Should Indian Federal Tax Rupees be Used to Fund Nepal’s Communist Experiment?

(Courtesy: el Gordo)

It's fascinating to see how fast and how far, Nepal's Maoists have come. A Maoist leader who spent years languishing in an Indian jail, now sings the Indian leadership's praise; the core Maoist doctrine "bidroha garnu janata ko hak ho" (to rebel is the peoples' right) has morphed into a whimper of regret over the communal unrest in Southern Nepal.

With each passing day it seems, the reality that speeches, slogans, and marches with banners don’t create jobs, that extortion is only a long-term career in an affluent country, and that 83 seats in an interim parliament will not suddenly produce three plates of "Daal Bhat," free education or health care, for 26 million people, is setting in. That a decade of bloodshed and misery was designed to achieve a single goal - to elevate the Maoists to power - is a bitter pill many have begun to swallow.

Without the luxury of being in violent opposition it would appear, Nepal's Maoists are no different than any of the other political parties that continue to over-promise and under-deliver.

The reality however, couldn't be any further. Neither Nepal, nor South Asia has witnessed the rise of left-wing radicalism of comparable ferocity, cunning or near the magnitude of what Nepal has borne over the last decade.

In pursuit of their objectives, Nepal's Maoists have successfully played the NC against the UML, the King against the 7 Parties, the Americans against the Indians and in their final bid, the Maoists will be playing the Nepali population (including the millions of Nepalis who reside in India), against India.

The Maoists have declared in doctrine and in speech, time and again, that their ultimate goal is the realization of a communist republic in Nepal. If the Indian government chooses to call the Maoists' bluff, they do so at their own peril.

Below are three sweeping updates, recommended to re-vitalize India’s current Nepal-policy:

Update #1: Don't treat Nepal like an Indian state. Doing so will widen the conceptual gap between the possible and the probable. It will also lead to an unsustainable position that feeds anti-Indian nationalism to the ultimate benefit of the Maoists.

Indian policy makers continue to maintain that Nepal, like India, has the resources and capacity to absorb violent insurgencies and then progress on a platform of development and democracy (illiberal as it may be). Given the number of similar insurgencies that India's federal structure has absorbed since 1950, this idea appears plausible.

However, the lens one chooses to view the problem through, determines the reality of what they see. From the lens of a regional Hegemon then, it is completely within the realm of possibility that Nepal (if perceived as yet another satellite Indian state), could withstand a full blown leftist onslaught.

But from the perspective of the satellite state (in this case, Nepal), surviving the type of radical populism that the Nepali Maoists have bred on, is not possible - not resource wise, not capacity wise - unless, India remains committed to cover the massive shortfall in wherewithal needed to engender such "absorptive" capacity.

Indian policy makers need to urgently ask themselves if they are in a position to make such a long-term commitment. Is the Federal government of India prepared to sustain democratic Nepalese forces, through the disbursement of material and non-material aid, indefinitely? Or, is the Congress-I ready to stake its legacy on a failed policy that promises to cultivate the (already sown) seeds of what the Indian Prime Minister (Man Mohan Singh) has termed the most immediate threat to Indian national security (left wing insurgency)?

As the more responsible constituent of India's coalition government, the burden of making policy decisions with far-reaching consequences, rests squarely on the Congress-I. This is even more the case when it is not Nepal's, but rather India's national security that the South Block is gambling with today.

Update #2: Do not underestimate Maoist Machiavellianism. Like any organized group, the Maoists are adept at using and discarding actors as they see fit. As events have shown, they have been exceptionally successful in Nepal. The Maoists' goal remains the establishment of a communist republic and to this end, they will not hesitate to break alliances or form new ones that best serve their strategic goals at any given point in time. India is on the Maoists' MFN (Most Favoured Nation) list today, but this will change as constituent assembly elections get closer.

If the Indians think the king was bad for business, they're in for a much bigger shock. The prevailing thought might be that having hosted, trained and equipped Nepal’s Maoists for over a decade, that taming this radical outfit will not pose significant challenges.

If this is so, it's time for Indian policy makers to think again. Part of the process of introspection should be a heart-to-heart session with Indian intelligence assets. The following questions would be both timely and relevant: "Given the conditions today, what is the likelihood that the Nepali Maoists will grab power in Nepal? And should this outcome occur, what leverage will India be in a position to exercise over the Maoists?"

If the answers to the questions above are "very likely" (or "likely") and "India could enforce an economic embargo", the Chief of intelligence should be fired, on the spot. Types of coercion (whether they are of the economic or military variety) may be toyed with as ideas, but cannot be applied without paying extraordinarily counterproductive costs. In Nepal's case, the cost would be manifested as a sharp rise in anti-Indian radicalism.

Once the king is gone, the Maoists will be in search of another diversion upon which to focus mass discontent. Their most likely candidate for such a focus will be radical nationalism. The consequences of such a transition would be catastrophic given the large Nepali population that already resides in India and the inert resentment that many Nepalese harbour against long-standing, regional Indian policies.

When the time comes (and come it will), India will quickly lose its MFN status with Nepal’s Maoists. The most favoured status at that time, will conveniently be reallocated to members of COCOMPOSA and RIM, and the objective of a CRZ in South Asia will be aggressively pursued (with Nepal as a launching pad).

Update #3: Stop hiding behind the Americans’ coat tails and start looking for REAL policy alternatives. Reliance on traditional levers in today’s day and age is foolish. Support the people of Nepal and a mutually beneficial, democratic future will result. Abandon Nepal to the clutches of a failed ideology and India too will pay dearly.

A decade into the future, historians are unlikely to recall the magnanimous change in Indian foreign policy that nurtured "people power" in Nepal and paved the way to a new and peaceful era. Rather, historians are much more likely to condemn the unrealistic and failed policies that the Congress-I served, that ultimately ignited leftwing radicalism and destabilized the entire sub-continent.

India’s political elite must urgently reconcile the differences between what they are preaching for public consumption and what they know to be taking place in Nepal. Horse trading policy on Nepal (under the illusion of supporting the will of the Nepalese people) is a façade that could lose its credibility as early as June 2007.

Should the Maoists bulldoze through constituent assembly elections in mid-2007, the peoples’ desire (i.e. the desire of a segment of formerly armed, poorly educated Nepalis, well-versed in the art of terror) is certain to collide with the Indian nation’s security prerogative. Then what? Will the Indian military be ready to invade Nepal? Will intelligence gathered by retired Indian Gurkhas be sufficient to fight a war (that in all likelihood) will engulf India from within? Will India take lessons learned from Bhutan and send a million Nepalese north of its border?

India’s elite need to engage in some hard thinking. Whether the current coalition lasts beyond the next two years is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the creation of a one-party, communist state to India’s north will transcend into the foreseeable future. The mistakes this Indian coalition government has committed, will have consequences for the next 3-4 governments that hold office in India.

Indian policy makers would do well to appreciate that 2007 is not 1990. This is a point that Indian leaders indirectly acknowledged when for example, several prominent Nepalese had called for economic sanctions against their own country, during the post-Feb.-1 period.

Examples of logic used at that time included the international community not "paying" for the king's rule (i.e. the argument that foreign aid should be cut) or that an immediate Indian economic blockade was required to "choke" the king into submission (i.e. references to the successful 1990 Indian blockade against Nepal after which the 1950 treaty was never seriously revised).

The thought process Indian leaders adopted in rejecting the notion of economic sanctions (against Nepal) was indeed a praiseworthy one; it worked well then and it applies equally now - under no circumstances should the general Nepali public be made to pay the price for Maoist aggression.

Instead, a range of alternative levers must be envisioned, that may be used to contain the radical growth of Maoist extremism in South Asia. Using the American Ambassador James Moriarty to clean up after failed Indian policy doesn't count. Indian policy requires immediate recalibration and India's leaders must act in the best interest of her own security and sovereignty, immediately.

The Indian nation in 2007 has all the ingredients necessary for radical leftists to exploit - an ever widening income gap, religious and ethnic tensions, a shaky coalition with a major communist faction. And if India doesn't get its act straight immediately, it will have a communist republic to its north, to add to its current list of potential destabilizers.

The writing is on the wall and it says India's failure to change its Nepal policy is guaranteed to invite turmoil and anarchy to South Asia.

The Idiot’s Guide to the Maoist Playbook

(Courtesy: Comrade Zorro)

The eyes have it. The interim constitution has no mechanism to remove the Prime Minister. Article 38, sub article 7 states that the Prime Minister shall be relieved of his office only under the following circumstances:

• If his/her resignation submitted to Speaker in writing;
• If he/she ceases to be a member of the Legislature;
• If he/she dies.

Article 36(5b) of the earlier Constitution has been removed.

Further, Article 38 (10) runs as follows:

• If Prime Minister dies, Deputy Prime Minister or Senior Minister shall carry out the duties of the Prime Minister until a new Prime Minister is appointed.

Given any of the circumstances above, the timeframe under which a new Prime Minister would be appointed is not stated in the constitution.

Anyone with half a brain can do the math: Probability that Girija will die – certain. Probability that after his death, the Maoist DPM will take the post of Prime Minister – certain. Probability that the communist majority in the interim stature will do everything possible to ensure that a new Prime Minister is immediately put in place – highly unlikely (unless comrade Baburam or comrade Pushpa are "requested" by the leftist majority in parliament to step in as caretaker PM). Probability that the Maoists (with their leftist front) will continue to consolidate their power-base by using state resources – absolutely certain.

As the term “conspiracy” is applied to any event that does not favor the Maoist rise to power, an alternative set of terms must be applied to describe the certainty of events to follow: “cunning” Maoist maneuvering and democratic political “paralysis” would seem appropriate.

Wishful mainstream thinking and ruthlessly calibrated Maoist tactics make a potent combination: a virtual "death wish" for those lost in hope, to be executed by those absorbed in rapid maneuvering.

The Maoists have an entire line-up of tactical steps, specifically designed to achieve their goal of a one-party, communist state. These include the following:

• Maintenance of public fury against the king, knowing fully well that the king is a spent force. The Maoists continue to uphold public fixation on the royal issue in order to keep the “mob” busy and to keep the political parties incapacitated. The notion of a wide political alliance (SPAM) to rid Nepal of its institution of monarchy are forwarded as a necessary and required condition - even to guarantee constituent assembly elections by the June 2007 timeframe. The reality however, is that continued fixation on the king (which diverts public and political will from the reality of Maoist manipulation) guarantees only one outcome – Maoist victory at the constituent assembly polls.

• Idea of a Domestic Leftist Coalition, to assuage the UML’s leadership, so that any hint of a division amongst the broader leftists ranks becomes inconceivable. Given the reality that grass roots UML cadre have mostly migrated to the Maoist ranks already, the only purpose of the idea of a united leftist front is to keep the interim parliament paralyzed (since there’s a leftist majority) and to string along the UML leadership, with the attractive idea that some power-sharing in the post-CA world, may be possible should an alliance of like-minded leftists be forged today. Although the formation of such an alliance in the present situation is almost a given, the maintenance of the alliance after Maoist victory at the CA polls is inconceivable. Yet again, the Maoists will have used what they need, when they need it, as a tactical pillar in support of their long-term strategy of a communist republic.

• Anti-Indian nationalism, is soon to become the Maoists’ greatest ally. The induction of known hardcore anti-Indians like retired Army General Phudung into Maoist ranks, forecasts the evolution in the Maoists’ tactical thinking. For the time being, Indian sponsorship of political changes in Nepal is coveted by the Maoists. But this sponsorship is conditional and is premised on the conduct of free and fair polls (and perhaps deals based on non-recourse debt, at favorable prices to Indian IPPs). These are both items that run contrary to larger Maoist goals that have galvanized their powerbase in Nepal. As time passes and the Maoists become more politically entrenched, sympathy and warm feelings toward New Delhi will be replaced by radical anti-Indian sentiment (that of course, will be termed as part of the larger “anti-peace conspiracy”). The Maoists will then position themselves as the only political entity in Nepal, with the capacity to keep such sentiments from getting out of hand – making the Indian government further beholden to them while simultaneously assuring members of CCOMPOSA and RIM that the Nepali Maoists remain true to the agenda of communist ideals and committed to the realization of the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ).

• Dismember Nepal’s State Military from within: This is a no-brainer. With the Maoists now occupying seats in Parliament, the Nepalese Army will take center stage as a candidate for destruction from within. Sympathetic elements within the Army (based on ethnic and caste allegiances) will be leveraged to the fullest by the Maoists. Others will be led down a path of perpetual frustration using seats in the interim parliament as tools. Promotions will be denied, unrest will be fuelled and existing divisions (along multiple dimensions) will be highlighted to destroy the fraternal fabric that sustains the military. The goal will be to integrate Maoist terrorists-turned-fighters into the ranks of the Army, thereby cultivating an asset to be deployed, when time for a political check mate arrives.

Both the American and Indian Ambassadors have stated that the new interim government should be formed only after the process of arms management is complete and this is the widespread, unspoken sentiment shared by members of Nepal’s beleaguered political parties as well. But as the choice of words illustrates, arms management is a PROCESS, processes take time, and to be precise, the collection and inventorying of weapons is only part of the larger process (of managing arms) - not the process in and of itself.

Collected inventories will have to be compared against government manifests of weapons that were stolen. Particularly, more modern weapons will have to be accounted for and discrepancies between what has been documented as stolen versus what was collected, need to be released for public consumption. Furthermore, an acceptable rate of error has to be arrived at for the arms management process to have the credibility necessary to instill public confidence.

Such will not be the case because all concerned parties are convinced in the required trade off between completeness and accuracy (which are ideal and desired attributes), versus expediency and momentum (which are desired above all, by the Maoists). The UN run arms management process will yield a sub-optimal solution (certainly better than nothing at all) but nonetheless, it remains to be seen, to what degree a war weary and desperate populous, will care (if at all) whether Maoist arms are fully managed.

More urgent in the general Nepali psyche is the need to get on with life, to make a living and to prosper. All of these elements remain contingent on the expediency of the peace process, and not surprisingly, reliant on the Maoists’ willingness to do what is necessary to maintain the peace. From a strategic standpoint, the Maoists couldn’t be better positioned and the political parties couldn’t be positioned better to lose.

With the Maoists now in power, they are more likely than ever to flex their newly acquired “rights” using the same tactics that were used by the former Foreign Minister who made it a point to publicly reprimand any emissary that spoke against the lack of democracy in Nepal, but behind the scenes, often went out of his way to please the same dignitaries. The German and Russian dignitaries in Nepal have expressed much enthusiasm while the American, British and Indian emissaries have expressed guarded optimism. (The last time the Germans and Russians were united, Hitler attacked Poland and ignited World War-II).

The diplomatic community and rational minded individuals in Nepal, have no choice but to go along with the Maoist charade because the Maoists are now in the interim government and are part of Nepal’s legal political structure.

Brutal suppression of political opposition for over a decade, using terror tactics and fear-enforced politics has yielded Nepal’s Maoists a position that those who have employed democratic norms and principles their entire lives, have failed to attain.

Not surprisingly, those on the bandwagon who believed that the Maoists had had a change of heart in favor of multiparty politics remain in shock at the pace of political transformations in Nepal. That the Maoists are defining the mainstream (as opposed to joining it) may have finally occurred to the most intelligent of Nepal’s intellectuals. If centrist intellectuals continue to ignore Baburam and Pushpa Dahal's allusions to the inadequacy of a multiparty framework for Nepal's needs, these pundits do so at their own peril.

In hindsight, the rabid anti-monarchy activism (that Nepal’s intellectuals displayed) as having facilitated the Maoists’ strategy, is a realization many will find difficult to come to terms with. It will be even more difficult to admit (for some of Nepal’s most conceited and elitist individuals), that yes, the king’s act was foolish but their response served only to exponentially compounded this foolishness, to the utter glee and satisfaction of Nepal's homegrown killers.

Not surprisingly, the unwillingness to admit mistakes, compromise and modify positions in response to the shifting political tide, is another dimension of Nepal's polity that the Maoists will leverage to consolidate power.

First the king, then the UML, then the Nepali Congress and last but not least, India, are all in for a big surprise. Yet, neither the UML, nor the Nepali Congress, nor India wants to beleive that the Maoists are capable of delivering a "killer" political knock out.

Rest assured, the final round is upon us and the odds are tilted disproportionately in the Maoists' favor.

So, “this is how liberty (what little Nepalis had earned) dies… in the midst of thunderous applause….”

Surreal Politics - How Nepal’s Intellectual / Political Class, Continue to Look the Other Way…

(Courtesy: Nacho Libre)

It was decided by the SPA and Maoists, (affectionately referred to as the coalition of 8 parties and also by the metaphorical acronym “SPAM”), that Subash Nembang and Chitralekha Yadav will continue to be the Speaker and Deputy Speaker respectively, of the new interim legislature. The next Deputy Prime Minister is expected to be a Maoist candidate. Given the ill health of the incumbent (Girija baboon), it is only a matter of time before the Deputy PM (whoever this turns out to be), will be the post-Girija Prime Minister of Nepal.

With Girija’s death, one extended era of political malfeasance (under the pretense of democracy) will end and another of anarchy (under the disguise of freedom) will begin. The war that Girija and his clansmen ignited in the early nineties has culminated after a decade and a half with Girija and his same clansmen now playing the role of the “peace loving,” democratic party that is prepared to go to any length to bring peace to Nepal.

There was no talk of peace when Girija first acknowledged the emergence of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. At that time, there was only talk of a terrorist group that needed to be eliminated. Today, we find a situation where there is no talk of the systematic terror that the Maoists consistently used to rise to their power. Instead, there is only talk of the years of tranquility, stability and economic growth ahead (now that the Maoists have finally made peace their own primary agenda - peace of the Maoists' terms).

Given this trend of forgetfulness, half a decade down the road, it is likely that Nepalese will find themselves speaking less about the peace that the Maoists made and more about how things could have gotten so out of hand, so quick? For the Nepalese population suffers from endemic short-term memory (short-sightedness), the corollary of which is a complete lack of appreciation for strategy, in general.

Nepalese find themselves so immersed in the present, so bitter about the recent past and so marred by multiple layers of feudal, ethnic, class-based agony, they have completely lost appreciation for the manipulative intent of their current “masters” or the lackluster performance of the same political elite who are being “rewarded” by renewed tenures in office.

Why else would Nepalese welcome mass murderers like Baburam and Pushpa into their government with open arms? What other rationale is there to account for the sycophants that follow Girija around like leaches sucking on the “power-teet,” (while fully aware of the ultra-feudal and nepotistic characteristics that Girija as an individual, epitomizes).

Thank goodness some Nepalese had the sense and courage to quash the idea of nominating Girija for a Nobel Peace Prize – that would have been a collective insult to every living, breathing and thinking Nepali. Even an ounce more of debate on the issue would have been sacrilege to the souls of thousands of Nepalis who either died or were maimed during the course of the insurgency. Continued debate would have simply added insult to injury: The dead are gone and life for the maimed will never be the same while those guilty of engineering mass murder, get to participate in Nepal’s interim legislature.

Even the price for peace can be valued and when the price approximates forgetfulness over of forgiveness, it becomes too high to incur. All in the name of peace is what the disillusioned class would have us believe. Nothing could be more inaccurate.

Insurgent/military combat may have ceased. But the fight goes on. Those who had the luxury of three degrees of separation from the decade-long conflict are free to speak their minds in way of academic discourse. Those who did not enjoy such luxuries are not as likely to forget either the Maoist terror or the state’s brutal response.

It is quite easy for consultants on "peace dividend salaries" to preach conflict resolution, reconciliation and truth. It is not as easy for those who have suffered, to comply. Even the king as a symbol of everything that is wrong in Nepal, is an insufficient distraction when the “killer of my brother is a sitting member of parliament."

Machu Picchuree - A Tale of 2 Fishes

(Courtesy: el Mariachi)

Did you read that Nepal Airlines used a picture of Machu Picchu, the famous Inca ruin in Peru, to promote the airline and tourism in Nepal? The Palace must have actually encouraged dropping the “R” in RNAC.

Don’t we have Mount Everest and hundreds of other peaks right here in our back yard? Its not like its HARD to get a picture of a mountain in Nepal. You can’t help but take a picture without a home-grown Himalayan mountain getting in the way.

How did the whole thing happen? Did the peon assigned by the RNAC PR guy accidentally stumble into the Peruvian guy’s house who moonlights as a salsa instructor in Babar Mahal Revisited but has a day job as a photographer? Did the Peruvian salsa instructor simply give the peon a picture of Macha Picchu because those Peruvians just love a good practical joke?

Uh, oh, I feel a high-level commission coming.

And has anyone read what Incas did to their prisoners? They would make Puspa “Chunkmuffin” Dahal and Baburam “Hatchet Face” Bhattarai look like saints. Speaking of which I have to ask: Is shampoo against Maoist doctrine? With their greasy hair and faces, shouldn’t we give the Maoists the Oil Portfolio and have them help the Nepal Oil Corporation get out of debt?

The Machu Picchu incident has to be Exhibit number 80 on why you need to privatize that airline.

Brace yourself for we had the Shahs give us the “Zone of Peace” and now we get the Maoist version of whacky foreign policy, drum rooolll please - Panchsheel (so that’s what Gajurel was doing in jail). Apparently, the whole policy is now comprised of two sentences repeated over and over again – “We hate Moriarty. If it wasn’t for him, we’d have a republic.”

Have you noticed that our high-minded media and activists have replaced the word “democracy” and “republic” by “gadatantra” and “loktantra” – even when they are writing in English (oh dear, democracy is soooooo Janaandolan I and its so boringly Western.).

What I don’t understand is why Ambassador Moriarty gets a bad rap when all he’s done is think straight. The reason just may be that Americans (brace yourself now) actually don’t go around and crush someone that bad mouths them. Call it my nah, nah, nah, ne nah nah theory of anti-Americanism.

Remember when our parliament wanted to pass a resolution condemning the Thai coup? Next thing you know, there’s a letter from the Ambassador from Thailand threatening to take some heads off with no questions asked. You don’t hear any comments from the Maoists, our media and “activists” railing on the Chinese do you? The Russians? No high-falutin morality on Tibet or commentary on rollbacks on democracy by Putin?

Why? Because they might just get an answer that might prevent them from attending the French Ambassador’s next cocktail party.