Thoughts on Retired Nepali Army General Chitra B. Gurung’s Proposition

It is indeed heartening to see such positive messages coming from a former officer of the state’s military.

Retired General Chitra B. Gurung’s article “So Far So Good” (posted at the following URL: http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue/325/GuestColumn/12879), could just as easily be tilted “So Far So Good but so much ass-kissing, still doesn't obscure the truth.”

In his piece, the General’s writing stops just shy of wholeheartedly endorsing General Mehta and “General” Prachanda’s suggestion to use ex-Gurkha servicemen as an example of “local” conflict management. He certainly does a fine job of presenting selective information in support of a logical next step – General Mehta and “General” Prachanda’s step.

For starters, General Gurung’s claim that Nepal’s peace process is homegrown is an insult to collective, Nepali intellect. Was is it not for external Indian assistance, the SPA alliance would still be talking about “regression” and the Maoists would be busy playing the Parties against the Palace.

The General’s suggestion that direct, external party mediation has not occurred is mind-boggling! Was the General busy at UN Headquarters when the 12 point agreement between the Maoists and the SPA was forged in New Delhi? Has the General been following accolades from Nepal’s highest ranking comrades, expressing gratitude to India for its role in bringing “democracy” to Nepal?

How much more “direct” evidence of external mediation need there be for General Gurung to admit that even his own brothers-in-arms, throughout the Maoist insurgency, continually voiced their opinion that the key to the Maoist insurgency lay in India

Surely, the General isn’t suggesting that it was the King’s February-1 move that forced the Indians to “indirectly” meditate peace in Nepal? The General’s reference to “the changed political scenario that led to the seven party and Maoist alliance,” implies praise for the King, for sacrificing his crown in return for peace monitored by the UN. But isn’t this notion a rather convoluted perception of how "organic peace" in Nepal has been created?

Judging by the UN’s history in peace keeping, General Gurung of all people, should know that there is no record-to-date (with the nebulous exception of Guatemala) where sole UN intervention has resulted in sustained peace. Fancy conflict resolution terminology aside, not a single one of the examples listed by General Gurung qualifies as a scenario where direct external mediation was absent, or where the UN mission in its sole capacity brought about peace.

Take for example the General’s example of disarmament in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone’s 2002 elections were preceded by the following: A $35 million contract that was awarded to private military firm, Executive Outcomes (in 1996); a $47 million Nigerian-led UN peace keeping force (ECOMOG) that failed miserably in 1997 (after RUF rebels launched operation “Pay Yourself”); and a $10 million payment to another private military firm (Sandline) in March 1998, which enabled victory to a counter-coup launched against RUF rebels.

The violence in Sierra Leone actually subsided years after initial UN intervention and it was only with concerted pressure by a rebuilt Sierra Leone Army, incursions by the Guinean army and a reinforced, revitalized UN force (that essentially picked up after all major internal and third party operations had ended), that Sierra Leone saw peace. (General Gurung’s own brethren - Nepalese troops - served in UN peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone).

The point to take away here is that during the UN retreat in 1997, the civilian population was left completely exposed to the rebels’ backlash. Another point to take away here is that the RUF rebels were finally disarmed after the government forces pounded the rebels and thereby, forced peace on the government’s terms.

The key take-away is this: the UN’s failure elsewhere doesn’t necessarily imply that it should fail in Nepal. Time and again, the UN’s failure has been positively linked to over-extension of its capabilities and a short-fall in resource availability (after boots have hit the ground). Based on the nonchalant and systematic violation of articles in Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Accord (by the Maoists) the UN’s ability to perform (in any sort of enforcement capacity) is already compromised.

General Gurung offers a perfect prelude to suggestive ex-Indian/British Gurkha operations under a Chapter-7 mandate from the United Nations. However, the General’s logic requires further introspection. The piece is thoughtful, positive and in line with the mood of the times. But it is also premature and riddled with examples that repeatedly defy the General’s own premises.

If the General’s suggestion is indeed to encourage ex-servicemen to be employed under the “peace payroll” (in ANY capacity), General Gurung urgently needs to go back and visit his peace keeping fundamentals and reacquaint himself with the meaning of impartiality and independence.