Indian Foreign Policy and the Dynamics of Regional Politics

(Courtesy: Siddhartha Thapa)

The fourteenth SAARC summit, like past summits was poignantly marked with rhetoric, applauses, vague promises and strict adherence to obsessive protocol. But, unfortunately, like other past summits, the New Delhi summit failed to depart from the paradigm of inaction and identify the core problem plaguing development and democratization in South Asia: terrorism.

Quintessentially, the drama attached to the SAARC summit was rather enchanting. Nepal, a prominent boat shaker in South Asian politics came out clearly favoring China to be given member status, this invariably in the long run will challenge India's hegemony and influence in the region. To add to SAARC's endless list of agonies, the addition of Afghanistan does no good, it further strains the mathematics of the beleaguered SAARC treasury. On the global front, powerful countries are coming together as efficient trading blocs and protecting the interest of member states within the trading bloc, unlike SAARC which remains bitterly divided. And despite some positive signs of economic development much to the credit of the IT sector boom and relocation of multi-nationals in South Asia; the rise in terrorism and political instability in the region has halted the consolidation of further success.

In the past Indo-Pak rivalry accounted for much of SAARC's failure and even to this date, the tension between these South Asian giants has hampered much of the progress at SAARC. But much has changed over the decade; India and Pakistan are not the only countries susceptible to terrorism and instability. A common feature in the politics of all South Asian countries is the resurgence of communist and religious extremism.

So are New Delhi and Islamabad the regional spoilers?

Pakistan's geographic location makes it a non-contender and a lesser player compared to India. On all accounts New Delhi has indeed failed on three fronts: stabilizing the region, effective exportation of democracy in its back yard, and conflict management. Peace is a prerequisite to development. Unlike other regional trading blocs, South Asia is marred by instability and contrary to the philosophy of other regional trading blocs; South Asian politics lacks a binding force. On the other hand the in the European Union - democracy, free market and stability in the region are desired objectives of all its member states.

For instance, the made in Delhi '12 point agreement', might yield dividends in Kathmandu but at the expense of the survival of democratic discourse. Where as in Bangladesh, India finds it hands unbound in taking strong measures against a military government. Worse still is Bhutan, where tragic ethnic cleansing, the relocation and repatriation of these refugees to a third country remain unsolved, though seventeen long years have passed by. The price that Nepal has had to pay has been dear, growing frustration among refugees has resulted in refugees posturing extreme nationalistic sentiments and in some cases resorting to violence. And last of course, Sri Lanka, where various groups within Tamil Nadu supported the LTTE. Unfortunately the see-saw change of policy in Delhi vis-à-vis Sri Lanka, costs many lives in the Indian army and tragically that of India's visionary Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

Therefore, for any successful overtures in South Asia – India needs to re-evaluate its foreign policy and national security and in conjunction, identify the main threats to its national security. It might also be prudent for the administration in New Delhi to question its policy makers in the South Block about a most pertinent issue - is South Asia headed towards disintegration? To find answers, policy makers and politicians in New Delhi need to identify interest groups within India that have worked in tandem with various extremist groups in South Asia.

It is no secret that the weapons in the Maoist armory were provided largely by radical communist sympathizers in West Bengal and Kerala. Historically speaking, BP Koirala was funded by various socialist parties around the world in collaboration with Indian socialists to provide him with arms. Similarly, the CPI-M has without a doubt provided moral support to the Maoists and more significantly, introduced them to the secret arms market of India.

Second, radical Islamic groups within India have perpetrated the ranks of various political parties in Bangladesh. But in regard to radical Islam, Pakistan 's notorious Islamic fugitives have outdone Indian Islamic radicals in disturbing the existence of a quasi- secular political balance in Bangladesh.

In the case of Sri Lanka, Karunanidhi in the early 80's not only provided monetary assistance but also sanctuary to Prabhakaran and his associates against the Lankan government. And in Bhutan, continued support to an autocratic regime and the reluctance of India to pressurize the Druk government on the repatriation of refugees languishing in Nepal are all parts and parcel of the fallacies of Indian policy in South Asia.

India and Pakistan have to recognize the unifying element in South Asian politics. Unfortunately, home-grown terrorism has contributed towards instability and extremism. First – the unprecedented growth of communism and the notion of self-determination have the proponents of mustering secession movements in India. Although India might have made gargantuan leaps economically, its failure to protect democracies in its backyard has undoubtedly questioned India's intentions and abilities in the global arena. If India cannot solve problems effectively in its own backyard how can she play a greater role in international relations?

The only solution to the advancement of South Asian regional development is a re-evaluation of policy at South Block and Race Course Road. But on a substantive policy level – it must be realized that both radical communism and religious extremism are the biggest threat to peace time politics in South Asia. And the only real response is a collective comprehensive security mechanism and the identification of common threats and rapid socio-economic response to the disgruntled masses. But more importantly it is imperative that India departs from a policy of 'democratic hypocrisy'.