Wednesday, November 01, 2006

Democracy in Nepal and South Asia

(Courtesy: Siddhartha Thapa)

Rejoice all the communist sympathizers around the globe! As the Maoists “people’s war” enters its more sedated 11th year, victory is inevitable for the Maoist in Nepal. With the on going peace between the State and the Maoists moving at an excruciatingly slow pace, the terms of a negotiated peace settlement have clearly tilted in favor of the Maoists. Peace in Nepal therefore, will be negotiated at the cost of democracy as we know it.

In the spring of 1996, the Maoist party (under the chairmanship of Pushpa Kumar Dahal a.k.a. “Prachanda”), launched a violent movement against a system of multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy. After years of bloody fighting (coupled with the short-sighted policies of successive governments) and inadequate counter-insurgency policies, the Maoists today have supplanted the political parties’ rhetoric of a democratic polity.

While the Nepali Maoists aim to establish a one party communist republic, it is extremely ironic that Nepal’s democratic parties serve as bench warmers while the Maoists are portrayed as the nation’s champions democratic champions.

The remarkable popular uprising in April 2006 marked the end of the 1990 constitution. Drafters of the 1990 constitution represented members of major political parties and a beleaguered palace. A compromise was reached between the palace and parties after assurances from the previous King Birendra, who agreed to function in a purely constitutional role.

However, as the democratic exercise failed to meet the aspirations of the people, King Gyanendra (late King Birendra’s younger brother), exploited the situation and went for a power grab. An abrupt dismissal of a multi-party transitional government in February 2005 unfortunately, instigated further confrontation between the King and the political parties.

By intentionally distancing himself from the political spectrum, King Gyanendra compelled the political parties to seek alternative routes to ending the political quagmire. As repeated pleas for the unification of constitutional forces fell on the deaf ears of King Gyanendra, the international community (primarily India), fostered an understanding between the Maoist rebels and the major political parties seeking a way to end the conflict.

The 12-point understanding that was reached between the Maoist rebels and the major political parties was an agreement to end the autocratic rule that prevailed in Nepal. However, nowhere in the 12 point understanding is the need for ending the fate of the institution of monarchy outlined. This is an institution that that birthed Nepal as a nation state and has largely served as a force of unification through good and bad times. The founding of the institution took place 235 years ago (at a time when democracy was a term not in existence) and the institution has continued to evolve with the times – albeit, at a pace slower than what most would like to see.

While the political parties sought to end autocracy and restore democracy and peace by mainstreaming the Maoist rebels (as per the 12-point agreement), the Maoist rebels sought to use the 12-point agreement as a catalyst to storm into power. Extolling flexibility and farsightedness were noble goals adopted by the political parties when signing an agreement with a rebel outfit that whose stipulated aim continues to be the creation of democracy in their own party manifesto’s image.

With the end of autocracy, the revival of democratic dispensation has already begun. Although the 12- point understanding has brought an end to autocracy, restoration of sustainable peace and democracy can only materialize through concerted negotiations between the government and the Maoist rebels.

Curtailing the King using extra-constitutional parameters has somewhat eased the political discourse. The tri-polar conflict (between the king, the parties and Maoists), has evolved into a bi-polar conflict. While conflict management theory tells us that this is a good indication, conflict management practice is showing us that this bi-polar situation is still fraught with very real challenges, every step of the way. In fact, the climate was not exactly tri-polar to begin with and is not bi-polar now – there are 7 parties in an alliance, numerous parties represented in parliament (but not in political decision making), the pro-palaces forces (still a power to be reckoned with) and last but not least, the Maoists.

Although the 12-point agreement has room for optimism, there is greater room for skepticism vis-à-vis the Maoists’ intent of adopting liberal democratic principles and ultimately joining mainstream politics. The current trends exhibit tendencies by the Maoists to define the mainstream as opposed to joining it, trends that ring alarm bells in various circles.

First, the “people’s” war was initiated in an effort to topple multi-party politics and establish a one party communist state. Second, the constant utterances delivered by Maoist leaders during political concourses explicitly question the system of a democratic governance. Third, the relentless effort pursued by the Maoists during the recent peace talks ignore the need for the Maoists to abandon their weapons.

An equally important facet is that despite the signing of a ceasefire fire agreement, the rebels continue to stage kangaroo courts, abduct, extort and silence political opponents with the use of force. However, the underlying difference between the past atrocities and the present atrocities (committed by the rebels) is that the convulsion of agreements reached between the political parties and the rebels have given the rebels the authority to exert their presence more openly and also the opportunity to continue their commitment to agreements in theory, while demonstrating huge variances in practice.

Rehabilitation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

As the peace talks proceed, pertinent political issues related to restoring permanent peace and democracy go unaddressed. There are approximately about eight hundred thousand displaced people in Nepal who have fled from their rural homes to seek refuge in the capital’s safety net.

For the greater Nepali population to participate in the Constituent Assembly elections, it is essential that all legitimate voters are roped into the electoral process – not just those that favor a particular ideology or a fear a particular group. Therefore it is extremely critical for government and the Maoists to prioritize the issue of rehabilitating displaced people prior to the election of constituent assembly.

But the rehabilitation of displaced people may not be desirable to the rebels. The majority of displaced people fled their homes due to pressure from the rebel militia. And during the early phase of the “people’s war,” the rebel militia had specifically targeted members of opposition political parties.

As most political opponents of the rebels fled in an exodus to Kathmandu and other safety nets, the void created by the abrupt exodus was filled by ardent rebel sympathizers and the militia in villages throughout rural Nepal.

Should the issue of displaced people surface during the talks and the process of rehabilitating displaced people start, the returnees could upset the balance of rebel hegemony throughout the countryside.

Another facet that has compelled the Maoists to hinder the rehabilitation process is because as long as the displaced people are not rehabilitated, the inefficient electoral mechanism has no provisions for non-native voters to vote in other districts. Therefore by delaying the rehabilitation process of displaced people, the rebels would succeed in sabotaging votes that go in the favor of the democratic parties.

Weapons Management

The issue of weapons management is the fulcrum of the peace process. Although the rebel’s pin point political issues as the important denominator for the stalling of the peace process, the parties on the other hand refute such claims declaring that controversial political issues should be decided by the constituent assembly elections.

Continual calls for the management of arms and the disarmament of the rebel army will not suffice. Even though the rebel’s have declared their willingness to separate their arms during the transitional phase, what assurance exists that the rebels will not resort to violence should the election results not tilt in their favor?

What about the Milita?

An equally ludicrous idea floated by leftist thinks tanks and partisan civil society leaders is the call for the integration of the rebels and the national army. Can an ideologically committed outfit such as the rebel army harmonize the balance in the state army or is it just a ploy to trigger a mutiny?

Nonetheless should there be a amicable resolution vis-à-vis the issue of weapons management of the rebel’s “People’s Liberation Army” ( PLA) it will shed light on a new beginning but along with the weapons of the PLA, the rebel’s militia too should be completely disarmed for an ambiance without fear.

The rebel militia which numbers anything between 10,000 – 25,000 poses small arms. The distinction between the PLA and the militia is critical. While the PLA has fought the security organs of the state, the militia has been responsible for staging kangaroo courts, patrolling villages, abducting, extorting and canvassing Maoist ideology through the country.

Therefore while the government takes a stance regarding the issue of weapons management, it is extremely important for the government to stress on the need for disarming both the PLA and the rebel militia. But if the government fails to grasp the importance of disarming the militia, the forthcoming Constituent Assembly election results will overwhelmingly tilt in the favor of the rebels.

The ruling SPA comprises of seven political parties out of which 2 political parties (NC and NSP) are advocates for a democratic polity. However the majority SPA constituents are left leaning.

The leftist parties accepted the 1990 Constitution on the condition reached amongst themselves, assuming that the 1990 Constitution would provide as a base for the launch for a republican set up.

Although the rebel ideology differs to a degree from other leftist parties in parliament, the desired outcome for all communist parties in Nepal is the establishment of a one party communist republic. Therefore it is only a matter of time before the Nepali Congress succumbs to the mounting pressure of its coalition partners in the government, parliament and mainstream detractors within its ranks.

While the government busies itself with talks, rebel union conventions, armed rebel patrolling in the heart of Kathmandu and extortion drives proceed without notice.

The incompetence of the judicial system has prompted the Maoists to relegate judicial tasks to its kangaroo courts. Judicial verdicts from the rebel’s “Peoples Court” in Kathmandu (in the absence of adequate state authority) have been widely accepted by the people as the government fails to step in.

The questioning of the appointment of Army Chief by the Supreme Court through a petition filed by leftist advocates is with the intention of instigating confrontation between the judiciary and the executive. The Supreme Court petition filed by leftist advocates against the appointment of the Army Chief serves as a dual purpose, instigate a confrontation between the executive and the legislature and second, the embarrassing prospect of the appointment being turned down by the Supreme Court would inevitably spur a crisis of confidence between the national army and the government.

However, despite the disparities in the attitudes amongst the political parties and the rebels, it is critical to mainstream the rebels in a democratic polity to establish lasting peace and democracy. But as long as the democratic forces continue to remain divided, the rebels will continue to exert their dominance during political discourses.

The rebels are ideologically committed, politically astute and strategically wed to their cause. The parties on the other hand need to demonstrate more commitment to their own ideologies (which one hopes is liberal democracy).

A bottom line approach must be adopted that does not compromise the status of democracy in the country. The situation demands the political parties to be just as committed to the cause of democracy, with the power of political acumen. It requires them to be equally strategic during political discourses.

The onus rests on the rebels to establish peace and democracy. Prolonged inconsistent political standings and lack of coherence will provide plenty of reasons for the rebels to believe in the ability to establish a one party communist republic. Alternatively, should the political parties persist with pressure and demonstrate rigidity, the rebels may feel compelled to reverse their current strategy of non-violence but pro-intimidation.

But the indicators from Kathamandu are rather bleak. As political parties fail to keep the rebels in check, the rebels’ undemocratic tendencies sweep the floor of urban centers. While political parties are busy tussling amongst each other, the rebels busy themselves concentrating their effort on consolidating their reach within urban centers.

If common sense prevails in Indian foreign policy vis-à-vis Nepal, the policy of playing silent will backfire as the rebels continue to overwhelm the democratic institutions slowly but remarkably efficiently.

For the sake of the protection of democracy in South Asia, India as the core state for prescribing democracy in its backyard, should cajole the democratic forces together. And at the same time India should exert its unparallel influence over the rebels and force them to lay down their arms and join mainstream politics.

The Americans as the champions of democracy should exert their leverage over India by pressing for prompt action in the formation of a democratic alliance. If prompt Indian utterance on safeguarding of democracy and the creation of a democratic alliance are delayed further, the inevitable control of Kathmandu by the rebels will pose a serious security threat to India’s national security and will raise speculation of the survival of democracy in South Asia.

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