Upon further examination (and in aggregating every miniscule drop of credibility the Maoists deserve), they do have a point. The most lenient interpretation of the Maoists’ inert hesitation to disarming may be derived of their experience during operations Romeo and Kilo-Sierra-II.
It is no secret that during its infancy, members of the Maoist movement were brutally suppressed and persecuted on the orders of the State. Nepal had not yet ascended the pole of prominence on the human rights agenda at that time, but it is anyone’s guess as to whether the Geneva Convention was honored by Police forces sanctioned by the State to “quell” the growing Moist rebellion in the early nineties.
Contemporary analysis tends to hinge on the insurmountable suffering that Maoists have inflicted on cadres of the UML and NC but conveniently discounts the horrors that Maoist cadre were subjected to at the hands previous governments. The parties that essentially spawned the armed Maoist insurrection are currently represented in the SPA and are members of the resurrected Parliament. This is not likely to be consideration the Maoists and their supporters take lightly.
Additionally, if there is any truth to the statement made by Maoist negotiator Dina Nath Sharma (that “the Thankot Police Post was attacked at the behest of the SPA”), this elicits a whole new dimension of complexity in an already convoluted sphere. Unverified “chatter” of the deployment of Maoist hit squads (at the SPA’s request) to disrupt previously sponsored municipal polls, is another troublesome rumor.
Should either the statement or rumor alluded to above, be substantiated in the future, the legacy of the peaceful “rhodendron revolution” that was celebrated across the globe will most certainly be called into question. In the context of this writing, should Dina Nath Sharma’s claim hold merit, it would most certainly explain the elevated expectations from the fighting ranks in the Maoist command, that naturally factor into demands tabled by Maoist negotiators.
Also, the Indian government’s maneuver (manifested in the 12 Point Agreement) that used the Maoists to accelerate the reversal of the February-1 move, is probably not lost on the Maoist leadership. Today, the Maoists find themselves too far into the mainstream to reverse this trend and too far from their ultimate objective (of capturing state power), to be comfortable with their current position.
Contrary to the much hyped view that the Maoists have gained new-found appreciation for the utility of non-violent protest, it is more likely that the Maoists have gained new-found appreciation for their political predicament vis-à-vis India’s changed tone.
India’s stance on the Nepali Maoists appears increasingly on par with that of the world’s sole super power. India’s refusal to release Maoist prisoners and her insistence on Maoist disarmament lends creed to this perception.
Sitaram Yechuri’s assertion that the Nepali Maoists should serve as a model for their brethren in India may have been intended as a double-edged sword: What’s happening in Nepal is a strong demonstration of what India’s extremists should look forward to, should they shun the prospects of joining (or rather, being forced to join) mainstream politics – domestic and international isolation.
It is no secret that during its infancy, members of the Maoist movement were brutally suppressed and persecuted on the orders of the State. Nepal had not yet ascended the pole of prominence on the human rights agenda at that time, but it is anyone’s guess as to whether the Geneva Convention was honored by Police forces sanctioned by the State to “quell” the growing Moist rebellion in the early nineties.
Contemporary analysis tends to hinge on the insurmountable suffering that Maoists have inflicted on cadres of the UML and NC but conveniently discounts the horrors that Maoist cadre were subjected to at the hands previous governments. The parties that essentially spawned the armed Maoist insurrection are currently represented in the SPA and are members of the resurrected Parliament. This is not likely to be consideration the Maoists and their supporters take lightly.
Additionally, if there is any truth to the statement made by Maoist negotiator Dina Nath Sharma (that “the Thankot Police Post was attacked at the behest of the SPA”), this elicits a whole new dimension of complexity in an already convoluted sphere. Unverified “chatter” of the deployment of Maoist hit squads (at the SPA’s request) to disrupt previously sponsored municipal polls, is another troublesome rumor.
Should either the statement or rumor alluded to above, be substantiated in the future, the legacy of the peaceful “rhodendron revolution” that was celebrated across the globe will most certainly be called into question. In the context of this writing, should Dina Nath Sharma’s claim hold merit, it would most certainly explain the elevated expectations from the fighting ranks in the Maoist command, that naturally factor into demands tabled by Maoist negotiators.
Also, the Indian government’s maneuver (manifested in the 12 Point Agreement) that used the Maoists to accelerate the reversal of the February-1 move, is probably not lost on the Maoist leadership. Today, the Maoists find themselves too far into the mainstream to reverse this trend and too far from their ultimate objective (of capturing state power), to be comfortable with their current position.
Contrary to the much hyped view that the Maoists have gained new-found appreciation for the utility of non-violent protest, it is more likely that the Maoists have gained new-found appreciation for their political predicament vis-à-vis India’s changed tone.
India’s stance on the Nepali Maoists appears increasingly on par with that of the world’s sole super power. India’s refusal to release Maoist prisoners and her insistence on Maoist disarmament lends creed to this perception.
Sitaram Yechuri’s assertion that the Nepali Maoists should serve as a model for their brethren in India may have been intended as a double-edged sword: What’s happening in Nepal is a strong demonstration of what India’s extremists should look forward to, should they shun the prospects of joining (or rather, being forced to join) mainstream politics – domestic and international isolation.
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