(Courtesy: Chiran Jung Thapa)
In a report submitted to the Nepal's transitional governing authority (TGA), the United Nations Electoral Expert Monitoring Team (EEMT) had stated that establishing an adequate security environment for the Constituent Assembly elections (CA) would be mainly contingent upon the cooperation between political parties, but not so much on the number of Police or arms deployed. But, ground realities tell a different story. Actually, inter-party cooperation alone has been insufficient. Establishing an adequate security environment will depend both on the numbers of deployed Police personnel and on the quality and effectiveness of the service provided.
As if abiding by the EEMT's counsel, the political parties in the ruling alliance had already been cooperating at a strategic level for quite some time now. Notwithstanding the minor squabbles and the current Maoist pull out from the TGA, the parties in the SPAM alliance have cooperated over major issues. They have satisfactorily cooperated in the power sharing process. In a conciliatory spirit, these political parties have divvied up the ministerial portfolios, compromised on the ambassadorial appointments, and increased the number of seats in the interim parliament to accommodate all parties in the alliance. Even with the recent Maoist withdrawal from the TGA, the eight party unity purportedly remains intact.
Such inter-party cooperation should have sufficed and effectuated a secure ambiance like the EEMT suggested. But despite such cooperation, the security environment has rather deteriorated abysmally. A culture of violence and radicalization is growing. Currently, there are close to a dozen armed groups operating in Nepal. Bloodletting continues. Extortion, abductions and other criminal activities remain rampant and unchecked. Ethnic tensions are escalating and the YCL terror continues unabated.
Following the April uprising, what has transpired is anything but consolidation of peace. The signing of the peace accords by two of the three protagonists of a tri-polar conflict has certainly halted major hostilities. But the cessation of the major hostilities has not engendered peace. On the contrary, public insecurities have skyrocketed.
This drastic surge in public insecurities is not only the result of rising threats but also due to the lack of mechanisms and capacity to mitigate these threats. All societies face threats of variable kinds. But in any functioning society, there are buffers designed to counter these threats. It is when these countermeasures fail, public insecurities escalate. This is exactly what has happened in Nepal. Public insecurities have spiked in leaps and bounds because the buffer that is supposed to shield the society from threats has crumbled.
Generally, public security is divided into external and internal realms. When threats arise from within the state's territory, threat mitigation falls under internal security system, namely the Police force. Likewise, when threats emanate from outside the national borders, it falls under external security system, namely the national army. In the current context, threats fomenting public insecurities are arising from within Nepal's territory. So the realm of threat mitigation falls under the rubric of internal security, i.e. it falls under the domain of the Police force.
Unfortunately, however, the National Police force - the organization designated with the tactical chore of providing public security has inherently become debilitated. The organization's authority has ebbed away over the years and now the organization teeters on the brink of impotence.
Ironically, the recent carnage in Kapilbastu serves as quintessential reminder as to what has become of the Police force. The trickling reports on the incidents heap substantial blame on the Police, mainly pointing to their inability to prevent the melee. Seemingly, they remained as mere indifferent spectators unwilling to intervene. The reports further states that had the Police intervened, the melee could have been thwarted.
This is not the first time the Police have been accused of such passivity. In similar incidents, video footage of the Nepalgunj communal riots showed the Police standing idly not enforcing their writ while marauding mobs went on a rampage. Also, in Kupondole, while Maoist cadres attacked a group protesting against Maoist atrocities, the Police watched powerlessly.
These incidents are not isolated incidents. Sadly, the utter laxity displayed by the Police reflects a growing norm throughout the country. Today, as YCL activities trample on its authority uninhibited, the Police personnel have become powerless. Due to its inability to counter such encroachment over its authority and the failure to check YCL transgressions, public confidence has sagged to an all time low. As a result, its authority is being brazenly challenged and increasingly defied. Further, the human-rights activism has added to its woes. Fretful of being tagged as a human -rights violator, it seems inaction has become more preferable.
The precarious predicament of the Police force, however, is not a recent phenomenon. Rather, the organization has degraded over the years and the current trend of events has only added to its plight. Overt political intrusion and flagrant corruption sapped out professionalism from the organization. Such loss of professionalism has in turn led to the decay in public trust and faith.
Another component that compounded the disastrous decay of the organization is the Maoist insurgency. When the then government decided to haphazardly mobilize the ill-equipped, inexperienced and ill-trained Police to counter the Maoist threat, the repercussions were grave.
First, given that the Maoists were waging a war against the State, for them, the Police embodied the state. Thus, the Police naturally became their mortal enemy and the primary targets for the rebels.
Second, ill crafted counter insurgency operations back fired. Operations like Romeo and Kilo Serra victimized many innocent people - who later went on to become willing recruits for the Maoists. Hence, a venture designed to extinguish the conflict, ended up flaring it.
Third, while the Police personnel were being sadistically massacred during the Maoist raids, there was little sympathy or assistance. The army shackled by the constitutional prerogatives never came to its rescue until it was daringly attacked in Dang in 2001. For the most part, the public and civil-society remained apathetic. And the political parties in the government had no remedies.
Fourth, even when the concocted remedy did arrive in the form of Armed Police Force (APF), it still inadvertently hurt the beleaguered organization. APF was resurrected from scratch to assist the Police in its battle against Maoist insurgents. However, due to lucrative perks, it lured many Police personnel into joining the newly formed organization. The formation of the APF also took a large chunk of the counter-insurgency budget with it. All of this cost the Police its manpower, monetary support and morale. As a result, the Maoist insurgency left a scarring sense of abandonment and helplessness in the Police force.
Also, with the formation of APF, the Police was pushed further down in the hierarchy of the security agencies and its unrivalled authority in internal security was diluted. At one point it was only bullied and belittled by the Army. But with the entry of the APF in the pecking order, the Police was further relegated to a lower status.
Ultimately, no other organization bore the brunt of the insurgency more than the Police force. The toll was not just the 1400 Police lives lost or the thousands injured, but what critically drooped as a consequence was public faith in the organization, and morale of the personnel. On top of that, it had to share with the APF, its manpower, budget, and authority.
To add to its ill fortunes, now with the entry of Maoists in the political mainstream and especially in the ruling alliance, the organization’s morale is further dented. Operating under the authority of the once mortal enemy has been quite discomfiting. Further, the YCL's own form of policing and highhandedness has been more humiliating and infringing upon it proper authority.
Despite such a depressed condition of the Police, hardly has a voice been raised to highlight this critical issue. Even those like Rajendra Bahadur Singh, the former AIG, whom many in the force reckoned as a bastion for raising the dire concerns of his fellow officers, have now been relegated into irrelevance.
Turning a blind eye to this issue, however, is more detrimental to the Nepali polity than it is to the Police force. How can peace endure in the absence of public security? How can a democratic society flourish when there is no mechanism to protect the freedom and liberty of individuals? How can a society function when law of the land cannot be enforced? Regardless of who governs, what becomes of the status quo of a state which lacks the capacity to enforce its own laws and establish a monopoly on the use of force within its territory?
The answers to these questions revealingly indicate the significance and relevance of effective policing. The Police force is not just scrawny, baton wielding individuals decked in riot gear. Neither is their duty solely confined to crowd control and criminal catching. Rather, they have a much greater role. The organization is an indispensable instrument of the State designated with the duty of maintaining law and order. Even more importantly, they are ordained with the cardinal task of legitimizing the state's monopoly on the use of force through a commitment to the rule of law. Above all, it is the vital organization that ensures the proper functioning of the society by preventing it from degenerating into anarchy.
Furthermore, since Nepal is in the transitional phase after a violent conflict, the role of Police has become more important than ever. Restoring public security in the aftermath of conflict is a crucial element of any post-conflict peace-building agenda. Also, establishing rule of law is a fundamental precondition to lasting and self-sustaining peace. And effective policing caters to that need.
In what can be characterized as a lawless interregnum, the failure to enforce law and order has had profound implications in the normalization process. Hence, the State needs to develop the capacity to impose a full-spectrum security to sustain peace. And in order to accomplish that goal, empowerment of the Police force is vital.
Empowerment of the Police necessitates both the Police and the public to act in concert. Since there is a huge gulf of mistrust between the Police and the public, confidence building measures need to be explored to bridge that gap. As a starting point, to win public support, the Police need to be sincerely committed to public service and perform their designated duties as required by their job descriptions and the law. The public, on the other hand, should give the Police the recognition it deserves.
Additionally, the Home Ministry and the Minister need to refrain from excessively meddling in Police affairs and need to provide more room for independent manoeuvring. The Police force is a national instrument, not some dowry at the disposal of the Home Minister. Home Ministry's call for selective enforcement of law and order not only corrodes the authority of the Police but also tarnishes the organization’s pubic image. Therefore, empowering the Police also entails uniform law enforcement, notwithstanding political affiliation or affluence of the individual.
In sum, amongst the innumerable requirements necessary for sustainability of peace, the protagonists' commitment to cooperate is mandatory. But alongside, there are other components equally important as those commitments. Finding ways to simultaneously stabilize the public security situation, and build up domestic law and order capacities remains a key peace-building challenge in Nepal. And such a challenge necessitates effective policing. Until it dawns upon all about the indispensability of an effective Police force, the functioning of Nepali society and the sustainability of ongoing peace process will remain imperilled
Related Posts:
Ordinary Nepali Realities vs. Extraordinary Nepali Dreams
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/08/ordinary-nepali-realities-vs.html
Nepal's Constituent Assembly Elections - It's not Just a Matter of Security
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/08/nepals-constituent-assembly-elections.html
The greatest threat to peace in Nepal is misinformed, misguided, agenda-divine journalists like "The Guardian's" Isabel Hilton
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/courtesy-el-punto-isabel-hiltons.html
UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html
These are the opinions of individuals with shared interests on Nepal..... the views are the writers' alone (unless otherwise stated) and do not reflect those of any organizations to which contributors are professionally affiliated. The objective of the material is to facilitate a range of perspectives to contemplate, deliberate and moderate the progression of democratic discourse in Nepali politics.
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1 comment:
Mr. Thapa, as you know, the Nepal Police force was completely corrupted by the Nepali Congress and related parties after the 1990 movement.
Achyut Krishna Kharel made milions of dollars on an arms deal where he bought .22 rifles for the police force to fight the Maoists. We have seen the results of fighting an insurgency campaign with .22 rifles.
The whole insurgency started becaue Home Ministers like Khum Bahadur Khadka and Sher Bahadur Deuba couldn't do their jobs. Even then (and present), Bahunist Girija Koirala claimed that he resigned because the army would not follow his orders to go to battle.
Today, it's the same band of jokers who are in seats of power, making a mockery out of democracy and rightful fools out of the Nepali sheep.
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