Myth #3: “The Americans are contributing to an eventual meltdown in the peace process, which will ultimately precipitate another political crisis in N

Myth #3: “The Americans are contributing to an eventual meltdown in the peace process, which will ultimately precipitate another political crisis in Nepal.”

The proponents of this argument have a point. Yet the point appears to be more a search for a psychological scapegoat to shift blame rather than a mindset that forces Nepali decision makers to be accountable for their decisions.

How Nepal handles her internal affairs need not be open to any sort of interpretation other than that of Nepalis themselves. In a utopian situation, no interests outside of Nepal’s own would factor into Nepal’s policy making process. Yet a realistic understanding of Nepal’s geopolitical stratification and her economic position dictate otherwise.

There are a minimum of two competing, external interest that concern Nepal, in addition to numerous sub-interests and interests within these sub-interests. This is not a symptom that is peculiar to Nepal, rather an indication of a living, breathing (perhaps in Nepal’s case, hyperventilating) political process.

To perceive any single interest as disproportionately important to Nepal’s political direction could be the outcome of only two (or variations of these two) elements. Either policy makers appreciate that the views proposed by a particular interest group (external or internal) serve long-term Nepali interests, or they realize that the absence of a particular viewpoint would imprudently unravel a delicate political balance.

Instead of seeking avenues to single out a given position, what critics (committed to intellectually exercising the boundaries of their imagination) need to ask is why most of their political representatives aren’t forwarding critiques of the American position similar to their own.

For the sake of this argument, the question that need be posed is why only a minority within the SPA leadership and Nepalese Civil Society continue their assault on the American position, while the majority of Nepal’s self-proclaimed Civil Society leaders and previously elected politicians remain quiet.

Adherents of the argument that American policy in Nepal pursues the rationalization of yet another political crisis need to consider the possibility that American legal parameters may actually be serving Nepal’s interest by permitting the survival of a political viewpoint that moderates agree to in private but do not dare speak in public.

If this was not the case, why hasn’t a single moderate leader spoken out against the American position? Why is it that even advocates of a republican setup from within the Nepali Congress remain silent? Why is it that only the most rabid and borderline leftist extremists in the SPA coalition continue their offensive against what they often refer to as “Moriarty’s position?”

Critics who feel that the American position is bound to precipitate an eventual political crisis may wish to communicate with Nepalis familiar with procedures on lobbying Staff Members of the US Congress.

Proponents of Senator Patrick Leahy’s position on Nepal (including the Maoist leader Pushpa Dahal, who has sung Leahy’s praise) should evaluate why the Senator’s office has not issued statements that contradict the American position on Nepal. Senator Leahy is, in fact, a Ranking Member for the Appropriations Committee’s Sub-Committee on State and Foreign Operations – a very powerful position to say the least.

Senator Leahy is also a leading critic of the Bush Administration. This is the same administration that Maoist, Dev Gurung, recently cited as a root-cause behind friction on the issue of managing Maoist arms.

The fact of the matter is that neither Senator Leahy nor American Nepalis (accustomed to visiting Congressional aides) are likely to contradict current American policy on Nepal. The reason is that no American politician (or moderate Nepali American) is likely to engage in a debate over the provision of aid to a government that houses an armed faction (be it in an interim government or otherwise).

Additionally, no one wants to be perceived as aiding a group that features on the US Terrorist watch list and seems to take every opportunity to sing the praises of America’s enemies (a fairly odious crew, whatever one thinks of American policies themselves). Some may forward the argument that Nepali Maoists no longer deserve such dubious credentials. Others, who have born the brunt of Maoist atrocities may hold a different view.

The point here is not to embark on a semantic debate over whether Nepal’s Maoists belong on the US Terrorist watch list – this is an American decision that is justified by American standards. Rather, the debate should focus on whether Nepalis perceive Maoist actions as those that have invoked terror to achieve political agendas (and whether the Maoists are likely to continue leveraging their terrorist pasts to sustain their political agendas into the foreseeable future).

If the answer is “no,” the Americans retaining the Maoists on their terror watch list is irrelevant, and there need not be a looming political crisis that being “forwarded with American sponsorship.” If the answer is “yes” (or “maybe”), then the looming political crisis isn’t a figment of the American imagination – it is real, it is present, and it is in fact tethering at the back of Nepali minds.

The only brinksmanship here is of the psychological variety that the Maoists continue to employ. The Maoists’ proposal to manage arms only after political settlements are reached is a great example of this strategy in action. That the Maoists have maneuvered into a position where they control the peace initiative is not of the Americans’ doing. This is the result of a series of conscious decisions made by Nepal’s mainstream political actors and their signatures on various agreements hold testimony to this fact.

Once more, it is Nepal’s leadership on whose shoulders the eventual outcome of ongoing negotiations rests. Actors in the international arena are bound to pursue interests and forward policies that fit into their particular world-views. Ultimately, though, it’s up to Nepal’s politicians to exercise good judgment and decide which world-views are conducive to Nepal’s interest and to act accordingly.

If the overwhelming perception is that the American position is contributing to instability, the American position should be ignored. It’s that simple.

At the same time, those who believe in this viewpoint should not expect American sympathy or aid when barriers within the American legal system provide unambiguous guidelines on the types of governments that should and should not receive aid.

Critics who advocate the “unhealthy” nature of current American policy should be prepared to forego the benefits that American aid provide the Nepali population (this includes funding for multiple NGO and INGO related activities, capacity building programs, etc.). Doing so automatically liberates Nepal from the perceived risk of an “inevitable political crisis.”

Suggesting that the American position is designed to debilitate the peace process but then demanding that American tax payer dollars continue to flow in support of a coalition government that includes anti-American elements is more than slightly illogical.