An authoritative expert on counter insurgency, scholar and author, Dr. Thomas A. Marks ended his response to a question regarding UNMIN on the following note: "It is difficult to speak of accountability when dealing with an institutional culture that invariably recognizes potential mass murderers only after they have committed their crimes. Read any work on UN performance in Rwanda, Darfur, and you see the problem." (http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/10/troglodytes-stalk-nepal-exclusive.html)
On December 14 2007, Ian Martin, Chief of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) displayed precisely the idea expressed in Dr. Marks' response. Essentially, Ian Martin lost his cool: http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=131262
Martin's frustration was visible and his irate message to the Nepali people is best encompassed by following question (statement): "Are chances of maintaining and strengthening peace in Nepal greater with UNMIN's presence? If the answer is no, tell us to go. If the answer is yes, then please don't stop criticizing us, but do constructive criticism."
Here are a few questions that Ian Martin should ask himself:
- Is it customary for the Chief of a mission bearing the UN flag to indirectly "threaten" the very people the mission was created to help?
- Is it normal for moderators/facilitators to insinuate that without their participation, the process they are supporting is doomed?
- Is it standard operating procedure for the UN to agree to a mandate without negotiating results-oriented terms and conditions (and then complain about not being able to do its job when failure becomes evident)?
If the answer to either of the questions above is "yes," then the chances of maintaining and strengthening peace in Nepal is less with Ian Martin's presence. Because a "yes" would be indicative of Martin's mindset - how best to entrench UNMIN in Nepal for the foreseeable future. Such an attitude is conducive neither to regional politics nor to Nepal's immediate needs.
The point that Ian Martin highlights (at this late hour in the peace process), is "mandate." This is the very heart of the issue that Martin should be taken to task on for a number of reasons.
First, the situation in Nepal was not at all "foreign" to Ian Martin. Having served as Louise Arbour's regional representative and the head of OHCHR in Nepal (before the peace process started), Ian should have anticipated better than most, the specific mandate needed for the UN to effectively pave a path to lasting peace in Nepal.
So a year later, how dare Martin make loose allusions to the inadequacy of UNMIN's mandate in Nepal. Having failed to negotiate the precise terms and conditions that UNMIN would need at the onset of Nepal's peace process, how dare Ian Martin now report to the UNSG (who in turn reported to the Security Council) that the "limited focus of the mandate of UNMIN has constrained its ability to adequately assist the overall management of the peace process."
Second, Ian Martin's stark failure is magnified by the overwhelming faith that civil society members (such as journalist Kanak Mani Dixit), placed in Martin's abilities. In "Come back, Ian" (http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue/307/Comment/12177), Dixit made an impassioned appeal to then UNSG, Kofi Annan in the following terms: "Well, what of the peace process in Nepal? It is poised on a razor’s edge and requires full UN engagement. Is not Nepal as important as East Timor (population 1 million)? And is this not one of those places where the UN can be pre-emptive for peace? How does the geo-strategic significance of East Timor compare with that of Nepal?"
Such public displays of confidence in Ian Martin led to the formation of a team of "subject matter experts" on Nepal. Namely, John Norris, formerly of the International Crisis Group (an individual whose coverage of Nepal's Maoist insurgency qualified him as an "expert" on Nepal), Ian Martin (then head of OHCHR in Nepal), and several Nepalis, experienced in INGO circuits.
In hindsight, what do Mr. Martin's advocates have to say about Martin's results? Can the blame for UNMIN's underperformance be squarely attributed to Nepal's political sphere or is Martin also liable for his egregious failure in leadership (guidance)? Was the creation of a team of "experts" preconditioned to a certain political outcome, a smart move or is this turning into a case of 20/20 hindsight? How is East Timor faring these days in Ian Martin's absence? Is Nepal to share a similar fate?
Third, Ian Martin's comment that "our (UNMIN's) mandate is to monitor, not enforce," is just ludicrous. The question that needs to asked is "how well has UNMIN executed on its limited role of "monitoring" Nepal's peace process?" Are stakeholders to Nepal's peace process content with the "value" that UNMIN has added? Based on what UNMIN has accomplished (given its "monitoring" mandate), do the results inspire confidence in Ian Martin's leadership to add three additional roles to UNMIN's existing mandate?
Dr. Bishnu Raj Upreti's comment to Ian Martin's outburst is right on target: "UNMIN can't deny responsibility saying that they were here just to monitor." This sentiment is echoed by former National Human Rights Council member, Sushil Pyakurel who made the following statement: "UNMIN can't say it could not deliver owing to a limited mandate."
Fourth, as for the "constructive" ciriticism that Ian Martin wants, it appears more a case of acting on the criticisms that have already been forwarded rather than receiving any to begin with. What Martin wants to hear is praise for the little his leadership has yielded and sympathy for his self-fabricated dilemma.
Unfortunately for Martin, he will get neither from thinking, feeling, rational Nepalis because it is evident that Ian Martin has clearly failed to deliver the consultative, subject matter expertise that the Nepali people expected of him. UNMIN's progress under Martin's leadership has not reached even a fraction of its true potential.
When Ian Martin spoke on December 14, 2007, it is possible he was having a bad day (week or even month). It is also possible that Mr. Martin's utility to Nepal's peace process had ended. Perhaps it is Ian Martin (not UNMIN), who should consider going home?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Listed below in chronological order is all the "constructive" criticism that Ian Martin could want. Whether he has acted on the criticisms provided is for the Nepali people to judge.
(Readers should feel free to e-mail the moderators at nepali.perspectives@gmail.com for the full text of any of the pieces listed below)
February 25, 2007
Summary of Declared (by State) vs. Inventoried (by UNMIN), Weapon Counts
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/symmary-of-declared-by-state-vs.html
February 25, 2007
Discrepancies in Maoist Weapons Inventoried by UNMIN – Do the Math
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/discrepancies-in-maoist-weapons.html
March 01, 2007
The UN and Maoist Arms Controversy: Overkill or Negligence?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/02/un-and-maoist-arms-controversy-overkill.html
March 01, 2007
UN Fast Losing Credibility in Nepal
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/03/un-fast-losing-credibility-in-nepal.html
June 18, 2007
UNMIN Clarifies its Role but Just in Time to be Humiliated by the Maoists
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/06/unmin-clarifies-its-role-but-just-in.html
July 04, 2007
UNMIN's Arms Verification Process in Nepal - More Timely Information and Transparency Needed
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmin-in-over-its-head-in-nepal-arms.html
July 15, 2007
The UN's (UNMIN) Involvement in Nepal's Peace Process: A turning point or another fiasco in the making?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/uns-unmin-involvement-in-nepals-peace.html
July 17, 2007
UNMIN's July 16 Press Release and Subsequent Q&A Disaster
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-july-16-press-release-and.html
July 19, 2007
UNMIN's "Consulting" Mentality Not Conducive to Nepal's "Stakeholder" Needs
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/07/unmins-consulting-mentality-not.html
September 21, 2007
What has UNMIN Accomplished in Nepal?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/09/what-has-unmin-accomplished-in-nepal.html
November 01, 2007
What UNMIN Should Do to Manage Nepal's Peace Process
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/courtesy-krishna-hari-pushkar-un-is.html
November 26, 2007
UNMIN in Need of Immediate Reform
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/unmin-in-need-of-immediate-reform.html
8 comments:
Thanks for this.
Yes UN does have many faults. Yes, it's performance in Nepal has not been satisfactory. But why are many diatribes launched at UNMIN, only and ONLY after the displeasure of India with UMIN was made public ?
That's a good question misras, and a timely one. Are you suggesting that Indian influece is what is bringing UN failure to the forefront in Nepal? That could well be the case.
There does seeem to be a long history of "diatribes" on the UNMIN per this article. I will admit I have not read each and every one but judging by the time line it appears that criticisms have been quite frequent. Woudln't you say?
I don't follow these comments... if the criticism is generally on target, what does it matter if India is annoyed or not?
We are discussing a SOVEREIGN Nepali issue here, correct?
Interesting arguments. But there is a competing analysis by Dhruba Adhikary who suggests that " visible UN presence can work as an effective bulwark against potential adventures from India in the south."
http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2007/others/guestcolumn/dec/guest_columns_08.php
Any reaction to this point of view?
UNMIN is like dog on search of a bone, may bone to pick, lick or just hold gridge to- nothing more. I just don't see what this hell of guy called Kanak does, may be except lick his or UNMIN ass to put them in pedastal. When we as a Nepali are letting our own very existence and sovereignty slip right through our hands by glorifying pedophile who are hell bent or creating space by destroying Nepal - What gives, y'all?
Forget about constructive and playing all is right just because one gringo face says or sermons us defending his inaptitudes by showing fault on others. Rather these mf leave then have then thrown by our side. Same applies for 8 syndicate- eradication is the cure, not constructive nor exclusive or maoist or interim parliament, illegal amendments, dead in the water giatrics or Kateh from hills who nothing but political this and that is their being.
Enough said. I do not know even if the sentences are right but I am MAD, MAD, and MAD and I cannot take it anymore.
Aftemath
uninvited,
Dhurba Adhikary raises an excellent point about the UN being the reason Indian interference is limited in Nepal.
But what about the UN's own interference in our sovereign affairs? Also, why be anyone's protectorate at all in this day and age when we managed to stay independent since the birth of our country?
I don't like the idea of choosing the best from the list of bad options when a better option is for us nepalis to get our own act together and carry on.
UNMIN has no significant role in Nepal. It is there just to have a good life and pay. The worst UN role in the history of Nepal, Mr. Martin is just there to bring the Maoist cades in Nepal Army, which will be the greatest blunder.
So, kick the UNMIN out of Nepal before they bring great havoc. They have better duties elswhare in African countries.
The current government must not in any way extend their stay at all. Technicall they are invited by India with the trust of Maoists.
Rana, it's a little too late for that isn't it?
At least thank your lucky stars the idiots in government didn't EXPAND the UNMIN mandate given the UNMIN's performance in Nepal.
I fully endorse this writer's conclusion that Ian Martin should consider going home and that under a new leadership, UNMIN should be able to do much more to help Nepal.
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