Highlights from ICG's Report - Nepal's Peace Process: Making it Work

The International Crisis Group’s (ICG) report of December 15, 2006, is a MUST READ for anyone even remotely interested in assessing the undercurrents that currently drive Nepal’s peace process.

Click on the text below to access the full report:

Nepal's Peace Process: Making it Work

This 29 page document, titled “Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work,” includes a detailed account of all major events that have transpired in Nepal, post-April 2006. The report also offers a holistic perspective on the challenges faced by individual constituents to Nepal’s political conflict and recommends various instruments that may be used to hedge against the risk of a failed peace process.

In the true spirit of independent, impartial analysis, this ICG report accurately documents numerous trends in Nepal’s political dynamics. The authors of this report take great pains to subvert any hint of pessimism; they allude to components of a number of “what if” scenarios, but intentionally fall short of discussing discrete ramifications. Sufficient, background information is provided, but the task of formulating conclusions is left to the report’s audience.

Outlined below are highlights of this ICG report, along with inferences that the information provided, may be used to substantiate.

Timetable for CA Elections – Way too aggressive and almost certainly unrealistic

• The ICG correctly recommends that “only free and fair elections can give a government the necessary decisive mandate” and that “nothing should be allowed to put them off.” Having outlined this reality at the forefront of the report, the rest of the document includes a myriad of recommendations that are close to impossible to fulfill in a 6-month time frame.
• There are 10 thematic (and approximately 34 supporting) recommendations outlined in this report. Of these, not one is relatively more important than another and it is apparent that only if implemented in tandem, can the desired outcome of “free and fair” elections be achieved.
• In other words, the 10 recommendations together, depict a best-case scenario for the up-coming CA elections – a scenario that is completely out of synch given the timeframe available in which to implement the ICG’s recommendations.
• Ironically, the correct assertion that “a gap (in the intended versus actual CA elections) could prompt disillusionment of misbehavior from disgruntled parties,” is included under a section entitled “Overambitious timetable.”
• Ideally, “restored rule of law and an open environment of campaigning and public education months in advance of the polls” and a “solid agreement on basic issues such as policing” are cited as elements necessary to make the June, 2007 CA timetable, viable.
• Endogenous factors aside, the number one exogenous factor that could send the entire peace process into a tailspin is astutely identified as follows: “The ed of his (Girija Prasad Koirala) active political life will spark power struggles with the NC, the SPA and the SPA-Maoist combine.”

Should CA elections be postponed, the postponement would not be because of “regressive forces at play” (although postponement would certainly permit additional time for non-republican forces to forward their agenda). It would be because the outcome of “free and fair” elections cannot be guaranteed given the ground reality of Nepal’s current political atmosphere.

Agreements of the past have to be implemented in full, public expectations have to be re-calibrated. Elections for the sake of having them (same argument used during last year’s municipal polls) may serve the Maoist agenda in the short term but they will certainly not serve Nepal’s long term interest – elections must be irrefutably “free and fair.”

UN role in Nepal – Constructive, but slow and inadequate given ground realities

• Other factors such as “whether enough (UN) monitors can be in place quickly enough to build confidence in the run-up to elections,” that “the arms management deal has boosted the UN’s credibility while adding to already exaggerated expectations” and the observation that “the UN’s task of registering Maoist fighters will be far from straightforward,” stop shy of highlighting the beaurecratic (organizational) risks that accompany the UN’s role in Nepal’s peace process.
• The UN has already been victim to Baburam Bhattarai’s suggestion that the UN should not be retained as an obstacle to the momentum of the peace process – even though inviting the UN to moderate peace has been a Maoist demand for years. Momentum is key to the achievement of Maoist goals whereas speed is certainly not an attribute of the UN as an organization. This dynamic is hinted at throughout the ICG report but is not outlined directly as a risk to Nepal’s peace process.
• The establishment of a UN human rights monitoring mission (during the King’s rule) is cited as an example that demonstrated “the utility of well-defined UN assistance” that allayed “Indian concerns of a possible erosion of its regional hegemony. In acknowledging geo-strategic realities, the ICG report inadvertently amounts to an endorsement of Indian hegemony over Nepal, by the UN.
• In due course of time, this acknowledgement may become more a liability than a strength to UN activities in Nepal for resentment of Indian influence is almost certain to re-surface with the passage of time.

There is a distinct possibility that the UN may be overextending itself in Nepal. The resource gap between what is required to conduct even the limited mandate the UN currently has, is becoming increasingly apparent. No UN mission (in situations of conflict) to date, has employed citizens of the country in question in any peace keeping/monitoring capacity.

By hiring ex-Gurkhas in Nepal, the UN has exacerbated its exposure to criticism by undermining that which makes the UN what it is – a body that has the world’s mandate to deliver unquestioningly INDEPENDENT and IMPARTIAL services. The employment of ex-Gurkha personnel under the pretext of technical proficiency (what proficiency does one need to be a gatekeeper of a storage depot?) is certain to give the UN a “black eye,” should unexpected events occur.

Parliamentary Parties – Same faces, same games, nothing new to report

• The ICG report cites the success of a “popular protest movement” without the use of force, by the Parliamentary Parties. While this claim is somewhat true, it sidelines historical context that fuelled the protest, that fuelled the insurgency and fails to acknowledge the very violent methods that were used to invalidate municipal polls held during 2006.
• Methods included threats to life and personal property and the targeted assassination of numerous electoral candidates. The SPA condoned Maoist enforcement methods and no investigations have been launched to punish Parliamentary Party endorsed, murders. The fact being, implicit force was very much a factor leveraged by the SPA throughout the movement.
• Koirala’s political bet that “the country is probably still more conservative than feverent republicans would like to believe,” is a brilliant observation. Whether this bet pays off or not is yet to be seen. But the pointed identification of the underlying premise of Koirala’s reluctance to advocate openly for a republican set-up, is commendable.
• Yet another apparent (but not openly discussed) dynamic is documented as follows: “Congress’ internal politics are as murky as ever. Despite public professions of contrition at past corruption and poor governance, party machinery has quietly been put back in the hands of some of the worst offenders.” This reference is made in relation to senior NC leaders Khum Bahadur Khadka and Govinda Raj Joshi who were cleared of corruption charges on "technical grounds."
• Yet another excellent observation is as follows: "Second rank officers in the regular and armed police appeared to be judged by their connections rather than their actions: The deputy chief of the armed force, Ravi Raj Thapa, was suspended despite the fact that he was in charge of human resources and not part of the command chain. Basudev Oli, who was responsible for operations, was promoted to become the new chief." Nepotism, favoritism and anything but merit-based, professional progression - biting examples of the traditional SPA mentality that has crept into the post-Feb. 1 period.
• Naturally, this report acknowledges the obvious that “jostling for control of the mainstream left has begun.” Invalidating Madhab Kumar Nepal’s past rhetoric (that the UML had infiltrated the Maoists to mainstream them) as hogwash, this ICG report correctly points out that “each (of the leftist parties) is a threat to the other’s long-term future, and there is little basis for a shared vision.”
• Perhaps the strongest (and most controversial language employed in the entire report) depicts a reality that is often sidelined owing to feudal, caste-based loyalties: "Control over the peace process has not increased confidence; that all decisions were made behind closed doors by a handful of Brahman men leaves sceptics wondering if ten years of conflict has done anything to change underlying structures."

The segment of the ICG report on the Parliamentary Parties is akin to a de-ja-vu. The new generation of leaders are still being held at bay, the practice of continued impunity for crimes committed while in power (corruption, murder, bribery, etc.) persists and the general state of disillusionment (Koirala with his insistence on retaining a ceremonial monarchy and Madhab Nepal with his dream of leading a republican front) is completely at odds with reality.

With the inevitable collapse of converged interests (namely anti-monarchist) inevitable, the Parliamentary parties (especially members of the SPA) are overdue for a rude awakening - courtesty, the Maoists.

The Maoists - Same strategic goals, different methods

• The ICG report says precisely that which Nepal’s disillusioned intellectuals and mainstream media refuse to admit: that they were wrong about the Maoists being desperate to enter the democratic mainstream when in fact, everything the Maoist have done (are doing), suggests that the Maoists are in the process of defining their own version of the mainstream.
• Two very accurate depictions of where the Maoists intend to take Nepalese polity are as follows: “The Maoists’ strategic goal remains a communist republic (janabadi ganatantra), although they have accepted the concept of a democratic republic (loktantrik ganatantra) as an interim objective” and “a central committee member explained that the hope remains of establishing their own government in an unspecified time.”
• Yet a third quote sums up that which no one dares speak (for fear of being labeled anti-peace), but increasingly understands with each passing day: "They (the Maoists) are still an organized force with a known capacity for violence."

A question back to the analysts at the ICG would be: "how exactly does the stipulated Maoist goal of a communist republic reconciles with the notion of lasting peace and freedom for Nepal’s population?" And, a related question to advocates of “reformed Maoists” is: "precisely how have the Maoists transformed or how has their agenda changed from what it was before February-1?"

Obviously, the use of armed violence has converted to the continued threat (of various forms) of violence but could it be that nothing has fundamentally altered within the Maoist psyche? When during the run up to constituent assembly elections, Maoist leaders continue to state in various public fora, that their end-goal remains a communist republic of Nepal, does it make sense for anyone to claim otherwise?

The Palace - No big deal unless one chooses to make it so

• There is no commentary to make here, aside from the obvious – the role of the monarchy will be decided during the first seating of the constituent assembly. Time is better spent thinking about “conspiracies” that are hatching in plain sight for the world to witness, than about “conspiracies” that the palace is supposedly in the process of hatching somewhere down the road.

The "New Nepal" - The Maoist Way or the Highway?

The SPA government failed to get the Maoist sign-off on its Ambassadorial nominations – at least publicly. But a closer look at the gross violations of the Peace Treaty by the Maoists (that SPA leaders have continued to overlook), reveals that the Maoists have no room to talk. Should they care to push this agenda and make something out of nothing, it will be to the ultimate loss of the Maoists.

In clear and systematic violations of the covenants of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the following Maoist acts against peace have been documented in various media outlets:

• The Maoists coming out of their cantonment sites (bearing arms) from camps in Ilam, Morang and Chitwan (Tandi) to protest the government’s decision to nominate ambassadors. Any thoughts on what might have happened if the army also had to leave their barracks to protect the civilian population from armed Maoists?

• The Maoists spent the last two weeks repelling reclaimed police posts. On December 11, Maoists captured police posts at Sunwal of Nawalparasi and Dhakdhai in Rupandehi district on December 14. The post at Dhakdhai was restored after local people complained about smuggler frequently using the route. In Korobari, Kobhara and Mabhara of Jhapa district also they removed the police posts which were re-established upon the request of the local population. In Dipayal and Doti, Maoists barred authorities from re-establishing police posts. The installation of police posts to maintain law and order has been discussed verbally and also outlined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. There is no clause which says law and order cannot be maintained until the Maoists become part of the interim government; but it is universally understood that without complete arms management, the Maoists cannot go into the government. So, should law and order remain on hold till the Maoists complete their arms management process?

• On December 14, Maoists ordered Biratnagar Sub-metropolis officials to stop development works and financial transactions. The Maoist in-charge in Biratnagar warned government officials not to initiate any financial transactions and ordered that all on-going construction work be halted. Why should governance and development work remain on hold? Why should the local population suffer till the Maoists come to power? Is this not blackmail of some form?

• Maoists obstructed Village Development Committee (VDC) council meetings in Sankhuwasabha district. They warned twenty-one VDCs secretaries of the district against holding such council meetings. Is this the Maoist version of democracy – only the Maoists are allowed to conduct political activism before the CA elections?

• According to Local Development Officer of Bardiya district, Maoists are collecting millions of rupees by exploiting the District Development Committee's resources. In the southern region of Jhapa district including Shivganj, Baigundhura, Topgachhi and Panchgachhi, Maoists are still collecting taxes. What happened to the dissolution of parallel structures of governance? Why is the SPA government giving the Maoists Rs. 280 million of Nepali tax-payers’ monies only to taxed twice anyway?

• Maoists have stopped murdering people. However, local populations have not been able to live in peace owing to the operation of the parallel Maoist government. In Jhapa district Maoists forced Nandu Thebe of Damak-8 (on December 13) to sign documents stating that he and his family members were willfully vacating their house and property. This was an example of the Maoist court in action. Aren’t these courts supposed to be dissolved (according to the CPA)? What is the timeframe for the dissolution to take place and who is going to verify this for the Nepali people? Do we need to request the UN for another verification team?

• The Maoists forcibly took over twenty-five youths from different VDCs of Panchthar district. They took them to their sub-camp at Yanshila in Morang district. Clearly in violation of all past agreements between the SPA and Maoists. What would the Maoist reaction be if the APF, the CPF and the Army started recruiting again? How is it that everything the Maoists do is alright but anything the government forces do is against peace and provocative? What’s Ian Martin’s team doing in Nepal to enforce the articles of the CPA? Why do we have a CPA with no one to enforce it?

• On December 18, Maoists clashed with police at Gaushala VDC in Mahottari district. The incident took place when Maoists staged demonstrations in front of police office. During the demonstration, the Maoists used verbal assaults against the government forces. Finally, after the police showed no signs of being provoked, the Maoists began their physical assault by throwing rocks at the policemen and attempted to forcefully enter the security perimeter. At this point, the police were left with no choice but to engage the unruly and violent group of Maoists. How does one educate the Maoists in the art of democratic and peaceful protest when the SPA students use the exact same methods to push their agendas?

Ok, so the SPA messed up by not publicly consulting the Maoists before divvying up the peace dividend. But what's the big fuss about "violation of the peace accords" when the Maoists have been (and continue to be) in systematic violation of numerous articles, every single day? Why the search for excuses to discredit the SPA only when the Maoists are twice as guilty for continually shifting goal posts and extracting concessions from the State without reciprocal, measurable concessions of their own. What article of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have the Maoists honored without piling up additional requirements as successive agreements have been reached?

US House of Representatives, Resolution 1051 – In Support of Peace and Democracy in Nepal

Sincerest thanks go to Representative Jim Walsh for introducing House Resolution 1051 on December 06, 2006. This resolution expresses support from the US House of Representatives for the creation of a participatory democratic framework in Nepal, through the promulgation of a new constitution via constituent assembly elections. The address delivered by Congressman Walsh explicitly asked “the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist to adhere to commitments it has made and respect human rights.”

(The full text of Rep. Walsh’s statement is located at the following URL: WALSH STATEMENT)
(The full text of Resolution 1051 is located at the following URL: USHOR RES1051)

Equal thanks go to Nepali-Americans based in the American North East, who have opted to maintain sustained pressure on all parties to Nepal’s conflict (especially the Maoists), to ensure that the dreams and aspirations (of sustained peace and prosperity), of a collective Nepali diaspora, may be brought to fruition.

It is encouraging for Nepalis that their “American” compatriots understand that sustained peace and democratic discourse in Nepal cannot be engendered solely by subduing the doomed-to-fail ambitions of an arrogant Monarch; the equally power-hungry and hubristic attitude demonstrated by the opposite extreme (Nepal’s Maoists) must also be publicly acknowledged, openly debated, moderated and countered by all peace-loving and democratically inclined individuals, globally.

Congressman Walsh’s statement provides a firm foundation upon which logical opposition to Maoist aggression can be staged. The balanced yet pointed verbiage incorporated in the text of Resolution 1051 provides a sigh of relief for every Nepali whose desire for sustained peace, the right to universal suffrage (in an environment without fear) and the realization of a political framework (that is devoid of various agendas of blackmail), may be possible.

Below are key excerpts from Congressman Walsh’s statement. Also included are comments based on public knowledge gathered from various media sites that have published information that runs contrary to the spirit of Resolution 1051 and Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in general.

“The agreement states that “After the Nepali Army is confined to barracks and the Maoist combatants to cantonments, possession and exhibition of arms, intimidation, and use of violence and weapons in any form shall be punishable by law.''”

The Nepalese military has remained confined to its barracks since the April movement. Maoist combatants have begun congregating in various designated cantonment sites. The total number of Maoist fighters that have accumulated-to-date, do not even come close to the 36,000 combatants, publicly declared by the Maoist leadership. Similarly, the publicly declared count of 10,000 weapons is a far cry from being accounted for.

To date, no legislation has been formulated that provides the necessary enforcement mechanisms to punish potential violators of the stipulation outlined above. Maoist-affiliated student and trade unions continue to threaten and intimidate various non-Maoist entities. Nepali media is ripe with examples of Maoists holding civilians against their will and of Maoist people’s courts persisting (despite the Comprehensive Peace Agreement).

Two blatant violations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement include the Maoist-affiliated Student Union engaging the Nepali Congress Student Union (and wounding a total of 40 students in the process) and the same Maoist-affiliated Student Union forcefully shutting down a regional political event being conducted by a political party that currently holds seats in the resurrected Nepalese Parliament (the “Rastriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal”).

The agreement bars the government and the Maoists from recruiting soldiers, smuggling or transporting weapons and explosives, carrying out violent activities against each other, intimidating any person and destroying private property or public property. The agreement states no one is allowed to move about or participate in mass meetings and rallies with any type of arms.

Despite the agreement being signed by both the government and the Maoists, the Maoist recruitment drive continues with relentless effort. Again, Nepali and international media outlets are full of reports that cite specific examples of Maoists recruiting combatants all over Nepal. Often, the recruits are under the legal age of 18 and the act of recruitment (per the provision outlined above), should not be proceeding at all.

"I again call upon the Maoists and their Chairman Prachanda to permanently end violence, to submit to the rule of law and to compete on an even playing field with Nepal's political parties for a contest of ideas to seek the votes of the Nepalese people in free and fair elections."

Free and fair elections” is truly a catch-22 phrase. Given the current political climate that prevails in Nepal, elections are certainly possible; whether these elections will be “free” or “fair” are matters of heated contention.

The underlying rationale behind such debates pertain to two primary sources – the exclusion of any mention of the Maoist militia in the Peace Accords and the failure of the Peace Accords to empower the United Nations to not only observe, but truly enforce the Peace Accords in letter and spirit.

The Maoists continue to exhibit anything but compliance with multiple provisions outlined in the recently signed agreement. Without legal recourse or the means with which to enforce such provisions, the probability of the UN transforming into a lame duck observer is magnified, exponentially.

Public Maoist rhetoric continues to contrast sharply with official Maoist statements. Because of this divergence, doubts have emerged over whether the peace process is aimed at mainstreaming the entire Maoist outfit or whether it will yield a situation whereby the Maoist leadership cruises into power while large sections of the Maoist-support base return to war.

The Maoist leadership continues to leverage fears based on this outcome to bulldoze their agendas. Meanwhile, the Nepali government appears largely helpless and beholden to what many term, the “Maoist agenda of peace” – basically, the provision of peace exclusively on Maoist terms and conditions.

There is no place in a democracy for private armies. The parties of Nepal have requested U.N. assistance in monitoring adherence to the peace agreements, particularly the restriction of arms and armies. I welcome that request and the U.N.'s involvement, and I strongly support a robust U.N. monitoring mission in Nepal for the upcoming elections.

For the past 11 years, it is the Maoist militia that enforced the Maoist writ while their fighters engaged the state’s security forces. It is unfathomable that elections can be carried out free of fear, with the Maoist militia unaddressed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

It is completely irrational and counter-intuitive to envision an “even playing filed” when enforcers of the “Maoist will” continue to roam about the countryside, unchecked and ungoverned by any hint of legal standards in sight. It is just as inconceivable that “free and fair” elections can be held as long as the threat of Maoist force persists through the presence of Maoist militia, all over Nepal.

The UN team that intends to ultimately monitor elections in a country of close to 26 million citizens, currently stands at 30. With elections scheduled for June of 2007, an urgent ramp-up in independent and impartial UN personnel is required for the elections to occur at all. Furthermore, the current mandate that has been bestowed upon the UN mission in Nepal needs immediate revision to provide for enforcement mechanisms and legal recourse should UN observers find either government or Maoist forces in material breech of the provisions outlined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Currently, the situation in Nepal (owing largely to continued Maoist aggression), is either in violation of (or alarmingly close to not being able to carry out) the following provisions of USHOR, Resolution 1051:

Article-2-(A)-ii: (That the Government of Nepal should) hold free and fair elections for a constituent assembly;
Article-2-(A)-iii: (That the Government of Nepal should) immediately take steps to restore law and order and government presence and service delivery throughout the country;
Article-2-(A)-iii: (That the Government of Nepal should) implement the will of the people of Nepal;
Article-2-(B)-i: (That the Maoists must) lay down their weapons and permanently and publicly give up violence and intimidation for political ends, both in word and deed;
Article-2-(B)-ii: (That the Maoists must) strictly honor and implement their commitments to the Government and people of Nepal, including to:
(I) respect human rights;
(II) uphold civil liberties, including freedom of speech, association, and the press;
(III) submit to the rule of law; and
(IV) dismantle parallel governance structures that emerged during the conflict.

In addition to a hearty “thank you” to Congressman Walsh (and 40 of his colleagues who co-signed Resolution 1051), this message is also a request to Representative Walsh and the American HOR, to continue to closely monitor and employ its due diligence on Nepal’s still fragile, peace process.

This request pertains specifically to the continued provision of material and non-material resources required by Nepal’s democratic forces, to ensure that elections are held in an environment that is truly “fair and free,” and without intimidation.

The continued and systematic violation of agreed-upon articles (in Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement) by the Maoists deserves close scrutiny and vigilant monitoring. It is a moral imperative for every individual that believes in peaceful, democratic discourse to ensure that the Maoist leadership is held accountable for their cadres’ actions (just as constituents of Nepal’s government must be held accountable for the actions of their party-base and the state’s forces).

A system of checks, balances and a framework that identifies both objectives and repercussions for non-compliance, are urgently needed to sustain Nepal’s peace process. Although “with the best of intentions,” the UN’s slow progress on the ground in Nepal cannot be permitted to serve as an excuse for the possible derailment of Nepal’s peace process.

To avoid such an outcome, we humbly request that the US, in its capacity as a P-5 member, continue to support the expedited provision of any and all resources (and mandates) that are requested of the SC.

Lastly, the potent message carried by the following quote from Senator Walsh deserves much introspection. It is with this quote in mind that the success of Nepal’s peace process (and the achievement of her peoples’ will) should be measured.

“The progress to date is commendable and there is cause for optimism, but there is much work to be done. Agreements are worth little if they go unimplemented, and the Maoists in particular continue to engage in behavior that calls into question their commitment to non-violence and multiparty democracy.”

Continued Manipulation of Nepal’s Political Mainstream

The following are a list of Maoist quotes, made before and immediately after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accords.

Baburam Bhattarai: "The UN might take six months to fulfill its bureaucratic procedures. We can't wait that long to form the interim government."
Interpretation: Time is not something the Maoists have on their side. If the momentum of the process of legitimizing the Maoists’ violent past (often synonymous with what is referred to at the “peace process”) is slowed in favor of long-term sustainability, the likelihood of the general population rising against the Maoists for their crimes, rises exponentially. Before this were to happen, the Maoists would be “forced” to return to the jungles, the peace process would fail and it would be the fault of unknown “regressive forces” that are lurking in the background. These "invisible agents" are also known as forces that believe in open, non-violent, democratic (by international standards), political entities.

Baburam Bhattarai: "There seems to be a conspiracy even (not) to hold the constituent assembly elections on time."
Interpretation: Same song as above, this time in “G-Major” as opposed to “A-minor” – same old rhythm.

Krishna Bahadur Mahara: "It'll be a big political blunder to believe that the 10-year people's war has ended. Only people without political consciousness say this."
Interpretation: For Nepal’s “a-political” civil society, this sort of rhetoric is a necessary evil because the Maoist cadre have to be assuaged as the Maoist leaders are hooked into mainstream politics. For the rest of Nepal, this sort of rhetoric is a very clear indication of the light in which the Maoists view the political changes of the recent past – as victory for the Maoists on their terms. Peace (again on the Maoists terms), is simply a concession the Maoists have yielded from the state, in return for their legitimization.

Baburam Bhattarai: "Right now, we have entered another phase of the people's war. It's only talk of an idea to say that conflict, war and struggle has ended forever."
Interpretation: Same as above. The only difference is the choice of words. The message itself is crystal clear – the Maoists are going to keep chugging along till every one of their demands are fulfilled. There will be no let down, there will be no compromise, the Maoists intend to have peace brokered as the state’s systematic surrender to the Maoist leadership’s will.

Deb Gurung: "Raising taxes and donations will continue. Parties in government are also collecting donations now. Until now, we are in a parallel government. Only after joining the government, we won't have a separate government."
Interpretation: It doesn’t matter what treaties, agreements or accords the Maoist leadership signs. It will continue to be business as usual until the Maoists are rewarded with legitimacy, through an interim government, for waging a violent campaign against a newly emerging, democratic state. In other words, the Maoists didn’t like being insignificant in the post-1990 atmosphere so they killed 13,000 and displaced over 200,000 to make their point – their point was that they belong in power in order for the country to be at peace and until this demand is met, the war various elements of the Maoists political pressure tactics will continue unabated.

Baburam Bhattarai: "Arms management will move ahead simultaneously," he said, adding, "If interim arrangement is not put in place within Mangsir (mid-December), the CA polls cannot be held by mid-June. And if there is a delay in CA polls, the entire peace process could get derailed."
Interpretation: Blackmail. Also known as holding one’s political opponents hostage to the Maoists’ peace agenda. Either everything goes the way the Maoists want (whereby the Maoists will sweep the CA polls given the levels of intimidation and control they still hold over the Nepalese countryside), or they will have no other choice to go back to war. And the peace process being derailed will be the government’s fault, not the Maoists’ who choose to go back to war, but the government that fails to play the game by the Maoist rules.

Each of these quotes represent veiled threats. Each of these statements runs contrary to the spirit and letter, enshrined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

A day after PM Girija Prasad Koirala claimed that “Nepalis no longer have to live under the dark shadow of terror,” (very reminiscent of President Bush’s claim regarding the end of “all major combat operations” in Iraq), news emerged of civilians being held in Maoist captivity (click here to access report).

It would appear that despite the Prime Minister’s grandiose claim and Home Minster Shitoula’s sycophantic interview (where he lauds Master Koirala as the father of Nepal’s peace), this is what thousands of Nepalis (out of media sight and thus out of public mind) are doing – living under Maoist terror.

Something is terribly amiss.

Either the Maoist leadership is faltering or the Nepalese intelligentsia is so deluded by the Maoist hold on the peace agenda (peace on the Maoists’ terms only), that the very people who everyone claims to be “fighting” for, continue to suffer untold misery.

Civil society and party elements’ are so emasculated by the Maoists’ ability to leverage fear of an already silenced monarchy, they are systematically overlooking Maoist atrocities taking place under their very noses.

If the Maoists want to be treated and perceived as responsible leaders (a task immensely complicated by their murderous past), they need to urgently begin moderating their public rhetoric and simultaneously moderating their cadres’ behavior.

Otherwise, Baburam is right, a fear-free environment for CA elections will never be fostered and there will be no one left to blame, but the Maoists themselves.

Below are 2 formerly published pieces (June & August 2006) that visit aspects of a democratic mainstream that the Maoist leadership needs to conform to; for the sake of peace and for their own sakes, immediately!

http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/06/defining-mainstream.html

http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/08/nepals-challenging-road-to-peace.html

http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/

Political Strategy to Balance South Asia’s Leftist Equation

(Courtesy: el Zorro)

No one but the Maoists themselves can burst the "peace bubble" in Nepal.

The reality of what has happened in Nepal will only hit home once the Maoists take on the Nepali Congress (NC) - and this eventuality (whether during constituent assembly elections, during campaigns or at the poll booths) is guaranteed.

All things being equal, Nepal’s comprehensive peace agreement fosters a political landscape where the claim of the legal left (the United Marxist Leninist party) to having "infiltrated" the Maoists (to mainstream them) will be invalidated.

In other words, where gaining political ground is concerned, the fact that the Maoists have systematically eroded the UML's (United Marxist Leninist) grass roots (outside urban centers) will become increasingly transparent. Essentially, the UML's leadership will become a "decapitated head" - no pun intended.

This is why increasingly erratic statements continue to emerge from the UML’s leader, Madhav Kumar Nepal. He understands that the rise of the Maoists means the destruction of his support-base. Hence the proposition of a referendum on the Monarchy, acquiescence to the idea of a United Republican Front, and the empty threat that the UML might not join the interim government.

If one digs deeper into such statements, it becomes apparent that these are words of desperation. None of Madhav Kumar Nepal’s recent propositions make sense - every one of them places the UML at a distinct disadvantage vis-à-vis the Maoists.

No party in Nepal can pretend to compete with the Maoists using the "republican" slogan. Madhav Kumar Nepal’s suggestion of a Republican Front is negated by the fact that it is not the UML (the legitimate, mainstream, democratic face of Nepal's leftist ilk) but the Maoists who will reside at the helm of any such coalition. The Maoists know this, which is precisely why they don't give the UML (or its leadership) the time of day.

It is also of consequence that much of the struggle between the student wings of the UML and the Maoists has gone unreported by Nepali media. This is a result of the Maoists’ grip on the peace agenda, which they hold can only be delivered on their terms -- the only ones they accept as legitimate.

It was only last week, after Maoist students gave the NC’s student wing a publicly humiliating thrashing, that the news made Nepali headlines. There was no mention of the UML’s student wing taking a Maoist beating only the day before.

What is happening at the student level is a microcosm of a larger phenomenon at the leadership level. In effect, the strategic ramifications of the peace agreement will yield a situation where ideological clashes will take the bottom-up approach.

The UML is no match for the Maoists. After the UML is absorbed, the only remaining obstacle to Maoist domination is the Nepali Congress. While Girija rests behind the fallacy that the NC-Maoist alliance serves the NC’s cause (during CA polls), the Maoists are busy entrenching themselves at the grass roots.

When time for polling comes, the NC’s access will not proceed beyond the district HQ level, and there will be many more clashes between NC and (soon to be) “United Maoist” cadre. Girija will probably die in the knowledge that his last act in a position of power greatly facilitated the decimation of his own party (Girija’s “dynasty,” as it is called by many).

It is late in the day but not hopeless. There is a narrow window for action. For credible opposition to the upcoming leftist onslaught, the following conditions must be met:

• Emergence of a right-of-center Party/Coalition. The only agenda of such a group (party) should be the following: “opposition to any group in Nepal that leverages (or has leveraged) a history of violence to attain power.” It must, in its party platform, distance itself from the king and work continually to challenge the Maoists on the basis of the Maoists’ violent path to power. The monarchy is an agenda of political concern only as long as the Nepalese polity chooses to view it as such. Much more serious is excusing the Maoists’ violent past in return for “peace.” Nepalese deserve better than being held hostage to peace – justice should be ubiquitous, not selective, and definitely not subject solely to Maoist interpretation.

• The Nepali Congress must face the consequences of its shortsightedness. The process of the NC “feeling the heat” has already begun, and it must intensify -- not at the hands of any other group, but purely at the hands of the Maoists. If the Feb 1st escapade has made anything clear, it is that the NC commands complacent intellectual assets (all of a single caste composition) that have global reach. In order for the NC leadership (and its supporting assets) to feel threatened, thus to be shocked into realization that their very political identity is in mortal peril, they must first recognize where the threat is coming from – the Maoists. The NC must also realize that the Maoist agenda of “eradicating feudalism” extends to the decimation of norms and practices that define the very core that is the Nepali Congress. The purported Maoist drive on this front won’t stop after it has finished off the Palace, the UML, and the smaller, right-of-center parties.

• The State military must be kept intact. This is easier said than done. However, the posture the military has adopted thus far is correct. The state’s armed forces continue to maintain a calculated distance from both the palace and the parties. The state’s army must continue to remain “master-less” (completely impartial) until the erection of a democratically elected polity. The transfer of control over military assets from the Palace to the Nepali Congress (no matter how externally democratic this party portrays itself to be) would be unacceptable. The challenge for the Army is to continue maintaining its current posture while keeping its most elite troops motivated, determined, and capable of facing any and all eventualities.

• The invalidation of the fallacious calculations of Nepali intellectuals must continue. The Nepali intellectual discourse that lends disproportionate sympathy to the Maoists must continue to be attacked and diminished. The propaganda line that holds to be anti-Maoist is automatically to being pro-palace must be exposed for the lie it is. The merits of an anti-Maoist, pro-peace political platform must be set forth and maintained independent of any other agenda. Simultaneously, specious arguments that portray a Maoist change of heart must be relentlessly hammered using examples of on-going, un-checked Maoist aggression against the population.

• The South Block has to be provided assurance of an alternative to the Maoists. The Indians’ ability to leverage the American position on Nepal to enhance its political clout should be taken away. Nepal’s sovereignty is lost, and American policy in this regard has inadvertently forwarded Indian dominance of South Asia. With this realization in mind, American “consultations” with New Delhi should be ratcheted up to yield a firm position on whether or not an armed, extremist element in Nepal can ever hope to be transformed into a credible, democratic force. Above all, the Indians desire respect and recognition – they want to be seen as the arbiter of Nepal’s peace (without being seen as the antagonist behind the Maoist conflict). American policy on this issue should be reformulated by placing emphasis on Indian strength, while simultaneously drawing the precise Indian position out into the open. There is the risk of such a move resulting in a Maoist-polity in Nepal in the short-run, but it will most certainly guarantee a more equitable solution in the medium-to-long-run by forcing New Delhi to put at stake that which its values most – its reputation. If Nepal goes to the gutter, it won’t be a headache for Washington! Indian awareness on this issue has to be immediately resurrected. Nepalese too, have to quickly learn to fight their own dirty political battles without having the Americans, Indians, or Chinese fight these on their behalf.

• The UN presence in Nepal has to be leveraged more effectively. The situation in Nepal is as much a challenge to Nepalese as it is to the UN. The UN’s past in making peace has to be continually highlighted to accentuate former mistakes, thus to hedge against the replication of such blunders as Timor and Kosovo in Nepal. If executed properly, this strategy has the potential to erect a natural check against Maoist aggression, using a tool that the Maoists themselves have employed to gain legitimacy – the UN. This could be an extremely powerful lever, but for this angle to become effective, enforcement mechanisms and consequences of being non-compliant have to be clearly spelled out in the Peace Accords to enable UN action.

The elements needed to forward this agenda are present but currently without leadership. The biggest tangible impediment is the lack of resources.

If the resources become available, there is no scenario that cannot be brought to fruition in Nepal. The April uprising is a perfect example of how far a “dollar” can go in a country where the vast majority are concerned primarily with a single challenge – how to put food on the table, once a day.

There are many methods that, if brought into play immediately, could undermine the Maoist agenda by exposing it for what it truly is – 13,000 dead, 200,000 displaced, uncounted maimed and kidnapped -- all for a handful of failed politicians making a mockery of democratic processes by holding the world hostage to a false agenda of peace.

Ret. General Mehta, “General” Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Ret. General Chitra B. Gurung and the UN Secretary General’s Envoy, Ian Martin – On ex-Gurkha Troops

(Courtesy: el Zorro)

Long gone are the days when the myth of Indian troops being deployed in Nepal was written off as Palace politics. Between the “nationalist till we come to power” Maoists and the “nationalist depending on political climate” SPA, the chances of Nepalis who spent their lives serving the Indian and British governments, monitoring Nepal’s fragile peace, is gaining momentum.

First it was Retired Indian Army General Ashok Mehta who suggested “volunteering” Indian Gurkha troops to “assist” in Nepal’s transition. Then came “General” Prachanda’s suggestion that former Gurkhas be employed to monitor the peace. Then came Retired Nepali Army General Chitra B. Gurung’s uncontrolled praise for his former UN employers (the General stopped just short of making the same argument as Pushpa Dahal and Ashok Mehta).

After this initial barrage came the statement from the Secretary of the Gurkha Ex Servicemen Organization (GAESO) Mahendra Lal Rai, that ex-Gurkhas have the technical knowledge to carry out monitoring duties. Finally, the UN Secretary General’s Envoy, Ian Martin, made a technical suggestion that the UN may consider “supervising” ex-Gurkha servicemen to carry out its official mandate in Nepal.

Is this sheer coincidence or a string of logical events that were calculated in advance? Is the idea of using Nepalis to monitor a cease-fire agreement in Nepal brilliance or stupidity?

Logically, the most important attributes of personnel involved in any peace-keeping capacity are the following:

Complete independence
Complete impartiality

Nepalis (whether they have served for the Indians or the British or whoever), fail the tests of independence and impartiality by virtue of being Nepali citizens.

One does not need military skills to observe a cantonment site. Why not mobilize any combination of the 1000 plus NGOs that perform all sorts of services instead? Why not give Nepal’s civil society leaders the option of observing the peace accords? The answer is the same. Because being Nepali means disqualification on the grounds of independence and impartiality. Nepalis of all ethnicities and backgrounds are party to this conflict by less than 2 degrees of separation.

Below are some thoughts on why Nepalis are getting a raw deal on the execution of the peace process.

Thoughts on General Ashok K. Mehta’s Proposition

Retired Indian Army General Ashok Mehta has been a consistent commentator on Nepal. As a former Indian Army officer, he is widely published on matters that pertain to Indian security interests. The relevance of his writings on Nepal however, derive more from having commanded the Indian Army’s Gurkha brigades than from substantive exposure to Nepal’s own military assets (and national interests).

While General Mehta’s book, “The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenge” is a mediocre work of tailored facts and figures (many of them inaccurate and out of context), it’s his recent views on Nepal’s road to peace, that are significantly more thought-provoking.

(Commentary on General Mehta’s suggestion from early June, 2006 is located at the following link: http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/06/consolidating-peace-in-nepal-general.html)

Thoughts on “General” Pushpa K. Dahal’s Proposition

Although never having attained legitimacy though an electoral process himself, Pushpa Dahal seems to be the only politician in Nepal who appreciates that the country is actually heading for constituent assembly elections.

According to Pushpa Dahal’s calculations, the Nepali Maoists face two strategic threats. The first is the state’s military and the second, is the risk of not obtaining “adequate” legitimacy through the constituent assembly polls. The term “adequate,” meaning sufficient electoral votes necessary to permanently obscure the fact that the Maoists murdered their way into power (with 13,000+ deaths and over 200,000 displaced).

In politics, an individual’s intelligence is gauged not by what he speaks but by how well he is able to divert attention away from his own weaknesses by placing the onus of decision making on his opponents. By this measure, Pushpa Dahal is easily the most masterful manipulator to have been born in Nepal.

Mr. Dahal knows perfectly well that the idea of using Nepali citizens (in any official capacity) during what MUST BE a completely IMPARTIAL peace process, is simply not feasible. Yet, partially with the significant vote bank in mind and partially with a view to putting his opponents on the defensive, Pushpa Dahal has successfully identified himself as the individual who introduced the possibility of employing former British and Indian Gurkhas, a peace monitors.

In essence, Mr. Dahal is extending the Maoist power-base they way his group has always done it. During the 11 year war, Pushpa Dahal and his cohorts mobilized Nepal’s rural populous by manipulating every point of social and ethnic tension that characterizes Nepalese polity. The Maoists did this even as successive attempts by the state to prevent its citizens becoming Maoist cannon fodder was foiled on the basis of alleged “conflict escalation” and human rights.

The recent Maoist suggestion of using ex-Gurkha servicemen is nothing but an extension of the Maoists’ 11-year strategy. They are mobilizing yet another segment of Nepal’s population to their electoral benefit by placing the onus of decision-making on the SPA (Girija in particular since the Maoists have found him to be rather lethargic in his old age), the UN and all other interest groups that are party to Nepal’s peace process.

Whatever the ultimate outcome of this preposterous suggestion may be, Pushpa Dahal and the Maoists have already maneuvered into the winning space.

Thoughts on Retired Nepali Army General Chitra B. Gurung’s Proposition

It is indeed heartening to see such positive messages coming from a former officer of the state’s military.

Retired General Chitra B. Gurung’s article “So Far So Good” (posted at the following URL: http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue/325/GuestColumn/12879), could just as easily be tilted “So Far So Good but so much ass-kissing, still doesn't obscure the truth.”

In his piece, the General’s writing stops just shy of wholeheartedly endorsing General Mehta and “General” Prachanda’s suggestion to use ex-Gurkha servicemen as an example of “local” conflict management. He certainly does a fine job of presenting selective information in support of a logical next step – General Mehta and “General” Prachanda’s step.

For starters, General Gurung’s claim that Nepal’s peace process is homegrown is an insult to collective, Nepali intellect. Was is it not for external Indian assistance, the SPA alliance would still be talking about “regression” and the Maoists would be busy playing the Parties against the Palace.

The General’s suggestion that direct, external party mediation has not occurred is mind-boggling! Was the General busy at UN Headquarters when the 12 point agreement between the Maoists and the SPA was forged in New Delhi? Has the General been following accolades from Nepal’s highest ranking comrades, expressing gratitude to India for its role in bringing “democracy” to Nepal?

How much more “direct” evidence of external mediation need there be for General Gurung to admit that even his own brothers-in-arms, throughout the Maoist insurgency, continually voiced their opinion that the key to the Maoist insurgency lay in India

Surely, the General isn’t suggesting that it was the King’s February-1 move that forced the Indians to “indirectly” meditate peace in Nepal? The General’s reference to “the changed political scenario that led to the seven party and Maoist alliance,” implies praise for the King, for sacrificing his crown in return for peace monitored by the UN. But isn’t this notion a rather convoluted perception of how "organic peace" in Nepal has been created?

Judging by the UN’s history in peace keeping, General Gurung of all people, should know that there is no record-to-date (with the nebulous exception of Guatemala) where sole UN intervention has resulted in sustained peace. Fancy conflict resolution terminology aside, not a single one of the examples listed by General Gurung qualifies as a scenario where direct external mediation was absent, or where the UN mission in its sole capacity brought about peace.

Take for example the General’s example of disarmament in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone’s 2002 elections were preceded by the following: A $35 million contract that was awarded to private military firm, Executive Outcomes (in 1996); a $47 million Nigerian-led UN peace keeping force (ECOMOG) that failed miserably in 1997 (after RUF rebels launched operation “Pay Yourself”); and a $10 million payment to another private military firm (Sandline) in March 1998, which enabled victory to a counter-coup launched against RUF rebels.

The violence in Sierra Leone actually subsided years after initial UN intervention and it was only with concerted pressure by a rebuilt Sierra Leone Army, incursions by the Guinean army and a reinforced, revitalized UN force (that essentially picked up after all major internal and third party operations had ended), that Sierra Leone saw peace. (General Gurung’s own brethren - Nepalese troops - served in UN peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone).

The point to take away here is that during the UN retreat in 1997, the civilian population was left completely exposed to the rebels’ backlash. Another point to take away here is that the RUF rebels were finally disarmed after the government forces pounded the rebels and thereby, forced peace on the government’s terms.

The key take-away is this: the UN’s failure elsewhere doesn’t necessarily imply that it should fail in Nepal. Time and again, the UN’s failure has been positively linked to over-extension of its capabilities and a short-fall in resource availability (after boots have hit the ground). Based on the nonchalant and systematic violation of articles in Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Accord (by the Maoists) the UN’s ability to perform (in any sort of enforcement capacity) is already compromised.

General Gurung offers a perfect prelude to suggestive ex-Indian/British Gurkha operations under a Chapter-7 mandate from the United Nations. However, the General’s logic requires further introspection. The piece is thoughtful, positive and in line with the mood of the times. But it is also premature and riddled with examples that repeatedly defy the General’s own premises.

If the General’s suggestion is indeed to encourage ex-servicemen to be employed under the “peace payroll” (in ANY capacity), General Gurung urgently needs to go back and visit his peace keeping fundamentals and reacquaint himself with the meaning of impartiality and independence.

Thoughts on the UN Secretary General’s Envoy, Ian Martin’s Proposition

UN Envoy, Ian Martin’s inability to decipher issues that pertain to the peace process and issues of a fundamental political nature is apalling! The UN’s promise to help Nepalese must be maintained in good faith and the UN must deliver on terms that do not compromise its fundamental charters.

Ian Martin’s suggestion that the UN may consider employing ex-Indian and British Gurkha servicemen in some unofficial capacity, borders dangerously on the edge of insanity. Martin's job in Nepal is as much to listen to the parties making peace as it is to give them sane advice.

Nepalis have endured 11 years of relentless violence, instigated by the Maoists. The country and the people of Nepal deserve better than a false hope of peace from the UN.

Before the peace process started, the UN was positive it could do so much and now that the process is in full swing, it can’t find the resources to do what needs to be done. This is the what the fundamental issue for Ian Martin is. The idea of employing ex-Gurkhas as a stop-gap measure is a "cheap," second-hand alternative, to Martin's lack of resources.

Hiring Nepalese (irrespective of whether it’s under the UN umbrella or not) is a raw deal that the UN is offering Nepal. It is not one that Nepalese should even consider.

While the idea of using ex-servicemen may be attractive to the GAESO (for post-retirement employment purposes) and to Ian Martin (owing to budgetary and resource constraints), it is not attractive to the overall level of impartiality and independence that a professionally conducted conflict resolution exercise, demands.

The level of technical expertise that ex-servicemen may have is not the issue of this debate. It is the fact that although these men served governments other than their own, their whole lives, they are Nepali by birth and thus are fundamentally a part of Nepal’s conflict.

Instead of acting in the capacity of a responsible diplomat, Ian Martin’s consideration of using local bodies in Nepal’s peace process (because his organization can’t foot the bill of a full, effective deployment) is robbery in broad daylight – robbery of the Nepalese peoples’ right to a professionally conducted peace process.

This is simply unacceptable. The UN’s presence in Nepal is not to generate jobs for ex-servicemen; it’s to ensure that Nepalese people get the best of what the international community can offer, to ensure that peace prevails in Nepal.

Rather than getting involved in semantic, politically motivated debates like these, Ian Martin and his team would do much better to start planning out exactly how they plan to hold the Maoists accountable for continued hostilities (even after the peace accords were signed). Martin’s team should be focusing on getting the Maoists and the government to agree upon a mutually acceptable enforcement mechanism that the UN can then carry out.

This “dog and pony show” on how capable the UN is at peace keeping is over. Now it’s time for Ian Martin and his team to deliver and it’s the responsibility of ever Nepali citizen (who has expressed undying adulation for the UN’s capabilities) to hold Ian Martin’s “feet to the fire.”

It is equally the moral responsibility of the international community to provide whatever resources are necessary to make peace prevail in Nepal. “Talk is cheap” as the saying goes and now it’s time for Nepal’s well-wishers to put money where their mouths are.

This is the bare minimum that Nepalese people deserve.

Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Gen. Mehta Overlap - Coincidence or More?

Maoist strongman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal's newly found love for Indian interests in Nepal comes as little surprise given the support the South Block has extended to the Nepali Maoists (officially over the past year and unofficially over the past decade).

Pushpa Dahal's most recent suggestion (that Indian Gurkhas be employed under a UN mandate in Nepal), conveniently overlaps with a suggestion that Retired Indian Army General, Ashok Mehta made approximately 6 months ago.

The writing below, was posted on NepaliPerspectives in June of 2006. The contents deserve a second review, given recent developments inNepal's peace process.

The questions our readers may want to ponder while reviewing this peace are as follows:

1. Is Nepal's peace really "organic" or was it fostered with directIndian assistance?

2. How relevant is UN presence in Nepal without a chapter 7 mandate (or some alternate enforcement mechanism)?

3. Where does one draw the line between the right to self-determination and sovereign national interest versus independent, impartial UN operations?

4. How impartial can Nepalis who have served in the Indian Army (even under a UN mandate) be? What attracts more loyalty, a disoriented sense of nationality or the source of one's pay check?

http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2006/06/consolidating-peace-in-nepal-general.html