Defining a Soft Coup

(Courtesy: Bidushi Dhungel and Siddhartha Thapa)

The peace process in Nepal is approaching a deadlock and the contentious issue is the disagreement between political parties and the former rebels, the Maoist party regarding the tussle over the control of state institutions. The mainstream political parties have endured a constitutional democratic culture where state institutions remain independent of political pressure through checks and balances and the separation of power. However, the Maoists a party have expressed time and again its commitment to establish a people’s republic; a system which contravenes the very structure of a liberal democracy. The state institution that has repeatedly become a topic of debate at a local and political level is the national army- the Nepal Army.

The Nepal army has a long history; it is one of the oldest institutions in South Asia, whereas the PLA has a very infant one. The distinction is as such; the PLA was created by a single radical movement in the span of less than two decades. Their origin can be traced to one single objective which is to fight against and defy the Nepali nation state for the simple purpose of propelling the Maoist ideology. On the other hand, since its inception, the Nepal army has been the lifeline of Nepal’s sovereignty from Prithvi Narayan Shah to Bhimsen Thapa through to Jung Bahadur and into the Shah Dynasty. Until the mid twentieth century, the army played a crucial role in the day to day activities of the state. This was true across continents. What is also true is the fact that the Nepalese army has always been loyal to the political authority of the time. For example, with the political demise of Bhimsen Thapa and Amar Singh Thapa, there was speculation that there would be large scale discontent. However, the army sustained its composure and supported the government of the time. Similarly, as the Rana rule came to an end, the army subsequently took allegiance with the reigning monarch. The Economist, in a publication soon after the April revolution of 2006 described how the army had played a crucial role in convincing the king to hand back power to the political parties. Thus, history has now repeated itself and today we see the army closely aligned with the democratic forces and the government of the day.

There is rife speculation that the Nepal army is staunchly anti- loktantra. If so, such apprehensions need to be justified. Since the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement, the army has not once defied the rules that define the peace process. On the contrary, there have been consistent incidents where one or more PLA members have been solely responsible for the death of political adversaries, journalists and the common people who have simply dared to contest Maoist beliefs. The Maoists today have described the process of integration of the two armies as the core issue on which the future of the peace process hangs. But one must understand the difference between the Nepal army and the former rebels. For example, let’s examine the training received by PLA and the national army. While the national army has multiple functions- maintaining territorial integrity, alongside defending the sovereignty of the country, the PLA has a unilinear function- to revolt against the state and to organise the state within the paradigms of a communist paradise. This immediately begs one to ask how an armed group designed to revolt against the state can be loyal to that very state.

The integration of ideologically indoctrinated guerrilla fighters into the national army is bound to trigger political instability. In the long run, these indoctrinated and dogmatic guerrilla fighters will pollute and influence the thoughts of the common soldier of the Nepali army. The implications of such a move would be profound. The National army would no longer be apolitical and the democratic system of checks and balances will erode as one party will hold power over the vast national army. In essence, the integration of these radicalised fighters would serve the purpose of a soft coup staged by the leaders of these very fighters.

What we often overlook is that victory is still to be seen. The Maoists have gotten thus far through a process of negotiations and power sharing agreements. Had they won a military victory, it would be their right to do as they please. However, as their victory has not been a military one, the 12 Point Agreement and subsequent agreements have bound them within the constraints of a democratic polity. Credit must be given to the Maoists for their decision to engage with other political parties and the common people so far. But the intention of the Maoist party has created a realm of doubt through the utterances of their party leaders who have consistently harped on the idea of eliminating their adversaries in order to achieve their long term goal of establishing a people’s republic. Today, rather than the consolidation of democratic ideals and values, the Maoist party seems to be engrossed in the process of exploiting the weaknesses of other political parties and vital state institutions. This can be manifested by their eventual demand of integrating their fighters into the national army as the political parties began to lose their edge.

The conclusion of the constituent assembly elections and the catapulting of the Maoist party into forefront of national politics as the largest political party have dramatically altered the political equation of the country. In fact, the election victory has bolstered the enthusiasm of the Maoist party to push for complete consolidation of power. However, the Nepalese army (the only other organised armed force that can challenge them) remains the only prominent hurdle to their destination of a people’s republic. The political parties have long been out manoeuvred and as a result, the Maoists have understood that the political parties are no match for them. Therefore, the neutralisation of the Nepal army is a strategic necessity for the Maoists to attain total power.

The episode that triggered the divergence between the Nepal army and the Maoists has been much scrutinised. At the heart of this conflict lies the debate regarding the actions of the army chief, the president and that of the Maoist party. First, the army chief’s bold move to defy the prime minister’s demand for his resignation prevented the collapse of the very structure of the Nepal army. Second, in an abnormal situation as was then the president’s apt intervention saved the country from serious political breakdown and crisis. Third, the army chief resignation row coupled with the release of the Prachanda video has completely exposed the Maoists. The consequences of this were so great that they had to leave government and have had to lie low as a result.

The future discourse of Nepali politics remains extremely fragile. This is because while the present government has enough members to form a government it doesn’t possess the numbers required to draft and implement a new constitution. It is this number game that has become the new mantra of the Maoist party to overwhelm the state. The Maoists now are engaging in talks with the two other major political parties (NC and UML) for the integration of their fighters into the national army. In such informal talks, the Maoists have been reported to be appeasing both the UML and the NC into fanciful power-sharing agreements like that of the past. Concurrently, the Maoists are also making it clear that without them the constitution will not be drafted on time as planned. Their demand: the integration of ideological fighters into the national army. You decide.