(Courtesty: Fat Bastard)
Resolution on the issue of arms management is a fundamental milestone to be traversed during the process of peace talks. Almost all other issues remain in abeyance of clarity on the management of arms. The UN’s proposed role, a possible referendum on the monarchy’s future, the construct of an interim government, the feasibility of an interim constitution and ultimately, the process of elections to a constituent assembly are all beholden to a mutually agreeable position on the modus operandi of arms management, monitoring and finally, de-commissioning.
A sharp difference of opinion partitions those who maintain the criticality of managing the Maoists’ arms prior to constituent assembly elections and those who envision this to be a non-issue (even a hindrance) to the formation of a constituent assembly.
The distinction here is between individuals who consider elections to a constituent assembly (i.e. the act of holding such elections) to be an end in itself and those who view the outcome of the elections (peace, stability and reconciliation) to be the ultimate end-goal.
For the latter group, the prospect of going to elections with an armed political competitor does not sit well; for the former group, any action that retards immediate progress toward a constituent assembly is “Royalist instigation,” “war-mongering” or in direct contravention to the aspirations for which 21 individuals died and an estimated 4 thousand were injured.
Form another perspective, the difference of opinion is between those who have regained power and those who aided in the process of reversal (and themselves, aspire to wield authority). Representing the latter group is a loose alliance of civil society and Maoist elements that have begun to express disenchantment with the pace of progress towards constituent assembly elections. The former group is comprised of an equally shaky amalgamation of political parties that enjoy international support, but are the subject of growing criticism at home.
The source of such criticisms originate partially from the Parliament’s less than glorious (past) track record and partially because this government personifies so many of the social, ethnic, gender and moral inequities that underpin and fuel conflict in Nepal. Behind closed doors, even representatives of international governments (that extend support to the resurrected Parliament) are under little illusion about the collective (in)capacity this lot has the potential to display.
Still, the current setup is widely perceived as several tiers above the post-February-1 world because it offers prospects for outcomes that were formerly unattainable – peace and stability. Furthermore, the environment now enjoys a stamp of democracy which endows a sense of legitimacy that was previously absent.
More to the point, regardless of whether the current setup is perceived as dysfunctional or partially functional (whichever way one chooses to view it), it is still democratic by conception and thus, enjoys uninhibited (but not unconditional) support from the international community.
Naturally, key players in the international community are much more at ease when dealing with agents who are beholden to their advice. Additionally, such advice is provisioned with much greater comfort when doled out under the umbrella of democratic auspices.
For the latter group, the prospect of going to elections with an armed political competitor does not sit well; for the former group, any action that retards immediate progress toward a constituent assembly is “Royalist instigation,” “war-mongering” or in direct contravention to the aspirations for which 21 individuals died and an estimated 4 thousand were injured.
Form another perspective, the difference of opinion is between those who have regained power and those who aided in the process of reversal (and themselves, aspire to wield authority). Representing the latter group is a loose alliance of civil society and Maoist elements that have begun to express disenchantment with the pace of progress towards constituent assembly elections. The former group is comprised of an equally shaky amalgamation of political parties that enjoy international support, but are the subject of growing criticism at home.
The source of such criticisms originate partially from the Parliament’s less than glorious (past) track record and partially because this government personifies so many of the social, ethnic, gender and moral inequities that underpin and fuel conflict in Nepal. Behind closed doors, even representatives of international governments (that extend support to the resurrected Parliament) are under little illusion about the collective (in)capacity this lot has the potential to display.
Still, the current setup is widely perceived as several tiers above the post-February-1 world because it offers prospects for outcomes that were formerly unattainable – peace and stability. Furthermore, the environment now enjoys a stamp of democracy which endows a sense of legitimacy that was previously absent.
More to the point, regardless of whether the current setup is perceived as dysfunctional or partially functional (whichever way one chooses to view it), it is still democratic by conception and thus, enjoys uninhibited (but not unconditional) support from the international community.
Naturally, key players in the international community are much more at ease when dealing with agents who are beholden to their advice. Additionally, such advice is provisioned with much greater comfort when doled out under the umbrella of democratic auspices.
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