Dear Editor of the Nepali Times:
I really enjoyed your editorial from last week. It's a really well-thought out and compromising position that allows proportional "give" to all the factions.
A couple of thoughts:
First, the distinction between Civil Society activists and Political activists is key. What makes Civil Society so potent is its ability to INFLUENCE policy-making without PARTICIPATING in the legal process itself. Civil Society is crucial in upholding the system of "checks and balances," especially in a country like ours. But, as you correctly point out, if Civil Society endorses the Maoist line exclusively at the detriment of all other views, and actively promotes a role for itself as a practicing member of the governing polity, then it looses its utility as an impartial observer. Worse, if the "usual suspects" from our self-declared Civil Society are to participate in any interim government, the result amounts to a biased advantage for the Maoist position. Just do the math - one third (or less) Maoists, one third (or less) Civil Society and one third (or more) SPA. In any event, with the Maoists and Civil Society on the same page, in which direction will decision-making be skewed?
Take the hypothesis above and apply your assumption of why the Maoists hesitate to disarm and you end up in a rather awkward position. Your assertion that the Maoists are afraid of laying down arms because they are unsure of their standing in the population (minus the threat of force), is plausible. So is your view of the heightened probability of a split in the Maoist ranks, should the issue of disarmament not suit the inclinations of certain factions within the Maoists. But in my mind, the question from the very beginning of this process has been whether the state is working to bring the Maoists into the manifold or if the idea is to bring whoever is willing from the Maoists, into the mainstream?
If it's the latter, I'm sorry, but it does not make sense to appease Pushpa and Baburam and their cohorts now, just to have 40 deaths a week and a partially failed peace process, later. The thought of exonerating the political leadership and condemning the Maoist fighting force has repercussions along ethnic, caste and class lines that reach far beyond the obvious issue of settlement. It's a biting indictment of the victimization of those who execute orders while the ones who dole them out, walk away unscathed - let's not forget who was in power when the Maoist outfit was actually radicalized and who is in power today.
You hit the nail on the head when you allude to the paranoia of the Maoists going back to the jungles after this Monsoon season. I agree with you in that they have come too far, too fast to maintain such a regressive alternative as a credible option. But the paranoia itself isn't misplaced. To the contrary, it is precisely this paranoia that drives so much of the policy making in Nepal today. The point here is that the Maoists have maneuvered into a position where ironically, the agenda of peace has become a Maoist agenda. So, the paranoia is justified in the sense that it prevents the seizure of concession from the Maoists that under conditions of parity would be rational.
But given the present circumstances, the suggestion of such concessions jeopardize the peace process and bring forth allegations of allegiance to the crown. Yes, the unfortunate alternative is 40 Nepali deaths a week. Equally unfortunate is idea of 28 million being held hostage, psychologically, by the Maoists refusing to disarm. What is really misplaced is the hope of political leadership that can navigate the Maoist gauntlet by exposing contradictions in the Maoist position while simultaneously driving the peace process in terms that are acceptable to ALL Nepalis and the international community.
Regards,
Your Faithful Reader
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