Myth #2: “Moriarty’s insistence on Maoist disarmament is interventionist policy.”

Myth #2: “Moriarty’s insistence on Maoist disarmament is interventionist policy.”

It’s important to distinguish here, the difference between James Moriarty as an individual and James Moriarty as the American emissary to Nepal. The former view furthers the myth of unwanted “American intervention,” whilst the latter view exposes the dubious thought-processes by which this myth was created.

Parties in Nepal that advocate the Maoist line would have the Nepalese people operate within the individualistic prism. This entails the adoption of the following worldview: “Asking the Maoists to disarm before entering the government is Moriarty’s pet peeve.”

Moriarty’s demonization (as an individual) achieves two sets of goals: First, it suggests that had there been any other American Ambassador in Moriarty’s stead, the insistence on disarmament would not be an issue. Second, it attempts to sideline the management of Maoist arms as a peripheral issue that is inconsequential to the outcome of the peace process.

The facts, however, are as follows: As opposed to the “interventionist” manner in which Moriarty’s position is framed (by Maoist sympathizers), the extent to which the supposed “intervention” is permitted is completely up to Nepalis.

As America’s official representative to the Nepalese nation state, Moriarty is at liberty to exercise some degree of discretion. Such discretion may be applied in feeding information to the US State Department, thereby impacting policy decisions that are ultimately made.

However, a position that implies that either American Policy regarding Nepal is carried out solely at the discretion of James Moriarty – or that the Ambassador’s opinion is the only opinion that carries weight for American law makers – is ludicrous.

For emotionally detached observers, Moriarty’s position is simply the execution of his job function – the representation of American foreign policy. It’s not up to Moriarty whether the US Congress passes legislation that forbids American aid from being transferred to governments that include armed political constituents, and it’s not up to Moriarty to determine which groups are placed on (or removed from) the US terrorist watch list.

For his part, Moriarty has expressed what is mandated by American law. The government of the United States cannot provide material aid to any country that includes an armed constituent as part of its national government – the Palestinian government is an example, and what is happening in Palestine today is also a trend worth noting.

Highlighting this legal requirement to power brokers in Nepal is Moriarty’s job. A decision on whether to comply with or reject American aid requirements is up to Nepal’s policy makers. This is precisely why the suggestion of interventionist American policy is a lot of hype and exaggeration. Nepal is free to choose as she wishes. Her political actors just need to figure out their priorities, make decisions, and run with them.

If the SPA government decides to negotiate armed Maoists into power (and there is every reason to believe they will), the outcome should be viewed for what it is – a conscious decision based on collective wisdom and not a forced outcome, unduly influenced by external American pressure.

Instead of seeking scapegoats to pass blame on, Nepali decision-makers need to demonstrate more willingness to be accountable for decisions that they make. This is the heart of the issue, not American intervention, as is often forwarded for public consumption.

Alternatively, if the issue at hand is intolerance for interventionist policies in general, then the American position isn’t necessarily the one Nepalis need worry about. Much more transparent is direct, material intervention of the Indian variety.

To the Maoists’ credit, they are conceivably the only actors in Nepal (at least the non-Baburam faction) who appreciate this fact. Unfortunately, they too are more than willing to exploit whatever they can get to further their cause in the interim.

In either case, although American policy may factor into the decision-making process, Moriarty as an individual should not.