On the one hand, Nepal’s Maoists have political space in the mainstream to look forward to. On the other, they have the combined wrath of the Indians, Americans and the Europeans to shoulder, should they choose any alternative other than that which is being charted for them – disarmament and entry into competitive, democratic politics.
The question now is how Pushpa, Baburam and the political echelon of the Maoists will position themselves with the fighters they’ve promised a communist utopia to, for the past 12 odd years?
On the surface, a feasible compromise appears to be international legitimacy for the Maoist ranks that UN involvement accompanies, and a die-hard republican platform that will spearhead their political campaign moving into constituent assembly elections.
However, neither of these platforms is a guaranteed safe landing for the Maoists – at least not of the variety a group that has waged a 12 year civil war, probably expects. The parity in treatment that UN observers will bring requires the disclosure of 36 thousand combatants the Maoists have declared (along with 10 thousand arms, ammunition and a number of yet to be determined socket bombs and IEDs). While the inflated number of Maoist troops may have been publicized with a view to attain greater than proportional representation in a future, national security force, for now, this tactic appears to have backfired on the Maoists.
Confinement to pre-determined areas (as indicated in the joint-letter sent to the UN) is much more easily achieved by the state’s security forces. The tranquility that such “confinement” offers is likely welcomed by battle-weary troops who have been deployed in combat conditions for over 4 years.
While the boots on the ground have been the targets of Maoist wave attacks, booby traps and roadside bombs, the boots in Army HQ have been the victims of inadequate political cover, public denigration and general dereliction by the political masters who committed them into the battle.
The army’s image has also been thoroughly tarnished by a brutal information warfare campaign that the military’s hierarchy neither demonstrated the capacity to rebuke, nor accept responsibility for. For Nepal’s military, the current environment offers a respite from what can only be described as a violent roller-coaster ride down a tunnel of disrepute. It also provides time, sorely needed for structural reforms within the military, many of which have already begun.
But for the Maoists, having to track their arms inventory against a list of missing munitions provided to UN monitors (by the state forces) and having to account for and confine 36 thousand fighters (who are probably also militia, local enforcers and a material portion of the Maoist vote-bank), probably isn’t the brightest idea they’ve committed to.
Is this a sign that the Maoist leaders are truly in search of a safe landing on the political playground? Perhaps. Could this be a hedging strategy by the Maoist leaders’ against reprisals from within their own ranks? It’s likely.
More to the point though, is the Maoist leadership’s gradual convergence with the government’s position (despite public threats of foregoing negotiations) an indication of Pushpa, Baburam and their ranks’ comprehension of the weakened position from which they are bargaining? Now we’re talking.
There is both theoretical and realistic impetus for this line of thought. With the right-wing extreme having been largely neutralized, the polar opposite left-wing’s utility is also severely impaired. With the King no longer in a position to be leveraged as a political scapegoat, the mainstream parties (and specifically those individuals associated with party leaders by kinship) are no longer beholden to the Maoist position.
This is probably another realization that keeps Pushpa Dahal and Baburam Bhattaria awake at night. Thus, the sprint to try and make things happen as quickly as possible. And by this logic, rumored suggestions of a potential alliance between the Palace and the Maoists seems comprehensible.
However, such an alliance also seems very implausible because it would be suicidal for any ceremonial aspirations the Palace may hold and it would also be a complete invalidation of any and all rationale the Maoists have touted as justification for their armed struggle. The goal of transforming Nepal into a communist republic has been a consistent Maoist theme, one that they are identified with and have used to distinguish themselves from their peer-competitors.
Unfortunately for the Maoists, the SPA knows this, the Indians know it, the Americans know it, the British know it and having borne the brunt of the Maoist-initiated siege against the State, the Nepali people (including the civil society leaders who for the most part are toeing the Maoist line), know it. So any murmurs of a conspiracy in the works to form an alliance between the King and the Maoists is probably nothing more than an unsubstantiated rumor, aimed at elevating the non-Maoist, republican platform.
The question now is how Pushpa, Baburam and the political echelon of the Maoists will position themselves with the fighters they’ve promised a communist utopia to, for the past 12 odd years?
On the surface, a feasible compromise appears to be international legitimacy for the Maoist ranks that UN involvement accompanies, and a die-hard republican platform that will spearhead their political campaign moving into constituent assembly elections.
However, neither of these platforms is a guaranteed safe landing for the Maoists – at least not of the variety a group that has waged a 12 year civil war, probably expects. The parity in treatment that UN observers will bring requires the disclosure of 36 thousand combatants the Maoists have declared (along with 10 thousand arms, ammunition and a number of yet to be determined socket bombs and IEDs). While the inflated number of Maoist troops may have been publicized with a view to attain greater than proportional representation in a future, national security force, for now, this tactic appears to have backfired on the Maoists.
Confinement to pre-determined areas (as indicated in the joint-letter sent to the UN) is much more easily achieved by the state’s security forces. The tranquility that such “confinement” offers is likely welcomed by battle-weary troops who have been deployed in combat conditions for over 4 years.
While the boots on the ground have been the targets of Maoist wave attacks, booby traps and roadside bombs, the boots in Army HQ have been the victims of inadequate political cover, public denigration and general dereliction by the political masters who committed them into the battle.
The army’s image has also been thoroughly tarnished by a brutal information warfare campaign that the military’s hierarchy neither demonstrated the capacity to rebuke, nor accept responsibility for. For Nepal’s military, the current environment offers a respite from what can only be described as a violent roller-coaster ride down a tunnel of disrepute. It also provides time, sorely needed for structural reforms within the military, many of which have already begun.
But for the Maoists, having to track their arms inventory against a list of missing munitions provided to UN monitors (by the state forces) and having to account for and confine 36 thousand fighters (who are probably also militia, local enforcers and a material portion of the Maoist vote-bank), probably isn’t the brightest idea they’ve committed to.
Is this a sign that the Maoist leaders are truly in search of a safe landing on the political playground? Perhaps. Could this be a hedging strategy by the Maoist leaders’ against reprisals from within their own ranks? It’s likely.
More to the point though, is the Maoist leadership’s gradual convergence with the government’s position (despite public threats of foregoing negotiations) an indication of Pushpa, Baburam and their ranks’ comprehension of the weakened position from which they are bargaining? Now we’re talking.
There is both theoretical and realistic impetus for this line of thought. With the right-wing extreme having been largely neutralized, the polar opposite left-wing’s utility is also severely impaired. With the King no longer in a position to be leveraged as a political scapegoat, the mainstream parties (and specifically those individuals associated with party leaders by kinship) are no longer beholden to the Maoist position.
This is probably another realization that keeps Pushpa Dahal and Baburam Bhattaria awake at night. Thus, the sprint to try and make things happen as quickly as possible. And by this logic, rumored suggestions of a potential alliance between the Palace and the Maoists seems comprehensible.
However, such an alliance also seems very implausible because it would be suicidal for any ceremonial aspirations the Palace may hold and it would also be a complete invalidation of any and all rationale the Maoists have touted as justification for their armed struggle. The goal of transforming Nepal into a communist republic has been a consistent Maoist theme, one that they are identified with and have used to distinguish themselves from their peer-competitors.
Unfortunately for the Maoists, the SPA knows this, the Indians know it, the Americans know it, the British know it and having borne the brunt of the Maoist-initiated siege against the State, the Nepali people (including the civil society leaders who for the most part are toeing the Maoist line), know it. So any murmurs of a conspiracy in the works to form an alliance between the King and the Maoists is probably nothing more than an unsubstantiated rumor, aimed at elevating the non-Maoist, republican platform.
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