist writ, probably does not lend to ease of mind when publishing material that according to journalistic norms should probably receive “air time,” but according to standards of personal safety and security, do not qualify for publication!

Yet another theme of gradual dissention that is likely to emerge from conviction-driven quarters of Nepal’s intelligentsia, is the idea that the Maoist tact of pursuing political goals by holding the nation hostage to (what has gradually become) a Maoist dominated agenda of peace, cannot be permitted to stand. Once more, a realization that is had rather late, but had later rather than never.

The prospects for peace in Nepal are real but with any fluid situation, the prospects of derailment are equally real. A concerted focus on the risks of failure go part in parcel with a strategy for sustainable peace.

The Maoists have contingencies on all fronts: Should the CA not obtain a simple majority (highly unlikely, but possible) when deciding the fate of the Monarchy, the Maoists have retained the option to wage war once again. If the CA elections show signs of not justifying the Maoist war against the state, the Maoist militia will be mobilized double time to pummel any credible opposition. Should the Maoists face political resistance from within Nepal, they will immediately fall back on their “royalist” or “regressive forces” mantra (were the citizens of Kupondole “reactionary elements” inspired by the “old regime” or Nepali citizens fed up with Maoist intimidation?).

Aside from a partisan strategy that is designed to pit the NC’s ideological adversaries against one another (before CA elections), what other contingency do any of Nepal’s political parties have? Nepal’s intellectuals were extremely effective against a king who deviated from his constitutional role. But what contingencies (other than normative enforcement) do our intellectuals have when it comes to battling extremism of another variety in Nepal?

If at the end of this exposition, doubt still remains over who the victors and the to-be vanquished currently are in Nepal, the country has problems on a scale that simply cannot be addressed.

It is absolutely crucial that all political elements remain vigilant and prepared to fight the greatest ideological battle of our time, for the outcome of this feud will establish for the next generation the shape of Nepal’s polity.

Whether Nepal sets the standard in the 21st century for mass murder as a credible platform to power or whether the democratic process punishes those who for so long have punished ordinary people, remains to be seen.